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Abstract 
The Korean steel industry has developed remarkably since it turned to modem steel-
making in the early 1970s with the establishment of the nation's only integrated large-
scale steel company, POSCO. This study explores major factors that contributed to the 
development of, and the evolution of intemational competitiveness in, the Korean steel 
industry. The conceptual approach employed here is based on the model of dynamic 
comparative advantage in a developing country. This model suggests that shifts in 
supply-side conditions are the main cause of changing comparative advantage. This 
model is subsequently extended to incorporate the effects of domestic demand, 
government intervention and industrial policy, and an industry's or firm's capability to 
absorb imported technology. A major interest in this study is to examine and assemble a 
large amount of data and evidence, including a detailed case study of POSCO, on the 
effects of these factors on the growth of the Korean steel industry. 
Examination of supply-side issues shows that the dynamics of comparative 
advantage in the Korean steel industry were closely associated with rapid economic 
growth and industrialisation relative to the rest of the world. Even though many argued 
that establishment of a large-scale integrated steel mill in Korea in the early 1970s was a 
poor option in light of static comparative advantage considerations, the growth of the 
steel industry seems to have accorded well with Korea's changing structure of 
comparative advantage and the intemational product cycle of steel-making in the longer 
run. The analysis shows also that steel industry competitiveness in Korea had its origins 
in a comparative production cost advantage, stemming mostly from its relatively cheap 
and abundant supply of skilled labour. 
On the demand side, it is shown that both the size and growth rates of steel 
consumption and the intensity of steel use in Korea were among the highest achieved in 
developing countries and that, with a few exceptions, achievement of a strong 
comparative advantage in steel was also associated with high levels of steel consumption 
in the domestic economy. While rapidly increasing domestic steel demand has had a 
direct negative effect in the short mn on Korea's trade performance in steel, it ultimately 
has contributed to the improvement of the trade performance of the Korean steel industry 
over the longer term. 
Analysis of the significance of industrial policy and the role played by the 
govemment in establishing and promoting modem steel-making in Korea shows that the 
financial policy of directing available capital to designated industries and firms was a 
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principal agent in industry promotion. It is argued that the role of government in the 
establishment of POSCO can be understood as an attempt to transform the industry into a 
modem steel-making industry by overcoming problems in capital markets. It is also 
shown that the extensive government measures undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s 
provided the steel industry, especially POSCO, with various development incentives, 
even though it is not so readily apparent whether there were net costs or benefits for the 
entire economy and whether the industry's development would have been promoted more 
efficiently under a different policy regime. Gradual removal of protection and assistance 
for the steel industry from the early 1980s, as it was seen to have moved out the infant 
industry stage, is also identified as an important part of its development. 
In an attempt to explore the issue of how the Korean steel industry obtained 
international competitiveness from an inefficient and non-competitive base, the case of 
POSCO is examined. Even though POSCO had to rely almost entirely on foreign 
sources of technology and capital to install its integrated production system, its long-run 
competitiveness was founded on effective technology transfer practices. POSCO built 
plant when new construction work was at low levels worldwide, and so was able to 
purchase relatively new technologies and attract low cost finance. Even more important 
was its low construction costs, due to its achievement of short construction times and low 
labour costs, which were much lower than elsewhere in the world. POSCO's efforts and 
ability not only to install plant effectively but also to obtain an international level of 
technological capability through rapid and successful learning of know-how and 
accumulation of experience are identified as the most crucial firm-specific factors in 
creating and strengthening international competitiveness. 
A key conclusion is that the establishment of fully integrated steel-making capacity 
in Korea in the 1970s clearly accorded with underlying changes in Korea's comparative 
advantage. The advantage of relatively low wages was magnified by other factors such 
as rapidly growing domestic demand, which allowed large increments to steel-making 
capacity, the role of government in the establishment of modem steel-making by 
overcoming market failure problems at the early stage of development, and rapidly 
accumulating workforce skills and technological capability. The argument also has 
several implications for prospects and policy strategies for future development of the 
Korean steel industry. As cost competitiveness has been gradually eroded, the central 
economic issue for the future of the industry is its capacity to upgrade so that domestic 
firms acquire the capability to innovate and advance product and process technology, and 
achieve technology-based advantage and higher productivity. 
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1 The Issues 
Since the first energy crisis in 1974, steel producers in advanced industrial countries in 
Western Europe and North America have come under pressure as a result not only of 
stagnant steel consumption and over-capacity in home markets but also because of the 
emergence of new large-scale steel-makers in some developing countries.^ The steel 
industry in developed countries suffered a prolonged structural crisis for more than a 
decade after the first oil shock. Table 1.1 shows clearly that not only total production 
and trade surplus but also average per capita consumption of steel in developed 
countries had fallen throughout the 1980s. Even though the world steel industry is still 
dominated by a group of developed countries in terms of production, consumption and 
trade volumes as well as technology levels, the industry is now considered as a 
declining one in developed countries. By contrast, developing countries have 
constituted an increasingly important source of growth in both world production and 
consumption of steel since the early 1970s. Among the most rapidly growing steel 
producers was Korea.^ 
During the 1960s, several developing countries made serious efforts to expand 
their production capacity but, by the late 1960s or early 1970s, they produced only 
around 50 million tonnes of crude steel annually, which was less than 10 per cent of the 
world total, and were unable to satisfy their domestic steel needs (see Table 1.1).^ From 
the early 1970s, however, an extraordinary burst of steel-making capacity expansion 
took place throughout the developing world. By 1990, the volume of developing 
country crude steel production reached 193.4 million tonnes, more than 3.5 times the 
level in 1971. This capacity expansion was concentrated in only a handful of 
developing countries, not many of which were able to establish an internationally 
competitive industry and become net exporters of steel products. 
Korea has established what some observers regard as the most competitive steel 
industry in the world in a relatively short period of time, an achievement which has 
1. In this thesis, 'steel' is confined to ordinary carbon steel as contrasted to specialty steel, unless 
otherwise specified. For the most part, this thesis does not address the specialty steel industry, a 
subject which is worthy of separate research. 
2. Throughout this thesis, the Republic of Korea (or South Korea) will be referred to as Korea for 
brevity, unless otherwise specified. 
3. In this thesis, 'tonne (tonnes)' refers to metric ton (tons). 
Table 1.1 Steel consumption, production and net trade in selected countries, 
1971,1980 and 1990 (million tonnes) 
Consumption Production Net Trade 
71 80" 90'' 71 80 90 71 80"^  90"^  
Korea 1.5 (55) 7.5 (193) 217 (506) 0.5 8.6 23.1 -0.5 2.3 3.5 
Taiwan 1.1 (76) 5.6 (307) 15.4 (755) 0.5 3.4 9.7 -0.3 -1.6 -3.9 
Hong Kong 0.7 (162) 2.0 (392) 2.3 (406) 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.5 -1.5 -0.9 
Singapore 0.9 (446) 1.8 (738) 3.5(1,151) 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.6 -1.2 -2.1 
China 24.0 (32) 43.0 (44) 68.8 (60) 21.0 37.1 66.3 -3.0 -4.6 -1.9 
India 7.7 (14) 117 (17) 217 (26) 6.1 9.5 11.5 -0.9 -1.8 -1.8 
Brazil 7.4 (77) 14.3 (118) 10.2 (68) 6.0 15.3 20.6 -0.9 0.8 8.8 
Mexico 4.1 (80) 10.3 (149) 8.3 (96) 3.8 7.2 8.7 0.2 -0.9 0.4 
Developing 79.5 (-) 160.6 (49) 224.5 (55) 52.6 111.0 193.4 -20.1 -39.3 -20.7 
W. Europe 136.1 (-) 132.4 (386) 143.1 (393) 151.1 158.8 153.4 11.3 17.5 9.9 
US 127.7 (617) 114.0 (501) 102.5 (410) 109.3 101.5 81.0 -137 -10.4 117 
Japan 57.7 (551) 79.0 (676) 99.0 (802) 88.6 111.4 110.3 23.2 28.5 9.5 
Developed 340.9 (-) 352.8 (465) 361.5 (449) 366.9 395.3 372.2 187 38.5 10.2 
World total 5787 (-) 722.6 (163) 783.1 (149) 582.6 715.6 769.2 
Notes Consumption (kilograms per head in parentheses) and production in crude steel equivalents. 
Net trade in finished and semi-finish^ steel products, including intra-regional trade. 
stands for "not available". 
Throughout this thesis, US refers to the United States, unless otherwise specified. 
Developing: Asia (except Japan), Middle East, Africa and Latin America. 
W. Europe: 18 countries in Western Europe including Yugoslavia 
Developed: Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
a 1981 figures for Korea and Taiwan. 1988 figure for Hong Kong. 
c 1982 figure for Mexico. d 1989 figure for Korea. 
Sources International Iron and Steel Institute (IISl), Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
drawn a great deal of attention from industrial analysts, researchers and policy-makers, 
as well as from the general public. 
The Korean steel industry has developed remarkably since it turned to modem 
steel-making in the early 1970s with the establishment of the state-run Pohang Iron and 
Steel Co. Ltd (POSCO). During the 1970s and the 1980s, Korea experienced the fastest 
growth in steel production in the world. Korea's annual crude steel production before 
1970 was less than 0.5 million tonnes per annum. As is clear from Table 1.1, 
production increased at an average of over 30 per cent per annum during the 1970s and 
reached a volume of 8.6 million tonnes (or 1.0 per cent of world output) in 1980. In 
1990, Korea produced 23.1 million tonnes of crude steel (or 3.0 per cent of total world 
production) and ranked as the seventh largest steel producing country in the world and 
the second among developing countries after China (see Table 1.1). This fast growth of 
steel production in Korea mainly resulted from the very competitive operation of 
POSCO, the nation's only integrated mill, which has accounted for more than 60 per 
cent of the nation's total steel production since it commenced operation. Since 1989, 
POSCO has been the third largest steel-making company in the world, producing about 
16-19 million tonnes of crude steel per annum (Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel 
Statistical Yearbook, 1992). 
The country's rapid economic growth and industrialisation saw Korea's steel 
consumption increase substantially, from a mere 1.5 million tonnes in 1971 to 7.5 
million tonnes in 1981, and to 21.7 million tonnes in 1990, the highest rate among 
developing countries. Of these countries, Korea, along with India, is now the second 
largest steel consumer after China. Steel consumption in developing countries has 
undergone a steady and continuous increase, but the level of per capita steel 
consumption is still very low in most developing countries. As shown in Table 1.1, 
only the newly industrialising countries (NICs) in East Asia experienced rapid growth 
rates and high levels of per capita steel consumption. Korea's level of per capita 
consumption until the early 1980s was quite low relative to levels in other East Asian 
NICs, though it increased quickly, reaching a volume of more than 500 kilograms in 
1990. This was almost 10 times as much as in 1970 and close to the highest level of per 
capita steel consumption attained in most developed countries. 
Korea has made remarkable progress in steel trade also, rapidly replacing foreign 
products both in domestic and international markets. Among the major steel-making 
developing countries which were all net importers until the late 1970s, only a few have 
emerged as net exporters: namely Korea and Brazil and, to a much lesser extent and 
more recently, Mexico and Turkey. Korea's steel exports grew very rapidly from the 
mid-1970s following the expansion of POSCO, while steel imports also increased due 
to rising domestic demand for various steel products. Korea became a net steel exporter 
in 1979 with around a 0.5 million tonne trade surplus in finished and semi-fmished 
steel. Since then, the country has maintained its position as the second largest net steel 
exporter among the developing countries after Brazil, accounting for between 2.5 and 
3.5 million tonnes. As of 1990, Korea was the world's seventh largest steel exporter 
(nSI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1991). 
The rapid growth of Korea's importance in world steel production, consumption 
and trade reflects evolving international competitiveness in the Korean steel industry. 
Industry development and the evolution of international competitiveness are influenced 
by many forces, and the Korean steel industry provides an interesting case study for 
examination of these forces in a developing country. But few attempts have been made 
to analyse closely what may be regarded as one of the most astounding achievements in 
modem steel industry history. 
This study explores the major forces contributing to the development of, and the 
evolution of international competitiveness in, the Korean steel industry and examines 
their influence on, and implications for, industry development more generally. It 
reviews the nature and pattern of steel industry development in Korea, and examines 
changes in the industry's performance such as productivity, production cost and 
technology levels compared with those in other international steel-makers, in an effort 
to evaluate the various dimensions of international competitiveness and its sources. 
ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN STEEL INDUSTRY 
The rapid growth of Korea's steel industry and its international competitiveness raises 
four important issues related to international trade theory and the theory of the firm. 
The first issue is 'the relationship between economic growth and the evolution of 
comparative advantage in steel'. This suggests that changes in supply-side conditions 
in a developing country resulting from rapid economic growth and industrialisation 
relative to other countries constitute the minimum necessary condition of, and also 
exert the foremost influence on, development of a new industry in the country. 
The second issue is 'the way in which domestic demand influences industry 
development and competitiveness'. The influence of domestic demand was explored in 
Linder's (1961) representative demand hypothesis. In addition to supply-side changes, 
increases in domestic demand for various steel products to a reasonable size associated 
with industrialisation are seen to be another important force in the development of the 
steel industry and hence increasing international competitiveness. 
The third issue is 'the role of government and industrial policy', where the infant 
industry argument and the existence of market failure are an important question. As 
Howell et al. (1988) argue, strong government intervention in the steel industry has 
historically been the rule rather than the exception, even in most developed countries. 
This is an important non-market factor influencing industry growth and international 
competitiveness. 
The fourth and final issue in this study is 'technology transfer and technological 
capability of a firm or an industry'. It can be argued that, even if the forces defined 
above provide a favourable environment for industry development, the most crucial 
factor for a new industry in a developing country in the creation and strengthening of 
international competitiveness is how individual firms, which may initially have to rely 
on imports of foreign technology, obtain competitive technological levels. 
Economic growth and evolution of comparative advantage in steel 
Over tiie last three decades, Korea along with the other East Asian NICs achieved very 
high gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates and rapid industrialisation in 
Table 12 Estimated average growth rates of GDP and GDP per capita in real terms, 
selected countries, 1960-90 (percent) 
1960-70 1970-90 1960-90 
Korea 8.22 (5.78) 8 .28 (6.79) 8 .62 (6.80) 
Taiwan" 9.53 (6.49) 8.07 (6.33) 8.88 (6.70) 
Hong Kong 8.59 (6.12) 8.16 (6.03) 8.22 (6.14) 
Singapore 7.98 (5.66) 7 .28 (5.98) 8.28 (6.69) 
Brazil 5.46 (2.69) 4 .75 (2.48) 6.13 (3.72) 
Mexico 7.09 (3.82) 4.11 (1.63) 5.37 (2.54) 
Developing countries'' 6.08 (3.66) 4.61 (2.49) 5.36 (3.09) 
in Asia 5.19 (2.85) 6.16 (4.24) 5.99 (3.85) 
in Latin America 5.78 (2.92) 3 .84 (1.48) 5.06 (2.52) 
Developed countries 5.09 (4.03) 2.71 (1.96) 3.46 (2.61) 
Notes The average growth rates were estimated by regressing natural logarithms of GDP (in constant 
US dollars) on a time trend. GDP per capita growth rates are in parentheses. 
For the real GDP f i ^ e s of each country, see Appendix Table A.l. 
a Data for Taiwan is up to 1988. 
b Asia excludes the Middle East. 
Sources International Economic Data Bank, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University (lEDB, RSPacS, ANU): compiled from World Bank, World Tables. 
developing several manufacturing sectors. This is viewed as one of the most 
remarkable features of modem economic history (Linder, 1985). Rapid income growth 
and industrialisation suggests that there have been substantial changes in the supply 
side conditions, such as the relative abundance of capital and labour, and hence the 
structure of the Korean economy's comparative advantage. Steel is one of the product 
groups which have been increasingly important in Korea throughout the 1970s and the 
1980s with respect to production and exports. The main forces fostering the steel 
industry in a developing country where modern steel-making is considered to be 
relatively capital intensive stem primarily from rapid economic growth relative to the 
rest of the world, which represents changes in supply-side conditions of the economy, 
and a shift in comparative advantage structure. 
Korea, having almost no industrial capacity at the end of the Second World War 
like many other developing countries, achieved considerable industrial growth during 
the last three decades and was one of the world's most rapidly growing economies. Its 
growth rate in the period 1960-89 was 8.6 per cent per annum on average, the world's 
second highest after Taiwan; 8.2 per cent in the period 1960-70; and 8.3 per cent in the 
period 1970-89, which was the highest in the world for the period (Table 1.2). 
Rapid economic growth during the 1960s initially brought about remarkable shifts 
in Korea's share of world exports in labour-intensive products such as textiles, clothing 
and footwear.'* As rapid income growth and industrialisation continued throughout the 
4. See Drysdale (1988, ch. 6), and Anderson et al. (1985). For the particular cases of textiles and 
1970s and the 1980s, Korea underwent a transformation, moving its national resources 
out of traditional labour-intensive light industries into more complex and capital-
intensive heavy and chemical sectors and thus changing the nation's comparative 
advantage structure. The very high population density and the rapidly accumulating per 
capita capital stock in this period indicate larger endowments of capital, in particular, 
human capital or skilled labour. This led Korea to growing comparative advantage in 
some (human) capital-intensive products and increasing shares of these commodities in 
production and exports. In the 1970s and 1980s, Korea increased international 
competitiveness rapidly in steel, shipbuilding, electrical appliances and automobiles. 
This pattern of economic development in Korea suggests that rapidly increasing 
capital-labour ratios in Korea relative to other countries would provide Korea with 
larger endowments of capital per head and hence an opportunity to operate the steel 
industry on a competitive level in the 1970s and 1980s, the steel industry being more 
capital-intensive than the light industries in which Korea obtained comparative 
advantages during the 1960s. As implied by the theory of (dynamic) comparative 
advantage, accumulation of capital per head to a level that can support a comparative 
advantage in steel, ceteris paribus, is a necessary condition for international 
competitiveness in steel without seriously distorting the nation's welfare and allocation 
of resources. This study places great importance on close examination of the 
relationship between economic growth and development of the steel industry, by asking 
whetiier the argument is supported by Korea's experience and whether the relationship 
between economic growth and steel industry development in Korea is different from 
that in the major steel-making developed countries. 
Influences of growing and sizeable domestic demand 
Industrialisation and rapidly increasing per capita income in Korea have brought about 
shifts in the demand structure as well. Diversification of the economy towards the 
heavy and chemical industries throughout the 1970s and the 1980s created increasing 
demand, particularly for various intermediate inputs, capital goods and industrial raw 
materials. Accordingly, Korea's consumption and imports have shown a significant 
increase in the shares of capital and technology-intensive goods and mineral resource-
based products (Drysdale, 1988; and Tyers and Phillips, 1984).^ Steel as a crucial 
intermediate input to industrialisation was a prime example. As shown in Tables 1.1 
clothing products, see Anderson and Park (1988) and Park (1988). 
5. Differing industrial structures among the NICs also resulted in varying demand patterns. As noted in 
Dr>'sdale (1988, p. 121), for example, imports of natural resources in Hong Kong and Singapore, 
which specialise relatively more in tradable service sectors, are concentrated on foodstuffs. In 
contrast, natural resources imports in Korea and Taiwan are concentrated more on industrial raw 
materials. 
and 1.2, Korea 's economic growth has been coupled with a strong increase in 
consumption of steel products, not only as final goods used in construction of 
infrastructure, buildings and industrial facilities but also as basic and principal 
intermediate inputs to a wide range of industries. 
While increasing domestic demand for various steel products initially led to 
mcreasing shares of imports of the products, it may in turn have reinforced Korea's 
changing pattern of production and specialisation in steel. The assured domestic 
demand may have contributed also to evolving competitiveness in production by 
allowing economies of scale to be captured, on the one hand, and by providing 
enhanced market opportunities which stimulate domestic or foreign investment in the 
industry, on the other. For the steel industry, which requires large investment and 
returns over the longer run, development without significant domestic demand or secure 
export market access for processed products may be risky, even in the presence of 
abundant supply-side factors.^ 
These considerations raise the second analytic point in this study, namely that the 
sizeable and increasing domestic demand for steel in Korea exerted a strong influence 
on the development of the industry and hence in creating and strengthening its 
international competitiveness. This could be supported by the fact that, as shown in 
Table 1.1, rapid production increases and considerable surpluses in steel trade in Korea 
have been accompanied by increasing and sizeable steel consumption not only in total 
but also per head. Total steel consumption in major steel-making Asian developing 
countries was also of a reasonable size, even though not all of these countries had high 
levels of per capita consumption. 
The existence of sizeable domestic demand does not always seem necessary to 
industry development. In fact, Korea's exports in many manufactures - for example, 
televisions, textiles and shipbuilding - were determined mainly by supply-side 
conditions of the economy, such as a relative abundance of labour, and by world 
demand rather than domestic demand. In the case of the steel industry in Brazil, the 
largest steel exporting developing country since the mid-1980s, and one endowed with 
an abundant supply of natural resources, steel consumption was relatively small 
compared with Korea or Taiwan. Nevertheless, the investment stimulating effect of 
domestic demand may be reinforced, especially when the effects of reduction in 
production cost are anticipated through scale economies and/or when some forms of 
home market advantage are exploited. 
6. This argument can also be applied to the development of some other heavy and chemical industries 
in the 1970s and the 1980s, which would have been stimulated not only by the supply-side changes 
but also by rapidly increasing domestic demand. 
Role of government and industrial policy 
In the course of steel industry development, government intervention has been intensive 
in most steel-making countries, even in most developed ones. In many cases, 
governments in developing countries made enormous efforts to establish large-scale 
steel mills earlier than implied by comparative advantage considerations, as steel has 
long been considered of great importance in the promotion of economic growth through 
industrialisation as well as in national defence and, by itself, constitutes an important 
manufacturing sector with very high backward and forward linkage effects within the 
economy. In many countries, the issue of supply security and import substitution of 
steel also exerted an important influence on the decision to produce steel domestically 
rather than to rely on importing.'' 
Moreover, even if the supply and demand-side conditions of dynamic 
comparative advantage offer opportunities for developing the steel industry, there is the 
general problem of various forms of market failure in developing countries, which, by 
preventing or delaying investment, constitute a substantial difficulty in establishing and 
fostering such a large industry. The problems of market failure such as imperfect 
capital markets and imperfect information in developing countries provide some 
justification for infant industry protection/promotion policies by government, even 
though government intervention is generally regarded as a poor option for industrial 
development. While macroeconomic or general industrial policies affect an industry's 
growth and competitiveness more or less indirectly, industry-specific policies are in 
general designed to have a more direct and positive impact on the development of the 
targeted industry (Adams and Duggal, 1985). 
The Korean government was also deeply involved in the establishment and 
development of Korea's modem steel-making industry, pushing the economy at an 
early stage of development into full-scale steel production. In the late 1960s, the 
Korean government took the initiative in founding the nation's only integrated large-
scale iron and steel mill, POSCO, equipping it with very modem technologies. Since 
then, POSCO has been a leading company in the Korean steel industry, accounting for 
more than 60 per cent of Korea's total steel production. Even after the creation of 
POSCO, policy intervention by the govemment was intensive to assure the steel 
industry's competitiveness both in the domestic and the intemational markets. The 
govemment provided various incentives and assistance to encourage exports as well as 
investment. Once POSCO was operational, import substitution soon gave way to 
7. In the case of a resource-poor country, the supply security of processed materials will lead to supply 
security in raw materials. In general, however, it is easier to diversify raw materials supplies than 
steel supplies since, for example, the crude steel market is unstable relative to the markets for iron 
ore. 
aggressive expon promotion not only to earn foreign currency but also to realise 
economies of scale in production, which domestic demand at the time alone, though 
rapidly increasing, could not assist fully. 
The role of government and industrial policy thus constitutes another significant 
force behind steel industry development in Korea. The general question to be asked in 
this thesis in relation to this issue is: to what extent did the government's industrial 
intervention influence the development of Korea's steel industry, despite the fact that a 
large pan of the industry's development and success in international markets can be 
attributed to the vitality of the more dynamic Korean economy as well as to corporate 
endeavours and the skill of the workforce? 
Technologv' transfer and efforts to enhance technological capability 
Even though development of the industry is primarily influenced by the factors 
discussed so far, there is another crucial reason that developing countries have 
difficulties in establishing an autonomous steel industry and operating it efficiently 
enough to be internationally competitive; namely, that intemationally competitive steel 
business requires not only huge amounts of capital for facility investment but also high 
levels of technology and know-how, which developing countries generally lack. 
Competitive steel-making fundamentally depends on the scale and technology of 
steelworks and the technical knowledge and skills embodied in workers. The steel 
industry not only depends on a long series of steps in the production process, which 
requires large-scale plant, but also produces various types of products, each with 
different technologies. Technology in ordinary steel-making is quite standardised 
intemationally but of a high level, complex and continuously evolving, and is embodied 
in vast physical machines and facilities and also in labour in the form of human skills. 
In establishing a mainstream steel-making industry, most developing countries 
first import the technology, often through a turnkey project. The establishment of 
POSCO was one such example. Setting up a steel industry involves enormous capital 
costs and a long construction period. A certain period of time is required then, not only 
to reach normal operation but also to master the imported technology so tiiat tiie 
domestic firm or industry can be competitive in terms of productivity, production costs, 
product mix and quality and so that it can improve and further develop the technology. 
These considerations suggest that, when a firm in a developing country imports 
technology, the most important factors for the firm in creating competitiveness are, 
firstly, the ability to establish the plant with the imported technology effectively and, 
secondly, the technological capability to learn and master the technology successfully 
and quickly. Efficient technology transfer at the initial stage is very important in 
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establishing longer run competitiveness. Once operation commences, the industry's or 
f i rm ' s technological capability to learn the imported technology quickly and, 
ultimately, to develop its own technology is the most crucial factor in the creation and 
strengthening of competitiveness. It is unKkely that Korea's achievements in large-
scale modem steel-making would have been so great had its acquisition of modem 
technolog>' been slow and inefficient (Enos and Park, 1988). 
The forces influencing the development of an industry and its international 
competitiveness are quite complex. These include not only those discussed above but 
also others which extend and qualify theories of intemational trade and of the firm in 
their application to development in the real world, such as spatial resistance and 
transpon costs, domestic and foreign political developments, and social and historical 
characteristics. Nevertheless, discussion so far suggests that it is profitable to examine 
the dynamics of international competitiveness in the steel industry in the rapidly 
growing Korean economy in combination with the four forces raised here - economic 
growth and shifts in supply-side conditions of comparative advantage; industrialisation 
and demand-side influences; the role of the govemment and industrial policies; and 
effective technolog>' transfer and the industry's technological capability. 
SCOPE AND STRUCTLUE OF THE THESIS 
This study does not seek to develop a complete theor\' of industrial development and 
trade. Rather, it has as its objective the exploration of facts about the Korean steel 
industr>' and how they bear on the issues above in the context of established economic 
theories. The thesis is organised around the theme of what has contributed to evolution 
of intemational competitiveness in the Korean steel industr\'. The following chapters 
constitute a series of essays, each of which deals with critical issues and questions 
related to the main theme of this thesis. WTiile most industr>' studies of similar subjects 
focus on specific aspects only, this study attempts to SNTithesise analysis of the major 
forces behind industry' development and the evolution of intemational competitiveness. 
Many of the points made here can also be applied to other industries more generally, 
especially to other metals-based industries. 
Chapter 2 pro\ddes an analN-tical framework for examining the specific principles 
underhing development of, and evolution of intemational competitiveness in, a new 
manufacturing sector in a developing countr\'. The chapter pro\ddes a defmition of 
intemational competitiveness in manufacturing and considers price and non-price 
factors of competitiveness. Theoretical underpinnings to examine the four issues posed 
above are then developed. 
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Chapter 3 describes the conventional steel-making technology and defines a 
number of terms and activities associated with the steel-making processes. It then 
provides detailed evidence of the Korean steel industry's growth with respect to the 
structure of the industry and changing panems of production, consumption and trade 
during the last three decades. Some evidence of changing price competitiveness in 
major steel products is also provided. 
Chapter 4 takes up the theory of dynamic comparative advantage developed in 
Chapter 2 and examines the supply-side issue in the development of the Korean steel 
industry. It explores, on the one hand, the relationship between economic growth and 
changes in comparative advantage structures in Korea and, on the other, the evolution 
of Korea's position in the international product cycle of steel, where the development of 
the steel industry in Korea is viewed as pan of the cycle. Given comparative advantage 
and intemational competitiveness in the Korean steel industry, the importance of labour 
productivity or labour costs as a key supply-side determinant is emphasised. 
Chapter 5 explores the influences of domestic demand on Korea's steel industry 
development, using the theoretical arguments of representative demand and effects of 
scale economies provided in the analytical framework (Chapter 2). It looks closely at 
the shifts in steel demand in Korea and analyses their effects on the development of the 
industry. The short-run and long-run effects of domestic demand on trade performance 
are also estimated. 
Chapter 6 examines the significance of industrial policy and the role played by 
the Korean government in establishing and promoting modem steel-making. The first 
question for detailed study is why the government decided to promote the industry. 
Market failure problems preventing investment in mainstream steel-making and the 
various forms of government assistance as a corrective to these problems are then 
identified. The focus is on the problems in both domestic and intemational capital 
markets and the effects of the govemment's financial policy on the steel industry's 
performance. The extent to which export promotion and other forms of govemment 
policies were implemented and the relationship between increasing competitiveness and 
liberalisation efforts are also discussed. 
Chapter 7 examines the founh issue of this thesis, arguing that, given the 
favourable conditions identified in the previous three chapters, the creation and 
strengthening of intemational competitiveness in a developing country's new industry 
depend ultimately on effective technology transfer and the importing f i rm's 
technological capability. Since the initial transfer of modem steel-making technology 
into Korea was achieved through the establishment of POSCO, this chapter uses 
POSCO as a case study, employing in-depth analysis of its efforts to import technology 
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effectively and of various learning and technology improving processes. 
Chapter 8 reviews the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters, and attempts 
to relate the findings to the conceptual framework, and to draw implications for future 
prospects and policy issues for the Korean steel industry. 
The thesis draws together a large amount of data on the Korean steel industry and 
its place in international steel-making, and seeks to interpret its development from the 
perspective of the core elements of the theory of trade and industrial development. 
While the nature of the data does not permit substantial quantitative analysis of the 
Korean steel industry in its comparative context, this study aims to provide the most 
comprehensive review of the development of Korea's steel industry that is presentiy 
possible. 
2 Industry Development and 
International Competitiveness 
The purpose of this chapter is to define an analytical framework incorporating relevant 
economic theories and models, by which to examine major forces behind the 
development of a new manufacturing industry in an industrialising country and evolution 
of its international competitiveness.' A key task is to elaborate the theoretical 
underpinnings of the four issues posed in Chapter 1: economic growth and shifts in 
supply-side determinants of comparative advantage; the influence of growing and sizeable 
domestic demand; the role of industrial policies; and technology transfer and the 
industry's technological capability. 
The first section presents a concept of intemational competitiveness in an industry, 
followed by discussion of price and non-price dimensions of competitiveness. In order 
to examine the supply-side forces in evolving intemational competitiveness in a new 
industry, the second section constructs a dynamic comparative advantage model by 
incorporating growth and product cycle theories into the conventional comparative 
advantage theory. In the third section, the model of dynamic comparative advantage is 
further elaborated to include consideration of demand-side effects on an industry's 
development. The fourth section discusses the relevance of infant industry promotion 
arguments and the role of government and industrial policy in the presence of market 
failures, which prevent smooth evolution of comparative advantage. In the fifth section, 
theories of technology transfer and leaming-by-doing are elaborated to show that, given 
supply and demand-side conditions and industrial policy, the evolution of intemational 
competitiveness is ultimately related to the industry's or firm's technological capability. 
CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 
International competitiveness can be defined broadly as a country's ability to improve 
economic welfare, especially real income gains and employment growth, without causing 
1. In this section, 'industry (or industries)' refers to a manufacturing industry (or industries), unless 
otherwise specified 
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balance of pa>TDents difficulties in the world of open trade (Fagerberg, 1988). 
In the case of a single industry or the industry products, the term can be defined 
more narrowly as the ability of a country to compete against other countries in 
international trade, maintaining or increasing its share of world exports and, by the same 
token, limiting the extent of import penetration into the domestic market (Pass et al., 
1988). This latter definition is of more relevance to this study. 
Price and non-price competitiveness 
Even if different types of measures of competitiveness are used for different research 
purposes, international competitiveness is fundamentally related to the global structure of 
comparative advantages.^ Traditional international trade theory says that a comparative 
advantage is generated by differences between countries in relative factor endowments (in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model) and/or in relative factor productivity (in the Ricardian 
model). In this theory, trade patterns can be predicted on the basis of relative unit labour 
costs of production (or, by the same token, the relative productivity of labour) among 
countries (see Johnson, 1968; and Deardorff, 1984a).^ By means of an elaborate model 
which takes into account other complications such as transport costs, exchange rates, 
demand patterns and trade barriers, a comparative advantage can be translated into an 
absolute advantage in prices (Haberler, 1936). 
In comparative advantage theory, differences in product prices among countries that 
determine the direction and commodity composition of trade are autarkic prices. When 
trade takes place, a homogenous commodity is then transacted at a unique world price. A 
countr>' which, at the equilibrium price level, can produce more than it requires to meet 
domestic demand will be an exporter of the good, and vice versa. In this case, a 
country's international competitiveness in the product can be predicted by the amount the 
country can produce and trade, such as market shares, or by the profitability of producers 
in the country. 
However, even if international competition and the influences of international 
demand and supply sides tend to draw world prices towards uniformity, this tendency in 
the real world is subject to much friction and interference, some of which tends to 
2. See Fagerberg (1988) for references to recent works using different measures of international 
competitiveness. 
3. Unit labour costs can be defined as wage costs and other costs for workers divided by gross product. 
In general, it is argued that increases in unit labour costs in one country at a rate higher than in other 
countries, ceteris paribus, reduce market shares at home and abroad. In addition, as unit labour costs 
are obviously positively related to wage rates, higher wage rates imply higher unit labour costs, 
ceteris paribus. However, higher wage rates do not necessarily mean a cost disadvantage "insofar as 
high wage rates represent a return to capital embodied in human skill" (Johnson, 1968). Many 
empirical studies, such as those by Fetherston et al. (1977), Kaldor (1978) and Kellman (1983), 
show that the fastest growing countries in terms of exports and GDP in the postwar period have 
experienced much faster growth in relative unit labour costs, and vice versa. 
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fragment markets or to isolate particular ones. There has been evidence of substantial 
differences not only in unit labour costs or productivity between producers but also in 
prices between competing manufacturing products, even in the same market"^ 
In this case, other things being equal, international competitiveness can be 
represented by price competitiveness. A primary and major component of price is unit 
production costs, which in general comprise operating costs (labour costs and material 
costs) and financial costs.^ It can be inferred, from trade theory, that a country with an 
abundant supply of a factor input such as labour, raw materials or capital has a certain 
cost advantage in use of the factor. As it is directly related to production cost, labour 
productivity is also an important determinant of price competitiveness in the world 
market.^ Other factors influencing price include, on the one hand, those directly bearing 
other forms of costs or expenses such as transport costs and environmental protection 
costs and, on the other, macroeconomic or policy-oriented factors such as exchange 
rates, inflation rates, interest rates and various forms of policy measures which indirectly 
affect the product price and sometimes bring about different prices in different markets. 
International comparison of production costs and labour productivity in steel-making is 
detailed in Chapter 4 to examine important supply-side determinants of comparative 
advantage, and some data on international price differences in several steel products are 
provided in Chapter 3, where development of the Korean steel industry is reviewed. 
International competition is influenced also by non-price competitiveness, such as 
product quality, size, design, packaging, speed of delivery, before and after sales 
services, product reputation, and marketing. For some buyers, the non-price 
4. See Kravis and Lipsey (1971), for example, for analysis of price differences in manufacturing 
between developed countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Kravis and Lipsey note also that a situation of 
disequilibrium is one case where different prices coexist in the same market. Some consumers may 
respond after a considerable time lag to price differences, even if continuation of price differences 
eventually means that the higher priced goods are not sold. This situation can arise from 
fluctuations in exchange rates; lack of information about price changes; a long-term sales contract; 
uncertainty about the reliability of new cheaper price offers; reluctance to give up a satisfactory 
relationship with a particular supplier; and/or commitment to one type of good among differentiated 
products b ^ u s e of previous purchases or stocks of spare parts. 
5. Analysis of international competitiveness based on price comparisons may not reflect the causes of 
shifts in the flow of trade as clearly as cost comparisons, since export prices adjust to changed 
market conditions more quickly than costs (Stem, 1962; and Stem and Zupnick, 1962). Kravis and 
Lipsey (1971) argue, however, that prices have some decisive advantages over costs especially in an 
empiricd study because (1) the concept of price is generally more objective and less likely to vary 
from one source to another; (2) cost data can be built up only for whole plants, companies, or 
groups of commodities rather than for precisely specified individual commodities, and intemational 
cost comparisons for individual products would be distorted by the diversity of methods of allocation 
of costs in different firms and countries; and (3) it is easier to obtain information about prices than 
costs, not only because many sellers are more willing to provide price than cost information, but 
also because price information can be supplied by buyers. 
6. Labour productivity is affected by technology levels, invesUnent in labour education and R&D, 
efficiency of work practices, labour dispute problems and so on. Changes in management can also 
generate incentives facing productivity growth (Aylen, 1988). Well-organised management or a 
managerial strategy for personnel, materials, production process, marketing, and so on can increase 
efficiency in resource use and then in productivity. 
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competitiveness offsets the apparent price differences in many cases, even if prices are 
perfectly adjusted to take account of the physical differences among the products. As 
non-price competitiveness is closely related to technology competitiveness, this aspect of 
competitiveness is discussed in Chapter 7, where Korea steel industry's technology 
learning process is examined. 
The importance of price and non-price competitiveness may vary from one market 
to another, but every firm has local market advantage to a certain extent, which 
sometimes constitutes an important base for industry development and hence has a 
substantial influence on price or non-price competitiveness in other markets. 
Government protectionist policies are an important source of an advantage of this kind. 
Even in the case of free trade, there is an apparent advantage which local producers 
(either national or multinational firms) enjoy in terms of stronger price competitiveness 
due to lower transport costs and so on. In many cases, even without apparent price 
competitiveness, local producers may still have advantage in their home markets. Local 
producers may have more accurate and richer information about local consumer 
preferences and also be able to provide quicker delivery, efficient and faster before and 
after sales services, and greater capability to meet sudden or frequent orders than remote 
suppliers. Even within a certain product type, local producers can build up a special 
relationship with local customers - for instance, in designing special products or logistics 
systems which are consistent with consumer demand (Findlay, 1990).' 
All of this suggests that international competitiveness is not determined by price 
differences alone but is a package including both price and non-price competitiveness. In 
the complicated real world, international competitiveness reflecting all these 
considerations may be hard to measure but observable results such as market shares and 
profitability or various relevant indices suggested in the literature can provide general 
indicators. Following the definition of intemational competitiveness in the narrow sense, 
the evolution of intemational competitiveness in an industry can be viewed from the 
changing patterns of import substitution in the domestic market and of export shares in 
the intemational market. 
SUPPLY-SIDE CHANGES AND DYNAMIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Intemational competitiveness in an industry is fundamentally related to the structure of 
comparative advantage of the economy. A country's comparative advantage stmcture is 
dependent basically upon supply (endowments) of production factors and/or productivity 
7. Another factor which tends to strengthen the competitive force of domestic firms are buy-domestic 
policies (Kravis and Lipsey, 1971). These appear to be widely practised by most countries, mainly 
through informal administrative means. 
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of the factors. This section seeks to establish the links between the supply-side changes 
in a rapidly developing economy and the evolution of comparative advantage in its 
manufacturing seaor, adopting the theory of dynamic comparative advantage. The issues 
raised in this section provide the conceptual framework employed in Chapter 4. 
Comparative advantage theory in growth and product cycle contexts 
The theory of dynamic comparative advantage adopted in tiiis study is explored in both 
growth and product cycle contexts, drawing conceptually on Johnson's (1968) 
generalised capital theoretic approach to economic development and also on his 
synthesised version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. While the growth theory highlights 
the systematic patterns along which a developing country's comparative advantage shifts 
from one set of industries to another, the product cycle tiieory explains the mechanism of 
shifts in comparative advantage in a certain industry's products from developed to 
developing countries as production technology is standardised and diffused. 
There has been considerable development in the theory of comparative advantage in 
the neoclassical tradition to provide improved analytic and predictive power when applied 
to a rapidly changing international economy. Johnson (1968) has synthesised static 
neoclassical trade theory and various supplementary and alternative approaches, 
providing helpful insights for study of the broader issue of dynamic comparative 
advantage. He argues that the explanation of comparative advantage and international 
trade can be integrated into the Heckscher-Ohlin model if capital and labour are redefined. 
In his model, capital includes not only physical capital but also natural resources, human 
skills, technical and organisational knowledge and social capital, while labour is defined 
narrowly to denote human time availability only instead of all the service of labour to 
production. Johnson then elaborates a dynamic theory of comparative cost by 
incorporating the generalised capital theoretic view of economic development, in which 
economic growth is seen as a generalised process of accumulating various forms of 
capital.^ In this model of the world, a developing economy accumulating capital rapidly 
relative to the rest of the world gradually sheds comparative advantage in more labour-
intensive products and generates new comparative advantage in more sophisticated and 
capital-intensive products.' 
There has been a further stream of theoretical developments, which extend the 
8. Johnson (1986, p. 17) holds that the condition of being 'developed' consists of having accumulated 
various forms of capital per head in large stocks and having established efficient social and economic 
mechanisms for maintaining and increasing the capital stocks, while 'under-developed' (or 
developing) countries possess relatively small stocks of capital per head and relatively weak and 
inefficient mechanisms for maintaining and increasing those stocks. 
9. Many empirical studies support this dynamic interpretation of factor proportions theory. See, for 
example, Blejer (1978), Balassa (1979), Kim (1983) and Hamilton and Svensson (1986). 
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conventional 2 x 2 model, emphasising the role of natural resources as another production 
factor. Jones (1971) developed the Ricardian 3 x 2 specific-factors model by treating 
natural resources as a third factor/" By generalising this model, Knieger (1977) 
provided a nice synthesis of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and specific-factors model and 
examined the implications for the case of many commodities and many countries (or 
many regions within which factor prices are equalised)." 
Gamaut and Anderson (1980) and Anderson and Smith (1981) applied both 
Krueger's model and Johnson's dynamic theory of comparative cost to explain tiie 
changing pattems of trade in the Pacific region. In this model, capital other than natural 
resources is specific to the manufacturing sector and natural resources are specific to tiie 
primary sector, while labour is used in, and is mobile between, both sectors.^^ The 
manufacturing sector is again divided into labour-intensive and capital-intensive activities, 
between which both labour and capital are mobile. The wage rate in a country is 
determined, at a given set of international prices, by tiie overall per worker endowment of 
capital and natural resources. This model was further elaborated by Smitii and Jordan 
(1990), where capital is separated into human capital and technology, each of which is 
considered to be a factor specific to a certain industry and to play a distinctive role in the 
process of economic development 
This stream of dynamic comparative advantage models in the growth context is 
useful in that it provides theoretical underpinnings for the issue of how economic growth 
in a developing country leads to the accumulation of various forms of capital and to 
changes in the structure of comparative advantage. The product cycle hypothesis is also 
incorporated to specify the process by which a comparative advantage in a certain 
industrial product (or a group of products) shifts from developed to developing countries 
over time - in other words, to explain how a developing country obtains a comparative 
advantage in its new industry. The product cycle theory explains the dynamic 
relationship between technology and trade, formally enunciated by the technological gap 
tiieorists such as Posner (1961) and Hufbauer (1966). Vernon (1966) and Hirsch (1967) 
elaborated and extended this work into a detailed account of product development by 
promoting the product cycle hypothesis. ^ ^ 
10. For the conventional 2 x 2 specific-factors model, see Neary (1978). See also Jones (1974) for a 2x 
n case and Jones (1975) fora ( / i+l)x/ i model. 
11. Krueger's model was further extended by Deardorff (1984a) to take account of the effects of trade 
policy, especially in capital-scarce developing countries. 
12. In Anderson and Smith (1981), this model is further extended to allow international mobility of 
some forms of capital, the use of capital in the primary sector, the existence of non-tradable goods 
and services trade. 
13. Vernon (1966) considers the product cycle as having three stages - new product, maturing and 
standardised. In Hirsch (1967), the cycle is divided into new, growth and mature stages. The theory 
of product cycle has been further developed by Hirsch (1974, 1975), Finger (1975), Nelson and 
Norman (1977), Vernon (1979) and Dollar (198Q. For a review of both the theoretical and empirical 
19 
The product cycle theory is based on two general premises. First, a production 
technology continuously evolves, changing factor intensity in a less capital-intensive 
direction as technology is standardised through time. Second, some countries are 
technologically more advanced than others, since, on the one hand, different countries 
facing different market opportunities engage in different rates of research and 
development (R&D) and, on the other, dissemination of technological information is 
neither instantaneous nor complete. Until an existing technological gap is closed, the 
owners of superior technology enjoy comparative advantage in the related products. As 
the technology is standardised and factor intensity of production becomes less capital-
intensive, incentives arise to transfer the technology and production location towards 
countries with lower production costs. 
By concentrating on various aspects of product development, production and 
marketing, the product cycle hypothesis predicts definite changes in comparative 
advantage over time. Nevertheless, the product cycle theory is basically complementary, 
and applicable, to the standard comparative advantage t h e o r y . T h a t is, the comparative 
advantage theory can be subsumed within the product cycle hypothesis, in which, for 
example, a certain stage of the process is associated with a particular factor intensity of 
production.'^ 
The framework employed here adopts and combines these two dynamic trade 
models along with Johnson's (1968) capital theoretic approach to economic growth. 
However, classification and definitions of production factors follow those of Krause 
(1982), which can be regarded as a modified and extended version of Johnson's 
definition of capital and labour. The factor 'natural resources' is separated from 
Johnson's (1968) broad definition of capital and considered as another factor input. 
Labour is divided into unskilled labour and skilled labour where the latter is regarded as a 
form of 'capital (human capital)'." The broad definition of Johnson's capital is again 
literature, see Cheng (1984). See also Dosi et al. (1990, ch. 2) for a broad survey of technology-
related trade theories. 
14. Hirsch (1967) suggests that the standard comparative advantage models and the product cycle 
approaches should be regarded as complementary rather than as competing theories. See also Nelson 
and Norman (1977). Vernon (1966), however, draws a sharp distinction between these two theories. 
15. There are a number of empirical studies which include, in addition to capital and labour, technology 
variable(s) to explain a country's comparative advantage structure. See, for instance, Gruber and 
Vernon (1970), Hufbauer (1970), Baldwin (1971), Choudhri (1979), Stem and Maskus (1981), 
Katrak (1982), Forstner (1984), Crafts and Thomas (1986) and Fagerberg (1988). See also Stem 
(1975) for a comprehensive summary of earlier studies. 
16. This is because, unlike other forms of capital, natural resources are more specific to particular types 
of primary products. See Krueger (1977), Gamaut and Anderson (1980) and Anderson and Smith 
(1981). 
17. In fact, human capital and skilled labour can be considered as the same factor input, since, as 
Johnson (1968, p. 12) asserts, "[F]or the sake of theoretical clarity ... the concept of differences in 
labour quality is restricted to differences in acquired skills, and such skills are regarded as capital 
embodied in human form". 
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subdivided into human capital, physical capital and technology. Technology includes 
technical, scientific and organisational knowledge and social capital. The supply-side 
factors comprise labour (unskilled labour), capital (human capital, physical capital and 
technology) and natural resources. Classification of production sectors in an economy 
according to the most intensively used factor in determining comparative advantage 
results in the following: natural resource-intensive, (unskilled) labour-intensive, human 
capital-intensive and technology-intensive sectors. Physical capital, though certainly an 
important production factor, is not considered to be a determining factor of comparative 
advantage, since the factor is considered to be relatively highly mobile between countries 
and to not affect significantiy location of production (Krause, 1982). A sector which 
uses physical capital intensively can in general be classified as either human capital-
intensive or technology-intensive. In the thesis, ordinary steel-making is classified as 
human capital-intensive industry, while iron-making is regarded as natural resource-
intensive. 
Changing comparative advantage in a developing economy 
At the early stage of economic development, a country has littie capital but natural 
resources and a relatively abundant supply of unskilled labour. Countries at this stage -
that is, less developed countries (LDCs) - produce mostiy primary products by using 
natural resources intensively and export them in a raw or lightly processed form in 
exchange for manufactures. If the LDC grows more rapidly than the world as a whole, 
accumulating various sorts of capital and increasing per capita incomes levels over time, 
the manufacturing sector expands relative to the primary sector (a Rybczynski effect).^^ 
Real wages increase as a part of capital accumulation involving an addition to per worker 
stock of capital, which is more specific to manufacturing. Labour is then gradually 
diverted from primary production towards manufacturing, since the opportunity cost of 
employing labour in primary production increases (Smith and Jordan, 1990). The LDC 
gradually becomes industrialised and shifts from predominantly exporting primary 
products and importing manufactures to exporting mainly manufactures.^' 
18. The fact that some forms of capital are internationally mobile can make for faster economic growth 
in a country than its domestic savings ratio alone would allow (Anderson and Park, 1988). 
19. If a country at the early stage of industrialisation has a lower endowment of natural resources and 
higher population density, the initial wage rate is lower than that in a country with a higher per 
worker endowment of natural resources. Given rates of capital accumulation, labour is transferred 
from primary to manufacturing sectors faster in a country with less per capita endowment of natural 
resources and lower initial wage rates (Gamaut and Anderson, 1980; and Anderson and Smith, 1981). 
A country with a higher endowment of natural resources per worker needs more capital accumulation 
to shift from predominanUy exporting primary products to exporting mainly manufactures. If coital 
is also required in primary production, countries with more natural resource endowments begin 
manufacturing with a greater capital availability per worker. That is, at a given level of capital per 
worker, a country with more agricultural land and mineral resources per worker would tend to employ 
a greater share of its available capital in primary production, since a greater natural resource 
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Providing there are no serious market distortions by government, the 
manufacturing sector in a LDC mainly consists of labour-intensive industries even if there 
are some trade barriers. Such industries consist mostly of conventional light industries 
producing consumer goods such as textiles, footwear and clothing. Production 
technologies in these industries are in general at the final stage in the product cycle and 
hence are mature and well-diffused internationally. The unskilled labour which the 
country has in relatively abundant supply is a dominant factor input for the products. It is 
relatively easy then for the LDC to adapt and absorb technologies and take over a 
comparative advantage in those industries from countries with higher incomes and wage 
rates. The LDC will then expon mainly labour-intensive manufactures to developed 
countries, competing with countries at the similar development stage or with advanced 
developing countries (ADCs). Meanwhile, the consumption pattern gradually shifts 
towards more capital-intensive products adapted to the new higher income levels, leading 
to increasing impons of the products. Some countries at this stage of industrialisation 
turn into net importers of primary products. 
With continuing economic growth and capital accumulation, levels of education and 
sknis increase overall. Productivity of labour and hence wage rates then rise. These 
shifts have two implications for changes in the country's comparative advantage 
structure. On the one hand, the country's comparative advantage in some labour-
intensive industries becomes weaker following the emergence of new competitors, 
which, though at lower levels of per capita income, enter those industries with lower 
wage rates. On the other, the gradually rising capital-labour ratios in the country support 
increasing comparative advantage in the industries where some forms of capital are more 
important than labour. Imports of capital-intensive products which have been increasing 
with income growth begin to be replaced by domestic ones. As it successfully develops 
in some of those industries, the country eventually becomes able to export some of those 
products. The country can now be referred to as an ADC or as a newly industrialising 
country (NIC). 
The manufacturing sectors in which an ADC achieves comparative advantage 
consist mainly of human capital-intensive activities, which in general comprise all or part 
of the production processes in some heavy industries such as minerals processing, 
shipbuilding, automobile and electrical appliances.^® The industries in developed 
endov-Tnent represents higher marginal product of capital in primary production, ceteris paribus. See 
Anderson and Smith (1981, pp297-299) for more discussion of this. See also Anderson (1980) for 
the agricultural case and Bradford and Branson (1987, p.15) for a brief discussion of the developing 
country case where the resource sector is expanding {i.e., the case of 'Dutch Disease'). 
20. Some light industries using advanced technology such as synthetic textiles can also be included. 
Some ADCs at this stage of development specialise more in human capital-intensive service sectors 
than in heavy and chemical industries. Singapore may be a prime example. This case is not 
addressed in this study. 
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countries are maturing. Even though technology is still at a high level and, in many 
cases, continuously evolving, it becomes fairly standardised internationally, enabling 
mass production. The product cycle is at the stage where high levels of R&D expenditure 
and technological knowledge are not very critical but labour with the necessary skill 
(human capital) to operate the production facilities is gradually becoming a dominant 
factor of comparative advantage. In establishing some industries, equipment and 
facilities and vast investment of physical capital may be very important also, but a newly 
industrialising country may lack these. However, provided that capital in the form of 
finance is internationally mobile and the equipment and facilities are available in the 
international markets, this may not represent a major obstacle in establishing those 
industries. 
As the technology in the human capital-intensive industries becomes standardised, 
relatively high wage rates in developed countries appear to be unfavourable to the 
maintenance of comparative advantage in these products. By contrast, in some ADCs, 
technological and scientific knowledge and R&D expenditure are still in relatively scarce 
supply but other inputs such as, most importantiy, labour with high levels of education 
and skill is relatively cheaply available, which may enable production at lower costs than 
in developed countries. In an effort to maintain their market shares abroad, firms in 
developed countries initiate offshore production and direct foreign investment, while also 
investing in upgrading or developing the current production technology. In ADCs, at the 
same time, continuously growing demand for the products provides incentives to some 
domestic firms to begin production based on imitation, the actual establishment of a 
subsidiary or an affiliate plant or through a turnkey technology import. As the 
technology becomes embodied in the workers and the scale of production becomes 
greater, lowering production costs, the firms in ADCs eventually displace developed 
country exports, initially in the ADCs' own markets. 
In the international market, the ADCs which have successfully developed some 
human capital-intensive industries compete with each other and with the developed 
countries that originally transferred the technology to them. Even if, given the level of 
technology, higher labour productivity and/or lower unit labour costs form the main 
determinants of comparative advantage, it is also likely that the technologies in the human 
capital-intensive industries are continuously evolving and that there is more technological 
development and introduction of newer products.^' Such technological development may 
21. The major technological advance may also generate a stream of process innovations (Nelson and 
Norman, 1977). This can happen in a labour saving way even without significant changes in 
product quality or specification. If this kind of technological improvement in production process 
requires substitution of larger parts of previous production facilities into new ones, newcomers in 
develq)iiig countries may have an advantage in setting up the new production facilities. If the new 
technology proves highly immobile across borders, or very costly to transfer, some developing 
countries may import old plant and technology from developed countries to commence domestic 
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occur mainly in developed countries, where there is a stronger capacity for R&D 
investment and scientific and industrial leadership, in an effort to overcome or 
compensate for the loss of comparative advantage in the human-capital intensive 
industries. Some ADCs which have absorbed the imported technology and accumulated 
scientific and technological capacity will also invest in technological development in those 
industries to sustain comparative advantage. In such a case, it is not only skilled labour 
but also the ability to improve or develop technology that provide important sources of 
longer run comparative advantage. 
As economic growth proceeds, an ADC may lose competitiveness eventually in 
unskilled labour-intensive products but become more competitive in human capital-
intensive sectors at a given set of world price ratios and technology levels. Production 
and export menus include higher capital-intensive and technically more complex 
products. At the same time, a society's demand pattern becomes more sophisticated, 
shifting imports towards more complex and technologically advanced goods and 
services.^^ Further income growth and accumulation of scientific and technological 
knowledge will give rise to R&D capacity and lead to the creation of comparative 
advantage in some technology-intensive industries. Increasing wage rates, however, 
gradually reduce comparative advantage in some human capital-intensive products. 
An ADC eventually becomes a net exporter of some human capital-intensive 
products, increasing imports of some labour-intensive and technology-intensive products 
and industrial raw materials. A qualification which has to be made with respect to a trade 
pattern is the existence of intra-industry trade, while comparative advantage theory 
predicts inter-industry trade between countries with different factor proportions. As 
many studies on trade theory incorporating different forms of market structures imply, 
the existence of scale economies and imperfect competition is the most important source 
of intra-industry trade in differentiated or even homogenous goods. Many large-scale 
human capital-intensive industries booming in ADCs are subject to some forms of scale 
economies and their market structure involves imperfect competition.^^ In these 
industries, an ADC will engage in intra-industry trade with other ADCs or with 
developed countries, as its rapid economic growth and industrialisation not only reduces 
its dissimilarity with developed countries in factor proportions but also result in 
overlapping patterns of production and consumption with those of developed countries in 
production. 
22. The growth and industrialisation of the ADCs, particularly of countries with poor per capita resource 
endowments, also points to growing imports of raw materials for capital-intensive relative to labour-
intensive industries and rising import shares for industrial raw materials over agricultural goods 
(Drysdale, 1988). 
23. See Appendix 1 for a brief review of studies on intra-industry trade and discussion of the relationship 
between comparative advantage and intra-industry trade in an ADC. 
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terms of commodity composition. 
The theory of intra-industry trade, after incorporation into the model of dynamic 
comparative advantage, suggests that, as an ADC develops some human capital-intensive 
industries, it changes from a net importer into a net exporter in those industries and, at the 
same time, may engage more in simultaneous exports and imports of the industry 
products. Even in the presence of intra-industry trade, an industry's overall competitive 
position can be explained within the comparative advantage framework and hence the 
country's position as a net exporter or importer in an industry is ultimately determined by 
the overall supply-side conditions of the economy (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
Indeed, the model of dynamic comparative advantage incorporates not only 
traditional comparative advantage theory but also the theories of economic growth, 
product cycle, and intra-industry trade. In Chapter 4, some implications of this model for 
the steel industry in a rapidly developing country are drawn and the issues of dynamic 
comparative advantage in the contexts of both domestic economy and the international 
market are closely examined with respect to development of the Korean steel industry. 
Demand-side implications of the dynamic comparative advantage model are addressed in 
Chapter 5. 
EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC DEMAND ON COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The model of dynamic comparative advantage focuses mainly on the effects of changes in 
the supply side of an economy and hence on the role of factor prices and production. 
Altiiough domestic demand is included in the model, its role is limited and is supposed 
not to affect production or the nation's comparative advantage in the product. 
Development of many industries is in fact dependent largely on shifts in tiie supply-side 
conditions. In the 1960s and the 1970s, for example, rapid evolution of East Asian 
NICs' comparative advantage in light industry products relied totally on an abundant 
supply of cheap but relatively well-educated labour. If there was some contribution to 
development from the demand side, it was not from the domestic market but from the 
world market. 
In this section, however, the dynamic comparative advantage model is elaborated 
further to show that, when a new industry is growing, the existence of sizeable domestic 
demand for the industry's products also has an important effect on the development of the 
industry and hence on evolution of comparative advantage in the industry.^ 
24. The product cycle theory also places importance on domestic demand. However, this is mostly 
confmed to innovation activity at the early stage of product development, as Vernon (1966) notes 
that most innovations are produced for the domestic market. Vernon (1966) suggests two reasons for 
this: (1) at the early stage of the product cycle, production cost is not a major factor, since the 
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Representative demand hypothesis 
Linder (1961) made a significant contribution to international trade theory by highlighting 
the importance of domestic demand. Arguing tiiat factor proportions alone cannot fully 
explain existing world trade, he assigns anotiier important factor influencing tiie pattem 
of international specialisation to the existence of domestic demand and international 
differences in demand for various tradable manufactures. Linder's theory, which was 
intended to apply to manufactures, consists of two propositions. First, it is a necessary 
(but not a sufficient) condition that, for a non-primary product to be potentially 
exportable, there be sizeable domestic demand or what he refers to as 'representative 
demand'. Second, die range of goods for which tiiere is domestic demand is determined 
by per capita income. 
These propositions, especially the first one, are useful in understanding how tiie 
existence of sizeable domestic demand leads to tiie industry's development and hence to 
evolution of comparative advantage.^ In a rapidly developing country, the accumulation 
of various forms of capital tends to shift comparative advantages to more capital-intensive 
industries. Within the limited capacity of tiie economy, however, it would prove neither 
necessary nor possible to develop all the new conceivable industries in which 
comparative advantages could be supported by an increasing capital-labour ratio. In this 
situation, the choice of industry (or industries) will be largely affected by the actual or 
expected sizes of domestic demand, ceteris paribus. As Linder (1961, p.87) argues, 
[T]he decision to take up production of any particular good is likely to be 
generated by clearly discernible economic needs. In a world of imperfect 
knowledge, entrepreneurs will react to profit opportunities of which they are 
aware. These would tend to arise from domestic needs. 
Scale economies, increasing domestic demand and industry development 
The representative demand hypotiiesis is even more applicable when the industry is 
characterised by various kinds of scale economies, where average production cost is in 
general a decreasing function of a production scale or output until a certain level is 
reached. This provides an important implication for the development of a newly 
established industry in a developing country. When a developing country has demand 
innovator has an initial monopoly and demand for the product is likely to be relatively price inelastic 
(but highly income elastic), and (2) the close contact of producers with machinery and component 
suppliers as well as direct communication with consumers are essential to development and 
maturation of the product. 
25. Linder (1961) argues also that, according to these two propositions, the amount of potential trade is 
greater between countries with similar levels of per capita income, since only those goods which 
have common markets in both countries are traded. This argument is very similar to that employed 
with respect to intra-industry trade. 
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for an industry output of a reasonable size, the new domestic industry which is currently 
operating at higher unit production costs than foreign producers can reduce costs by 
expanding capacity and thus improve its comparative advantage. 
Unlike industries with constant returns to scale and competitive market structure, 
however, industries which are subject to various kinds of scale economies leading to 
strong interdependence with other industries and hence oligopolistic market structure may 
have difficulties foreseeing market prospects (see Itoh et al, 1988b; and Okuno-
Fujiwara, 1988). For example, an oligopolistic industry with scale economies both at the 
firm and industry levels uses other industries' outputs as an input and produces 
intermediate inputs for other industries as well. In such an industry, with important and 
complicated links with others, prices by themselves do not transmit the information 
necessary for efficient resource allocation (Itoh et al, 1988b). Firms or investors may 
not be able to foresee how induced demand or the supply of inputs will change as the 
industry develops. Due to the uncertain nature of domestic and international markets, 
many risks are also involved if large-scale investment is required. Furthermore, at the 
early stage of development, the size of the world market may not be enough to attract 
investment. It may be because, even if there exists a large near-by market, scale 
economies involved will make the world market prospects much more complicated than 
the domestic market and it may be very difficult for domestic firms or investors to see 
profit opportunities in the unfamiliar market. If substantial fixed costs are required to 
meet a minimum efficient scale, this problem in the world market is more complicated and 
hence rapidly increasing and/or reasonably sized domestic demand is necessary to attract 
investment. If domestic demand is rapidly increasing or is clearly expected to increase to 
a reasonable size, this will provide firms or investors with long-run profit opportunities, 
even though an initial loss is necessary. 
When domestic producers encounter rapidly increasing domestic demand, which 
can provide them with potential gains, they will tolerate current losses and increase 
capacity, which in turn helps the firms to realise various kinds of scale economies and 
eventually reduce production costs. The channel through which increasing domestic 
demand and scale economies contribute to industry development can be described as 
follows. ^ 
External scale economies are generated in various ways, one important condition 
being the large size of the domestic market.^' For example, an industry producing 
26. A sizeable domestic market and scale economies have important implications for industrial policy. 
The issue of industrial policy is discussed in the next section. 
27. This case is also referred to as 'national economies of scale' (Ethier, 1982b) or Marshallian 
externalities, where industry output is an increasing function of the domestic market size and the 
average cost is a decreasing function of the industry. It can be assumed that the size of an individual 
firm does not influence its average costs - that is, constant returns to scale and perfect competition 
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intermediate industrial inputs such as steel can benefit from external scale economies 
when domestic steel-consuming industries expand rapidly. The expansion of the steel-
consuming sectors gives rise to domestic demand for steel and may generate externalities 
such as a labour force with better skills; greater specialisation; faster and more accurate 
information flows; better access to materials and services; and support for an extensive 
infrastructure. Such externalities may provide the steel industry or firms directly or 
indirecdy with better production conditions and hence the possibility of reducing average 
costs. In turn, increases in steel production to meet growing domestic demand accelerate 
expansion of the steel-consuming sectors, since the steel industry is able to support a 
wider variety of steel products at lower costs. The steel industry may again be induced to 
expand production and product mix and hence reduce further average production costs 
for all steel-makers. This kind of cost reducing effect of domestic demand due to external 
scale economies will be larger if the industry is subject to larger linkage effects with the 
upstream industries. 
If economies of scale exist at the firm level, reflecting the efficiency of a large plant, 
an individual firm operating at a larger scale can realise lower average costs. Factors 
such as the minimum efficient size of plant and/or indivisibility in the production process 
will then play an important role in production. When a newly growing firm in a 
developing country is not yet internationally competitive and cannot acquire intemational 
market shares large enough to support the minimum efficient scale or make longer 
production runs possible, a reasonably sized domestic market which can provide the local 
firm with some advantages over foreign firms may be crucial in creating cost 
competitiveness. 
In many industries newly established in developing countries, learning of imported 
technology is an important source of improving comparative advantage.^ Dynamic 
forms of scale economies and hence cost reducing effects arise from learning. If learning 
increases with experience in production activities, thus depending on a cumulative output 
level, it is important that the industry or firm has markets to sell its products over time. 
In such a case, the existence of sizeable domestic demand for the products plays an 
important role also in developing the industry. 
Under a free trade regime, and when the industry or firm obtains competitiveness 
and has some shares in the intemational export market, the size of the domestic market 
may no longer serve as a major constraint on its development, if transport cost resistances 
can still hold even if external scale economies exist. Average costs in a firm depend on the size of 
the entire industry, and large firms do not have any advantage over smaller ones. In this case, 
economies of scale are constant at the level of the firm. 
28. The idea of 'learning' has been widely used in the literature to conceptualise the information flows 
generated by various activities. The importance of learning in industrial development is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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are small (Anderson and Smith, 1981). In this case, average cost of production will 
depend on the size of the world market, referred to as 'international economies of scale' 
(Ethier, 1979, 1982b; and Helpman, 1984b). The minimum efficient plant size can also 
be supported by the international market.^' Even in this case, however, the domestic 
market still has important effects on the domestic industry as long as feedback between 
consumers and producers in the same region plays an important role in market 
development. 
The demand-side effects on changes in comparative advantage can be summarised 
as follows. As per capita income grows in an ADC, domestic demand shifts towards 
more capital-intensive and technologically advanced goods adapted to the new income 
levels and relative commodity prices. Continuing industrialisation increases domestic 
demand for, in particular, industrial inputs and capital goods, which may constitute a 
representative demand in the economy (following Under, 1961). The increasing demand 
for such products has to be met initially by imports. While improvement of supply-side 
conditions tends to produce comparative advantages in the products, the existence of 
sizeable domestic demand (actual or expected) induces investment in the industries and 
certainly has a positive effect on development of the industries. As a successful firm 
grows and the country's comparative advantage in the product improves, the size of the 
local market becomes insufficient for further expansion. The trade horizon of the firm is 
then gradually lifted and the country eventually becomes a net exporter. Thus, in many 
cases, the existence of domestic demand can be an important source of shifting 
comparative advantage. Based on this framework, the demand-side influence on the 
Korean steel industry growth will be analysed in Chapter 5, where the issue is also 
extended to identifying the short-run and long-run effects of domestic demand on steel 
trade. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW INDUSTRY 
The arguments so far have focused on the supply and demand-side conditions of dynamic 
comparative advantage in a developing economy. These conditions constitute important 
market factors in industry growth. The process of industry growth also involves non-
market factors stemming from government intervention and industrial policy. These are 
certainly important factors affecting the evolution of international competitiveness in a 
29. However, the existence of transport costs can be an important source of home market advantage. 
Although they are complex and employ special examples, theoretical works by Krugman (1980), 
Helpman and Razin (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Venables (1987) show that, in the 
presence of transport costs, other things being equal, countries tend to be net exporters of not only 
standardised but also differentiated goods for which they have large domestic markets. These studies 
argue that a large domestic market serves as a base for exports. 
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new or infant industry in a developing country, since they may either reduce or promote 
growth of the industry. 
Even though government intervention is generally regarded as a poor option for 
mdustrial development and industrial policy does not necessarily imply its efficient 
application, governments in most developing countries become preoccupied with 
industrial policies and assisting in establishing and promoting new manufacturing 
industries, in an effort to create industrial structures considered desirable for economic 
development.^" There is no presumption that promotive or protective policies are always 
effective. Only under several strict conditions may industrial policy contribute to the 
process of industry growth, and only when welfare gains from the establishment and 
promotion of an industry spread through the entire economy is there reason for the 
government to foster and protect them. In fact, governments in many countries have 
been strongly influenced by theoretical justification of industrial policy to promote 
manufacturing, the most influential being the infant industry argument for temporary 
protection against import competition.^^ The following discusses how and under what 
conditions industrial policies help an infant industry in a developing country grow and 
realise its potential comparative advantage. 
Conditions and effects of infant industry promotion policies 
In a developing country, the evolution of comparative advantage in more capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries may not proceed in the presence of various forms of market 
failure. Moreover, the fact that new firms or industries in a dynamically developing 
economy may be subject to various forms of scale economies makes for a different 
situation from the case of perfect competition and perfect markets, where prices reflect the 
scarcity value of all goods and provide appropriate incentives for economic decision-
makers. For a new industry in a developing country, international competitiveness may 
also take some time, during which the industry suffers from cost disadvantage and 
30. In many cases, the political economy underlying promotion and protection of some manufacturing 
industries in rapidly industrialising countries is i s o closely related to the problem of security of 
supply for industri^isation. As the industrial structure becomes complex, for example, domestic 
demand for intermediate inputs such as steel sharply increases. As central-planners in developing 
countries believe that the long-run supply security of such intermediate inputs affects overall 
development of the national economy, industries producing the inputs are promoted earlier than 
would have been suggested by considerations of comparative advantage, in an effort to reap strong 
linkage effects and external scale economies generated by the industries. Incentives to promote such 
industries may be weakened, if their development in turn brings about a raw materials supply 
security problem in resource-poor developing countries. Economic and trade security issues are in 
fact more relevant to the case of energy, raw materials and food. See Drysdale (1988, ch. 5) for an 
extensive discussion of the supply security issues for energy and resources in the Pacific and East 
Asia. 
31. The term 'infant' refers to new or not yet established industrial activities which are prevented from 
developing because market prices are kept too low by foreign competition (Caves and Jones, 1981, 
p.223). 
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losses, and high setup costs. If the domestic market is ruled by a foreign monopoly or 
oligopoly strategically preventing domestic firms from entering the market, the domestic 
firms may not have any incentive to invest. Under these circumstances, the young 
domestic industry in the developing country may not develop properly regardless of its 
potential comparative advantage. 
However, the fact that building up an industry is a costly and time-consuming 
process does not by itself constitute an argument for government intervention. Protection 
of an industry can be justified only in the case of domestic market failures, which prevent 
private markets from developing the industry in the proper manner and as rapidly as is 
desirable (see Kemp, 1960; Johnson, 1970; Negishi, 1972, ch.6; and Corden, 1974, 
ch.9). Market failures faced by infant industries in a developing country commonly 
include imperfect information and an imperfect capital market 
Imperfect private information 
In general, private firms in a developing country may be unable to clearly foresee profit 
opportunities or to fully grasp the extent of the market.^^ They may also lack the ability 
to assess information. Imperfect information and uncertain prospects in the market affect 
not only a private firm's behaviour but also domestic and foreign financiers' incentives to 
invest or finance. In this case, firms or financiers may be reluctant to invest in the new 
area or in expansion of existing capacity, regardless of potential comparative advantage. 
This problem is complicated further when the target industry exhibits various forms 
of scale economies and strong interdependence with other industries (see Itoh et al, 
1988b; and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1988). In such an industry, as discussed in the previous 
section, firms or investors may not be able to foresee how induced demand or the supply 
of inputs will change as the industry develops. If firms or investors are unable to grasp 
fully the dynamic extent of changes in induced demand, proper investment may not 
eventuate (see page 26 of this chapter).^^ 
Imperfect capital market 
Infant firms in a developing country may not be able to obtain capital to finance 
investment projects and also to cover possible initial losses. If the developing country 
has no financial institutions that would allow savings from traditional sectors to be used 
to finance investment in a new sector, then growth of the new industry will be restricted 
32. This does not necessarily mean that the government has more or better information. The 
government may have less information or understanding of future market prospects than some large 
international companies. 
33. The government can induce investment by spreading more information about market prospects. 
Komiya (1975, p.221) argues that: "Viewed as a system of information collection and 
dissemination, Japan's system of industrial policies may have been among the most important 
factors in Japan's high rate of industrial growth, apart from the direct and indirect economic effects of 
individual policy measures". 
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by lack of ability to earn current profits among firms in the industry. Even if long-term 
returns on investment in the infant industry are high, under-investment or failure to invest 
due to imperfection of the capital market may result. Moreover, if interest rates are set 
above social discount rates to the extent that borrowings made to cover current losses 
cannot be repaid from future profits, the industry cannot develop properly. These 
problems may become more complicated when combined with imperfect information and 
uncertain market prospects. For example, even though capital in the form of finance is 
internationally mobile, imperfect information and the economic situation in the developing 
country may constitute serious obstacles to the firm in terms of accessing international 
financial markets. 
Conditions and effects of infant industry promotion 
In the infant industry argument, it is necessary to go beyond the plausible but 
questionable view that, in the presence of market failure, infant industries always need to 
be sheltered. Thus, there arises a question of which industries really warrant special 
treatment. The following summarises the conditions of infant industry promotion, on the 
one hand, and how it affects growth of an infant industry when working ideally, on the 
other (quotations in Krueger and Tuncer, 1982). 
"Some new industries in developing countries may initially operate at high cost 
relative to established foreign producers, and it requires time for them to become 
competitive". It is the minimum necessary condition for infant industry protection that 
high setup costs be used to establish the industry but that average costs decline as time 
goes on. One can conceive of many sources of setup costs, initially high and then 
declining, but the important ones in relation to the issue of fostering an industry are 
various forms of scale economies.^"* The case of high setup costs in the presence of 
dynamic scale economies, which can be observed in most young industries to some 
extent, is the main focus of the traditional infant industry argument. High setup costs but 
declining average costs can be generated also in the industries subject to Marshallian 
externalities (Hirschman, 1958; Chenery, 1959; Bardhan, 1964; Okuno and Suzumura, 
1986; and Okuno-Fujiwara, 1988) or scale economies internal to firms whereby the 
structure of the industry is oligopolistic (see Itoh et ai, 1988b). 
"It does not pay any individual firm to enter an infant industry at free trade prices". 
This proposition has its origins in Kemp's (1960) 'appropriability' argument for infant 
industry protection (see also Kemp, 1969 and 1974). Unless externalities generated by 
34. The fact that it is costly and time-consuming to build up an industry is not an argument for 
government intervention unless there are some domestic market failures. One example could be the 
case of 'the pseudo infant industry arguments' (Corden, 1974). In some situations such as when the 
industry generates few external economies, infant industry protection ends up looking like a success 
but may actually have been a net cost to the economy. 
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35 the firm undertaking the infant activity accrue only to the firm, protection is necessary. 
Even if the social benefits from promotion of an infant industry exceed its costs, no 
private entrepreneur may be willing to initiate or enter the industry concerned because of 
the problem of appropriability.^® Under protection, however, the firm, even if incurring 
losses initially, may be able to make up for these losses by reaping benefits from the 
extemalities later on. 
"The industry, if developed, would be economic enough to permit a reasonable rate 
of return on the initial losses". This condition, what is called 'the Mill-Bastable test', 
asserts that the protected industry has to develop so that firms in the industry can become 
profitable. Moreover, the costs of production must fall enough to repay the losses 
associated with the high costs of the protected period and to provide a reasonable rate of 
return on those losses, since resources could otherwise have been allocated to 
unprotected sectors with incremental international value added.^ 
"The industry requires a temporary period of protection or assistance during which 
its costs will fall enough to permit it to survive international competition without 
assistance". This proposition asserts that, with permanent protection, the intended 
purposes of protection will not be achieved.^^ The conditions of, and justifications for, 
protection may taper off as time goes by and as the protected industry develops. Corden 
(1974, p.256) posits that extemalities, learning and other forms of scale economies 
generated by a new industry may not be permanent and that imperfection of information 
or of the capital market, as these apply to the firm concerned, may be temporary. He 
argues also that any form of protection could prove unnecessary once imports of the 
product have been completely replaced, and that protection should be lifted if the 
protected firm(s) has above-normal profits. 
Pre-commitment to unconditional liberalisation 
Not only economic theory but also real world situations suggest many pitfalls in the 
3 5. This argument can take many forms. The common idea is that pioneering firms generate some kind 
of extemalities providing social benefits, all of which cannot be recouped by the firms. For 
example, a firm making an initial investment may have to incur high setup costs to adapt 
technology and create human skills or to open new markets. If other firms are able to follow their 
lead without incurring these costs, the pioneers will be prevented from receiving compensation for 
any returns from these outlays. Another possible case is that any indivisible lump of investment 
will generate pecuniary external economies (producer and consumer surpluses generated outside the 
investing firm). The gains from the investment will thus not stay completely within the firm, and 
so the investment might not prove profitable (Negishi, 1968, 1972; and Corden, 1974). 
3 6. This problem can be solved by compensating furos for their intangible contributions. When this is 
not possible, however, a second-best policy exists for encouraging entry into a new industry by 
using tariffs or other methods. 
37. It is not necessary that the recovery of the initial losses be done by the furn starting up the activity. 
38. See Baldwin (1969) for this argument, who shows why, even in the presence of infant industry 
considerations, tariff protection may fail to correct the assumed market failures. 
33 
argument for infant industry promotion, among which the following two are considered 
to be the most crucial, since they may not only adversely affect industry growth but also 
incur unnecessary costs to the entire economy. 
First, regardless of the theoretical conditions of protection, it may be practically 
difficult to identify which industry or firm satisfies the conditions." Moreover, the 
mdustries or firms with no actual potential may be protected due to political or social 
pressure or government miscalculation. In many cases, protection reflects pressure by 
special interest groups rather than national welfare maximisation.^ The policy-making 
process in practice includes lobbying or game-like interactions between the government 
and firms. This could be because firms in the industry will also try to figure out the 
government's intentions and make their decisions accordingly. This problem is more 
complicated in an industry where monopoly or oligopoly prevails."*^ 
Second, even though the temporariness of protection proves to be one of the most 
important conditions of the welfare-maximising protectionist argument, protection is 
liable in practice to be rather permanent, producing unnecessary social costs. Withdrawal 
of protection may bring about strong pressure by firms or interested parties to extend 
protection period, since protection always gives them some advantages. There is then an 
important question with respect to the temporariness of protection of whether government 
or authorities can assure the firms under protection of unconditional elimination of 
protection after a certain period of time so that the firms do not consider the possibility of 
extension or renewal of protection. 
In general, the fact that there are high barriers to foreign exports penetrating 
domestic markets or that firms receive assistance to survive international competition may 
not be sufficient to encourage the development of the infant industry. When domestic 
firms expect some degree of protection as long as the government thinks they are not 
competitive enough, they may base their behaviour on the protected nature of the 
domestic market and act or lobby as if protection is still required. In particular, if the 
gains from extended protection are greater than the losses of benefits which would be 
derived from appropriate investment, they may lack sufficient interest and incentives in 
investment and growth. Even if they respond to import challenges by boosting their 
efforts and taking risks to increase investment, they will not invest sufficient amounts but 
39. Timing of policy application bears another difficulty. It may not always be a good idea for 
government to allow (or push) domestic firms to move immediately into the industries, even if they 
satisfy the conditions of protection. 
40. This argument is formalised by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980), Brock and Magee (1980), Findlay 
and Wellisz (1982), Krueger (1974) and Rodrik (1986). See Bhagwati (1988), Baldwin (1985) and 
Hillman (1989) for recent surveys of this issue. 
41. In the case of a protected infant industry in a developing country, in which only small numbers of 
firms are allowed, this issue seems particularly important not only to national welfare but also to 
potential competitiveness of the industry. In a perfectiy competitive sector, the effects of policy 
based on observations of domestic and international situations may be straightforward. 
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try, rather, to save on the opportunity costs of capital and also induce extension of the 
protection period because of the advantages that protection gives them.''^ In such cases, a 
protectionist program intended to be temporary becomes 'time inconsistent' (see Staiger 
and Tabellini, 1987; Matsuyama, 1990; and Tomell, 1991). This happens because, if 
protection has to be extended in the future, the original liberalisation plan is no longer 
optimal. 
If an argument is to provide valid justification for protection, it must show that the 
protectionist program is time consistent (Tomell, 1991). In this sense, it can be argued 
that, for a strategic reason, the government or authorities should pre-commit to the 
unconditional liberalisation, rather than planning to reduce or remove protection or 
assistance according to the achievement of the protected firms or industries. The certainty 
of unconditional liberalisation after a given period of protection implies a potential for 
future competition with foreign producers. Accordingly, this considerably influences 
corporate actions to boost competitiveness (Itoh, 1987). 
Analysis of industrial policies in the Korean steel industry is the main interest in 
Chapter 6. Applying the issues raised in this section about the effects of infant industry 
promotion or protection policies on industry growth in a developing economy, Chapter 6 
explores the questions on how industrial policies were implemented in the Korean steel 
industry, how the infant industry protection argument can be applied to this case, and 
how these policies affect the industry. 
ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 
The overall long-run pattem of evolving international competitiveness in a manufacturing 
industry can be explained by the model of dynamic comparative advantage, taking into 
account the influences of both supply and demand-side conditions in a country, and also 
by the argument of infant industry protection. These are certainly important in providing 
the necessary environment for industrial development. 
However, it can be argued that those conditions are necessary but may not be 
sufficient to explain how in practice an industry newly introduced in a developing country 
acquires technology and know-how and hence produces manufactures at an 
internationally competitive level.''^ Even though it can be assumed that, as in the standard 
42. This argument may be valid not only for import substituting industries but also export oriented 
industries protected by direct and indir^t export subsidisation. 
43. The definition of 'technology' is not unique in the literature, whether theoretic or empirical. See 
Mansour (1981) and Dunning (1982) for these definitional issues. See also Hall and Johnson 
(1970), Mansfield (1975), Robock (1980) and Madeuf (1984) for various taxonomies of technology. 
In this study, technology is defined as firm-specific information encompassing not only the 
application of scientific and technical knowledge to transform essential inputs to designed ou^ut but 
also managerial, organisational, financial and marketing skills, unless otherwise specified. 
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Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, every country has the same technology, the process 
by which that occurs involves not only time lags but also costs in a country which enters 
the business as a newcomers. What is ultimately required for the country, given the 
supply and demand-side conditions, is an industry-specific technological capability to 
catch up rapidly to international technology and know-how, without which relatively low 
wages as a low production cost advantage cannot be realised."^ 
In the simplest version of neoclassical theory of international trade, this problem of 
technological capability acquisition is not of great concern, since the theory assumes that 
technology, which is defined broadly to include all the abilities and skills needed to be 
assimilated, is acquired instantaneously and without cost. Many recent developments in 
the theory of the firm relax the assumption of costiess and timeless acquisition of 
technology but still assume that the firm adopting and creating the new technology is 'a 
monolithic body responding perfectiy to its single-minded owner/manager' (Enos and 
Park, 1988, p.18).''^ The fact that firms in a developing country frequentiy encounter 
many obstacles to smooth and effective acquisition of technology, even if the country 
grows rapidly, is tiien easily overlooked. These hindrances include poor infrastructure, 
physical bottlenecks, lack of information, government intervention, a small domestic 
market, low education levels, political and social instability, and so on. Under these 
circumstances, the ability of a new industry or firm to catch up to international levels of 
technology has important implications for its dynamic comparative advantage. 
Given the state of economic growth and national scientific and technological 
development in a developing country, an industry or firm at the initial stage of 
development possesses weak technological capability and has to rely largely on 
technology imports from developed countries, which necessarily involves transactions 
across international borders."^ A developing country can acquire technology through 
Technology can be formed as (1) capital embodied technology (such as equipment, tools and 
intermediate goods), (2) human embodied technology (such as various forms of skills, knowledge and 
know-how possessed by labour), and (3) disembodied technology (such as patent, blueprints and 
operating instructions), which may combine and constitute complex forms defmed as 'technological 
packages' (Madeuf, 1984). 
44. Technological capability, which is a combined outcome of various economic, social and technical 
inputs, can be defined as the ability to make effective use of technology in production, investment 
and innovation and to improve and/or reproduce the technology. Typologies of technological 
capability are provided by many researchers. See, for example, Baranson and Roark (1985), Desai 
(1984), Fransman (1984) and Westphal, Kim and Dahlman (1985). 
45. Arguments in these works, which are well summarised and advanced in Kamien and Schwartz (1982), 
are more relevant to the innovation and technical change activities of firms close to the world 
technology frontier. 
46. This is the case with respect to 'north-south' technology flows. However, it is argued frequently 
that world technology trade occurs predominantly among developed countries. Madeuf (1984) shows 
that more than 90 per cent of expenditure by OECD countries on technology trade is remitted to 
other developed countries. Vickerly (1986) also argues that three-quarters of world technology trade 
occurs between OECD countries. For an overview of the issue of technology transfer among 
developed countries, see Pavitt (1985). 
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transnational corporations or multinational enterprises, involving long-term ownership 
and management by the technology suppliers.^'' However, for the purpose of the present 
study, where the selection and operation and then development of the imported 
technology in the recipient country is of concern, discussion will be limited to non-
multinational type technology trade. That is, in the international market, the recipient 
purchases packages of technology including manufacturing facilities, capital equipment 
and the services and skills necessary to put it into operation. Turnkey technology transfer 
is one typical example. 
Technological capability in the recipient industry or firm can be acquired through a 
series of stages, through what can be described simply as (1) decision-making and 
technology transfer, (2) technology learning and creation of competitiveness, and (3) 
R&D and technology improvement to strengthen competitiveness (Figure 2.1). The 
process of acquiring technological capability and the creation of international 
competitiveness will be analysed in Chapter 7, with the focus on POSCO. 
Figure 2.1 Flow chart of technological capability acquisition process 
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and 
technology import 
Capital embodied and/or dis-
embodied technology is mainly 
transmitted via imports of the 
technology package(s). Some 
forms of learning take place. 
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Technology 
learning • 
R&D and 
technology 
innovation 
Human embodied technology is 
mainly obtained via learning-
by-doing, labour training and 
education, etc. Some technical 
changes occur. 
The technology is absorbed. 
It will be improved and/or 
innovated upon in order to 
proceed towards the world 
technology frontier. 
Decision-making and technology transfer 
In a technology transaction, there is always a supplier (or a number of suppliers) and a 
recipient, or sometimes an intermediary. In order to establish a new or not-yet-
47. See Reddy and Zhao (1990) for an extensive literature review of a multinational enterprise's role in 
international technology transfer, mode of transfer and choice mechanisms and determinants of the 
mode. There are various channels by which technology flows to developing countries. Forms of 
technology transaction include the purchase of all or part of a plant and equipment; the establishment 
of technical service contracts; the purchase of know-how in the form of specifications or blueprints; 
license or patent agreements; franchising; subsidiaries; joint ventures; hiring or inviting foreign 
technicians; and sending people abroad for training or to obtain detailed information, or both. These 
types can be categorised as 'commercial' technology transfer, but 'non-commercial' transfer exists 
and includes reviews by technical journals and training of foreign students (UNCTC, 1987). Myer-
S tamer (1990) in his study of high-tech development in NICs distinguishes two types of technology 
transfer - 'conventional' including the above two types and 'unconventional' including reverse 
engineering, reverse brain drain and foreign direct investment in developed countries. 
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competitive industry, a recipient makes plans for technology import; searches for 
available technology packages in the international market; studies the economic and 
technical feasibility of these packages; and selects one of them. At the same time, 
prospective suppliers offer packages of technologies and conditions. Subsequently, as 
the interests of the recipient and supplier sides meet, the technology will be transferred.^ 
In this study, 'technology transfer' is defined to mean that, once foreign suppliers 
are approached, the transfer begins and is said to be completed when the recipient has 
carried out all of the activities necessary to commence production (Enos and Park, 
1988)."' Negotiations of terms of contract, financing, equipment purchase, construction 
and installation (and, in many cases, training of local labour), testing and start up are 
included. The overall output at this stage is an operational production facility for 
producing goods. Many factors at this stage are important not only for efficient and 
smooth transfer of the technology but for future competitiveness of the recipient. The 
main factors among them are summarised as follows. Some evidence about the 
importance of these factors in the technology import process is provided in Chapter 7. 
Appropriate technology^^ 
This issue arises from the general disparity between present factor proportions in the 
recipient country and the factor requirements of the technology. It is very important to 
the long-run competitiveness of a recipient whether the most advanced technology or a 
simpler one which may now be obsolete in developed countries is chosen. In a static 
sense, the simpler technologies may be more appropriate to developing countries given 
current input availabilities and general economic conditions. In a dynamic sense, 
however, the advanced technologies may serve as growth cones for further 
development.^^ 
Transfer price 
Technology transaction involves outlays on engineering consultation prior to building 
48. The objective of the supplier is to maximise its expected present value of operation by gaining a 
secure position in new markets, countering competitive pressure and utilising cheaper inputs abroad 
or by selling the technology and receiving payments from its exploitation by the recipient. The 
objective of the recipient is, if viewed as a separate firm, to maximise the risk adjusted expected 
present value of operation by employing the new technology (Smith and Jordan, 1990). If the 
government of the recipient country is a decision-maker, the objectives will be broader and include 
increasing national technological capability; reducing technological dependence abroad; improving 
the balance of payments; employment creation; and/or supporting the development of particular 
sectors. 
49. In the literature, 'technology transfer' has been viewed from many different angles, depending on 
research purpose and design. For useful reviews, see Mansour (1981) and Reddy and Zhao (1990). 
50. This is an old but long-standing issue. See various contributions on this subject by Kindleberger 
(1965), Stewart (1977), Harper and Soon (1979), Sen (1980), LitUe (1982), Enos (1984) and the 
volumes edited by Bhalla (1979,1981), Robinson (1979) and Stewart and James (1982). 
51. Vernon (1966) suggests that presently the best technology in developed countries would likewise be 
best for the newly established industry in the developing country. 
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plants; purchasing facilities and capital equipment; transferring engineering information 
about production processes; supervising detailed engineering; and labour training." 
Determination of the price of technology transfer is a matter of transactor behaviour and 
the structure of the international technology market/^ In some cases, competition among 
supplier firms will be the main determinant (Baranson, 1970). In many cases, however, 
a recipient pays high costs for technology import due to the oligopolistic character of the 
technology market, which is a major problem of technology transfer (Vaitsos, 1973; 
Teece, 1976; and Contractor, 1981). Nevertheless, effective transfer involves the 
recipient's ability to purchase or hire the most advanced equipment for exploration and 
development at a fair and reasonable cost (Zakariya, 1982). 
Financing 
Financial bottlenecks due to low levels of foreign currency reserves and imperfect 
conditions on the capital market in developing countries sometimes constitute an obstacle 
to effective technology transfer. Even if capital in the form of finance (or loans) is 
internationally mobile, it may be difficult sometimes for the recipient to gain access to the 
international loan market due to the finance and/or technology suppliers' concerns about 
risks and the uncertainty involved in the technology transfer and loan repayment. Other 
tilings being equal, tiie recipient's ability to arrange cheaper and sufficient loans will give 
the firm some advantages over the long term. 
Plant construction 
When plant is a major part of the imported technology, plant construction may be the 
most important part of the technology transfer and use up most of the transfer costs. Any 
defect or weakness in the plant will not only induce additional costs but also have a 
negative impact on the firm's operation. In a large turnkey project, construction costs are 
immense, and generally comprise fixed costs (such as capital equipment purchase) and 
variable costs (such as site construction and hiring local labour). Variable costs can be 
saved in a substantial amount, if work practices are more efficient or construction labour 
costs are cheaper (Findlay, 1990). If construction is not carried out rapidly and 
skillfully, huge expenditure on large pieces of equipment can saddle a firm with excessive 
costs. 
52. Madeuf (1984) argues that there must be a distinction between transfer cost and technology cost. 
The former refers to marginal cost of the technology per unit of final product and the latter to the 
marginal cost per transfer agreement. Here, in this discussion, transfer cost includes both, unless 
otherwise specified. 
53. According to Caves (1982), the imperfection of the technology market, like other markets for 
intangible assets, would make for an indeterminate transfer price. Alam and Langrish (1981) 
suggests that a recipient firm will enjoy more favourable terms if a non-multinational enterprise is 
willing to transfer technology and if the recipient makes less frequent use of a supplier's brand 
names. 
39 
Role of government 
An indigenous firm in a developing country may have a limited capacity or capability to 
carry out efficient decision-making and negotiation, regardless of competitive potential. 
This offers a possible explanation for interventionist practices by government, whatever 
the demerits of intervention. When a domestic firm lacks the information necessary for 
technology import, the government may play a leading role in information collection and 
dissemination, influencing the firm's decision-making process.^ "* When the domestic 
firm has neither an international reputation for technological and financial capacity nor 
experience in dealing with foreign technology and finance suppliers, government 
involvement as a de facto guarantor of repayments of the debts or loans may be valuable 
not only in bargaining over the terms of the technology import but also in procuring 
foreign fmance. 
Learning effects 
As the recipient accumulates experience and information during the transfer stage or from 
the akeady executed projects, the costs of subsequent transfer will decline (Teece, 1977; 
and Davidson, 1983).^^ Three kinds of learning effects can be identified at this stage. 
First, a host firm can gain information about and experience of the process of searching 
for the appropriate technology and negotiating with prospective suppliers (Smith and 
Jordan, 1990).^^ Much technical knowledge can also be acquired by the host firm 
through active participation in a succession of technology contracts with foreign 
consultants, producers and equipment suppliers. Second, the labour force can gain 
technical skills and knowledge during the transfer process from the training program 
(Lasserre, 1982).^' Third, participation and involvement in plant construction and 
facilities installation generates learning in construction techniques, process design, 
equipment design, and various planning and management skills. 
Learning and creation of competitiveness 
Production, adaptation of the imported technology, maintenance of the plant and 
equipment, capital widening and/or deepening, intensive labour training and education. 
54. The practice of having an organisation screening all technology import proposals ensures that a large 
body of information is gathered in the one place (Smith and Jordan, 1990). 
55. Other firms also can benefit from the experience and information accumulated by the previous 
recipient, as a result of which the counuy's overall technology dependence will ease. 
56. Since identification of and negotiation with potential technology suppliers is itself a costly process, 
this kind of learning is valuable for subsequent U^sfer negotiations. 
57. Through initial training, a labour force can acquire basic know-how in the application of all aspects 
of the imported technology, such as basic process design, equipment design and procurement, 
consUTJCtion, testing, start up, operation and maintenance. This form of learning allows for the 
acquisition of human embodied technology and is as important a process as the possession of capital 
embodied technology. 
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minor technical changes and initiation of R&D can be included in this stage. Major 
learning and acquisition of know-how takes place through experience and training, which 
is an important source of dynamic scale economies and of the human embodied 
technological capability of the host firm. As the recipient begins to achieve success with 
the imponed technology, it also acquires a reputation for technological capability, which 
constitutes an advantage in further technology transactions. 
Once the technology has been transferred appropriately, the question arises of how 
rapidly and effectively to master and utilise it in a way which allows for, on the one hand, 
productivity growth and quality improvement and, on the other hand, high operating rates 
and technological efficiency at the designated levels or at least at those achieved in 
competing countries.^^ The incremental forms of technological change are also required 
to fit the recipient's conditions.^' The most important factor in achieving tiiese is the 
early emergence of indigenous technological capability, not only to adapt, modify and 
develop the technology and to use it efficientiy (Rosenberg, 1982; Stewart, 1984; and 
Fransman, 1986) but also to reduce technological dependence on advanced countries 
(Stewart, 1984). 
When we define 'learning' as various processes and means by which individuals 
firms acquire information, technical skills and knowledge, this must be the most 
important factor contributing to building indigenous technological capability. Learning is 
an important source of dynamic scale economies (or, in other words, learning 
economies), which may be internal to the firm, external to the firm, or generated by the 
accumulation of manufacturing experience as whole. In any case, the cumulative level of 
learning leads to performance improvement and hence to a decrease in average production 
costs.^ Having the ability to realise learning economies effectively, the recipient firm in 
58. Wide variations occur in rates of plant utilisation and operation across countries. High operating 
rates reflect the ability to keep a plant operating, which apart from being a skill is also a source of 
long-run competitiveness (Findlay, 1990). 
59. Imported technology is always to some extent implicit in the sense that the recipient never possesses 
information as complete as the supplier (Nelson and Winter, 1977; and Fransman, 1984). In 
addition, domestic conditions, either economic or technical, will come to exert an influence as the 
foreign technology is assimilated and adapted, since technology is to some degree responsive to 
prevailing conditions. These conditions suggest that incremental changes are the rule rather than the 
exception. 
60. Effects of learning from various activities on average cost can be written as follows: 
First, assume that there are n (/ = 7 , 2 , . . . , /) forms of activities and that each activity generates a 
different kind of learning; /'th kind of learning is represented by the cumulative sum of ith activity 
only; all activities commence from r = 1; and there are no other variables affecting average cost other 
than learning. Then, the average cost function at a certain point of time (c,) can be written as 
i=l i=J 
where N-, = y«(T) dT.and t = l , 2 , ... , T ; i = 1 . 2 I. 
A is a parameter and c, is the average production cost at time t. Y^, is the level of /th activity at 
time t. Ni, is the cumulative sum of Jth activity, representing the /th kind of learning. Aj is the ith 
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a developing country can eventually reduce the gap in technology and labour productivity 
between it and firms in developed countries where the learning effect is now less 
significant.®^ Technology learning will bring about not only enhancement of the host 
firm's technological capability but also various forms of incremental or minor 
technological improvements.®^ Chapter 7 employs the concept of learning developed here 
and will discuss the importance of learning in acquiring technological capability and 
creating competitiveness in POSCO's growth. 
Learning can be generated from two kinds of sources - one which depends largely 
or entirely on experience in activities related to plant operation and production (leaming-
by-doing) and another which does not (see Bell, 1984). This distinction may be pedantic 
but it has some practical implications, as follows. 
Learning-by-doing 
The execution of production tasks generates a flow of leaming-by-doing. This includes 
(1) accumulation of information about a system from problems encountered or 
opportunities perceived, which stimulates the search for improvement, and (2) 
understanding and knowledge about how the particular system works and how changes 
might be made, which serves to enable definition of better methods (Bell, 1984). 
Leaming-by-doing can then be seen as feedback, allowing for improvement in 
subsequent executions. In the literature, accumulation of experience and information in 
production tasks is most commonly conceived as the cumulative sum of output, which, 
given input prices and facilities, leads to a decline in average production costs." Sources 
learning coefficient, satisfying 0 < A, < 1 for all i. 
61. The learning effect generates cumulative tendencies between firms and also between countries, so that 
the one which acquires an initial advantage in any area where learning economies are significant 
enjoys an increasing advantage over time until the effect tapers off. See Stewart (1982), Westphal 
(1982) and Krugman (1984). For the learning effects in monopoly or oligopoly models, see also 
Spence (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Teng and Thompson (1983), Bhattacharya (1984), Hall 
(1984) and Ross (1986). One conclusion is that (strong) learning economies will stagger entry by 
other firms and protect early entrants from competition by conferring cost advantages on them. 
62. Fransman (1986) holds that technology improvements, taking place within developing countries, 
have resulted in technological trajectories different from those in the highly industrialised countries. 
These may result in a situation where some advanced developing countries are able to export some 
forms of technologies. See Nelson and Winter (1977) and Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) for 
discussions of 'technological trajectory'. The technology learning process may incorporate, in some 
cases, new technical knowledge generated from R&D activities, as well. However, this close 
involvement of R&D activity in industrial investment products seems relatively rare in developing 
countries (Chantramonklasri, 1990). 
63. This is the case in the conventional learning model, where learning is represented by a single 
variable, the cumulative output (/ = 1). 
c, = AN-^ = A{ 
which is frequently described as a 'learning curve'. It has been widely observed that, in a broad range 
of industries, the effects of leaming-by-doing are shown to be highly significant (Hirsch, 1952, 
1956; Alchian, 1963; Hirschmann, 1964; Preston and Keachie, 1964; Rapping, 1965; Sheshinski, 
1967; Stobaugh and Townsend, 1975; Zimmerman, 1982; and Lieberman, 1984, 1987). Arrow 
(1962), who introduced leaming-by-doing into the main stream of economic theory, rejects 
42 
of leaming-by-doing include not only actual production tasks but also the other activities 
related to operation of plant and equipment such as plant maintenance and repairs. 
Bell (1984) suggests that 'learning from changing' is another important source of 
performance improvement.^ This form of leaming-by-doing denotes experience 
obtained from various technical change activities. Various technical problems are 
encountered in the course of production. Adaptation of the original plant design is also 
required to suit local and specific production conditions. Much of the growing 
technological capacity of the firm can be generated from engaging in these trouble-
shooting and adaptive activities and from actually undertaking the technical changes and 
improvements in the plant (Bell, 1984). If there are successive investment projects in 
major new units of capital embodied technology for capital widening and/or deepening, 
the firm has opportunities for significant learning by participating in the projects.®^ 
Enthusiastic participation and extensive involvement in the projects contribute to building 
up the capacity to undertake subsequent improvements and modifications or to make 
technical changes. 
As Bell (1984) asserts, these kinds of learning generate: (1) greater understanding 
of the particular form of the technology, (2) greater knowledge of the more general 
principles involved, which can allow perception of possible wider applications of those 
principles to the particular production system, and (3) increased confidence in 
manipulating the technology. However, in most economic analyses, leaming-by-doing is 
viewed as having three characteristics - passive, automatic and costless.®® This 
assumption is convenient for theoretical development but is by no means entirely realistic. 
Fransman (1986, p.41) argues that, 
[T]hese flows do not emerge automatically and the quantity and quality of 
information will be largely dependent on the degree of effort allocated by the 
firm to facilitate such flows. Furthermore, the improvement-response of 
individuals and groups within the firm to such information ... is also not 
automatic but will depend on numerous firm-specific factors ... [CJhange 
inevitably implies additional cost, in terms of the opportunity cost of human 
and possibly material resources, relative to the no-change situation ... 
cumulative output as representing learning {Yt) on the ground that, if the rate of output is constant, 
then the stimulus to learning will seem to be constant. Arrow thus takes cumulative gross 
investment as Yt, since each new machine produced and put into use is capable of changing the 
environment in which production takes place, implying that learning can occur because of 
continually new stimuli. 
64. Bell (1984) in fact argues that there is a limit to the improvement generated by accumulation of 
experience and information from actual production and that the limit may often be reached very 
quickly. 
65. See Gilbert and Harris (1981) and Ghemawat (1984), who show, in formulating game-theoretic 
models, that learning lowers construction costs for successive plants. 
66. In much of the literature, it is assumed implicitly that little or no explicit action is required to realise 
increased knowledge and skill; some quantum leap in learning will take place given the period of 
doing; and no expenditure is required to capture learning effects. 
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Furthermore, there is always a degree of uncertainty in the process of 
knowledge acquisition. For these reasons the casual link between 'doing' 
and, later, changing the ways of doing, is not necessarily a strong one, and is 
certainly not inevitable. 
Learning can certainly be accelerated by the willingness and ability of a firm and 
individuals in the firm and by investment in labour training and education, for example. 
More effective learning can also be acquired through institutionalised mechanisms for 
monitoring, recording, reviewing and interpreting the experience.®' Without these, the 
ongoing operation of the plant will result in less experience, and the process of 
technological capability acquisition will lack a critical driving force. Furthermore, the 
opportunity for learning may vary depending on plant size, the domestic market, 
industrial structure and government policies. All of these imply that learning-by-doing is 
more than passive, automatic and costiess. 
Other forms of learning 
'Leaming-by-training' or 'leaming-by-using' does not rest primarily on accumulation of 
production-related experience. The former is an explicit flow of understanding and 
knowledge from labour training and education. The latter is a flow of information from 
consumers, which again stimulates the firm's leaming-by-doing ability. However, it 
may not be easy in practice to distinguish these forms of learning from doing-based 
learning and hence their importance will often be blurred. 
A number of studies suggest that various kinds of formalised training programs are 
crucial sources of learning the techniques employed in securing improvements in any 
technology (see Bell, 1984, for references). Training and education provides individuals 
in the firm with not only technical knowledge and skills but also the ability to undertake 
effective leaming-by-doing. This type of learning is in fact a costly process and, in many 
cases, is far more explicit and significant than doing-based leaming. Its importance is 
apparent from the early stage of technology transfer (Lasserre, 1982). 
Rosenberg (1982) and Maidique and Zirger (1985) have proposed 'leaming-by-
using', which refers to a flow of new information generated as the result of the activities 
involved in selling products and their use by consumers over an extended period.®^ 
Westphal, Rhee and Purcell (1981) also emphasise the importance of the information 
feedback provided by distributors and users to firms. Maidique and Zirger (1985) 
suggest two types of effects from this source. One is new knowledge in design 
modifications that improves performance, useability or reliability. The other is improved 
6 7. This can be considered as a separate form of leaming in the sense that it can also generate stimuli fw 
change and elements of knowledge and understanding about the technology itself. See Bell (1984, 
pp. 194-195), for more discussion of this. 
68. This type of information flow may occur even in the absence of competitive markets, although the 
pressures to act on the information and make improvements may be reduced (Fransman, 1986). 
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operation of the original or the subsequently modified product. Dynamic scale economies 
generated from this type of learning are, in most cases, external to firms. 
R&D competition and technology innovation®' 
For a developing country, technology-learning capacity is overwhelmingly more 
important than technology-creating capacity and technological activity in the country tends 
to be almost exclusively of the learning and improvement kind rather than the 
Schumpeterian frontier moving innovation type (Westphal, Rhee and Purcell, 1981; Lall, 
1982; Dore, 1984; Katz, 1984; and Fransman, 1986).™ However, this does not mean 
that technology-creating activity is neither important nor necessary in a developing 
country. It implies, rather, tiiat technology learning and assimilation is a prerequisite in 
building technology innovation capacity. Although technology transfer and learning can 
stimulate development, the recipient country's ultimate requirement is to build up the 
capacity to generate its own technology in an effort to reduce technology dependence and 
to approach the international technology firontier. 
While the host firm accumulates technological capability through learning, its low 
unit labour cost advantage relative to developed countries, which in fact stimulated the 
technology import, may also diminish as the economy grows and hence the wage rate 
increases. The recipient firm, whose competitiveness in the intemational market has been 
increasing through learning, will then encounter stronger pressure from competitors in 
other countries. Even if producers in developed countries suffer from a comparative cost 
disadvantage, they in general have stronger product and process innovation capacity than 
the host firm. The latecomers in less developed countries may possess less technological 
capability but have an advantage with respect to lower labour costs in many process lines. 
In this situation, although having mastered the imported technology at a substantial level, 
the host firm is in need of newer or more updated technology to strengthen intemational 
competitiveness.^^ However, the fmn may not be able to buy the new technology from 
developed countries whenever needed (at least in the short run), if the developed 
countries which possess the newer or more advanced technology can exploit the effect of 
dynamic scale economies and the technology is strategically very important to sustain or 
69. The term R&D is commonly defined as 'work undertaken to acquire new technical knowledge to 
produce new materials, products or processes'. See Freeman (1969) and OECD (1981). 
70. See Kamien and Schwartz (1982, chs 2 and 3) for an extensive survey and analysis of the 
Schumpeterian hypotheses regarding the economics of technical progress. See also Scherer and 
Perlman (1992) for various empirical contributions on this issue. 
71. If a country is unable to increase productivity at the same rate as its competitors, or if it lags behind 
in quality improvement (when quality changes are accounted for in constructing price indices), the 
relative prices wiU rise. Given a price elastic demand as well as substitutabiUty between goods from 
different countries, the country which lacks either productivity growth or quality improvement may 
lose competitiveness both at home and abroad, ceteris paribus. 
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Strengthen their competitiveness. 
Under these circumstances, the host firm's activities need to go beyond technology 
learning and involve various forms of major (more than incremental or minor) technology 
improvement and innovation in order to enhance its indigenous technological capability 
and to provide a firm competitive basis/^ This process usually involves more complex 
and cosdy activities such as institutionalised searches for more significant improvements 
and innovations alongside development of industrial R&D facilities. In this sense, R&D 
is important in determining longer run developments in the firm or industry and also in 
capturing the capabilities involved not only in know-how but also in know-why."' 
There is considerable evidence that industrial R&D is crucial to technological 
progress and hence productivity growth.'"* High levels of R&D expenditures relative to 
competitors consequently serve as an effective tool in promoting comparative advantage 
by enhancing the industry's market share (Audretsch and Yamawaki, 1988; and 
Lundberg, 1988). Many empirical studies, though mostly applied to the cases of 
developed countries, imply that industrial development undertaken to capture technical 
innovation ability in a developing country requires aggressive efforts in terms of 
engagement in R&D competition. Even though industrial R&D involves large fixed 
costs, product (and also process) development through R&D can have the same ultimate 
effect as cost reduction.'^ R&D is, rather, a longer term activity in terms of industrial 
72. If pressure exists for structural adjustment, incentives will be created to develop new technologies. 
In principle, technological change can affect the present status of competitiveness by changing factor 
intensity. 
73. There have been many studies of R&D, innovation and technical change, containing different 
analytical aims and contributions. Dosi, Paviu and Soete (1990, p.83) point out common features 
in these studies that appear to be crucially important to understanding of the process of technological 
innovation and indusuial development: (1) The increasing complexity of research and innovation 
activities militates in favour of institutional organisations (R&D laboratories, government 
laboratories, universities, and so on) as the typical environment for the production of innovations. 
(2) A significant amount of innovation and improvement is generated primarily through R&D and is 
generally embodied in human skills and organisations (primarily firms). R&D, like learning, is 
generally incorporated in, and linked with, the productive activities of the firm. (3) Technical change 
does not occur randomly, which implies that technical change and innovation is to a large degree a 
cumulative activity. (4) It seems incorrect to assume that technological knowledge consists mainly 
of scientific principles, since such knowledge is very specific to applications. Scientific knowledge, 
which certainly plays an increasingly crucial role in opening up new possibilities of major 
technological advances, may account for only a fraction of the input in the innovative process. (5) 
The innovative process has rules of its own which, at least in the short and medium term, cannot be 
described as simple and flexible reactions to changes in market conditions. Innovation is inherent in 
the technologies themselves, and determines the range within which products and processes can 
adjust to changing economic conditions, and possible directions of technical progress. (6) Research 
and innovative activities are characterised as maintaining a highly uncertain nature. The technical 
and commercial outcomes of research activities are difficult to predict ex ante. See also Freeman 
(1974), Rosenberg (1976, 1982), Klein (1977), Nelson and Winter (1977, 1982), Soete (1979), 
Sahal (1981, 1985), Dosi (1982, 1984), Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Tuebal (1982), Pavitt (1984), 
Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) and the volumes edited by Griliches (1984) and by Dosi et al. (1988, 
especially Parts IV and V). 
74. See, for example, Griliches (1979, 1980, 1986), Mansfield (1980), Scherer (1982a, 1982b), Odagiri 
(1985), Odagiri and Itawa (1986) and Herman (1990). 
75. Following Spence (1986, p.475), suppose that products deliver services to customers. Let 5 be the 
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development in the sense that dynamic scale economies can be realised through 
cumulative R&D expenditure. This issue in relation to the Korean steel industry, 
especially with respect to POSCO, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided a concept of international competitiveness and a theoretical 
rationale for the development of a manufacturing industry and the evolution of its 
international competitiveness from a developing country's perspective. The arguments 
can be summarised as follows: 
(1) International competitiveness is defined as the ability of a country to compete 
against other countries in international trade, maintaining or increasing its share of world 
exports and/or limiting the extent of import penetration into the domestic market While 
the concept of comparative advantage provides a theoretical basis for international 
specialisation and trade pattems, the term intemational competitiveness can be applied to 
real world situation where, among competing products from different countries, there 
exist differences not only in prices but also in non-price dimensions of the products. The 
evolution of intemational competitiveness in an industry can ultimately be viewed from 
the changing pattems of import substitution in the domestic market and of export shares 
in the intemational market. 
(2) Development and evolution of intemational competitiveness in a new 
manufacturing industry in a developing country can be understood firstly by the dynamic 
comparative advantage model in the contexts of economic growth and product cycle. 
This model asserts that the general but fundamental forces behind development of the 
industry are economic growth and accumulation of various forms of capital specific to the 
industry to ensure comparative advantage in the industry and the tendency of intemational 
production locations to move from developed to developing countries as technology 
becomes standardised. 
(3) The importance of sizeable domestic demand in industry growth is also stressed 
here. Investment is made primarily in industries where a large domestic demand exists, 
ceteris paribus. When various forms of scale economies are present, sizeable and 
increasing domestic demand plays an important role in the evolution of the industry's 
competitiveness by providing opportunities for cost reduction. A country with a large 
domestic demand can, with relative ease, pursue industrial development using that 
service, P(s) the inverse demand, x the quantity of goods and c(x) the cost function. Let f(q) be the 
quantity of services per unit of the good. Then, s = f(q}x, and the cost of delivering services 5 is c(x) 
= c(slf(q)). lif(q) > 0, and ^ is raised through R&D of the product development kind, then (dcldq) < 
0, that is, the effect is to reduce the cost of the service. 
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domestic demand as a springboard. 
(4) Government intervention and industrial policies are also important factors 
affecting the industry development process, since these may either reduce or promote 
growth of an industry. When a developing country encounters market failure problems 
preventing private markets from developing an industry in a proper manner and as rapidly 
as is desirable, infant industry promotion policies may be effective in helping the industry 
grow and may contribute to realisation not only of potential comparative advantage in the 
industry but also national welfare, but only under several strict conditions. Even in this 
case, sustained and unnecessary protection or assistance produces economic distortions 
nationally and intemationally. To boost efficiency and competence in protected firms, it 
has been suggested that authorities have to assure firms of unconditional elimination of 
protection and assistance after a certain time. 
(5) It is argued that, given the conditions mentioned above, evolution of 
international competitiveness in a new manufacturing sector depends ultimately on 
successful acquisition of technological capability. Since technology is neither costlessly 
nor instantaneously transferable, and successful technology transfer is in general subject 
to many obstacles and difficulties in developing countries, the firm's or industry's ability 
to overcome difficulties and to accumulate technological capability efficiendy is crucial to 
developing competitiveness. The process of technological capability acquisition begins 
with technology imports from developed countries. Competitiveness is then achieved 
through technology learning by involvement in operation of the imported technology and 
actual production. As the host firm accumulates technological capability through various 
forms of learning, the importance of R&D and the capacity to undertake technology 
improvement and innovation increases to sustain and strengthen competitiveness. 
3 Development of the Korean 
Steel Industry: A Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear picture of the growth of, and the 
structural changes in, the Korean iron and steel industry during the last three decades. 
Understanding the development process and changes in the structure of the industry is 
an important part of the analysis of major factors contributing to the industry's 
development. The main interest is not only to provide basic industry statistics and 
background information for use in the following chapters but also to look closely at the 
pattern of development and structural changes in the steel industry in relation to the 
issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2. 
This chapter first describes the conventional iron and steel production process and 
defines a number of terms and activities associated with it. It then reviews development 
of the Korean steel industr>' with respect to the structure of tiie industr>' and changing 
patterns of production, consumption and trade in iron and steel products. Some 
evidence of changing price competitiveness in Korea's major steel products is also 
provided. 
STEEL PRODUCTION PROCESS 
Figure 3.1 provides a flow chan of conventional integrated steel production technology, 
which can be divided into three stages - iron-making, steel-making and rolling.^ 
(1) Iron-making: Concentrate of raw materials such as iron ore, coking coal and 
limestone is heated in a blast furnace, providing pig iron. Firms in resource-rich 
countries such as Australia and the United States usually include raw materials mining 
activities as a part of their integrated production systems. 
(2) Steel-making: This stage includes, first, crude steel production using mainly 
pig iron and scrap steel in a crude steel-making furnace - either in a basic oxygen 
1. For details, see Appendix 2. There are alternative techniques such as the direct reduction steel-
making (accounting for only about 3 per cent of the world total output) and the smelting reduction 
iron-making technologies. The smelting reduction technique is not yet in commercial operation. See 
Findlay (1990). 
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Figure 3.1 Flow chart of the conventional integrated steel production process 
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furnace (BOF, also referred to as a Linz-Donawitz (LD) converter), an open hearth 
furnace (OHF), or an electric arc furnace (EAF) - and, second, production of semi-
finished steel such as slabs, blooms and billets. The pig iron-intensive BOF, mostly 
adopted in large integrated mills, and the scrap-intensive EAF, commonly used in mini-
mills, are today's conventional technologies, replacing the OHF, which was widely 
used until as recently as the mid-1960s. 
In general, a country's steel production capability is measured by its crude steel-
making capacity. The molten crude steel issuing from a furnace is sent to either the 
ingot casting shop or the continuous casting shop. Ingots from the ingot casting plant 
are reheated in the primary rolling mills, such as the blooming and slabbing mills, and 
transformed into semi-finished steel products. In the continuous casting system, the 
molten crude steel is poured into a mould and is cast directly into slabs, blooms or 
billets. Other things being equal, continuous casting is considered to be superior to the 
ingot casting system in terms of operating costs, capital costs, quality and yield. 
(3) Rolling process: The steel primary forms are further rolled to produce 
finished steel. In general, the yield of finished steel per unit of crude steel is between 
0.80 and 0.95. Rolled products can be divided into two groups, long products and flat 
products.^ 
Long products are produced either from blooms or billets. Blooms are rolled into 
structural bars of varying cross sections such as H-beams, which are used in 
construction, shipbuilding, rails and wheels. Billets, rolled from square booms into 
smaller sections, are transformed into wire rod (used in making wire entanglements, 
volts and nuts, nails and various wire products), and small sections/bars (used for 
machinery parts and accessories, agricultural machinery and reinforcing bars). 
Flat products are rolled from slabs. Slabs are sent either to a plate mill to make 
plates or to a hot strip mill where hot rolled steel coils are produced. Hot rolled steel 
coils either emerge as hot rolled sheets, strip, skelp and chequered plates, or further 
rolled in a cold strip mill or in a silicon steel mill. A cold strip mill produces cold 
rolled strip and sheets or coated products such as galvanised sheet, tinplate and black 
plate sheets in coil. Electrical sheets and strip are produced in a silicon steel mill. 
Plates are used in shipbuilding, transport equipment, civil engineering, heavy duty 
equipment, heavy machinery, tank boilers, LPG containers and so on. Hot rolled 
products are transformed into steel pipes, containers and guard rails. Various forms of 
cold rolled products are important in the production of automobiles and trains, electrical 
machinery and apparatus, office supplies, beverage containers and consumer durables. 
Electrical sheets and strip are essential materials for a wide range of electrical products. 
2. In general, flat products are produced in a large-scale integrated steel mill. Long products can be 
produced either in an integrated mill or in a mini-mill using electric arc furnaces. 
Table 3.1 Production, consumption and trade of semi-fmished and finished steel in 
Korea, 1962-90 (thousand tonnes; per cent) 
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Crude Steel Semis Finished Steel 
CP Q OR Q X M DD Q X M DD 
62 148 130 88.1 125 0 2 127 113 3 123 233 
63 247 145 58.5 137 0 43 180 165 77 202 290 
64 322 186 57.7 170 0 25 195 180 35 76 221 
65 322 227 70.5 219 0 13 232 215 58 155 312 
66 529 223 42.1 216 0 98 314 273 32 214 455 
67 585 331 56.6 320 0 26 346 394 19 369 744 
68 585 383 65.5 365 0 36 401 637 23 407 1,021 
69 756 438 58.0 416 15 98 499 916 72 556 1,400 
70 853 504 59.1 481 34 27 474 1,179 141 512 1,550 
71 911 547 60.0 519 35 90 574 1,359 382 826 1,803 
72 931 608 65.3 580 0 160 740 1,761 664 1,129 2,226 
73 2,183 1,240 56.8 1,163 1 383 1,545 2,672 880 1,421 3,213 
74 2,702 2,308 85.4 1,928 629 97 1,396 3,119 1,354 1,678 3,443 
75 2,852 2,558 89.7 2,430 23 180 2,587 2,727 972 985 2,740 
76 4,530 3,511 77.5 3,475 12 133 3,596 3,796 1,423 1,610 3,983 
77 4,635 4,346 93.8 3,020 18 274 3,276 4,951 1,352 2,072 5,671 
78 5,040 4,969 98.6 4,131 0 465 4,596 6,346 1,664 2,581 7,263 
79 8,680 7,610 87.7 6,130 718 273 5,685 7,479 2,431 2,404 7,452 
80 9,335 8,558 91.7 7,098 943 75 6,230 7,852 3,548 2,035 6,339 
81 12,587 10,753 85.4 10,067 340 74 9,801 10,115 4,368 2,026 7,773 
82 13,115 11,785 89.9 10,649 364 126 10,411 10,858 5,263 1,205 6,800 
83 14,040 11,915 84.9 10,995 336 89 10,748 12,089 5,366 2,023 8,746 
84 14,555 13,034 89.6 12,115 440 100 11,775 13,427 5,473 2,801 10,755 
85 15,612 13,539 86.7 12,594 374 80 12,300 13,931 5,239 2,547 11,239 
86 15,842 14,555 91.9 13,586 167 396 13,815 15,308 5,597 2,525 12,236 
87 18,298 16,782 91.7 16,124 182 880 16,822 17,507 5,743 2,873 14,637 
88 21,656 19,118 88.3 18,580 353 632 18,859 18,887 6,262 2,730 15,355 
89 22,176 21,873 98.6 21,704 804 394 21,294 21,756 6,448 3,407 18,715 
90 25,561 23,125 90.6 22,622 331 1,142 23,433 24,535 6,799 4,421 22,157 
Notes CP (capacity); OR (operating rate, %); Q (production); X (export); M (import); and 
DD (domestic demand = apparent consumption = Q + X - M). 
Semis (semi-finished steel) trade: the sum of slabs, blooms, billets and sheet bar. 
Semis production: ingots only untU 1976. The sum of slabs, blooms, billets and sheet bar 
from 1977 to 1990. The figures reported on an ingot basis from 1977 are the same as crude 
steel production figures. 
"0" means less than 500 tonnes. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
requiring many processes and a relatively high level of manufacturing technology. 
(4) Vertical integration: When a steel industry or firm undertakes these 
successive stages in the supply of finished steel products, the industry or firm is said to 
be vertically integrated. Backward integration occurs when the industry or firm 
develops a rolling sector first and then begins producing in turn steel primary forms and 
pig iron, previously supplied by imports (or by other firms). This process of backward 
integration generally precedes the establishment of a modem iron and steel industry in a 
developing country. 
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Table 3.2 Pig iron and raw materials production, consumption and trade in Korea, 1962-90 (thousand tonnes) 
Pig Iron Scrap Iron Ore CC 
Q X M DD Q X M DD Q X M DD M 
62 3 0 0 3 201 0 0 201 471 364 0 107 63 8 0 4 12 199 18 61 242 501 559 0 -58 134 64 7 0 19 26 250 26 45 269 685 587 0 98 166 65 26 0 9 35 269 23 77 323 735 709 0 26 117 66 43 0 51 94 109 5 118 ??? 789 882 5 -88 91 
67 33 0 50 83 88 3 287 372 698 668 0 30 88 68 46 0 79 125 178 0 391 569 830 772 0 58 103 69 41 6 58 93 104 8 701 797 710 673 10 47 92 70 49 0 8 57 275 27 840 1,088 571 515 75 131 80 71 23 0 53 76 307 30 755 1,032 504 421 31 114 56 
72 1 6 83 78 327 168 520 679 492 475 20 37 33 73 454 0 86 540 307 2 808 1,113 595 261 468 802 611 74 1,023 3 90 1,110 252 206 1,120 1,166 625 76 1,395 1,944 773 75 1,374 3 94 1,465 569 0 966 1,535 644 62 1,494 2,076 672 76 2,009 1 7 2,015 772 19 1,221 1,974 755 8 2,149 2,896 1,494 
77 2,426 15 20 2,431 1,227 1 1,714 2,940 791 4 3,722 4,509 2,007 78 2,749 17 29 2,761 1,813 8 1,932 3,737 693 0 3,623 4,316 2,067 
79 5,077 80 33 5,030 2,818 13 1,944 4,749 639 0 7,517 8,156 4,217 
80 5,582 130 7 5,459 3,142 10 1,910 5,042 619 0 9,142 9,761 4,910 
81 7,935 66 64 7,933 3,444 25 1,616 5,035 594 0 10,688 11,282 7,245 
82 8,442 40 72 8,474 3,593 141 2,424 5,876 620 0 11,510 12,130 9,039 
83 8,024 10 105 8,119 3,729 285 3,185 6,629 655 0 10,171 10,826 10,151 
84 8,764 0 166 8,930 4,280 124 3,217 7,373 625 0 10,287 10,912 12,193 
85 8,833 0 100 8,933 4,589 54 3,532 8,067 688 0 12,418 13,106 17,131 
86 9,003 1 386 9,388 4,783 76 4,108 8,815 582 0 11,941 12,523 16,436 
87 11,057 2 673 11,728 4,943 47 3,961 8,857 470 0 17,310 17780 18,386 
88 12,578 1 801 13,378 5,903 26 3,920 9,797 390 0 20,228 20,618 21,913 
89 14,846 0 1,063 15,909 6,254 19 4,089 10,324 344 0 21,685 22,029 23,500 
90 15,339 1 981 16,319 7,185 36 3,885 11,034 298 0 21,183 21,481 22,846 
Notes Scrap includes both iron and steel scrap and production means domesdc collection. 
CC: coking coal. Coking coal is not produced in Korea. 
Ferro-content of iron ore produced is equal to or more than 56 per cent 
Sources Kim (1976); 
Korea Iron and Steel Associadon, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Korea Energy Economics Institute, Yearbook of Energy Statistics, various issues. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the development of the Korean iron and steel industry in 
terms of production, trade and domestic demand in the categories of iron-making, steel-
making, rolling and major raw materials. There were two developments in particular 
that proved significant to Korea's creation of a modem iron and steel industry and that 
had a substantial impact on its international competitiveness. 
The first was the establishment of POSCO at Pohang, a small port town in the 
south-eastern part of the Korean Peninsular, and construction of POSCO's (and also 
Korea 's) first integrated steel mill, known as the Pohang works. POSCO began 
operation in some rolling plants from 1972 but was dedicated in June 1973 with 
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completion of the first stage project. Three expansions of the POSCO Pohang facility 
continued until May 1983. The second significant event was construction of Korea's 
and POSCO's second integrated steel mill at Kwangyang, a greenfield site on the 
southern coast in Korea. The first stage of the Kwangyang works was dedicated in May 
1987 and the final (fourth) stage was completed in October 1992. 
These two events have had a decisive impact on the development of the 
production side of the Korean steel industry. The development of the industry in Korea 
can be roughly divided into three stages in line with these events: after the Korean War 
(1950-53) and before 1972 when POSCO commenced production; from 1972 to 1986, a 
period of rapid development with the expansion of POSCO's Pohang works; and the 
period since 1987 with respect to the two integrated steel works in POSCO and 
completion of the first stage of the Kwangyang mill. 
THE KOREAN STEEL INDUSTRY BEFORE POSCO, 1954-71 
After the Korean War until the early 1960s 
Until the early 1960s, Korea was regarded as a typical less developed economy with 
high population density, very low levels of income, slow GDP growth rates, a small 
manufacturing sector and little infrastructure. GDP in real terms grew slowly, 
averaging about 4 per cent per annum during that period. As shown in Table 3.3, real 
GDP (at 1987 constant prices) in 1961 was less than US$14 billion.^ Real GDP per 
capita in that year was less than US$600 (see Appendix Table A.l) . Manufacturing 
was small but grew gradually, increasing its contribution to the national economy from 
about 12 per cent of GDP in 1954 to 14 per cent in 1961 (Table 3.3). The contribution 
of the iron and steel industry to the Korean economy during that period was negligible, 
accounting for less than or just about 1 per cent of total manufacturing value added. 
Scarcity of private capital and of technological knowledge constituted significant 
constraints on development of the industry. 
The history of Korea's modem steel industry can be dated back to the period of 
occupation by Japan (1910-45). In 1941, Japan built two steel mills in southern Korea 
to enhance its war efforts, though these were severely damaged during the Korean War 
(Amsden, 1989, p.293).'^ After the war, many small rolling firms emerged, producing 
mainly bars and wire required for reconstruction from the devastation of the war. Even 
though, as shown in Table 3.3, finished steel production rose steadily in tiiis period, 
3. Throughout this thesis, 'billion' refers to 'thousand million'. 
4. Kim (1976) provides some analysis of the status of the Korean steel industry in this period. 
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Table 33 Korea's iron and steel industry in the period 1954-61 (thousand tonnes) 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Production 
Iron ore 31.0 28.6 62.9 185.4 261.0 281.7 392.1 488.9 Pig iron 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 8.3 13.9 9.1 Reclaimed iron " 2.0 4.0 4.0 5.7 5.3 3.8 0.9 1.1 Ingots 0.3 0.1 0.1 17.0 19.5 38.2 50.1 46.7 Finished steel 9.7 10.3 20.2 24.6 35.4 64.5 89.3 60.9 Bars 5.1 6.1 15.0 17.4 25.1 40.2 44.6 32.5 Wires 4.0 3.0 4.0 4.8 6.3 18.2 20.7 11.5 Casting, forging - - - - 21.2 26.7 26.3 26.1 
Imports 
Ingots and billets - 0.2 3.3 0.9 0.3 1.0 8.1 20.1 Finished steel - 5.0 35.3 136.9 71.7 42.2 56.7 33.9 Bars - 0.0 17.5 18.6 12.9 7.9 7.2 4.1 Plates - 3.3 7.2 98.7 34.6 24.1 33.4 177 Others ^ - - - - 6.1 1.2 2.6 3.0 
Demand 
Ingots and billets - 0.3 3.4 17.9 19.8 39.2 58.2 66.8 Finished steel - 15.3 55.5 161.5 107.1 106.8 146.0 94.8 
GDP" 10.9 11.5 11.3 12.1 12.8 13.3 137 14.4 Mnf/GDP"^ 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.2 12.8 14.1 13.8 13.6 I & S / M n f ^ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 07 1.1 1.0 
Notes a Production of pig iron using iron and steel scrap. 
b Mainly ferro alloys, forgings and castings. 
c In billion US dollars at 1987 market prices. 
d Manufacturing output as a proportion of GDP (per cent). 
e Steel industry value added as a proportion of total manufacturing value added (per cent). 
Sources Kim (1976); 
Bank of Korea, National Accounts, 1984 and 1989; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1976; 
Korea Energy Economics Institute, Yearbook of Energy Statistics, various issues. 
Korea ' s production facilities were not only small in scale but employed obsolete 
technologies. To make matters worse, many of the facilities were idle, and many of 
firms frequently ceased production, resulting in very low overall operating rates. As of 
1961, total rolling capacity in all 27 firms was 346,000 tonnes per annum (Kim, 1976). 
However, total finished steel production was far below capacity - only 89,300 tonnes in 
1960 and 60,900 tonnes in 1961 (Table 3.3). 
As shown in Table 3.3, domestic demand for finished steel products was small. 
Consumption increased rapidly from less than 20,000 tonnes in 1955 to about 146,000 
tonnes in 1960, but dropped to 95,000 tonnes in 1961 due to lack of economic vitality 
and unstable social and political circumstances. Per capita consumption was still as low 
as 10 kilograms or less in this period. Regardless of low levels of finished steel 
consumption, more than half of Korea's domestic demand had to be met by imports 
because of low levels of domestic production. 
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Production of ingots and other steel primary forms increased after the late 1950s 
to meet growing finished steel production (Table 3.3). Smelting of iron and steel scrap, 
which was in relatively abundant supply as a result of the Korean War, was a main 
source of iron and ingot-making after the war.^ As finished steel production increased 
and supply of scrap began to exhaust itself, scrap smelting was gradually replaced by 
ordinary processes using iron ore as an input. However, the iron-making firms were 
still very small in scale and operations suffered from frequent shutdowns. Due to low 
iron-making capacity, more than 70 per cent of iron ore production was exported in this 
period (Kim, 1976). 
During the first two economic development plan periods, 1962-71 
As the Korean government promulgated its first 'Five-Year Economic Development 
Plan ' (development plan, hereafter) in 1962, the economy entered a path of rapid 
industrialisadon and economic growth. During the first two development plan periods 
(1962-71), Korea successfully promoted export-oriented economic growth, building up 
substantial production and export capacities mainly in its light industries, which were 
relatively labour-intensive and were at the late stages in their product cycles. In this 
period, the nadon's GDP in real terms grew rapidly, at an average of 9.6 per cent per 
annum. The manufacturing sector expanded at a rate even greater than GDP growth in 
real terms, accounting for less than 15 per cent of GDP in the early 1960s and more 
than 20 per cent at the end of the second development plan period. Although the 
nation's manufacturing was dominated by light industries, shares of total manufacturing 
output by heavy industries gradually increased, from 28.5 per cent in 1962 to 39.4 per 
cent in 1971 (see Appendix Table A.2). 
With accelerated industrialisation, domestic steel demand, especially for finished 
products for direct use in the rapidly growing economy, increased rapidly. Apparent 
consumption of finished steel was 0.2 million tonnes in 1962 and about 1.8 million 
tonnes in 1971 (Table 3.1). This inidally had to be met by imports, leading to sharply 
increasing imports of rolled products from about 0.2 million tonnes until the mid-1960s 
to 0.8 million tonnes in 1971. Hot coils accounted for about 40 per cent of total imports 
of rolled products, and these were further processed into final products by domestic 
firms (Korea Iron and Steel Association, 1977). 
Structural imbalances among different steel production stages 
The rapid growth of the Korean economy not only increased domesric demand for 
5. In 1955-60, total supply (Q + M) of ingots and other steel primary forms was less than finished steel 
production, implying that the difference was met by steel scrap (Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.4 Number of iron and steel firms and production capacity in Korea, 
1962 and 1971 (thousand tonnes) 
1962 1971 
No. of Firms Capacity No. of Firms Capacity 
Iron-making ^ 
Steel-making" 
EOF 
EAF 
OHF 
3 203 
7 1 48 1 7 911 
4 80 9 318 
0 0 5 430 
3 68 3 1 63 
39 571 56 2 135 
^ n g product 31 420 44 ^ 233 
0 0 2 340 
2 56 
Plate 
Hot rolled sheet 2 56 
Cold rolled sheet 0 0 2 210 
and tube 5 89 6 288 
Stainless sheet 1 6 2 8 
Notes a Represented by crude steel production capacity. 
EOF (Basic Oxygen Furnace); 
EAF (Electric Arc Furnace); 
OHF (Open Hearth Furnace). 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1975 and 1991. 
f inished steel but also led to accumulation of private capital, making some forms of 
investment available, particularly in the rolling facilities, where business opportunities 
were cenainly enhanced. This brought about considerable expansion of the nat ion 's 
production capacity, through either augmentation of existing plant or the construction 
of new facilities. As shown in Table 3.4, iron and steel-making capacity more than 
quadrupled between 1962 and 1971. Rolling capacity in 1971 was 3.7 times larger than 
in 1962. The major iron and steel firms increased in number f rom 47 in 1962 to 76 in 
1971. ' 
Most of the investment was in rolling facilities, particularly in making long 
products such as bars and wire rods, which caused substantial imbalances among iron-
making, steel-making and rolling capacities (see Table 3.4). As shown in Table 3.4, 
crude steel capacity as of 1971 was less than half that of rolling capacity, while iron-
making capacity was just over 20 per cent that of steel-making. Finished steel 
production increased rapidly thereafter, averaging about 32 per cent per annum during 
the two development plan periods. Production, which was about 0.1 million tonnes in 
1962, increased to about 1.4 million tonnes in 1971 (Table 3.1). 
However , none of the rolling plants were modem in terms of technology, scale 
and product quality. All facilities were medium or small in scale, with annual capacity 
6. According to the Korea Iron and Steel Association, 350 firms existed in 1971. Of these, 269 were 
iron and steel casting and/or forging facilities of extremely small scale. Their combined capacity was 
only 385,000 tonnes per annum; that is, their average capacit)' was less than 1,500 tonnes. 
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varying between 30,000 and 300,000 tonnes (Kim, 1976).' Operating rates were low 
because of the obsolete technology adopted, lack of operating skills and frequent 
shutdowns. As of 1971, the last year of the second development plan period, the level 
of finished steel production corresponded to only 64 per cent of the total capacity of the 
56 rolUng plants of more than 2.1 miUion tonnes (Table 3.4). 
Compared to the rolling sector, upstream steel production was still weak because 
of the small plant capacity (ranging from 50,000 to 160,000 tonnes per annum), old and 
out-dated equipment, obsolete technologies and biased investment towards finished 
steel production. Nevertheless, rapidly increasing production and imports of finished 
steel induced some expansion of steel-making capacity. Electric arc furnaces were the 
main source of steel-making in this period due to their greater suitability to small-scale 
operation. Capacity was 120,000 tonnes in 1963, when the technology was formally 
adopted for the first time, expanding to 430,000 tonnes in five firms at the end of 1971 
(Kim, 1976).^ Few steel-making firms were equipped with basic oxygen furnaces. As 
of 1971, nine firms possessed basic oxygen converters, with a total capacity of just 
318,000 tonnes per annum (Kim, 1976). Open hearth furnaces increased their capacity 
slightly from 68,000 tonnes in 1962 to 163,000 tonnes in 1971 (Table 3.4). Most of the 
crude steel-making furnaces were out-dated, uneconomically small in scale, and 
suffering from frequent operation failure and shutdowns, thus lowering overall 
operating rates of crude steel production for most years to no more than 60 per cent 
(Table 3.1). 
A few iron-making installations existed in this period, but most were obsolete and 
some stopped operation due to lack of commercial profit (Kim, 1976). In 1971, total 
iron-making capacity was 203,000 tonnes per annum but actual production was a mere 
23,000 tonnes (see Tables 3.2 and 3.4). Because of poor production capacity and low 
demand for pig iron, about 90 per cent of the iron ore produced in this period was 
exported (Table 3.2).' More than half of Korea's pig iron consumption, though very 
small, had thus to be met by imports. 
Government intervention to promote the iron and steel industry 
One of the serious deficiencies which the Korean iron and steel industry had to confront 
7. Even though there were sharp increases in finished steel production, particularly in the 1967-71 
period, rapidly increasing domestic demand and hence rising imports prevented Korea from reducing 
trade deficits in these products. 
8. Growing production of steel primary forms in electric arc furnaces again raised demand for iron and 
steel scrap from 201,000 tonnes in 1962 to 1,032,000 tonnes in 1971. Until 1965, most of the 
demand for scrap was met by domestic collection. Since then, however, imports began to increase 
due to exhaustion of war scrap and the consecutive construction of electric arc furnaces. 
9. Because of the low ferro-content of iron ore deposits and the huge costs required for mining and 
investment in equipment, iron ore production began to decline after 1968. 
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in this period was the large imbalance in production capacities between rolling, steel-
making and iron-making. This implies that it was possible to produce only a small 
proportion of fmal products within an integrated production system. A modem large-
scale integrated mill was seen as a prerequisite for efficient and competitive steel 
production. Even though some investment in the industry took place at the time, and 
rapid economic growth and increasing domestic steel demand followed, no private 
capital was invested in establishing such a modem integrated steel mill due, on the one 
hand, to huge capital and technology requirements and, on the other, to the uncertain 
and risky nature of the business. 
There also existed substantial differences between the product types supplied and 
those demanded, due to obsolete and old-fashioned production technologies, low levels 
of skill and technique, and capacity limits. High production costs and poor and uneven 
quality of domestic products were equally serious problems. Since the existing 
domestic plants could hardly compete with foreign producers in every area, the price 
levels of most products in Korea were higher than in the intemational market, which in 
turn affected competitiveness in many downstream industries (Table 3.5). 
Table Steel prices in the domestic market, selected products and countries, 
January 1969 (US$ per tonne) 
Korea Japan UK West Germany 
Cold rolled sheet 162 153 142 160 
Plate 163 128 105 128 
Wire rod 139 114 105 109 
Bar 124 108 106 119 
Angle 156 111 109 119 
Source Japan Iron and Steel Federation. 
The Korean govemment had long cherished a desire to establish a modem large-
scale integrated steel industry, even though it was commonly believed that such 
industry was too intensive in its use of capital and technology to allow a less developed 
country like Korea at the time to achieve successful and competitive operation. The 
govemment was nevertheless driven to promote such a project in light of the fact steel 
is a key industry for industrialisation, supplying an important input to a wide range of 
industries. This interest was also fuelled by Korea's domestic steel demand, which 
increased rapidly throughout the 1960s, causing substantial trade deficits, and was 
expected to grow strongly over the future in association with continuing economic 
growth and industrialisation. 
The govemment presumed that, in establishing a large-scale integrated steel mill, 
capital investment would be too large, and the period of time in which a reasonable rate 
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of return to capital could be realised would prove too long to attract initiative from a 
private domestic private firm. It sought therefore to establish the industry as a state-run 
project. During the second development plan period, the government strongly 
promoted the establishment of a large-scale integrated steel mill, equipped with modem 
technology that all had to be imported from technology and equipment suppliers in 
developed countries. In 1968, the government founded POSCO as a state-run entity.'" 
In April 1970, construction began on the first stage of POSCO at a greenfield site in 
Pohang. In fact, promotion of steel industry development in Korea was totally driven 
by the government, not by market forces, at a time when everyone believed that the 
current supply and demand-side situation in the Korean economy was too unfavourable 
to allow the project to succeed. In July 1970, the government promulgated the Iron and 
Steel Industry Promotion Law, which offered various direct and indirect forms of 
assistance to the industry. 
CONSTRUCTION OF POSCO AND RAPID GROWTH, 1972-86 
From 1972, the first year of the third development plan and one year before the official 
dedication of POSCO with completion of its fu-st stage project, POSCO commenced 
operation in some rolling mills to meet rapidly increasing domestic demand for finished 
steel. The Korean steel industry began to develop dramatically, with three more 
consecutive POSCO expansion projects to May 1983. POSCO's successful transfer of 
the most up-to-date technology in ordinary steel-making substantially enhanced the 
nation's iron and steel production capability in terms not only of scale but also of 
integrated steel-making technology and product mix. 
Rapid industrialisation and steel demand growth 
Korea's rapid economic growth continued throughout this period. Between 1972 and 
1986 (the third, fourth and fifth development plan periods), economic growth averaged 
8.9 per cent per annum in terms of real GDP. Per capita GDP in real terms almost 
tripled during the same period (Appendix Table A.l). 
While the manufacturing sector continuously increased its share of GDP, from 
22.4 to 31.7 per cent, the heavy and chemical industries' share of total manufacturing 
rose from 36.2 per cent in 1972 to 57.1 per cent in 1986 (Appendix Table A.2), helped 
by the government's 'heavy and chemical industry drive', which was launched in 1973 
and officially ended in 1 9 7 9 . I n particular, the metal products and machinery 
10. See Appendix 3 for a brief history of the founding and establishment of POSCO. 
11. As economic take-off and rapid industrialisation was being achieved through export-oriented growth 
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industries, which are highly steel-intensive, expanded remarkably, from 16.7 per cent of 
total manufacturing value added in 1972 to 40.0 per cent in 1986 (Appendix Table 
A.3a). The construction sector, another high steel-consuming industry, also grew 
steadily, increasing its share of GDP from between 5 and 7 per cent in the late 1960s 
and the early 1970s to more than 10 per cent in the mid-1980s (Appendix Table A.2). 
This growth provided favourable conditions for development of the steel industry, from 
both supply and demand sides. 
Rapid economic growth and the development of the heavy and chemical 
industries in this period were associated with strong growth of domestic demand for 
steel products. Consumption of finished steel rose from 2.2 million tonnes in 1972 to 
4.0 million in 1976 at the end of the third development plan period (Table 3.1). In 
1984, total finished steel consumption, which had grown at about 15 per cent per 
annum from 1970, exceeded 10 million tonnes for the first time. It reached 12.2 million 
tonnes in 1986 at the end of the fifth development plan period. Annual growth in the 
period 1971-86 was about 13 per cent on average. Per head steel consumption 
measured in crude steel equivalent also grew rapidly, from a mere 55 kilograms in 1971 
to 160 kilograms in 1980, and to almost 300 kilograms in 1986 (Korea Iron and Steel 
Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues). This rapidly increasing 
demand for finished steel, which caused growing trade deficits until the early 1970s, 
was gradually replaced by domestic products owing to construction of POSCO and, to a 
lesser extent, expansion of rolling capacity in other private firms. 
Capacity expansion in the Korean steel industry 
Korea's rolling capacity, which was 2.1 million tonnes in 1971 (before construction of 
POSCO's first rolling mill), increased to 4.6 million tonnes in 1973 with completion of 
the first stage of POSCO's Pohang works (Tables 3.4 and 3.6). POSCO's share of total 
rolling capacity in 1973 was about 40 per cent. As shown in Table 3.6, rolling capacity 
(excluding secondary processing) expanded to 14.6 million tonnes in 1983 with 
completion of the Pohang works' final expansion project, which accounted for more 
than half of Korea's total rolling capacity. Finished steel production, which began to 
increase rapidly from the mid-1960s, rose sharply to 2.7 million tonnes in 1973, which 
was about a 52 per cent increase from 1972 and almost double 1971 production levels 
in light industries in ttie 1960s, the Korean government, in an effort to achieve rapid economic 
transformation towards more complex and capital-intensive sectors, began to pursue vigorously a 
policy to move national resources out of the traditional labour-intensive light industries into the 
heavy and chemical industries. Under the 'heavy and chemical industry drive' policy, which was 
officially announced in 1973 and implemented until 1979, the government designated certain 
indusuies as 'targeted industries'. These included steel and other metals, shipbuilding, machinery, 
chemicals and electronics. 
61 
Table 3.6 Number of iron and steel firms and production capacity in Korea, 1973 and 1983 (thousand tonnes) 
1973 1983 
No. of Firms'' Capacity'' No. of Firms" Capacity' 
Iron-making 3 1^ 153 (o g2) ^ 8 332 qo) 
Steel^making'^ 14 2,183 (0.47) 15 14,040 (0.65) 
6 1,252 1 9,100 
7 789 14 4,940 
1 140 0 0 
70 ( - ) 4,593 (0.37) 87 (72) 14,553 (0.52) 
BOF 
EAF 
OHF 
Wire rod .^r 6 745 
Other long product 
Large size 0 0 2 550 
Medium/small size 59 3,442 65 4 542 
Plate 3 486 3 1^ 869 
HR sheet/coil 1 27 2 4 792 
Cold rolled sheet 2 600 3 i'826 
4 114 
n j 1 80 
35 
Stainless sheet 5 33 
Electrical sheet 
T>Tes and wheel n j 1 
Secondary processing 
Pipe and tube 10 480 20 2,882 
Tin plate nj- 3 269 
Galvanised sheet n j 4 504 
Section n j 13 388 
Wire rope n j 6 282 
Notes 'n.r' stands for 'not reported' - either zero or included in the other category. 
a Total number of rolling firms is the sum of the figures in the table excluding those of 
secondary processing. The figures in the parentheses are the actual number of firms. 
b The figures in parendieses are the shares of POSCO. 
c Represented by crude steel production capacity. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1983 and 1991. 
(Table 3.1). Production grew continuously thereafter, reaching 15.3 million tonnes in 
1986. 
The expansion of rolling capacity also brought about diversification of the 
product mix. Before the establishment of POSCO, rolling facilities were concentrated 
mainly on production of long products. Throughout the 1970s, however, flat product 
capacity grew more rapidly than long product capacity. By 1983, flat product capacity 
exceeded that for long products. While the capacity to produce long products in 1983 
was about 5.8 million tonnes per annum, capacity required to produce the two major 
forms of flat products, plates and hot rolled sheets/strip was 6.7 million tonnes (Table 
3.6). With respect to flat products, the capacity for higher quality products such as cold 
rolled or electrical steel products was still small compared to that for hot rolled steel 
products and plates, even though these higher quality products are produced primarily 
f rom hot rolled sheets (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.6). 
The founding of POSCO contributed greatly to development of the rolling sector, 
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and also marked a turning point in the nation's modem crude steel-making and pig iron-
making capacity. With completion of POSCO's first stage project, equipped with 1.03 
million tonnes of crude steel-making basic oxygen furnaces and about 0.95 million 
tonnes of iron-making blast furnaces, Korea in 1973 now had a total of 2.2 million 
tonnes of crude steel capacity and 1.2 million tonnes of iron-making capacity (Table 
3.6). When the Pohang works' final stage was finished in 1983, Korea's crude steel 
production capacity increased to 14.0 million tonnes (65 per cent in POSCO) and its pig 
iron capacity, all possessed by POSCO, to 8.8 million tonnes.^^ 
Thanks largely to POSCO's consecutive expansion projects, production of crude 
steel and hence of semi-finished steel increased very rapidly. In 1973, when POSCO's 
Pohang works were officially dedicated, crude steel production exceeded one million 
tonnes for the first time in Korean history, double the 1972 figure. From then until 
1986, one year before dedication of the first stage of POSCO's second integrated mill 
(the Kwangyang works), Korea's crude steel production averaged 21 per cent of growth 
rates per annum. Crude steel production reached about 15 million tonnes in 1986, after 
exceeding 10 million tonnes for the first time in 1981 (Table 3.1). 
Pig iron production, which was less than 50,000 tonnes per annum until 1972, 
increased sharply to 454,000 tonnes in 1973 and to 1 million tonnes in 1974 (Table 
3.2). POSCO's consecutive expansion projects brought about growth rates of almost 20 
per cent per annum until 1986. Pig iron production as of 1986 was 9.0 million tonnes. 
Vertical integration process 
With the establishment of POSCO, the structural imbalances between rolling, steel-
making and iron-making capacities and the gaps between finished steel, semi-finished 
steel and pig iron production levels narrowed gradually. As shown in Table 3.7, the 
capacities of steel-making and iron-making as a proportion of rolling capacity in 1971 
were just 43 per cent and 10 per cent respectively, but increased to 48 per cent and 25 
per cent respectively in 1973. Until 1983, the capacities of steel-making and iron-
making continued to increase, reaching about 97 per cent and 61 per cent of rolling 
capacity respectively (Table 3.7). 
On a production volume basis, semi-finished steel production in 1983 (of 22.6 
million tonnes) accounted for more than 90 per cent of finished steel production. Pig 
iron production by POSCO in the same year was 8 million tonnes, which was 
equivalent to 63 per cent of Korea's total finished steel production volume and was able 
12. All other pig iron plants and basic oxygen furnaces except those in POSCO stopped operation or 
were scrapped by 1980 due to obsolescence or non-profitabihty (internal information, Korea Iron and 
Steel Association). Many small or medium-sized firms entered into rolling or further processing of 
steel primary forms or hot coils supplied by POSCO. Some of them installed or upgraded their 
elecuic arc furnaces to meet their own demand for crude steel. 
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Table 3.7 Differences in capacities and production levels among rolling, steel-making 
and iron-making in Korea, selected years, 1971-90'' 
1971 1973 19g3 1987 1990 
(RoUing =100) 
Steel-making 
Iron-making 
427 (38.2) 
9.5 (17) 
47.5 (61.8)^  
25.1 (32.8)'' 
96.5 (91.0) 
60.7 (66.4) 
86.4 (92.1) 
53.3 (63.2) 
78.8 (92.2) 
54.2 (62.5) 
Notes a Ratios of semis and pig iron production to that of finished steel in parentheses 
b Figures for 1974 when POSCO operated a fuU year for the first time. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
to supply nearly 90 per cent of POSCO's crude steel-making capacity (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 
3.6 and 3.7). As the Korean steel industry underwent a process of vertical integration, 
f rom 1983 about 70 per cent of pig iron requirements for crude steel production was 
supplied by POSCO and about 90 per cent of finished steel was met by domestically 
produced steel primary forms. Table 3.7 suggests that the Korean steel industry was 
integrated backwards - developing a rolling sector first, followed by expansion in steel-
making capacity and then in iron-making capacity. 
Export expansion and enhancing international competitiveness 
Due to rapidly increasing domestic production, Korea's exports of finished steel, which 
were less than 100,000 tonnes before 1970, began to expand dramatically from the early 
1970s.^^ After exceeding 1 million tonnes in 1974, finished steel exports grew 
continuously to reach 5.6 million tonnes in 1986. The average growth rate in the period 
1974-86 was 12.6 per cent per annum. 
However, Korea imported substantial and increasing amounts of rolled products 
as well, due to rapidly rising domestic demand. Total finished steel imports broke the 
one million tonne level in 1972, rising to over 2.5 million tonnes in the mid-1980s, 
accounting for more than 20 per cent of domestic consumption (see Table 3.1). 
Despite remarkable increases in production, Korea remained a net importer until 
1978 due to high growth rates of domestic demand for rolled products in this period 
(Figure 3.2). Korea's total exports of finished steel exceeded imports for the first time 
in 1979, by 27,000 tonnes. Finished steel trade surpluses increased progressively 
thereafter. Korea achieved a trade surplus of 4.1 million tonnes in 1982, and then 
maintained its position as a net finished steel exporter with surpluses of between 2.5 
and 3.5 million tonnes (Figure 3.2). 
13. Unlike the other industries promoted by the government under the heavy and chemical industry 
drive, POSCO actively entered the international export market for finished steel as soon as it began 
operation, although it was meant to supply mainly the domestic market. 
Figure 3.2 Net trade of iron and steel in Korea, 1970-90 (thousand tonnes) 
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Construction of POSCO brought about not only rapid increases in production and 
exports but also a remarkable improvement in price competitiveness. In 1974, the year 
after the dedication of POSCO, domestic prices of various steel products in Korea were 
still higher than those in both Japan, the most price-competitive country at the time, and 
the United States (Figure 3.3a). Since that time, the price competit iveness of the 
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Korean steel industry has increased both in the domestic and international markets. In 
1984, ten years after the construction of POSCO, the Korean steel industry was 
supplying the domestic market with various steel products at prices lower than steel 
firms in other countries/^ Export prices were also very competitive. In the mid-1980s, 
for example, Korea's export prices of most products were about 10 or 20 per cent lower 
than Japan's export prices (information provided by POSCO). 
As shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, upstream processing - crude steel and pig iron-
making - supplied mostly the domestic rolling sectors. Both exports and imports of 
semi-fmished steel and pig iron were not very large compared to those of finished steel, 
even though production and domestic demand were rapidly increasing. In the case of 
semi-fmished steel, Korea became a net exporter in 1979, though with a small surplus, 
owing to the completion of POSCO's third expansion project in December 1978, which 
added 2.9 million tonnes to the nation's crude steel capacity.^^ Despite continuously 
increasing crude steel production, however, Korea turned into a net importer of semi-
fmished steel again in 1986, to meet input requirements for a strong increase in finished 
steel production. 
Iron-making experienced a similar trade trend to steel-making (Figure 3.2). 
Followed by a sharp rise in production of pig iron by POSCO, Korea became a net 
exporter of pig iron in 1979, though with a small surplus. Soon after, in 1983, however, 
Korea became a net importer of pig iron once more. Since that time, pig iron imports 
have risen, and there has been little export, although production was continuously 
increasing with expansion of POSCO's blast furnaces (see Table 3.2). 
FURTHER CAPACITY EXPANSION SINCE 1987 
Rapid economic growth and industrialisation in Korea has continued strongly since 
1987. Growth of GDP at constant prices averaged more than 9.6 per cent per annum 
between 1986 and 1990 (National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean 
Economy, 1992). Continuing industrialisation resulted in increasing shares of 
manufacturing output by heavy and chemical industries from about 57 per cent in the 
mid-1980s to more than 60 per cent in the late 1980s (Appendix Table A.2). In 
particular, the metal products and machinery sectors, which produce various steel-
14. This does not necessarily mean either that the prices were decided fully by market forces or that the 
Korean steel products were also the most competitive in terms of product quality and other non-price 
factors. See Chapters 6 and 7 in this thesis. 
15. There was in fact a large trade surplus of semi-fmished steel in 1974, after POSCO's first full-year of 
operation, bringing sharp rises in crude steel production The sudden and large amounts of additional 
semi-finished steel could not be fully consumed domestically at firsL A substantial amount of semi-
finished steel was exported in that year. In 1975, however, Korea soon turned into a net importer of 
semi-fmished steel again to meet rapidly increasing domestic finished steel production. 
Figure 33b Price competitiveness in major steel products, selected countries, 
1989 and 1992 (US$ per tonne) 
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intensive manufactures such as fabricated metal products, machinery, electrical 
appliances, trains and automobiles, have grown persistently and accounted for larger 
shares of manufacturing value added over time - from about 30 per cent in the mid-
1980s to more than 37 per cent in 1990 (Appendix Table A.3a). Finished steel 
consumption in 1990 was 22.2 million tonnes, which is almost 10 million tonnes more 
than in 1986, the last year of the fifth development plan period. 
As shown in Table 3.3b, Korea has maintained strong price competitiveness in 
major steel products throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. In 1989, Korea still 
showed the lowest domestic steel prices among the major steel producers in Northeast 
Asia and the United States. In 1992, Korea was the most price-competitive in terms of 
domestic market prices of hot coils, cold rolled coils and plates, though the United 
States, which has made enormous efforts to restructure the steel industry in recent 
times, achieved domestic wire rod prices lower than in Korea. 
Construction of Korea's second integrated mill in POSCO: the Kwangyang works 
In the early 1980s, the Korean government promoted establishment of the nation's 
second integrated steel mill to meet the rapid growth of domestic demand for and 
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Table Number of iron and steel firms and production capacity in Korea, 1987 and 1990 (thousand tonnes) 
1987 
No. of Firms" Capacity^ 
Iron-making 1 11,672 
Steel-making 13 15,612 BOF 1 11,800 EAF 12 6,498 
Rolling 79 (71) 21,915 
Wire rod 5 1,118 Other long product 
Large size 2 850 Medium/small size 56 5,910 Plate 3 2,360 HR sheet/coil 1 7,940 Cold rolled sheet 3 3,344 Cold rolled hoop 0 0 Stainless sheet 7 278 Electrical sheet 1 80 T>Tes and wheel 1 35 
Secondary processing 
Pipe and tube 29 3,258 Tin plate 3 295 Galvanised sheet 4 1,157 Section 13 414 Wire rope 6 339 
(1.00) 
0.65)) 
1990 
No. of Firms" Capacity^ 
1 
14 
1 
13 
79 (68) 
3 
2 
48 
3 
1 
3 
12 
5 
1 
1 
36 
3 
5 
13 
19 
17,561 
25,516 
17,580 
7,936 
32,423 
1,726 
1,000 
7,385 
2,810 
13,525 
5,036 
300 
450 
156 
35 
3,149 
580 
2,450 
438 
495 
(1.00) 
(0.69) 
(0.63) 
Notes a Total number of rolling firms is the sum of the figures in the table excluding those of 
secondar>' processing. The figures in parentheses are the actual numbers of firms. 
b In thousand tonnes. The figures in parentheses are the shares of POSCO. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1988 and 1991. 
exports of steel products. Even though there were strong efforts this time by private 
companies to enter the large-scale steel business, the government ended up assigning 
the project to POSCO, which was believed to have accumulated internationally 
competitive steel-making technologies and experiences. With construction of not only 
Korea 's but also POSCO's second integrated mill - the Kwangyang works, which 
adopted the world's most up-to-date integrated steel-making technologies (POSCO, 
1988) - the Korean steel industry has taken a step forward with respect to production 
scale and technology. The first stage of the Kwangyang works project was dedicated in 
May 1987 and its fourth and final stage is scheduled for completion in October 1992. 
When the third (of four) projects by the Kwangyang works was completed in 
December 1990, Korea's crude steel capacity rose to 25.5 million tonnes, including 9.6 
million tonnes provided by the Pohang works and 8.1 million tonnes by the Kwangyang 
works. This represented an 82 per cent expansion compared to capacity in 1983 when 
the expansion projects of the Pohang works were finished (Tables 3.1 and 3.8). A 
comparison of Tables 3.6 and 3.8 shows remarkable capacity expansion in rolling and 
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in iron-making also. The nation's (and POSCO's) iron-making capacity expanded to 
17.6 million tonnes by 1990. Rolling capacity in 1990 rose to 32.4 million tonnes, 
more than double that of 1983, resulting not only in greater gaps between the capacities 
of rolling, steel-making and iron-making compared with those in 1983 but also in a 
sharp increase in imports of steel primary forms in 1990 and of pig iron since 1986 (see 
Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.7). 
Growth of mini-mills and other rolling firms 
The Korean iron and steel industry as of 1990 was composed of one large-scale firm, 
POSCO, having two integrated works; 13 semi-integrated mini-mills equipped with 
electric arc furnaces and rolling facilities; and 54 non-integrated rolling firms, mostly 
small in scale (Table 3.9). By adding 3 blast furnaces, 5 basic oxygen converters and 
several rolling mills belonging to the Kwangyang works, which finished its third stage 
projects at the end of 1990, POSCO expanded to 17.6 million tonnes of iron-making 
capacity with 8 blast furnaces, 17.6 tonnes of steel-making capacity with 11 basic 
oxygen furnaces, and 20.4 million tonnes of rolling capacity (Korea Iron and Steel 
Association, 1991).'^ These accounted for all of Korea's iron-making, 69 per cent of 
steel-making and 63 per cent of its rolling capacities (Table 3.8). 
In the case of the mini-mills, total electric arc furnace capacity increased steadily 
from 2.9 million tonnes in 1979 to 4.9 million tonnes in 1983 and to 7.9 million tonnes 
in 1990 (Table 3.9). Rolling capacity also grew at similar rates, reaching 8.6 million 
tonnes in 1990, which represented a 57 per cent increase over 1 9 8 3 . U n t i l 1987, 
shares of mini-mills in Korea's total steel-making and roUing capacity rose to 43 and 36 
per cent, respectively. However, due to consecutive construction of large-scale basic 
oxygen furnaces and rolling mills in the Kwangyang works, the shares dropped to 31 
and 27 per cent, respectively, as of 1990, although the mini-mills continuously 
expanded their capacities. In the case of the non-integrated rolling firms, they 
16. This suggests that, by assuming 100 per cent operating rates by its steel-making furnaces and 95 per 
cent of roUing yield, POSCO could supply more than 80 per cent of the steel primary forms required 
at full operation of its rolling mills. Since commencing operation, POSCO's operating rates in crude 
steel-making have in fact been more than 100 per cent, except for a few years (internal information 
from POSCO; and World Steel Dynamics, 1988 and 1989). 
17. By considering generally lower operating rates in rolling than in steel-making, the mini-mills' crude 
steel production could supply most of their input requirements for rolling, although the expanding 
electric arc furnace capacity increased scrap consumption from about 8.5 million tonnes in Ae mid-
1980s to 11.0 million tonnes in 1990 (Table 3.2). Operating rates (per cent), calculated as ratios of 
production to capacity, of the different production stages in the Korean iron and steel industry are as 
follows (Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues): 
1983 1987 1990 
Iron-making 90.9 94.7 87.3 
Steel-making 84.9 91.7 90.6 
RoUing 83.1 79.9 75.7 
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Table 3.9 Structure of mini-mills and rolling firms in the Korean steel industry, 
1979-90 (thousand tonnes; per cent) 
1979 1983 1987 1990 
Mini-mills (semi-integrated) 
No. of firms / of EAFs 16/34 14/42 12/38 13/29 Steel-making capacity * 2,885 (34.4) 4,940 (35.2) 6,498 (42.6) 7,936 (31.1) per firm 180 353 542 610 per EAF 85 118 171 274 Rolling capacity" 3,429 (38.4) 5,477 (37.6) 6,893 (36.4) 8,593 (26.5) per firm 214 391 574 661 
Rolling firms (non-integrated) 
No. of firms 62 60 58 54 
Total capacity 1,319 (14.8) 1,508 (10.4) 2,552 (14.9) 3,387 (10.5) per firm 21 25 44 63 
Notes 'per firm': average capacity per firm; 
'per EAF': average capacity per EAF. 
a Number of firms and total number of EAFs. 
b Per cent of Korea's total steel-making capacity in parentheses. 
c Per cent of Korea's total rolling capacity in parentheses. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
accounted for a small share in Korea's total capacity. Even though their capacity 
expanded gradually from 1.5 million tonnes in 1983 to 3.4 million tonnes by 1990, their 
share in Korea 's total rolling capacity remained only at between 10 and 15 per cent 
(Table 3.9). 
The mini-mills and rolling f u m s expanded not only their total capacity but also 
their average scale. As shown in Table 3.9, average steel-making capacity per mini-
mill rose from 0.35 million tonnes in 1983 to 0.61 million tonnes in 1990. Average 
rolling capacity per mini-mill also increased from 0.39 to 0.66 million tonnes during the 
same period.^^ Average capacity per electric arc furnace in mini-mills also grew 
considerably to 0.27 million tonnes in 1990, which was more than twice as large as that 
in 1983, while the number of furnaces was reducing. These changes imply that these 
small-scale and obsolete electric arc furnaces were gradually scrapped and that the 
mini-mills were being modernised, at least, in terms of scale. In the case of the non-
integrated rolling firms, there would appear to have been more frequent entry and exit 
in the steel business. Over time, the number of rolling firms was declining but average 
capacity was increasing, even though most firms were still operating on a very small 
18. According to the Korea Iron and Steel Association, there were 12 mini-mills in 1991 with 28 EAFs. 
The numbers of fu-ms and of EAFs were reduced by one each, compared with those in 1990. 
However, their total steel-making and rolling capacities increased to 8.4 and 9.5 million tonnes, 
respectively. Their average capacities then grew to 0.70 million tonnes in steel-making and 0.79 
million tonnes in rolling. Average capacity per steel-making furnace also increased to 0.30 million 
tonnes. 
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scale. As of 1990, there were 54 rolling firms, with an average capacity of merely 
63,000 tonnes per annum (Table 3.9). 
Strong production and demand growth 
Construction of the Kwangyang works and expanding steel-making and rolling 
capacities in private companies brought about substantial increases in Korea's iron and 
steel production. Between 1986 and 1990, finished steel production increased at an 
average of 12.5 per cent per annum - from 15.3 million tonnes in 1986 to 24.5 million 
tonnes in 1990 (Tables 3.1). Installation of new blast furnaces and basic oxygen 
converters in POSCO led to a sharp rise in production of steel primary forms and pig 
iron in this period, at rates even higher than for finished steel production, averaging 
13.6 and 14.3 per cent per annum, respectively. As of 1990, Korea produced 23.1 
million tonnes of crude steel. This made Korea the world's seventh largest steel-
making country after Russia (161.4 million tonnes), Japan (110.3 million tonnes), the 
United States (81.0 million tonnes), China (66.3 million tonnes), West Germany before 
unification (38.4 million tonnes) and Italy (25.5 million tonnes). 
Korea also experienced very rapid and persistent growth in steel consumption in 
this period. Apparent consumption of finished steel in crude steel equivalents, which 
was less than 10 million tonnes before 1984, grew to over 20 million tonnes in 1990. 
Consumption growth rates averaged 14 per cent per annum in the period 1983-90. 
Such very strong growth in domestic steel demand was associated with high economic 
growth rates in this period, averaging almost 10 per cent per annum in real terms. 
Due to rapid growth of domestic demand, Korea's finished steel trade surplus 
declined in the late 1980s despite persistent capacity expansion and increasing 
production and exports (see Figure 3.2). Even though construction of the Kwangyang 
works contributed significantly to increases in steel production, growth rates of 
domestic demand for finished steel in the period 1986-90 (16 per cent per annum on 
average) exceeded those of production (12.5 per cent). And while finished steel exports 
increased continuously, averaging 5 per cent per annum between 1986 (5.6 million 
tonnes) and 1990 (6.8 million tonnes), imports also increased simultaneously but at a 
greater rate (at an average of 15 per cent per annum). Korea's trade surplus in finished 
steel of 4.1 million tonnes in 1982 dropped to 2.7 million tonnes in 1984 and 1985. It 
rose again, to 3.5 million tonnes in 1988, but fell to 3.0 million tonnes in 1989 and to 
2.4 million tonnes in 1990 (Figure 3.2). 
As finished steel production and consumption grew, domestic demand for steel 
primary forms also increased rapidly. Semi-finished steel demand, which rose to 16.8 
million tonnes in 1987, increased further to 23.4 million tonnes in 1990 (Table 3.1). 
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Most of this increase was met by rapidly growing domestic crude steel production. 
With construction of the Kwangyang works, Korea was able to meet 98.3 per cent of 
semi-finished steel consumption during the period 1987-90. Even though Korea was a 
net imponer of semi-finished steel from 1986, trade volumes were very small. During 
the period 1986-90, exports and imports averaged 334,000 tonnes and 643,000 tonnes 
per annum, respectively, with only 5.5 per cent of total supply of steel primary forms 
being traded (calculated from Table 3.1). 
Production and consumption of pig iron also continued to grow. Production 
increased to 11.1 million tonnes in 1987 and further to 15.3 million tonnes in 1990. 
POSCO was able to meet about 65 to 70 per cent of Korea's pig iron requirements for 
steel-making. POSCO consumed most of its pig iron output in its integrated steel-
making systems. Growing semi-fmished steel production in mini-mills was met by 
increasing domestic scrap collection and imports (Table 3.2). After being a net exporter 
of pig iron for a short period between 1979 and 1981, Korea turned into a net importer 
again, with almost no export. Imports increased gradually, although in very small 
volume, with total pig iron trade accounting for about 6 per cent of its total supply 
(production and imports) during the period 1986-90 (Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2). These 
semi-finished steel and pig iron trends imply that, even though there was rapidly 
increasing domestic demand throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and slightly increasing 
trade deficits in the late 1980s, Korea achieved near self-sufficiency in these products 
with capacity expansion by POSCO. 
Increasing imports of raw materials and iron and steel scrap 
Increasing steel consumption brought about growing domestic supply of steel scrap, 
which is an important input for electric arc furnaces in mini-mills. Domestic collection 
of scrap was around 0.3 million tonnes per annum in the first half of the 1970s and 
increased continuously to 4.8 million tonnes in 1986 (Table 3.2). Nonetheless, 
substantial expansion of electric arc furnace capacity in the private steel firms was 
associated with strong growth in demand for iron and steel scrap, increasing imports of 
scrap from less than 1 million tonnes in the early 1970s to about 4 million tonnes in the 
mid-1980s and onwards. Scrap supply security emerged as one of the important issues 
in the Korean steel industry, especially for mini-mills. 
Growing demand for, and production of, crude steel and hence pig iron induced 
rapidly increasing raw materials consumption.^' Throughout this period, Korea 
produced about 0.6-0.8 million tonnes of iron ore every year (Table 3.2). Before 
19. Of the many raw materials for iron and steel production, only limestone can be entirely domestically 
supplied. 
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construction of POSCO, Korea had to export most of its domestically mined iron ore. 
However, as POSCO's blast furnaces came into operation, imports of iron ore increased 
abrupdy to 0.5 million tonnes in 1973, 1.4 million tonnes in 1974, 9.1 million tonnes in 
1980, and 11.9 million tonnes in 1986 (Table 3.2). Korea turned into a net importer of 
iron ore in 1973. From 1978, there were no exports of iron ore. In the case of coking 
coal, another important raw material for iron-making that Korea does not produce, 
imports rose rapidly from 0.6 million tonnes in 1973 to 4.9 million tonnes in 1980 and 
to about 17 million tonnes in the mid-1980s (Table 3.2). 
Development of the steel industry has resulted in high import dependence on raw 
materials. For a resource-poor country like Korea, long-run supply security of raw 
materials is crucial. According to POSCO, a major importer of raw materials in the 
Korean steel industry, it has not encountered any major problems in securing adequate 
supplies of iron ore and coking coal, since these are relatively abundant throughout the 
world. There have also been various efforts, accompanied by investment, to develop 
foreign resources and diversify sources of supply. However, the situation with regard 
to iron and steel scrap is less certain, since these are more vulnerable to price and 
supply fluctuations throughout the world. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has employed basic industry data and relevant statistics to provide a 
review of the development of the Korean steel industry over the last three decades. A 
number of observations have been made about the major forces behind the development 
of the Korean steel industry. 
The Korean steel industry has developed substantially, particularly through rapid 
expansion in production volumes, since the establishment of POSCO in the early 1970s. 
It is perhaps not surprising that development of the Korean steel industry after 
construction of POSCO was strongly associated with Korea's rapid economic growth 
through industrialisation during the 1970s and 1980s. Close examination of the 
relationship between economic growth and the development of the Korean steel 
industry is the main focus of the next chapter. 
The growth of the Korean steel industry was associated with not only a 
remarkable expansion in production and exports but also with steady increases in 
domestic demand and imports. This implies that strong growth of various steel-
intensive manufacturing activities had important effects on steel industry development. 
This is reflected in the increasing and large-sized domestic demand for finished steel 
raised imports initially but subsequently induced domestic capacity expansion and 
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output growth, leading to the backward integration of the industry and eventually to 
increasing exports. The fall in net exports of finished steel, especially in the late 1980s, 
may also stem from the rapid increase in domestic demand in this period. 
The establishment of modem steel-making in Korean was driven by government. 
The government pushed the country into full-scale modem steel-making by founding 
POSCO despite the fact that the Korean economy was believed to be insufficiently 
developed at the time to establish such capital and technology-intensive integrated steel 
mills. Even the construction of Korea's and POSCO's second integrated steel works at 
Kwangyang in the mid-1980s was designed and promoted by the government. This 
involvement clearly suggests that the role played by government and industrial policy 
cannot be ignored in identifying the major sources of development of the Korean steel 
industry.^ 
The development of the Korean steel industry was clearly led by construction and 
expansion of POSCO, which has accounted for more than 60 per cent of Korea's total 
steel output. POSCO was established in the absence of experience and technology in 
modern large-scale integrated steel-making and thus depended totally on imported 
technology, but has grown to be one of the largest steel-making firms in the world. 
While the rapid economic growth and steel consumption rises provided favourable 
conditions to the development of the nation's steel industry and the government 
promoted establishment of modem steel-making, the creation and strengthening of 
international competitiveness depended ultimately on the capability of individual firms 
to acquire quickly and efficiently modem steel-making technology. 
20. This raises important questions of why the government promoted the establishment of POSCO given 
the lack of interest among private investors at the time, of how the government's promotional and 
protective practices can be justified, of what the major policy instrument was, and of how it affected 
the development of the steel industry. The extent of the government's involvement in development 
of the nation's steel industry after the construction of POSCO is discussed in Chapter 6. 
4 Economic Growth and 
Dynamic Comparative 
Advantage in Steel 
The dynamic comparative advantage model developed in Chapter 2 suggests that rapid 
economic growth in a developing country relative to the rest of the world increases the 
country's per capita stock of various types of capital - not only physical capital but also 
human capital in the form of skilled labour. These upward changes on the supply side 
deriving from rapid economic growth will propel the country towards development of 
modem steel-making, which requires intensive use of both physical and human capital 
relative to traditional light industries. It is not surprising then that, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the development of the Korean steel industry was strongly associated 
with the nation's rapid economic growth in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The main task of this chapter is to explain the growth of the Korean steel industry 
and shifts in comparative advantage in steel from a supply-side perspective. To do this, 
the chapter explores whether the model of dynamic comparative advantage is supported 
by evidence provided over the last three decades of Korea's experience in developing 
its steel industry. Great importance is placed on examination of the relationship 
between economic growth and changes in the structure of comparative advantage in 
Korea and within its steel industry, and the changes in Korea's position in the 
international steel product cycle. Changes in Korea's comparative cost advantage in 
steel-making are also examined in an effort to identify the main factors contributing to 
steel industry competitiveness. 
The first section sets out several propositions implied by the model of dynamic 
comparative advantage (DCA) in relation to steel industry development. These 
propositions are examined in subsequent sections. The second section shows that 
Korea's economic growth and expansion in manufacturing were rapid relative to the 
rest of the world. It also looks at shifts in the structure of the Korean economy, 
particularly in manufacturing, and the changing importance of the steel industry in 
manufacturing production, employment and trade. The third section explores changes 
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Table 4.1 Manufacturing classification by major production factors, selected products" 
Unskilled labour-intensive Human capital-intensive Technology-intensive 
Leather manufactures 
Yarn and thread, fabrics 
Textile products 
Clothing and footwear 
Televisions and radios 
Travel goods, handbags 
Toys, sporting goods 
Furniture 
Wood manufactures 
Glass and glassware, pottery 
Ships and boats 
Steel products * 
Automobiles and motorcycles 
Machine and automobile parts 
Domestic electrical goods 
Other metal manufacturing 
Trains, trailers 
Hand tools 
Plastic and rubber materials 
Pigments, paints, perfumes 
Watches and clocks 
Musical instruments 
Industrial machinery 
Chemical products 
Car and jet engines 
Office machines, computers 
Tractors, fork lifts, pumps 
Telecommunications equipment 
Electric power machinery 
Electrical apparatus 
Scientific and optical equipment 
Photo & cinema supplies 
Aircraft 
Notes a Product groups in each column are not in order of factor intensity. 
b Pig iron is classified as 'natural resource-intensive'. 
Source Krause (1982, pp.91-4); and Tyers and Phillips (1984, pp.53-5). 
in Korea's position in world steel production and trade, and growth of the Korean steel 
industry in the context of the world steel product cycle. This product cycle is examined 
in terms of steel production intensities with respect to stages of economic growth in the 
major steel-making developing and developed countries. The fourth section discusses 
the changing pattern of comparative advantage within the Korean steel industry over 
time. Several indexes are used to estimate comparative advantage and changes in trade-
related performance. The fifth section compares Korea's unit production costs and 
labour productivity with those of major steel competitors in the world, the main aim 
being to identify important sources of Korea's comparative cost advantage. 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DCA MODEL FOR STEEL IN NICS 
The dynamic comparative advantage (DCA) model developed in Chapter 2 suggests 
that, as a newly industrialising country (NIC) develops a relatively abundant supply of 
human capital, its production of tradables and its export specialisation in manufacturing 
gradually switch away from unskilled labour-intensive products to human capital-
intensive ones.' In human capital-intensive industries, production technology is 
relatively well standardised throughout the world, and of a sufficiently high level that 
well-trained skilled labour is a dominant factor in production. High levels of scientific 
and technological leadership and R&D capacity for technology innovation, which are 
1. Some human capital-intensive industries may require high levels of physical capital inputs, which 
developing countries, though growing rapidly, may still lack. However, physical capital is not 
considered to be a determining factor of comparative advantage due to relatively high international 
mobility (see Chapter 2). A degree of international capital mobility in the form of foreign loans may 
allow the human and physical capital-intensive industry in a developing country to proceed faster 
along its development path than the country's capital-labour rado alone would do. 
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Still in relatively scarce supply in NICs, are not crucial in determining international 
production location. 
As shown in Table 4.1, ordinary steel-making can generally be considered as a 
human capital-intensive industry, where a newly industrialising country may eventually 
obtain comparative advantage. The theory of dynamic comparative advantage therefore 
predicts the following general propositions with respect to changing comparative 
advantage in the steel industry in a NIC, particularly in a country like Korea with a high 
population density and poor natural resource endowments. 
In the domestic economy: Shares of manufacturing in the NIC's GDP, 
employment and exports rise as the country grows rapidly. At the same time, the 
primary sector's importance in the national economy shrinks. Within manufacturing, 
comparative advantage shifts gradually from unskilled labour-intensive light industries 
towards human capital (or skilled labour) intensive heavy industries.^ Steel becomes 
one of the manufactured items for which production and consumption are increasingly 
important in the NIC. Rapid increases in steel consumption result at first in rising 
shares of steel in manufacturing imports. As imports are gradually replaced and exports 
expand following increases in domestic production, the shares of steel in manufacturing 
exports grow and eventually its shares in manufacturing imports decline. When the 
economy grows further and obtains comparative advantage also in technology-intensive 
manufactures, the importance of steel in its GDP, employment and exports declines 
although its output and exports of steel products continue to increase. 
In the international steel market: Inter-country relocation of steel production 
occurs over time, with some NICs gradually eroding the developed countries' 
dominance. Rapidly growing NICs gradually obtain comparative advantage in steel, 
with rising shares in world steel output and exports. The product cycle of steel with 
respect to consumption also suggests rising intensity of steel use in developing 
countries but the opposite trend in most developed countries.^ As a consequence, a 
NIC's importance in world steel consumption and possibly imports also grows. 
Within the NIC's steel industry: The steel industry has many component 
processes, and factor intensities vary between its sub-sectors (Findlay, 1990). Final 
goods also comprise various product types manufactured in different mills with 
different technology. Accordingly, production and trade patterns within the steel 
industry differ between sub-sectors or between different product groups.'' As the 
2. As assumed in the DCA model developed in Chapter 2, the service sector is excluded from the 
discussion. 
3. The demand-side issue of the product cycle of steel will be discussed in Ch^ter 5. 
4. Even though a NIC establishes an integrated steel-making system, it specialises neither in all sub-
sectors nor all products in any sub-sector even if overall comparative advantage is sustained. 
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economy grows and the steel industry develops further, the densely populated but 
resource-poor NIC specialises more in downstream rolling processes.^ Among finished 
steel products, the country may be a net exporter of some steel products and, at the 
same time, a net importer of others. At first, production and exports (and also 
consumption) will be concentrated on long products and, among flat products, plates 
and pipes (Findlay, 1990). These products are not only, in general, less capital-
intensive and technically sophisticated than hot rolled or cold rolled flat products but 
are also mostly consumed in the early stage of economic development.® As the industry 
develops, comparative advantage shifts gradually to hot/cold rolled flat products that 
are used mostly in various manufacturing activities (Findlay, 1990). Continuing 
economic growth in the country reduces its dissimilarity with developed countries in 
regard to factor proportions, resulting in overlapping production and consumption 
patterns with developed countries in commodity composition. As impUed by the theory 
of intra-industry trade incorporated into the dynamic comparative advantage model, the 
NIC will then engage in increasing intra-industry trade in various steel products, 
particularly in hot/cold rolled flat products. 
Sources of comparative advantage: In an environment where all factor inputs 
other than labour are internationally traded, unit labour costs or labour productivity (per 
man-hour) will be the major determinant of international competitiveness. In the real 
world, however, there exist international differences in other factor costs per unit 
output. In this case total production costs per tonne, which can be divided into labour 
costs, material costs and financial costs, provide a proper means to measure 
intemational comparative cost advantage. A densely populated resource-poor NIC may 
enjoy a low labour cost advantage relative to developed countries but have 
5. This is because, even if the countr>' has an apparent advantage in its use of skilled labour, increasing 
impon dependence on raw materids becomes a major constraint to expanding further into more raw 
material-intensive products such as pig iron and, to a lesser extent, steel primary forms. As a result, 
iron and steel-making in an integrated steel mill would be limited by the degree to which it can 
support its own rolling capacity. Even if the in t e^ ted production system that processes imported 
raw materials through to final products is internationally competitive, extra production of pig iron 
and steel primary forms to supply other domestic firms or for export would not be beneficial unless 
there exists sufficient domestic demand. Therefore, the country may be a net importer of pig iron 
and, to a lesser extent, steel primary forms, even if integrated mills in the country are able to sustain 
self-sufficiency in those products. 
6. It is generally accepted that manufacturing HR/CR flat products requires higher technology levels 
and capital inputs than long products. Findlay (1990, p.28) argues, 'the use of a large hot strip mill 
to make flat products will raise the capital intensity of the rolling stage'. While long products are 
used mostly for buildings and infrastructure construction, HR/CR flat products are used as 
intermediate inputs to wider ranges of capital goods and consumer goods. Among flat products, 
manufacturing plates and other secondary products (welded pipes and tubes) require in general 
simpler processes and less capital or technology than HR/CR flat products. Plate are rolled directly 
from slabs without going through a strip mill or delicate coating processes like HR/CR products (see 
Figure 3.1). Tubes are further rolled from plates. Welded pipes are secondary products of HR steel. 
Among pipe products, seamless products are produced from blooms or billets. For details of steel-
making technology and use of steel, see the first section of Chapter 3 and Appendix 2. 
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disadvantages with respect to material costs compared with resource-rich countries. 
The country with higher external financing and depreciation expenses (due to its being 
equipped with relatively new facilities) will incur higher financial costs. An alternative 
measure of international competitiveness is productivity of labour. The NIC may suffer 
relatively low labour productivity but have advantages in relatively abundant supply of 
labour time inputs and low wage rates compared with developed countries. 
THE KOREAN STEEL INDUSTRY IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY 
Table 4.2 shows Korea's rapid economic growth in terms of GDP and GDP per capita 
since the early 1960s relative not only to the worid average but also to the major areas 
of the worid economy. Korea's annual average growth rates of GDP and GDP per 
capita in the period 1965-90 were 8.6 per cent and 7.0 per cent, respectively. This is 
one of the worid's highest rates, along with those of other rapidly growing East Asian 
NICs. This suggests that various forms of capital stock and the capital-labour ratio in 
Korea have been rapidly increasing relative to the rest of the worid, GDP (or GDP per 
capita) being used as a good proxy of a country's capital stock (or capital-labour ratio, 
respectively).'' Table 4.2 also shows that Korea accounts for the world's highest growth 
rates of both exports and imports, export growth rates exceeding import growth rates. 
As the dynamic comparative advantage model predicts, rapid economic growth 
was associated with the increasing importance of manufacturing and declining shares of 
primary sectors in the nation's economy. As shown in Table 4.2, Korea exhibited the 
highest economic growth rates during the last three decades and also experienced the 
world's most rapid rates of expansion in the manufacturing sector and of reduction in 
the agricultural sector. The manufacturing sector's shares of value added in Korea 
increased at a rate of 5.6 per cent per annum during the period 1965-90, which is higher 
than that experienced by other major developing and developed countries. By contrast, 
the agricultural sector's shares of total value added fell rapidly, at an average rate of 6.1 
per cent per annum during the same period. 
Figure 4.1 also provides evidence which clearly supports a primary expectation of 
the dynamic comparative advantage model conceming the increasing importance of the 
manufacturing sector in the nation's production, consumption, trade and employment. 
At the early stage of economic development between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, 
the primary sector accounted for about half of Korea's GDP, almost 60 per cent of 
employment and more than 40 per cent of total commodity exports. Those shares 
7. Many studies suggest that a country's capital stock is positively correlated to its GDP. For example, 
Branson (1989) shows that growth rates of capital stock are about the same as those of national 
output in the United States. 
Table 4 J 
79 
Growth rates of GDP, trade and shares of value added among major sectors 
in Korea and major areas of the world, 1960-90 (per cent)" 
•60 '65 '70 '75 'go '85 (•65 '60 '65 '70 '75 •80 •85 ('65 
-'65 -'70 -'75 -'80 -'85 -'90 -'90) -'65 -'70 -'75 -'80 -'85 -'90 -'90) 
GDF ' at market prices (yi) GDP per capita (yj) 
Korea 6.3 10.0 9,3 8.0 8.5 9,6 8.6 37 7,8 7.3 6.5 7,1 8,6 7.0 NICs (3) 9.2 8.6 8.3 10.1 6.0 9.0 8.3 6,0 6,0 6.4 8.0 4,3 7.7 6.4 ASEAN (4) 4.3 6.2 6,4 7.1 4.0 7.0 5.9 1,8 3,6 3.8 4.9 1,9 5,1 3.6 Latin Am (6) 4.6 6.2 7,2 5.2 0.5 1.5 4.3 1,8 3,5 4.8 2,9 -1,6 -0,4 2.0 US & Japan 5.5 5.1 3.1 3.8 3.0 3,7 3.3 4,2 4,0 2.0 2,8 2,1 2,9 2.3 EC (12) 4.8 4.7 3.2 3.1 1,4 3,2 2.8 3,9 3,2 2.7 27 1.2 2,8 22 World 5.3 5.3 4.0 3.8 2,5 3.4 3.6 3,4 27 1.9 2,0 0,8 1,6 1.6 
Exports of goods & services (Js) Imports of goods & services 
Korea 18.9 297 23.0 13.9 9.9 10.5 16.7 6,8 28,3 14.5 15,2 5,9 14,9 13.0 NICs (3) 12.9 15.1 14.0 14.3 8.4 14.3 13.6 11,3 13,5 14,8 14,1 5,8 15,9 12.1 
ASEAN (4) 4.5 6.2 8.6 87 2.4 13.0 7.1 4,1 8,6 9,7 11,7 2,2 13,3 8.0 
Latin Am (6) 4.3 6.0 6.0 9.4 7.8 5.9 6.9 1,4 8,3 10,2 8,1 -11,8 7,9 3.9 
US & Japan 77 5.7 9.1 7,1 2.6 9.2 6.0 6,9 9,3 5,3 5,5 5,9 8,0 52 
EC (12) 6.3 9.5 6.3 5,2 3.8 5.0 5.3 8,1 9,5 4,8 5.2 2.2 7,0 4.8 
World 8.3 8.5 6.6 6.1 37 6.5 5.7 7,1 9,0 6,5 6,1 2.5 7,0 5.5 
Manufacturing VA shares (jj) ^ Agriculture VA shares (yg)' 
Korea 57 11.3 7.6 5.4 2.7 2.0 5.6 -0,3 -6,1 -4,5 -10,2 -2,8 -9,6 -6.1 
NICs (3)" - 5.6 1,9 2.4 3.9 2.7 -5,9 -8,2 -8,0 -5,1 -8,7 •7.3 
ASEAN (4) 1.4 2.6 3.0 2.1 1.0 3.7 2.2 -1,2 -2,1 -2,2 -2,7 -1.4 -3,6 -22 
Latin Am (4) - 1.6 0.8 1.3 -0.8 -07 0.3 -3,7 -5,0 -1,6 1.6 -0,3 -1.5 
US & Japan 2,4 1.0 0.3 1.2 0.9 - 0.6 -5,4 -5,7 -1,0 -4,6 -0,7 •2.8 
EC (12) ' 0.8 -2.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.7 1.3 -0.4 -3,6 5,6 •1.4 -1,4 1,0 1,0 1.3 
World 1.5 0.5 0.3 1.2 0,5 - 0.4 -2.2 -3,4 -1.4 -2,9 0.2 - •1.5 
Notes a Annual average growth rates (P's) for the specified pericxl, estimated from 
+ + i = i , 2 6 
where t is the time trend and e is an enror term. 
Raw data (y.) were in real terms (constant USS at 1987 prices). 
NlCs (3): East Asian NICs excluding Korea. 
ASEAN (4): excluding Singapore. 
Latin Am (6): Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay in Latin America. 
Latin Am (4): Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. 
US & Japan: the United States and Japan total. 
EC (12): 12 countries in the European Community. 
b Shares of manufacturing sector (and agricultural sector, respectively) in total value added, 
c From 1963. Up to (1987). e Up to (1989). 
Source lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from Worid Bank, World Tables). 
declined steadily so that, at the end of the 1980s, the primary sector contributed only 
around 10 per cent of GDP, less than 20 per cent of employment, and 6 or 7 per cent of 
exports. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector was growing in importance - from 
accounting for less than 15 per cent of GDP (equivalent to a quarter of the primary 
sector) and less than 10 per cent of total employment up until the mid-1960s to 
accounting for more than 30 per cent of GDP and about 28 per cent of employment by 
the late 1980s.' 
8. Due to persistent expansion of the construction and service sectors, shares of manufacturing in GDP 
have declined slightly since 1987. 
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Figure 4.1 Primary and manufacturing sector shares of GDP, commodity exports 
and employment in Korea, 1945-90 and 1965-90 (per cent) 
Index of GDP in real 
100 T 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Manufacturing exports (% of total commodity exports; 65-90) 
T—I—t—1—r 
1985 1990 
8 0 -
6 0 -
4 0 -
2 0 -
z Other sectors employment 
Primary sector employment 
65-70 70-75 
Manufacturing sector employment 
75-80 80-85 85-90 
Notes Primar>' sector includes agriculture, forestry, fishery and mining. 
Manufacturing is divided into light' and Tieavy and chemical' industrial sectors. 
The other sectors include electricity, gas, water, construction and services. 
Total commodity exports = manufacturing exports + primary exports. 
Sources Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various issues; 
National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, various issues; 
lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UNIDO, Industrial Statistics-, and 
Worid Bank, World Tables). 
In this period of rapid economic growth and industrialisation, the heavy industries 
expanded more rapidly than the light ones. As shown in Figure 4.1, the light industries' 
shares of manufacturing output, although having reduced gradually, were more than 60 
per cent until the early 1970s. As Korea's economic growth proceeded, the importance 
of the more capital-intensive heavy industries in domestic production increased, with 
their shares of manufacturing output exceeding 50 per cent from 1978 and reaching 
more than 60 per cent in 1989 (see also Appendix Table A.2). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Korean steel industry has grown very 
rapidly since the early 1970s. As a single industry in the Korean economy, steel-
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Table 4.3 Industry shares of manufactur ing output, employment and trade in Korea, 1963-91 (percent) 
Shares 
1963-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1991 
Shares 
1963-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
1990 
Shares 
1970 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1990 
Shares 
1970 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
1990 
of manufacturing output 
24.2 20.7 
18.2 14.5 13.0 10.4 
9.7 
21.0 
20.1 
20.2 17.7 14.2 
12.2 
9.5 
0.8 
0 .6 1.3 
1.6 
1.7 
2.2 
1.8 
5.2 5.6 
4.3 3.0 1.9 
1.6 
1.6 
7.5 5.3 4.3 3.7 
4.0 4.2 
4.1 
7.6 9.2 
8.6 
9.0 9.1 8.5 
9.6 
of manufacturing employment 
15.3 13.0 
12.0 8.7 
8.2 7.1 
6.7 
30.6 31.6 32.3 30.3 27.4 22.3 
20.5 
1.2 
1.0 1.5 2.3 2.7 
2.6 
2.5 
4.2 5.1 4.1 35 
2.8 
2 .6 
2.7 
7.0 5.9 
5.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 
4.5 
of manufacturing exports 
2.0 3.7 
2.6 1.4 
1.1 
0.9 
48.1 41.7 
34.7 
26.8 24.1 
21.5 
0.2 1.3 1.9 
1 .8 1.3 
2.3 
13.6 
8.1 4.5 
1.2 
0.6 
0.5 
0.2 1.3 
1.2 0.9 
1.2 
1.0 
of manufacturing imports 
7.8 7.9 6.9 5.9 5.5 
5.6 
10.1 8.4 4.9 4.4 4.9 
4.8 
0.1 
0.8 1.7 
2.0 1.5 
1.1 
0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 
1.2 
1.6 
3.8 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.9 
2.6 
6.0 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.2 
4.1 
4.2 
2 .1 1.9 3.5 3.4 3.8 
5.1 
15.4 
16.0 14.9 14.7 14.4 
12.6 
8.0 10.9 
5.5 
2.4 
2 .0 1.4 
0.8 
0.8 
0.6 
0.7 
2.0 0.7 
2.6 
1.6 
2.5 
1.1 1.7 3.3 4.5 4.2 
4.9 
RP MN ST NF FM MC EL TE SC 
4.7 5.1 4.8 1.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 3.4 0.2 3.3 5.2 4.7 1.0 2.5 1.9 3.8 5.9 0.4 3.7 4.0 6.9 1.0 2.2 1.9 6.2 4.5 0.5 4.6 4.2 72 1.3 2.8 3.0 8.3 6.4 0.9 4.5 4.0 7.8 1.6 3.3 3.4 9.7 8.0 0.8 5.6 3.9 7.1 1.8 4.4 5.6 14.6 9.4 1.1 
5.0 4.1 7.8 1.9 4.6 6.3 14.9 11.0 1.5 
5.2 6.2 2.6 0.8 3.9 3.6 2.7 4.6 0.4 4.3 6.2 3.0 0.7 4.2 3.4 4.1 4.5 0.6 5.8 4.6 2.6 0.7 3.9 2.9 8.0 3.9 0.9 7.0 4.4 3.2 0.8 4.3 4.1 10.9 5.3 1.6 7.9 4.5 32 1.0 5.0 4.6 11.1 6.7 1.4 9.2 4.0 2.8 1.0 5.6 6.2 14.9 7.2 1.7 
9.3 4.0 2.9 1.0 5.8 7.0 15.2 8.0 1.8 
3.4 1.0 22 0.9 1.1 0.8 6.4 1.2 0.3 7.2 2.0 7.9 0.2 1.8 1.5 11.3 1.8 1.1 10.8 2.5 8.1 0.4 3.6 1.7 12.2 5.8 1.9 12.0 1.9 8.8 0.5 4.6 3.1 12.6 13.9 1.5 10.6 1.3 6.5 0.6 3.0 7.5 20.7 10.0 1.4 
10.3 1.0 6.4 0.5 2.5 7.9 22.7 10.3 1.2 
1.8 0.7 6.8 1.6 6.0 16.9 8.4 11.8 2.0 2.7 0.8 9.6 1.7 3.7 14.3 10.9 11.4 1.9 2.8 1.1 9.0 2.6 4.2 16.2 11.9 10.4 3.0 5.4 1.4 6.5 2.7 3.6 12.1 13.9 13.5 3.4 2.5 1.6 6.5 3.7 3.4 17.1 16.2 7.6 4.3 
2.3 2.1 7.8 3.6 3.4 18.2 15.3 7.5 4.2 
Notes FD: food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 31) 
WR: leather products (323) and footwear (324) 
PP: paper products and publishing (34) 
PT: petroleum products (353, 354) 
MN: non-metal mineral products (36) 
NF: non-ferrous metal (372) 
MC: machinery except electrical (382) 
TE: transport equipment (384) electric machinery (383) , , - scientific equipment (385) 
Source E D B , RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UNIDO, Industrial Statistics; and lEDB estimates). 
TW: 
WD: 
CH: 
RP: 
ST: 
FM: 
EL: 
SC: 
textiles (321) and clothing (322) 
wood products (33) 
chemicals (351,352) 
rubber (355) and plastic (356) 
iron and steel (371) 
fabricated metal (381) 
making has not been as prominent as the textiles industry, accounting for less than 10 
per cent of total manufacturing output, employment and trade (Table 4.3). 
Nevertheless, development of the industry in Korea throughout the 1970s and the 1980s 
can be seen as a part of the process of industrialisation and structural change, 
accelerated by rapid economic growth and capital accumulation, which resulted in a 
developing country with a relatively abundant supply of labour becoming a NIC with a 
relatively abundant supply of human capital. 
Table 4.3 shows the structural changes that have taken place in Korea's 
manufacturing sector during the last three decades. The labour-intensive light 
industries such as textiles, clothing and wood manufacturing dominated Korea's 
manufacturing in terms of production, employment and exports at least until the mid-
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1970s, thereafter reducing gradually in importance. Until the mid-1970s, for example, 
the textile and clothing industry (TW) accounted for around 20 per cent of output, more 
than 30 per cent of employment and more than 40 per cent of exports in Korea's 
manufacturing. Since then, this industry's contribution to the national economy has 
declined gradually. As of 1990, the industry accounted for around 10 per cent of 
manufacturing output and 20 per cent of manufacturing employment. The textile and 
clothing industry still accounted for the largest share of manufacturing exports (22.4 per 
cent) as of 1990, but this is less than half of its share in the early 1970s. 
As a consequence, some heavy and chemical industries, which are considered 
more capital intensive in competitive production than the traditional light industries, 
gradually assumed the dominant position in the national economy, having increased 
their shares of manufacturing output, exports and employment since the early 1970s 
and, at the same time, lowered their shares of manufacturing imports. In the period 
1966-70, for example, the textile and clothing industry's annual average share of 
manufacturing output (20.1 per cent) was 5 times greater than that of the electronic 
goods (EL) industry (3.8 per cent). During the period 1986-90, however, their shares 
were 12.2 per cent and 14.6 per cent, respectively.^ 
The manufacturing industries that became dominant in the Korean economy 
during the 1970s and 1980s included the chemical and the metals industries (CH, PT, 
RP, ST and NF) and the machinery industries (MC, EL, TE and SC). The contribution 
of steel (ST) to the Korean economy began to grow from the 1970s. In the 1960s, the 
Korean steel industry provided less than 5 per cent of manufacturing output. The 
importance of steel within the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector grew gradually, 
accounting on average for about 8 per cent of manufacturing output during the period 
1981-85. Since then, the relative importance of steel in Korea's manufacturing output 
has been maintained at a level of between 7 and 8 per cent, similar to that in the period 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. This implies that the iron and steel industry 
grew almost as rapidly as the manufacturing average during the 1970s and 1980s.'° 
Table 4.3 suggests that employment in the steel industry also grew at almost the same 
rate as that in total manufacturing. 
Until the mid-1970s the shares of the steel industry in Korea 's total 
9. Wood manufacturing is another example of a declining labour-intensive industry in Korea 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Until the early 1970s, the industry was larger in terms of output 
and export size than the major human capital-intensive industries such as steel, electrical goods and 
automobiles. Those heavy industries are now 5 or 10 times greater than wood manufacturing, which 
experienced a very rapid reduction in its shares in Korea's manufacturing output and exports during 
the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 4.3). 
10. The ratio of annual average growth rates for the steel industry to total manufacturing growth rates 
was 1.21 between 1963 and 1973 when POSCO's first stage of construction was completed. 
Between 1973 and 1991, this ratio was 1.01 (calculated from UNIDO, Industrial Statistics). 
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manufacturing impons were much higher than its export shares. The steel industry's 
export shares in 1970 were only about 2 per cent, but its import shares were about 7 per 
cent (Table 4.3). Manufacturing export and import shares both grew continuously 
throughout the period 1971-75, but import shares (9.6 per cent) were still higher than 
export shares (7.9 per cent). This suggests that, as the Korean economy continued to 
industrialise in the early 1970s, the relative size of domestic demand for iron and steel 
and hence for imports grew rapidly but that domestic production was still sluggish, 
resulting in relatively low shares in manufacturing production and exports. As the 
shares of the steel industry in manufacturing output grew from the mid-1970s, those in 
manufacturing exports also increased to about 9 per cent during the period 1981-85. By 
contrast, its import shares dropped sharply and were maintained at a level of 6.5 per 
cent throughout the 1980s. From the mid-1980s the shares of the steel industry in 
manufacturing exports fell to around 6.5 per cent. This may have been due to the sharp 
increase in domestic demand for steel products, on the one hand, and also to relatively 
rapid export expansion among some industries producing high value added capital or 
consumer goods such as machinery, electrical goods or automobiles (see Table 4.3). 
As shown in Table 4.3, the importance of the iron and steel industry in Korea's 
manufacturing sector grew rapidly from the early 1970s and peaked in the mid-1980s. 
Even though the absolute sizes of steel production and exports continued to increase 
through the 1980s, the importance of the industry in the national economy in terms of 
Korea's total production and export shares began to decline from the mid-1980s (see 
Table 3.1). This suggests the greater importance of more capital-intensive or 
technology-intensive goods such as machinery, electrical goods and automobiles in the 
domestic economy associated with further economic growth since the mid-1980s (see 
Table 4.3). As it accumulates more capital and technological knowledge, Korea will 
strengthen comparative advantage in these industries. 
PRODUCT CYCLE AND KOREA'S CHANGING POSITION IN WORLD STEEL 
Since the innovation in steel-making technology by H. Bessemer in 1856, competitive 
modem steel-making had been a relatively capital and technology-intensive industry in 
the world economy, at least until the early 1970s. Since then, the importance of steel in 
production and consumption has been declining in developed countries. Nevertheless, 
steel-making technology has continuously evolved and the industry is still considered 
as capital intensive, involving huge amounts of facility investments and human skills 
and experience. The theory of dynamic comparative advantage predicts that steel 
industries in rapidly developing countries will enhance the importance of steel not only 
Figure World crude steel production, 1950-90 (miUion tonnes) 
800 -I 
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(Q) 746.8 (-79) 785.8 (-89) 704.1 ('74) 
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Notes a Includes Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (23 countries). 
b Includes Asia (except Japan), Middle East, Africa and Latin America, 
c Includes Russia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
Sources IIS I, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
in the domestic economy but also in the world steel market with respect to production, 
consumption and trade, when the country accumulates per capita capital stocks and 
proceeds rapidly along industrialisation paths relative to the rest of the world. 
Production 
As shown in Figure 4.2, world steel production is still dominated by developed 
countries, though steel is considered a declining industry in developed countries. 
Nevertheless, gradual shifts in the location of production from developed countries to 
developing countries took place during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
As predicted by the product cycle hypothesis, shifts in the centres of world steel 
production have long been observed (Table 4.4a). In the mid-nineteenth century, the 
United Kingdom, where modem steel-making technology was innovated, dominated 
world steel production, accounting for almost 40 per cent of world crude steel output as 
of 1875. In the early 1900s the United States and Germany became two of the world's 
largest steel producers, each producing more than 35 per cent and 20 per cent of the 
world total, respectively, while the UK's shares fell to less than 10 per cent. During the 
1960s the relatively late-industrialised Japan emerged as a new competitor in the world 
steel market, with its share of world output increasing rapidly from about 6 per cent in 
1960 to more than 15 per cent in 1970. By contrast, the shares of the United States and 
the major European steel-makers declined continuously in the same period. In this 
period, the shares of some developing countries in world steel production were also 
continuously enhanced as their relative incomes grew rapidly. 
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T a b l e 4.4a S h a r e s of w o r l d c r u d e steel o u t p u t , selected coun t r i e s a n d years , 
1875-1990 (percent) 
UK Germany" France US Japan Brazil Mexico India China Taiwan Korea 
1875 37.9 19.5 13.7 21.1 0.0 
1900 17.5 23.3 5.6 36.3 0.0 ( - ) 1936 9.7 15.5 5.4 39.1 4.2 
\ / 
1960 7.2 9.9 5.0 26.1 6.4 0.7 0.4 1.0 4.9 0.0 0.0 1970 4.7 7.6 4.0 20.0 15.6 0.9 0.7 1.1 3.0 0.1 0.1 1975 3.1 6.3 3.3 16.4 15.9 1.3 0.8 1.2 3.7 0.1 0.4 1980 1.6 6.1 3.2 14.2 15.5 2.1 1.0 1.3 5.2 0.5 1.2 1985 2.2 5.6 2.6 11.1 14.6 2.8 1.0 1.7 6.5 0.7 1.9 
1990 2.3 5.0 2.5 10.5 14.3 2.7 1.1 1.5 8.6 1.3 3.0 
Note a In this thesis, 'Germany' stands for 'West Germany before unification', unless otherwise 
specified. 1875, 1900 and 1936 data are for Germany before division. 
Sources IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Production in deve loped countries has in fact hardly increased since 1974 ." Their 
shares o f world total production have decl ined from about 65 per cent in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s 
to less than 5 0 per cent by 1990 (Figure A.2)}^ B y contrast, deve loping countries' total 
production increased rapidly by an average of 7 .3 per cent per annum between 1974 and 
1990. The share of deve lop ing countries in world output was 8.9 per cent in 1974 and 
a lmost tripled to 25 .1 per cent by 1990. A m o n g the emerging steel -making deve loping 
countries in the 1970s , Korea, China, Taiwan, India, Turkey, Brazil and M e x i c o are the 
largest producers. 
D e s p i t e be ing poor in natural resources, Korea along with Taiwan increased steel 
product ion mos t rapidly in the worid through the 1970s and 1980s. The annual average 
growth rate of crude steel production be tween 1970 and 1990 w a s more than 2 0 per 
cent per annum (Table 4.4b) . Korea's share of world crude steel production rose from 
mere ly 0.1 per cent in 1970 to 3 .0 per cent in 1990 (Table 4.4a). 
A s the theory of dynamic comparat ive advantage impl ies , a country's steel 
11. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, the world steel industry grew steadily until the early 1970s, culminating 
in an output of 704 million tonnes of molten crude steel in 1974. In particular, the increase in 
production over the early 1970s was remarkable. The annual growth rate averaged 5.6 per cent 
between 1950 and 1974. However, steel output growth ended abruptly in 1975 as the worldwide 
energy crises exerted their impact on the industry. The oil shocks dealt a severe blow to the steel-
makers in Japan and Western Europe, since they depend heavily on oil imports to meet their energy 
requirements and the increased costs registered an immediate impact on their balances of payments 
(Hogan, 1983). This was followed by another sharp collapse after 1979. From 1974 to 1990, 
production grew at only an average rate of 0.56 per cent per annum, with considerable fluctuations, 
although there was substantial recovery in the late 1980s. 
12. Enveloped countries' total crude steel production has not yet recovered to the level achieved in 1974. 
The United States, the largest single steel producer in the western world until the end of 1970s, and 
some industrial countries in Western Europe, experienced substantial reductions in production after 
1974. Japan, exhibiting the most rapid growth from the 1950s to the early 1970s, became the second 
largest producer in the world after the USSR in the 1980s and 1990s. However, its production hardly 
increased after the mid-1970s. See Table 4.4a 
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Table 4.4b World crude steel production, selected countries and years, 1960-90 
(averages for the specified period: million tonnes)" 
58-62 63-67 68-72 73-77 78-82 83-87 88-90 AWj' 
EC (12) 92.35 113.28 141.13 150.67 141.25 129.11 138.24 -0.1 (aermany 31.16 35.56 43.11 44.11 41.72 37.80 40.18 -0.4 France 16.39 19.24 22.71 23.83 21.81 18.19 19.16 -0.8 Italy 8.20 12.43 17.59 22.69 24.76 23.10 24.81 1.7 UK 21.67 25.19 26.30 22.34 16.34 15.59 18.51 -1.7 O W E ' 8.38 10.61 13.97 15.55 16.57 17.86 17.88 1.2 Australia 3.62 5.48 6.83 7.70 7.46 6.27 6.60 -0.2 Canada 5.39 8.54 10.73 13.39 14.71 14.20 14.20 1.4 US 86.06 114.15 119.37 120.93 105.35 79.14 89.74 -1.4 Japan 21.34 44.48 85.57 109.73 105.30 100.97 107.98 1.2 
Korea 0.05 0.21 0.50 2.79 8.73 13.97 21.37 2 0 7 Taiwan 0.11 0.21 0.38 0.93 3.47 5.31 9.03 17.2 China 11.63 12.20 17.66 22.89 35.23 47.76 62.46 6.5 ASEAN (5) - 0.15 0.57 1.10 1.60 2.93 5.32 11.9 India 3.38 6.33 6.47 8.26 10.30 11.59 14.62 4.2 Turkey 0.24 0.64 1.29 1.70 2.54 5.20 8.37 9.8 Latin America 4.68 8.42 13.15 18.90 27.07 35.12 41.03 5.9 Brazil 2.13 3.26 5.46 871 13.53 19.40 23.43 7.6 Mexico 1.46 2.52 3.77 5.23 7.15 7.36 8.12 3.9 
World Total 326.88 448.71 582.38 67922 706.76 708.79 778.71 1.5 
Notes a Other countries (excluding Eastern Europe), not listed here but producing more than 10 
million tonnes per annum on average in the period 1988-90 are Belgium and Spain. 
b A%: Annual average growth rates (per cent) of production from the average of the period 
1968-72 to that in the period 1986-90. 
c Stands for 'Other Western Europe'. 
d Five countries in ASEAN including Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore. The figure for the period 1963-67 is 1987 data. 
Sources British Steel Corp., International Steel Statistics: Summary Tables, various issues; 
IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
production is closely related to its per capita income level. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show 
the product cycle of steel in terms of production levels per unit income (denoted as steel 
production intensities) in the world's major steel-making countries. Even though the 
steel production intensities at a certain per capita income level vary widely among the 
countries, there is a common pattern - the intensities rose until the economy grew to 
reach a certain level of per capita income, and then began to fall gradually. 
Figure 4.3a shows that the intensities of the group (A) countries in Europe and 
North America were already declining in the early postwar period of the mid-1950s, 
and those of Japan, which had rapidly risen until the early 1970s, also began to drop as 
well from the mid-1970s.'^ By contrast, the steel production intensities in developing 
countries were rising through the last three decades. Among them, the world's most 
13. Other major steel-making developed countries such as Australia, Sweden and Italy also show 
declining production intensities between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, even though their highest 
intensity levels were much less than those of the group (A) countries and Japan. 
87 
Figure 43a Intensities of crude steel production, selected countries, 1955-88 
(MA(5); kilograms of crude steel per doUar at 1985 US$) 
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Figure 4 3 b Economic growlh and steel production intensities, selected countries, 
1955-88 (MA(5); kilograms of crude steel per dollar at 1985 US$) 
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Notes The data set used in calculations is or = { ^x, A t ) , where e-t, and At are five-year 
moving average (MA) processes of Qt (crude steel production), Y/ (GDP in real terms at 1985 
USS) and L, (population), respectively. Fori = 1957,1958,..., 1986, MA(5) is defined as: 
Et = MA(5 I V,, t = t-2, ..., t+2 ) = i ( X where V, = {Q,, Yr, U }. J Vt=T-2 / 
For I = 1955,1956,1987, 1988: 
Hi955= AVG(V,, /= 1955, 56, 57); 5i956= AVG(V,, t= 1955, 56,57, 58) 
ii987 = AVG(V,, t = 1985, 86, 87, 88); and E1988 = AVG(V,, t= 1986, 87,88). 
Any two countries with similar production intensity levels and trends are grouped together. 
Sources Q;: as in Table 4.4a; 
Yt (estimated using purchasing power parity valuations) and U: lEDB, RSPacS, ANU 
(compiled from Summers and Heston (1991), Penn World Tables). 
rapidly growing NICs - Korea and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan - showed the highest 
growth rates in production intensities from the early 1970s until the early 1980s. After 
that, the intensity levels in Korea fell slightly, as rapid economic growth continued. 
This fall is consistent with declining shares of steel in Korea's manufacturing output 
since the mid-1980s (Table 4.3). Figure 4.3b depicts trends in steel production 
intensities with respect to per capita income levels in internationally comparable real 
terms. The experience of developed countries implies that a tuming point in increasing 
steel intensity would be somewhere between US$5,000 and US$9,000 of real GDP per 
capita at 1985 prices. Most developing countries in Figure 4.3b except Taiwan had not 
reached US$5,000 of GDP per capita as of 1988 and their steel intensities were still 
tending to increase. However, Korea's production intensities, which rose faster than 
those of other developing countries, showed a sudden downturn when its GDP per 
capita reached around US$4,000. 
Even though Korea achieved the most rapid growth of steel production intensities 
over a relatively short period of time, its longer run path does not appear to be 
diverging from those of tiie major steel-making developed countries. Korea exhibited 
very rapidly growing production intensities in the 1970s, similar to Japan's experience 
between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s. After showing a decline from the mid-
1980s, Korea's production intensities appear to be following the path of some European 
countries such as West Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom and France during the 
late 1950s or 1960s. 
Trade 
Table 4.5 shows that the size of international steel trade continued to rise over time, but 
that there were slow but gradual shifts in the direction of trade flows as part of the 
product cycle of s t e e l . D e v e l o p e d countries, though still dominating world steel 
expons, gradually lost their shares in world total steel exports, falling from above 80 
per cent around 1970 to less than 70 per cent in the period 1988-90 (Table 4.5). Most 
major steel-making developed countries such as the European Community countries 
and Japan, except tiie United States and Italy, were still net exporters of steel as of 
1990, but showed falling ratios of net steel trade to total steel trade (Table 4.6). Due to 
14. Steel is a widely traded product. World total trade in crude steel equivalents accounted for about 20 
per cent of total crude steel production in 1970 and about 30 per cent in the 1980s. Much like the 
cases of production and consumption, world steel trade also increased rapidly until 1974. 
Calculations using annual trade data {i.e, not moving averages but actual data) show that the average 
growth rate per annum between 1971 and 1974 was 10.6 per cent. However, world steel trade fell 
sharply from about 115 milhon tonnes of total exports in 1974 to about 95 million tonnes in 1975, 
with an annual average growth rate since then of just 2.7 per cent. This fall was due mainly to the 
developed countries' slack trade performance. The average growth rate of steel exports in developed 
countries between 1971 and 1974 was more than 12 per cent, but less than 2 per cent between 1975 
and 1990 (IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues). 
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Table World trade in finished and semi-finished steel products, selected countries 
and years, 1968-90 (million tonnes; averages for the specified period) 
1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87 1986-90 1988-90 A%' 
Australia X 0.95 (1.1) 1.92 1.74 (1.2) 1.18 (0.7) 1.20 1.22 (0.7) 1.3 M 0.99 (1.1) 1.13 0.64 (0.5) 0.70 (0.4) 0.75 0.75 (0.4) -1.5 
Canada X 1.37 (1.5) 1.71 3.15 (2.2) 3.25 (2.0) 3.70 3.73 (2.2) 5.7 M 1.78 (2.0) 1.79 1.89 (1.3) 2.10 (1.3) 2.84 3.09 (1.8) 2.6 
US X 3.74 (4.2) 3.28 2.60 (1.9) 0.94 (0.6) 2.36 3.31 (2.0) -2.5 M 14.43 (16.1) 13.63 16.19 (11.6) 19.70 (12.4) 17.51 16.75 (10.6) 1.1 
Japan X 17.99 (20.0) 31.07 29.66 (21.2) 29.65 (18.6) 22.72 19.89 (11.8) 1.3 M 0.11 (0.1) 0.19 1.31 (0.9) 3.59 (2.3) 5.91 7.08 (4.2) 24.9 
EC (12) X 44.44 (49.5) 56.85 64.18 (45.8) 66.86 (42.0) 69.24 70.86 (42.2) 2.5 M 32.23 (35.9) 38.64 41.31 (29.5) 43.60 (27.4) 53.63 58.09 (34.6) 2.9 
UK X 4.33 (4.8) 3.74 3.84 (2.7) 4.96 (3.1) 6.45 6.83 (4.1) 2.4 M 2.29 (2.5) 3.67 3.93 (2.8) 3.91 (2.5) 4.95 5.38 (3.2) 4.4 
France X 7.44 (8.3) 9.22 10.82 (7.7) 10.83 (6.8) 11.24 11.40 (6.8) 2.3 
M 6.85 (7.6) 8.19 8.56 (6.1) 8.02 (5.0) 9.26 9.95 (5.9) 17 
Italy X 2.61 (2.9) 5.47 7.43 (5.3) 7.53 (4.7) 7.40 7.50 (4.5) 5.9 
M 4.07 (4.5) 4.71 5.57 (4.0) 6.30 (4.0) 8.91 9.95 (5.9) 4.4 
West X 12.84 (14.3) 17.28 18.83 (13.4) 18.77 (11.8) 19.10 19.31 (11.5) 2.2 Germany M 9.39 (10.4) 10.18 11.81 (8.4) 12.25 (7.7) 13.98 14.81 (8.8) 2.2 
Other Western X 4.13 (4.6) 5.62 7.18 (5.1) 9.74 (6.1) 12.35 13.81 (8.2) 6.3 Europe M 7.03 (7.8) 8.39 8.31 (5.9) 9.01 (5.7) 9.81 9.61 (5.7) 1.9 
Total'' X 72.62 (80.8) 100.45 108.51 (77.5) 111.63 (70.2) 111.56 112.83 (67.5) 2.4 M 56.57 (63.0) 63.77 69.64 (49.7) 78.70 (49.5) 90.44 95.37 (54.7) 2.6 
Korea X 0.13 (0.1) 1.13 3.89 (2.8) 5.81 (3.6) 6.69 7.19 (4.3) 24.6 
M 0.70 (0.8) 1.98 2.27 (1.6) 2.88 (1.8) 3.88 4.25 (2.5) 10.0 
Taiwan X 0.30 (0.3) 0.26 1.24 (0.9) 1.69 (1.1) 1.51 1.67 (1.0) 9.4 
M 0.66 (0.7) 1.34 2.24 (1.6) 2.04 (1.3) 4.64 5.76 (3.4) 11.5 
China X 0.00 (0.0) 0.11 0.56 (0.4) 0.27 (0.2) 0.70 1.01 (0.6) 15.1 
M 1.84 (2.0) 4.41 5.87 (4.2) 14.88 (9.3) 10.45 6.86 (4.1) 10.1 
ASEAN (5) and Hong Kong 
X 0.21 (0.2) 0.33 0.70 (0.5) 1.37 (0.9) 1.90 2.06 (1.2) 13.1 
M 3.18 (3.5) 5.18 8.67 (6.2) 8.85 (5.6) 10.24 11.55 (6.9) 6.7 
India X 0.59 (0.7) 0.65 0.08 (0.1) 0.05 (0.0) 0.12 0.18 (0.1) -8.3 
M 0.80 (0.9) 0.83 2.00 (1.4) 1.98 (1.2) 1.90 1.69 (1.0) 4.9 
Turkey X 0.00 (0.0) 0.02 0.07 (0.0) 1.99 (1.3) 3.05 3.48 (2.1) 46.9 
M 0.39 (0.4) 1.53 0.82 (0.6) 2.15 (1.3) 2.12 2.19 (1.3) 9.9 
Latin America X 1.10 (1.2) 0.88 2.79 (2.0) 9.44 (5.9) 12.99 14.96 (8.9) 14.7 
M 3.82 (4.3) 7.41 6.32 (4.5) 3.57 (2.2) 3.88 3.96 (2.4) 0.1 
Brazil X 0.36 (0.4) 0.29 1.63 (1.2) 6.28 (3.9) 8.68 10.23 (6.1) 19.4 
M 0.72 (0.8) 2.18 0.66 (0.5) 0.28 (0.2) 0.34 0.20 (0.1) -4.1 
Mexico X 0.27 (0.3) 0.14 0.20 (0.1) 0.98 (0.6) 1.28 1.28 (0.8) 9.1 M 0.18 (0.2) 0.54 1.93 (1.4) 0.53 (0.3) 0.61 0.73 (0.4) 7.1 
Total ' X 2.32 (2.6) 3.39 9.34 (6.7) 20.62 (13.0) 26.97 30.55 (16.3) 14.6 M 11.39 (12.7) 22.68 28.19 (20.1) 36.34 (22.8) 37.11 36.26 (22.5) 6.8 
World'' X 89.85 122.46 140.06 159.12 16526 168.08 3.4 
Notes Inter-regional trade is included. 
Per cent of world total steel exports or imports in parentheses. 
a Annual average growth rates between 1968-72 and 1986-90 average figures (in the case of 
China's exports, between 1973-77 and 1986-90 figures). 
b New Zealand is the only one of the developed countries omitted in the total figures. The 
country accounted for only 0.3 per cent of total steel trade in developed countries as of 1990. 
c Total of the listed developing countries/areas. These constitute major sources of steel trade 
among all developing countries, accounting for more than 75 per cent of exports and about 60 
per cent of imports of steel products by all developing countries in 1990. 
d World total steel exports do not equal world imports because export and import data are 
recorded separately. The total export figures are used also in calculation of a country's shares 
in world total steel imports. 
Source nSI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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Table 4.6 Net trade ratios to total trade of steel, selected countries, 1968-90 
68-72 73-77 78-82 83-87 86-90 88-90 
EC (12) 
US 0.16 0,19 0.22 0.21 0,13 0,10 -0.59 -0.61 -0.72 -0.91 -0,90 -0,90 Japan 0.99 0,99 0.92 0 7 8 0,59 0,47 Canada -0.13 -0.02 0.25 0.21 0,13 0,09 Other developed'' -0.22 -0.12 0.00 0,06 0,12 0,18 
Total developed'' 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.17 0,10 0,08 
Korea -0,69 -0.27 0.26 0.34 0.27 0.26 Taiwan -0.37 -0.68 -0.29 -0.09 -0,51 -0,55 China -1.00 -0.95 -0.83 -0.96 -0,87 -0,74 Brazil -0.34 -0.77 0.42 0.92 0,92 0,96 Other developing •0.66 -0.7& -0.79 -0.42 -0,31 -0,29 
Total developing * -0.66 -0.74 -0.50 -0.28 -0,16 -0,09 
Notes The net trade ratio to total trade (NTR) is defined as: 
1 (exports only) > NTR s ^ ^ > -1 (imports only). 
NTR is one of the commonly used trade specialisation indices or revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) indices. It is generally the case that a country has comparative 
advantage when 1 > NTR > 0, or comparative disadvantage when 0 > NTR > -1. 
NTR = 0 {i.e, X = M) indicates a state of neutral comparative advantage. 
a Other developed (or developing) countries, among those listed in Table 4.5. 
b Total developed (or developing) countries listed in Table 4.5. 
Source Export (X) and import (M) data are from Table 4.5. 
their declining expon shares but rising import shares, the trading positions of the 
developed countries as net exporters have been weakened since the mid-1970s and 
early 1980s.'^ 
By contrast, the developing countries listed in Table 4.5 increased their expon 
market shares from less than 3 per cent in the early 1970s to more than 15 per cent in 
the late 1980s (Table 4.5).^^ However, most developing countries are still substantial 
net importers of steel and only a few, such as Brazil and Korea and, to a much lesser 
extent, Mexico and Turkey, have emerged as net exporters. 
Korea's steel exports grew rapidly from a mere 0.1 per cent of world exports in 
the period 1968-72 to more than 4 per cent in the period 1988-90 (Table 4.5). Korea 
turned from a net importer, up until the late 1970s, to being the world's seventh largest 
15. The United States became the world's largest net importer of steel in the 1970s, and has since been 
absorbing an annual average of more than 10 per cent of world steel imports (Table 4.5). Italy, one 
of a few developed countries which increased crude steel production continuously in the 1980s, 
turned into a net importer in the late 1980s, due mainly to a sharp increase in domestic demand for 
steel products in this period (Table 4.5). 
16. Although still accounting for small shares in world trade, these countries experienced fast growth in 
steel exports of more than 15 per cent per annum on average in the 1970s and the 1980s, while 
imports grew at smaller rates - averaging 7 per cent per annum. Even though their steel imports 
accounted for more than 20 per cent of world total steel imports in the 1980s, increasing steel exports 
reduced their steel trade deficit substantially from about 20 million tonnes in the 1970s to 6 million 
tonnes in the late 1980s. Hence, their average ratios of net trade to total trade improved considerably 
from -0.74 in around 1975 to -0.09 in the period 1988-90 (Tables 4.5 and 4.6) 
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exporter in the late 1980s and 1990. In addition, owing to rapidly increasing steel 
consumption throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Korea's steel imports also increased 
rapidly. With its shares in world total steel imports rising from around 1 per cent in the 
early 1970s to 2.5 per cent at the end of the 1980s, Korea is now one of the major steel-
importing NICs (Table 4.5). Korea's net trade ratios to total trade in steel products, 
which was -0.7 with a substantial trade deficit in the period 1968-72, rose rapidly to 
more than 0.34 in the mid-1980s helped by large output and export expansion. Despite 
continuing growth of production and exports the ratios fell slighdy to 0.26 in the late 
1980s, due to larger increases in consumption and imports. 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN KOREA'S IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS 
As Korea's economic growth and industrialisation proceeded and as its steel industry 
grew, its structures of production, consumption and trade and, hence, of comparative 
advantage among different iron and steel products also changed. Figure 4.5 oudines the 
changing pattern of finished steel production and consumption in Korea, categorising 
finished steel products into three major groups - long products rolled from blooms and 
billets, such as bars, reinforcing bars, wire rods and beams; hot rolled and cold rolled 
flat products (HR/CR products, henceforth) in the forms of sheets, strips and hoops; 
and plates and secondary long or flat products such as tubes and pipes. 
Figure 4.4 shows that, until the late 1960s, Korea's steel production and 
consumption were concentrated in long products. The dominance of long products in 
Korea's finished steel production and consumption continued until the late 1980s, 
except in the period 1973-74 when production of HR/CR flat products increased 
sharply soon after POSCO commenced operation (Figure 4.4)." From the late 1970s, 
long product output exceeded apparent consumption, increasing trade surpluses in these 
products to about 1.1 million tonnes around the period 1985-87. Thereafter, until the 
early 1990s, consumption increased at greater rates than production of long products, 
substantially reducing the trade surpluses. 
With the construction of POSCO, Korea's HR/CR product output also increased 
rapidly from the early 1970s. From the mid-1980s HR/CR steel output showed faster 
growth rates than other product groups, and exceeded long product output in 1989 (see 
also Appendix Table A.4). Trade surpluses in HR/CR products, which were achieved 
17. Figure 4.4, which provides 5-year moving averages, shows that Korea produced and consumed more 
HR/CR products than long products for the period 1971-75. However, the actual years where 
production and consumption of HR/CR steel exceeded those of long products were 1973 and 1974, 
when there were sharp increases in production and consumption of HR/CR products following the 
construction of POSCO (see Appendix Table A.4). 
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Figure 4.4 Production and apparent consumption of finished steel products in Korea, 
1964-90 (MA(5); 1,000 tonnes) 
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Notes a MA(5) as defined in Figure 4.3a, except f o r the 1989 figures (averages f o r t = 1987, 1988, 
1989, 1990) and the 1990 figures (averages f o r t = 1988, 1989, 1990). 
Apparent consumption = Domestic demand (DD) = Q + M - X. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
in the late 1970s, continued to expand, reaching 1.6 million tonnes on average per 
annum in the period 1988-90. Production of plates and pipes also increased rapidly. 
These products accounted for almost half of total flat steel output and more than 1.3 
million tonnes of net exports in the early 1980s. Thereafter, rates of production and 
consumption of these products were much slower than for other product groups, 
accounting for slightly above one-third of total flat product output and consumption in 
the late 1980s (Figure 4.4). 
Changes in production and consumption patterns are reflected in the shifts in 
trade patterns and the changing structure of comparative advantage within the industry. 
Figure 4.5 depicts the pattern of net trade ratios to total trade (NTRs) of iron and steel 
products. Until the late 1960s domestic demand for all categories of iron and steel 
exceeded domestic production, leading to high and increasing NTRs (Figure 4.5). The 
NTRs of iron ore, however, were close to one, as most domestic production was 
exported. In this period semi-finished steel and pig iron production was very small; 
there was virtually no export of these products, but some imports led to NTRs of close 
to-1 . 
As the industry underwent rapid development from the early 1970s, Korea 
eventually became a net exporter of finished steel products overall. Figure 4.5 shows 
that comparative advantage in finished steel trade in Korea was achieved firstly in the 
less capital-intensive products such as plates and long steel and then in the more 
capital-intensive HR/CR flat products. In the early 1970s, plates and pipes (and tubes) 
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Figure Changes in net trade ratios to total trade of iron and steel products in Korea, 
1964-90 (MA(5); volume based) 
Notes 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 (t) 
NTRt are calculated from MA(5) trade figures as defined in Figure 4.4. 
See Table 4.6 for definition and interpretations of NTR. 
Sources IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
became the first finished steel group where exports exceeded imports, followed by long 
products achieving net exports in and after the late 1970s. As the steel industry 
developed further, the HR/CR products trade also recorded surpluses in the early 1980s. 
Following the development of finished steel manufacturing, the Korean steel 
industry started to integrate backwards into semi-finished steel and iron production. 
With the establishment of the large-scale integrated steel mill (POSCO), Korea 
registered substantial achievements in production and import substitution of semi-
finished steel and pig iron between the 1970s and the early 1980s (see also Tables 3.1 
and 3.2). As shown in Figure 4.5, the NTRs of both semi-finished steel and pig iron 
until the early 1970s were close to -1 with almost no exports but only imports, but grew 
sharply f rom the early 1970s and mid-1970s, respectively. The NTRs of both the 
intermediate product groups recorded positive values in the late 1970s. In the case of 
semi-finished steel, the NTRs grew continuously, realising stronger comparative 
advantage until 1983. After that, however, continuously growing finished steel 
production and hence demand for crude steel rapidly reduced exports of semi-finished 
steel, and Korea became a net importer of these products again from the mid-1980s. In 
pig iron-making, which is regarded as natural resources-intensive relative to other 
processes, imports were replaced by domestic production and Korea eventually became 
a net exporter of pig iron in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Showing positive 
values just for the short period, however, the NTRs of pig iron dropped sharply, as 
94 
rapidly expanding steel production in the 1980s brought about sharp increases in 
domestic demand for pig iron and hence its imports. Since 1984, the ratios have been 
close to -1 with almost no exports but increasing imports (see also Table 3.2). 
The NTRs are regarded as useful indicators of comparative advantage, showing 
both Korea's trade balance status - whether a net exporter or a net importer - and the 
relative size of net trade to total trade. However, the ratios calculated from only trade 
data reflect neither the importance of exports and/or imports in Korea's total steel 
demand (= domestic demand + export demand) or total steel supply (= production + 
imports) nor the extent of Korea's ability to meet its total demand for iron and steel 
products. ^^  Table 4.7 provides estimates of the degrees of export, import and trade 
dependence, self-sufficiency and intra-industry trade, which can be used as 
complementary information with the NTRs in explaining the changing structure of 
comparative advantage in Korea's iron and steel products. 
In an effort to measure the degrees of comparative advantage (or disadvantage), 
taking account of both NTRs and the relative size of trade to total supply or demand, a 
revealed comparative advantage index is constructed in Table 4.7 by weighting the 
NTRs with trade dependence ratios. The index is reduced to the ratio of net trade to 
total supply or total demand, and its estimates (denoted as 'RCA' in Table 4.7) are used 
to represent the degrees of comparative advantage in Korea's iron and steel products.^' 
18. Furthermore, the NTRs do not reflect the importance of steel trade in Korea's total commodity trade 
or in the world steel trade, which may be important components in estimating revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA). With this in mind, Balassa (1965) suggested the following index (RCAB): 
RCAB(X) = [(Xy/Xi)/(XHy7Xw)l 
where Xy = countr>' i's exports of commodity j; Xi = country i's total commodity exports; Xwj = 
world exports of commodity y; and Xw= world's total commodity exports. However, ^ though the 
index can similarly be defined in terms of imports as R C A B ( f ^ = [ (My/M, ) / (M»-y /M>v) ] , it 
considers just one side of trade - either exports or imports. Adopting the concept of net exports or 
net imports rather than just exports or imports, the following index (RCA*) can be suggested: 
RCA* = 
( X , ; - M . ; ) / ( X . + M,) 
L(XHy+M>vy)/(X>,+M>v)J L 
• (Xy-My)/ (X.-+MO 
Xny /Xw 
, since Xwj = Mw; and Xw = M 
Appendix Table A.6 provides estimates of RCAB(X), RCAB(M) and RCA* for Korea's iron and steel 
products according to 3 or 4 digit SITC codes. Those estimates show some interesting results but do 
not alter the major findings in this section. 
19. The use of this index as a measure of degree of comparative advantage (or disadvantage) can be 
explained using the conventional comparative advantage diagram as follows: 
Figure (A) Figure (B) 
^ Producdon-possibilities set 
Cur%'e y°: Indifference curve 
Line TUt: Relative price of steel 
in the world market 
Steel Steel 
O a* e* Tt O 0* 
Figures (A) and (B) represent the cases of comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage in 
Steel, respectively. In (A), if the degree of comparative advantage can be measured as (a9/Tc8), then: 
RCA(A) = ( a * e * / O 0 * ) = [ a * e * / ( O a * + ae*)] = [X/(DD+X)], where (DD+X) = Q and M = 0. 
In (B), if the degree of comparative disadvantage is estimated as the negative value of (6p/7ip), then: 
RCA(B) = -(e*P*/0[3*) = -[e*p*/(Oe* + e*p*)] = - [M/(Q+M)], where (Q+M) = DD and X = 0. 
Assuming that there exists intra-industry u^de and a * 9 * in (A) and 9*P* in (B) represent 'net 
95 
Table 4.7 Indices of external transaction and revealed comparative advantage of 
Korea's iron and steel products, 1963-90 (volume based) 
Long Plate and pipe HR/CR Finished steel total Semis Pig iron 
DX DM DX DM DX DM DX DM DX DM DX DM 
66-68 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.59 0.10 0.64 0.03 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.60 69-71 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.25 0.60 0.11 0.36 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.51 72-74 0.13 0.18 0.36 0.24 0.27 0.48 0.25 0.36 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.15 75-77 0.11 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.39 0.23 0.29 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 78-80 0.15 0.16 0.43 0.12 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 81-83 0.24 0.11 0.49 0.10 0.47 0.21 0.39 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 84-86 0.26 0.08 0.37 0.11 0.36 0.28 0.32 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 87-88 0.19 0.08 0.31 0.12 0.36 0.20 0.29 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.06 89-90 0.11 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 
DT SS DT SS DT SS DT SS DT SS DT SS 
66-68 0.21 0.79 0.59 0.41 074 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.15 0.85 0.60 0.40 69-71 0,15 0.87 0.30 0.73 0.85 0.40 0.47 0.64 0.18 0.87 0.54 0.49 72-74 0.31 0.82 0.60 0.76 0.75 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.30 0.85 0.16 0.85 75-77 0.30 0.81 0.54 0.74 0.69 0.61 0.52 071 0.07 0.94 0.02 0.98 78-80 0.31 0.84 0.55 0.88 0.68 0.57 0.51 0.76 0.13 0.96 0.03 0.99 81-83 0.35 0.89 0.59 0.90 0.67 0.79 0.53 0.86 0.04 0.99 0.01 0.99 84-86 0.34 0.92 0.48 0.89 0.64 0.72 0.48 0.84 0.04 0.99 0.02 0.98 87-88 0.27 0.92 0.43 0.88 0.56 0.80 0.42 0.87 0.05 0.96 0.06 0.94 89-90 0.20 0.91 0.35 0.91 0.57 0.78 0.38 0.86 0.05 0.97 0.06 0.94 
RCA n x RCA m RCA HT RCA IIT RCA n T RCA DT 
66-68 -0.20 0.05 -0.58 0.01 -0.54 0.27 -0.40 0.14 -0.15 0.00 -0.60 0.00 69-71 -0.11 0.18 -0.23 0.22 -0.35 0.46 -0.25 0.39 -0.08 0.52 -0.48 0.10 
72-74 -0.04 0.56 0.12 0.73 -0.21 0.14 -0.11 0.31 0.00 0.15 -0.14 0.07 
75-77 -0.07 0.41 0.02 0.61 -0.10 0.43 -0.07 0.47 -0.05 0.15 -0.02 0.28 
78-80 0.00 0.51 0.31 0.34 -0.19 0.29 0.03 0.35 0.05 0.27 0.01 0.38 
81-83 0.13 0.41 0.40 0.33 0.26 0.59 0.25 0.47 0.02 0.41 -0.01 0.63 
84-86 0.18 0.34 0.26 0.45 0.08 0.81 0.16 0.59 0.02 0.44 -0.02 0.00 
87-88 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.57 0.17 0.67 0.16 0.56 -0.03 0.52 -0.06 0.00 
89-90 0.01 0.61 0.18 0.50 0.14 0.74 0.10 0.67 -0.01 0.58 -0.06 0.00 
Notes DX: Export dependence = (exports / total demand), where total demand = (DD+X) 
DM: Import dependence = (imports / total supply), where total supply = (Q+M) 
DT: Trade dependence = DX + DM = (X+M)/ (Q+M) 
SS: Self-sufficiency = (production / total supply) = Q / (Q+M) = (1 - DM) 
RCA: Revealed comparative advantage index =(X+M)/(Q+M) = DX - DM 
nT: Intra-industry trade index (as defined in Greenaway and Milner ,1983) 
= 1 - I | X , - M , | / i ( X , + H ) , i = l , 2 , . . . , n . 
i = l i = l 
The IIT index values of each product group are calculated over n number of sub-groups. For 
long products, n = 4, and, for the plate and pipe group, n = l. For the HR/CR product group, 
n = l before 1975 due to limitations of data, but n = 7 after that. Semi-finished steel (and pig 
iron) is considered as a single product (« = 1). If the number of sub-groups is larger and net 
trade in more sub-groups have opposite signs, the numeric value of the index will be smaller. 
For the list of the sub-groups, see Appendix Table A.4. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
exports' and 'net imports', respectively, and that the identity 'total demand = total supply (DD + X = 
Q + M)' holds, dien RCA(A) and RCA(B) can be written as RCA(A) = (net exports/total demand), 
and RCA(B) = -(net imports/total supply). These can be generalised as RCA = (X-M)/(Q+M). 
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Table 4.7 shows that export dependence of total finished steel products rose from 
less than 0.1 in the period 1966-68 to about 0.4 in the period 1981-83. In the meantime, 
domestic production gradually replaced imports, and import dependence fell from 0.44 
to about 0.15 during the same period. From the mid-1980s, export dependence began 
to drop but import dependence remained at around 0.14, implying that Korea's rolling 
sector in this period became oriented less towards exports and more towards domestic 
supply. Total trade dependence of finished steel then declined with rising self-
sufficiency throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. The estimates of RCA suggest that 
Korea's comparative advantage in finished steel trade was strengthened throughout the 
1970s and until the early 1980s but declined gradually from the mid-1980s, though it 
retained self-sufficiency levels as high as those achieved in the early 1980s 
The plate and pipe group not only obtained a comparative advantage first among 
finished steel products in the early 1970s but has also revealed the highest degree of 
comparative advantage since then. Its RCA reached 0.4 in the early 1980s but then fell 
to around 0.2 in the late 1980s. Self-sufficiency in this product group grew rapidly 
from less than 0.5 in the period 1966-68 to almost 0.9 in and after the late 1970s. 
Following the plate and pipe group, long products acquired a comparative 
advantage in the late 1970s. Compared to other rolled products, long products showed 
relatively low degrees of export orientation and import competition, as suggested by 
smaller DX and DM levels in Table 4.7, but high self-sufficiency throughout the whole 
period. This was reflected in the pattern of changes in comparative advantage in long 
products - compared to flat products, on the one hand, relatively low levels of 
comparative disadvantage when the Korean steel industry was at the underdeveloped 
stage (that is, smaller I RCAs I, when RCAs<0, until the early 1970s) but, on the other 
hand, relatively slow growth of RCAs when the industry developed rapidly in the 1970s 
and relatively low degrees of comparative advantage when the industry enjoyed overall 
comparative advantage in finished steel products in the 1980s. Korea eventually lost 
comparative advantage in long products, after reaching a peak RCA level of about 0.2 
in the mid-1980s, and was in a state of comparative advantage neutral (RCA = 0) in 
long products as of the period 1989-90. 
Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, larger changes took place in Korea's trade 
in HR/CR products. Until the early 1980s, HR/CR flat products exhibited the lowest 
degrees of comparative advantage among finished products. Nevertheless, as the 
Korean steel industry developed rapidly from the early 1970s, the RCAs of HR/CR flat 
products gradually improved from about -0.5 in the period 1966-68 to more than -0.2 in 
the mid and late 1970s (Table 4.7). From the early 1980s, HR/CR products also 
obtained comparative advantage. As the Korean steel industry continued to grow in the 
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late 1980s, the RCAs of HR/CR products exceeded those of long products. Compared 
to long products and plates, HR/CR products exhibited greater engagement in 
international trade and hence lower self-sufficiency levels, due perhaps to their greater 
complexity and diversity in terms of product mix than other product groups, on the one 
hand, and scale constraint in production and domestic demand, on the other. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, import dependence on these products was much 
higher than on other finished steel groups, though falling over time from about 0.6 in 
the early 1970s to 0.2 in the late 1980s. Export dependence was also higher than the 
finished steel averages during this period. 
Even though overall trade dependence on finished steel fell and self-sufficiency 
rose with development of the steel industry, intra-industry trade continuously increased 
over time, as suggested by the trade theory incorporating the importance of scale 
economies (see the IIT columns in Table 4.7). In the 1970s, during the early period of 
rapid steel industry development, relatively less capital-intensive rolled products such 
as plates, pipes and long products, which exhibited relatively high comparative 
advantage at the time, were engaged in intra-industry trade to a greater extent than 
HR/CR products.^® However, in the 1980s as the Korean economy attained high levels 
of industrialisation alongside rapid growth of the steel industry, the degree of intra-
industry trade in the relatively more capital-intensive HR/CR products rose faster and 
showed larger values of the index than other products. 
In the 1970s, the Korean iron and steel industry underwent more changes in its 
production capacity of upstream processes such as manufacturing of crude steel and pig 
iron following the construction of POSCO. Domestic demand for these products also 
rapidly increased as the nation's rolling sector expanded. Despite Korea's backward 
integration of its iron and steel industry as discussed in Chapter 3, the output growth in 
these sub-sectors stayed within domestic demand, perhaps because that the growth of 
the iron-making sector was constrained by scarce domestic supply but rapidly 
increasing imports of raw materials such as iron ore and coking coal (see Table 3.2 and 
Figure 4.5). The nation's iron-making capacity, in POSCO's integrated iron and steel-
making system, was limited to the extent it could only meet the crude steel capacity of 
the integrated steel works. Korea's crude steel capacity in POSCO and in some electric 
arc firms did not expand beyond rolling capacity. The RCAs in these products did not 
rise as high as in rolled products. Nevertheless, Korea's steel-making and iron-making 
retained RCA levels close to 0 from the mid-1970s, even though pig iron trade showed 
increasing imports with almost no exports (and hence almost no intra-industry trade) 
20. While the degrees of IIT in HR/CR products ranged between 0.15 and 0.45 during the 1970s, those 
in long products and in plates and pipes were between 0.20 and 0.55 and between 0.20 and 0.70, 
respectively, during the same period. 
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Since the early 1980s and semi-finished steel trade recorded net imports again after the 
mid-1980s. Another feature of these sectors was that, since the mid-1970s, trade 
dependence (and both export and import dependence) was much lower at around or less 
than 0.1 but self-sufficiency ratios were high, at a level close to 1.0, though they 
dropped slighdy in the period 1987-90 (Table 4.7). 
These data are consistent with the framework proposed in this thesis. There were 
substantial changes in the structure of comparative advantage within Korea's iron and 
steel industry, which included the increasing importance of more capital and technology 
intensive HR/CR products in Korea's finished steel production, consumption and trade, 
rising index values of intra-industry trade and the growth of steel-making and iron 
making constrained by increasing import dependence on raw materials. 
SUPPLY-SIDE SOURCES OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
Despite being poor in natural resources, the Korean steel industry grew throughout the 
1970s and the 1980s and obtained comparative advantage. Trade theory suggests that 
an industry's comparative advantage derives from its relatively low unit labour costs 
(or, by the same token, high labour productivity) when capital and natural resources are 
freely traded. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, uniformity of unit labour costs (or 
the world price) in the trading world, which the theory suggests as an equilibrium, is 
subject to much friction and, hence, international differences exist in unit labour costs 
to produce homogenous products. This implies that the real world lies somewhere 
between the autarkic situation and the theoretical equilibrium situation. 
In practice, differences exist in unit labour costs in steel-making. In the real 
world, moreover, there are also international differences in other factor costs per unit 
output. In this case, comparison of international differences in total production costs 
per tonne and costs of each input factor can make it possible to examine whether Korea 
has an overall comparative cost advantage in steel-making, which production factor(s) 
Korea's cost advantage has originated from, and how Korea's cost advantage has 
changed.^' In the analysis of financial statements of firms or industries, production 
costs per unit output comprise three major factor costs: employment costs, material 
costs and financial costs.^^ It is possible then to infer from the trade theory that a 
21. Production costs per tonne at an industry level are in fact 'average' costs of many steel firms with 
different product mix, which may constitute another reason for the existence of international 
differences in estimates of unit production costs. 
22. Employment costs comprise wages, pensions, benefits, allowances and other expenses for workers. 
Material costs include expenses for raw materials, energy, scrap, alloys, electricity, working 
machinery, other consumables and durables, and so on. Employment costs and material costs are 
both referred to as operating costs. Operating costs are also closely related to technology embodied 
both in labour and equipment such as labour productivity, fuel ratio and coke ratio. Financial costs 
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country with an abundant supply of a factor input (labour, raw materials or capital) has 
a certain cost advantage in use of the factor, ceteris paribus. 
Factor cost advantage 
Table 4.8 compares total production costs per unit crude steel among the world's major 
steel-competing countries. Even if the data do not reflect differences in product quality 
and product mix, they show that Korea along with Taiwan have enjoyed strong 
competitiveness in terms of production costs in ordinary steel-making since launching 
their major integrated mills - POSCO and China Steel, respectively." Recently, 
although the Korean steel industry still shows lower unit production costs than most 
steel-competing countries, except for Taiwan, its comparative cost advantage has been 
eroded substantially due to rapid rises in wage rates and continuous appreciation of its 
domestic currency since the mid-1980s.^'^ 
Table 4.8 shows that Korea enjoyed an extremely lower cost advantage in using 
labour than the other major steel-making countries. Even compared to other developing 
countries such as Brazil and India, Korea's employment costs per tonne were very low. 
Until the late 1980s Korea's employment costs per tonne of steel production were about 
20 per cent of the costs averaged over the major international steel mills. As of 1990 
Korea's employment costs per tonne were still US$60-120 less than those of Japanese, 
Australian and North American producers. 
From the early 1980s, Korea along with Taiwan showed a prominent cost 
advantage also in use of various materials. In the period 1985-90, Korea's material cost 
advantage over major steel-makers in developed countries ranged from US$30 to 
US$200 per tonne. Material costs account for the largest shares (in general 50-70 per 
cent) in total production costs and, as shown in Table 4.8, the largest difference in unit 
consist of interest costs and depreciation costs. 
23. Meanwhile, some older steel-makers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, who had 
suffered from falling competitiveness in the 1970s and/or the early 1980s, show considerable 
improvement in cost advantage relative to other countries since the mid or late 1980s. Table 4.8 
shows that, in 1989-90, these were the only countries to record average production costs per tonne of 
less than USS500 among the developed countries in Table 4.8. 
24. The reduction in Korea's comparative cost advantage in steel-making may be due to rising wage 
rates and appreciation of the Korean currency and/or relative improvement in cost conditions in other 
countries in recent years. The effect of these factors was assumed in the estimates of production 
costs in dollar terms (Table 4.8). Close examination of the effects of these factors is a separate 
research topic, and is not explicitly treated in this thesis. 
25. In this section, the cost data of each country are averages over their major steel firms, unless 
otherwise specified. POSCO is the only one included in the case of Korea. Other countries 
represented by one firm are Australia (BHP), France (Usinor-Sacilor), the United Kingdom (British 
Steel), Brazil (CSN), India (Tata Iron & Steel) and Taiwan (China Steel). The countries that include 
more than two firms are the United States (14), Japan (8), West Germany (6) and Canada (4). Two 
firms were included in the Mexico data until 1985, but one afterwards. For the names of firms 
included, see WSD, Financial Dynamics of 61 International Steelmakers, 1991. 
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Table Factor costs per tonne of gross steel output produced, selected countries 
and years, 1975-90 (US$; averages over major firais) 
Australia US Canada Japan Germany France UK Brazil India Taiwan Korea World" 
Total production costs per tonne 
1975 176.1 259.8 205.5 220.4 322.3 296.4 301.9 409.3 207.4 __ 162.7 252.7 1978 217.7 312.7 247.1 357.4 364.2 350.4 386.2 423.4 277.4 272.0 243.5 326.7 1980 292.6 442.1 295.6 415.1 472.5 434.0 657.1 410.6 375.0 248.5 264.0 427.2 1983 504.0 465.9 346.7 397.9 417.8 449.0 350.5 383.4 503.1 266.0 249.2 400.7 1985 381.8 457.7 323.0 413.3 334.3 433.6 335.7 473.0 504.4 258.4 234.9 384.6 1987 407.5 413.0 366.1 534.3 492.8 537.5 370.7 574.3 552.8 236.3 301.5 444.3 1989 664.3 441.4 430.2 554.8 539.4 530.9 424.4 1133.5 580.4 220.5 406.4 497.3 1990 684.3 433.7 541.1 575.9 - - - - - 248.7 414.8 505.8 
Employment costs per tonne 
1975 68.0 109.5 71.5 28.2 91.3 66.8 101.5 67.3 43.5 _ 11.0 73.9 1978 77.6 118.7 81.4 49.1 105.5 67.6 117.0 83.2 58.8 16.2 18.2 88.8 1980 99.6 169.9 95.4 56.6 125.4 81.4 198.8 83.0 80.3 19.7 11.8 113.0 1983 177.1 162.1 121.0 59.1 118.7 75.5 84.1 57.6 93.3 22.2 12.9 98.7 1985 126.0 131.4 112.3 66.5 82.6 107.5 80.5 51.1 84.5 28.6 11.9 87.2 1987 125.4 118.1 121.7 91.5 141.8 151.5 84.9 79.8 104.5 30.4 16.5 102.3 1989 156.3 105.4 136.5 84.3 137.3 110.8 93.3 170.5 104.2 37.8 21.7 100.1 1990 155.5 106.3 154.6 82.4 - - - - - 50.2 23.4 89.9 
Material costs per tonne 
1975 84.4 135.8 116.3 158.5 206.0 197.8 173.1 298.2 144.4 _ 123.4 152.9 1978 112.8 178.1 143.0 250.2 230.3 248.0 231.5 289.2 196.7 152.0 168.5 202.7 1980 161.6 249.9 177.5 289.7 310.1 307.9 401.7 287.2 266.0 158.6 182.1 267.8 1983 288.3 269.1 193.6 272.3 263.0 328.9 249.7 218.7 358.6 167.2 174.5 252.9 
1985 211.2 291.0 184.7 280.0 227.5 293.3 239.3 318.0 374.0 153.7 154.8 250.9 1987 247.5 263.8 215.5 353.7 312.8 328.4 266.2 386.3 393.0 156.0 192.8 286.4 
1989 435.7 307.9 253.9 396.1 365.9 377.2 308.0 705.4 406.2 132.5 238.3 339.8 
1990 458.1 300.4 329.6 416.5 - - - - - 143.3 249.8 351.1 
Financial costs per tonne 
1975 23.7 14.5 17.7 33.7 24.9 31.7 27.2 43.9 19.4 - 28.3 25.9 
1978 27.3 16.0 22.7 58.2 28.3 34.8 37.7 50.9 21.9 103.7 56.8 35.3 
1980 31.3 22.4 22.7 68.7 36.9 44.7 56.6 40.3 28.7 70.2 70.1 46.4 
1983 38.6 34.9 32.1 66.5 36.1 44.6 16.7 107.1 51.2 76.6 61.9 49.2 
1985 44.6 35.2 26.0 66.8 24.3 32.8 15.9 103.9 45.9 76.2 68.3 46.5 
1987 34.5 31.1 28.8 89.1 38.2 57.6 19.6 108.2 55.2 49.9 92.2 54.7 
1989 72.3 28.2 39.8 74.4 36.1 42.9 23.2 257.6 70.0 50.1 146.5 57.4 
1990 70.7 27.1 56.8 77.1 - - - - - 55.3 141.7 65.0 
of which: 
Interest costs per tonne 
1975 3.4 3.8 6.9 17.6 7.5 23.9 13.0 31.9 7.2 - 9.8 11.4 
1978 6.4 4.9 12.2 29.5 8.9 21.1 23.0 32.4 6.2 65.9 23.7 16.3 
1980 6.7 6.3 10.0 36.1 14.6 22.8 34.9 25.3 9.7 40.0 33.3 22.2 
1983 9.8 14.4 13.9 32.9 12.2 29.4 7.4 80.5 26.2 35.2 16.3 23.0 
1985 16.4 12.9 10.4 31.5 7.1 14.3 5.2 64.0 23.9 18.8 9.4 19.9 
1987 13.6 10.0 11.6 34.7 8.4 26.2 1.9 64.8 26.3 8.3 15.0 19.2 
1989 32.9 7.9 14.7 26.2 6.9 14.8 1.3 256.4 34.8 4.4 18.0 19.1 
1990 33.3 5.9 21.3 27.9 - - - - - 5.6 18.4 19.0 
Depreciation costs per tonne 
1975 20.3 10.7 10.8 16.1 17.4 7.8 14.2 12.0 12.2 - 18.5 14.5 
1978 20.9 11.1 10.5 28.7 19.4 13.7 14.7 18.5 15.7 37.8 33.1 19.0 
1980 24.6 16.1 12.7 32.6 22.3 21.9 21.7 15.0 19.0 30.2 36.8 24.2 
1983 28.8 20.5 18.2 33.6 23.9 15.2 9.3 26.6 25.0 41.4 45.6 26.2 
1985 28.2 22.3 15.6 35.3 17.2 18.5 10.7 39.9 22.0 57.4 58.9 26.6 
1987 20.9 21.1 17.2 54.4 29.8 31.4 17.7 43.4 28.9 41.6 77.2 35.5 
1989 39.4 20.3 25.1 48.2 29.2 28.1 21.9 1.2 35.2 45.7 128.5 38.3 
1990 37.4 21.2 35.5 49.2 - - - — — 49.7 123.3 46.0 
Notes a Averages of 61 world majormills. 1990 data are averages of Australia, the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. Appendix Table A.5 shows the data for the whole period. 
Source WSD, Financial Dynamics of 61 International Steelmakers, various issues. 
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prcxiuction costs among competing countries stems from differences in unit material 
costs. In a typical integrated mill, costs of raw materials such as iron ore/sinter, coking 
coal, scrap and other energy inputs account for about a half of total material costs.^ It 
IS to be expected then that resource-rich countries will have some cost advantage in use 
of raw materials and hence may bear less expense in employing materials. However, 
Table 4.8 does not support this expectation. Instead, the two East Asian NICs, Korea 
and Taiwan - both with high population densities and poor endowment in raw materials 
per head - exhibited strong material cost competitiveness. This may be due to the 
stable and low international raw material prices and the countries' efforts to secure 
longer term raw material supply at competitive prices.^' On the other hand, the 
sophisticated, up-to-date technology embodied in these countries' young plant may 
have also promoted efficiency in material use. 
In terms of financial costs, comprising depreciation costs and interest payments, 
Korea was one of the countries to bear relatively high expenses. However, despite the 
fact that Korea relied heavily on foreign capital in the construction of its first integrated 
mill, it maintained a competitive edge in terms of interest payments.^^ Korea's interest 
costs rose until the early 1980s as expansion of POSCO continued, but thereafter fell 
until the mid-1980s, followed by gradual repayment of foreign debt and increasing self-
financing. From 1987 its interest payments rose slightly due to construction of its 
26. Other material costs include expenses for water, electricity, capital goods such as working 
machinery, other consumables and durables. 
27. It is probable that, due to internationally stable raw material prices, resource-abundant countries do 
not have a cost advantage in the use of the factor. 
US Japan UK Korea 
Ore 61 (35) 40 (23) 51 (28) 40 (23) 
Scrap 13 (110) 3 (100) 5 (100) 2 (110) 
Coal 41 (47) 46 (55) 46 (57) 52 (55) 
Energy 26 (3) 18 (4) 24 (4) 20 (4) 
Note Raw material costs (US$ per tonne of steel output) and input prices (US$ 
per tonne; in parentheses), as of June 1989. 
Source \JST>, Steel Survival Strategies IV, Aag. 1989. 
This table shows that input prices of raw materials in the resource-poor countries such as Korea, 
Japan and the United Kingdom were at similar levels to those in countries with a relatively abundant 
supply of raw materials, such as the United States. In the case of iron ore, the United States, whose 
import dependence ratios were not more than 0.35 in the 1980s, paid higher input prices than Korea, 
Japan and the United Kingdom, where import dependence ratios were more than 0.95 in the 1980s 
(IISI, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1991). 
28. The introduction of long-term loans and cheaper financing arrangements and, hence, lower amount 
that have to be paid per annum as interest will provide a newly-built firm with a favourable position 
in terms of cost competitiveness, ceteris paribus. In Korea, however, interest cost has to be 
considered as a poHcy-oriented factor, rather than a supply-side factor, for the 1970s and at least until 
the early 1980s, since interest rates in Korea were distorted by government intervention in the 
domestic fmancial market. Thus, a large part of POSCO's advantage in interest costs stemmed from 
the subsidised nature of interest payments. During this period, Korea's major manufactures in the 
strategic or targeted industries designated by the government were considerably subsidised with 
respect to interest payments as the government had control over the nation's fmancial systems. 
Chapter 6 discusses this issue in detail. 
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second integrated mill, the Kwangyang works.^^ In the case of depreciation costs, 
Korea along with Taiwan bore relatively high expenses, due to the fact that their 
facilities and equipments were relatively new and that relatively high depreciation rates 
are generally applied to newer plants. A new plant then has some disadvantages with 
respect to relatively higher depreciation costs, regardless of its various advantages, such 
as the up-to-date technology it embodies. Nevertheless, Table 4.8 shows that, among 
competing countries, there were in general no big differences in either interest costs or 
depreciation costs compared with employment costs or material costs. The differences 
in interest costs between the highest and the lowest were at most US$30 per tonne, with 
just a few exceptions. In terms of depreciation costs, Korea bore the highest expenses, 
but the differences with other countries were in general less than US$50 dollars per 
tonne until the sharp rise in depreciation costs in 1988 due to the construction of the 
Kwangyang mill. As of 1989 and 1990, POSCO's depreciation costs per tonne were 
more than US$120 per annum, which substantially reduced Korea's total production 
cost advantage relative to other producers. 
Labour productivity 
Table 4.8 shows that Korea 's comparative cost advantage stems primarily from 
relatively low operating costs, despite the offsetting effects of high depreciation costs. 
In the broadest sense, unit production costs, especially operating costs, reflect overall 
physical efficiency and thus are the fundamental determinant of international 
competitiveness. Whereas sources of comparative advantage can be identified by factor 
costs per unit output, the physical efficiency of input is measured in terms of factor 
productivity, that is, output per unit of input. Productivity can be specified in terms of 
inputs to the production process and be measured as either output per unit of labour 
time (labour productivity), per unit of capital (capital productivity), per unit of energy 
(energy efficiency) or per unit of any raw material. Certain measures may assume 
greater importance in certain cases, but labour productivity is generally recognised as 
the most illuminating physical measure of efficiency and competitiveness.^" 
Labour productivity reflects levels of skills and technology embodied in a work-
force. Table 4.9 provides two different estimates of labour productivity - output per 
man-hour at a standard operating rate (SOR) and at an actual operating rate (AOR). 
29. About 60 per cent of POSCO's total foreign debt (USS 1,723 million out of total US$2,928 miUion) 
was repaid by the end of 1987. Moreover, POSCO was able to raise 75 per cent of its domestically-
financed capital by itself in the second stage construction project, which was completed in May 
1976, and gradually increased its self-financing ratios. In the first stage construction of the 
Kwangyang works, the ratio of POSCO's self-financing (to domestically-financed capital total) was 
100 per cent, which provided immense financial savings (TOSCO, 1990). 
30. Growth of labour productivity is also used as a proxy of technological progress. 
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Table 4.9 Productivity of man-hour and hourly wage rates in steel-making, selected 
countries and years, 1975-90 (kilograms and US$ per tonne shipped) 
US Japan Germany UK Australia Brazil Taiwan Korea 
At 0.90 standard operating rates (actual operating rates in parentheses) 
1975 M (0.75) 95 (0.80) 103 (0.60) 48 (0.70) 31 (1 20) 
97 8 96 (0.87) 132 (0.64) 119 (0,60) 50 0.73 t l ^ ) 
9 0 ^ 102 (0.78) 140 (0.66) 123 (0.64) 60 0.40 ( - ) 73 (1 o1 
9 8 2 111 (0.55) 137 (0.57) 137 (0.55 135 0.55 ^ 3 0 
1984 132 (0.72) 146 (0.59) 145 (0.72) 154 U ) 104 101 
^89 179 175 175 147 89 143 141 
At actual operating rates (hourly wage rates in USS in parentheses) 
1975 80 (10.8) 88 (5.4) 77 (6.5) 37 (4.6) 54 (0 9) 
1978 95 (14.7) 105 (9.5) 89 (9.8) 42 6,0 ( f s 
1980 97 (19,1) 114 (10,5) 97 (12,7) 17 (9.7) 97 9 
1982 94 (24.7) 100 (10.1) 94 (10.8) 85 (10.0) ( - ) 122 2 6 
1984 124 (22.4) 110 (11.3) 125 (11.0) 112 (9.3) 13^ 3 0 
1987 149 (24.1) 130 (18.7) 136 (19.0) 143 (14.3) I39 (4.5) 
1988 ^ 159 (25.4) 147 (22.0) 154 (19.6) 154 (16.0) 125 (17.2) 69 (3.5) 111 (8.0) 118 (6.0) 
1 9 8 9 ^ 159 (26.0) 152 (21.0) 156 (20.0) 159 (16.0) 133 (18.0) 71 (4.0) 115 (9.0) 122 (8.0) 
Notes The figures are averages over major steel-makers in each country. POSCO only in Korea. 
a Estimates of productivity assuming operating rates are 90 per cent in all firms. This is not the 
average operating rate but rather a figure tiiat represents a fairly optimum rate 
b 1979 data for Korea. 
c For cold rolled sheet shipped as of November for die specified years. These figures are not 
directiy comparable with those of otiier years. 
Sources WSD, Cost Monitor #12, Nov. 1989; and #13, Jan. 1991; 
WSD, Steel Strategist #15, Jan. 1989; 
WSD, POSCO: Korea's Emerging Steel Giant, Core Report V, 1985. 
Labour productivity at SOR is the achievable output level per man-hour input under the 
assumption of the same operating rates (normally 90 per cent) across all firms or all 
countries. Table 4.9 shows that total steel output per labour time at SOR in Korea was 
much lower than in most developed countries, though gradually improving.^^ However, 
Korea 's productivity of labour time in terms of AOR has been very competitive since 
the early 1980s." In the early and mid-1980s, before developed countries began to 
make serious efforts to make structural adjustments and to rationalise their steel 
industries so as to promote a substantial improvement in productivity despite a drop in 
output, Korea 's labour productivity in terms of AOR was in fact greater than in most 
developed countries. This suggests how important operating rates in productivity are. 
Table 4.9 shows the differences between productivity measures at SOR and at AOR, 
31. In production of cold-rolled sheets at the end of 1990, for example, Korea showed similar levels to 
Taiwan and AusQ-alia but was 30-50 kilograms less productive per hour, compared to some steel-
making developed countries such as the United States, Japan, West Germany and the United 
Kingdom (Table 4.9). 
32. Table 4.9 shows that Korea's labour productivity in cold-rolled products was still lower than its 
average steel productivity level and also less than that in die major steel-making developed countries 
(see 1988 and 1989 figures). This implies that, in the Korean steel industiy, the more capital-
intensive cold-roUed flat products are relatively less competitive than other products. 
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Table 4.10 Crude steel production per worker, selected countries, 1975-90 
(tonnes; averages over major firms) 
Australia US Canada Japan Germany France UK Brazil India Taiwan Korea World 
1975 177.5 179.1 229.2 423.9 153.4 186.3 85.5 79.8 25.3 208.5 185.6 1976 176.6 205.6 246.3 451.1 156.8 207.2 103.8 64.9 26.2 283.2 202.2 1977 170.0 202.2 241.7 418.4 158.6 208.9 94.9 90.2 27.1 272.8 196.0 1978 176.0 225.5 245.4 440.1 168.4 228.7 99.1 95.2 24.9 114.5 244.2 210.6 1979 173.4 217.3 246,3 474.2 179.0 293.7 85.8 101.4 23.3 351.1 448.7 218.0 1980 152.6 198.1 241.1 442.6 190.3 310.9 92.3 99.9 24.2 337.0 403.5 211.2 1981 151.2 W.8 213.0 435.8 177.6 340.9 149.4 102.3 24.9 338.7 560.5 224.6 1982 133.3 182.3 215.0 399.9 167.5 292.7 145.8 105.0 24.0 360.9 611.6 207.3 1983 131.4 242.6 263.4 422.0 164.4 299.2 206.0 136.7 24.4 423.8 587.7 232.5 1984 171.6 273.3 274.5 464.9 189,9 359.2 205.9 119.6 26.1 492.1 650.5 262.2 1985 150.7 318.1 281.1 461.5 207.3 202.0 227.2 156.7 27.3 394.9 549.3 266.4 1986 171.2 310.1 283.3 449.0 200.4 211.9 230.6 178.1 29.6 414.6 499.1 269.5 1987 164.0 369.4 290.9 537.0 203.7 206.0 311.6 192.0 29.9 435.4 586.7 299.2 1988 163.7 423.4 292.8 505.6 239.2 242.8 310.5 188.9 30.8 475.2 622.5 311.3 1989 196.3 448.6 312.5 640.6 245.1 291.2 300.2 172.7 31.2 702.4 688.7 350.7 1990 193.5 455.4 265.9 673.7 - - - - - 673.2 659.2 507.8 
Notes and Sources As in Table 4.8. 
suggesting that higher operating rates raise output per time, ceteris paribus. By 
utilising its plant beyond the designed capacity (that is, more than 100 per cent 
operating rates), POSCO was able to increase its production level per man-hour input 
and boost its production performance. By contrast, most international steel-makers in 
developed countries operated at rates much lower than 90 per cent - a rate generally 
considered to be fairly optimum - and hence their productivity remained below the 
level suggested by their SOR. 
Table 4.9 shows also that the average hourly wage rates of Korean steel workers 
have been much lower than in developed countries. A lower man-hour input price does 
not necessarily lead to less unit labour costs, when lower wage rates reflect lower 
productivity of labour time. Nevertheless, with relatively low wage rates and fairly 
competitive labour productivity, the Korean steel industry has been able to achieve low 
levels of labour costs per unit steel output relative to competing countries (see also 
Table 4.8) ." In addition, even if higher labour productivity (or less man-hours per 
tonne) alone does not guarantee more output per worker in the case of the relatively 
small average number of working hours per worker, Korea's performance in terms of 
output per worker has been remarkable, surpassing the levels achieved in competing 
countries in the 1980s (Table 4.10).^ This implies that one of the important sources of 
33. If total factor price could be specified in terms of hourly rate such as total input price per hour, higher 
productivity of labour time would result in lower total production cost per unit output, given the total 
input price per hour. 
34. In relation to operating rates, Findlay (1990) argues that the number of hours worked per worker also 
influences the ability to utilise a steel plant in a way that, other things being equal, longer working 
105 
Korea's international competitiveness in steel-making is its cheap but abundant supply 
of skilled labour, that is, a labour force with low wage rates per hour, long working 
hours and competitive productivity levels relative to other competing countries in the 
world steel market. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite being a resource-poor country, Korea has seen its steel industry grow 
remarkably. The dynamics of comparative advantage in Korea's steel-making, which 
can be summarised as being rapidly strengthened from the early 1970s until the mid-
1980s and beginning to decline in the late 1980s despite continuing output and export 
growth, are evident from a number of perspectives: the relative importance of steel in 
Korea's manufacturing output, exports, imports and employment; the importance of 
Korea in world steel production, consumption and trade; and the changing structure of 
comparative advantage within its steel industry. The rise of the industry was closely 
associated with changes in supply-side factor conditions represented by rapid economic 
growth and industrialisation relative to the rest of the world, at the expense of 
developed countries where steel-making is matured and/or declining. Steel industry 
competitiveness in Korea has its origins in a comparative production cost advantage, 
which stems mostly from its relatively cheap and abundandy supplied skilled labour 
creating high labour productivity both in per man-hour and per worker terms. All these 
factors are consistent with the framework proposed in the dynamic comparative 
advantage model. 
Bearing these in mind, the development of the Korean steel industry with respect 
to changes in the supply-side conditions of the economy can be summarised as 
follows.'^ 
In the early stages of economic growth in the 1960s, Korea specialised mostly in 
unskilled labour-intensive light industries. Despite low labour costs, the steel industry 
had a comparative disadvantage due to skill shortages and poor technology. The 
intensities of both steel production and consumption were very low by international 
standards. The demand for steel was small, though increasing, and concentrated in long 
products, and the country was relatively more self-sufficient in long products than flat 
products, though overall a net importer.^^ 
hours per worker mean the plant can operate for longer hours. 
35. See Findlay (1990, pp.32-34) for an excellent summary of the steel industry development paths using 
examples of the economies of the Pacific region. 
36. As described in Chapter 3, facilities were also concentrated in non-integrated small-scale rolling 
firms where mostly long products were produced. As suggested in Findlay (1990), there were also 
some small electric arc mills processing local scrap to make simple bar products for the construction 
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As rapid economic growth and capital accumulation continued in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, manufacturing, especially heavy industries, increased its importance in the 
Korean economy. Shares of steel in manufacturing production, employment and trade 
also rose. The importance of Korea in the world steel market also grew, in terms not 
only of production and exports but also of consumption and imports. The steel industry 
was integrated backwards into steel and iron production with the construction of its first 
large-scale integrated mil l ." An abundant supply of skilled labour constituted an 
important source of rising comparative advantage. Wage rates were still low but 
working hours were long and hence operating rates were high relative to major steel-
makers in developed countries. The steel industry in this period was characterised by 
rapid growth in production as well as in consumption. Korea became a net exporter 
firstly of long products (including pipes and tubes) and plates. Even though Korea then 
achieved comparative advantage in flat products also, import dependence on these 
products was higher than other products, leading to relatively high degrees of intra-
industry trade. Construction of an integrated firm led Korea to become a net exporter 
of semi-finished steel and pig iron, but only for a short period of time. With growth of 
the steel industry, Korea became a large buyer in raw material markets. 
Despite continuously increasing production and exports, revealed comparative 
advantage especially in finished steel dropped from the mid-1980s coupled with a rapid 
rise in domestic demand and hence imports. The fall in comparative advantage 
measured by RCA indices coincided not only with the declining importance of steel in 
the nation's manufacturing output, employment and exports and hence a drop in steel 
production intensity with respect to GDP, but also with a reduction in comparative cost 
advantage in this period. This is also consistent with an expectation derived from the 
dynamic comparative advantage model, suggesting that, as the Korean economy grows 
further, increasing comparative advantage in more capital-intensive (technology-
intensive) sectors, the importance of steel in the national economy and its comparative 
advantage eventually falls. 
industry. 
37. Findlay (1990) argues that, because of the lack of domestic scrap, a rapidly developing country is 
likely to build integrated steel/iron-making plants. Integrated mills on greenfield sites have the 
advantage of being able to incorporate the latest technology into its increments to capacity and to 
renegotiate work practices. 
S Increasing Domestic Demand 
and Comparative Advantage: 
Short-Run and Long-Run 
Effects on Steel Trade 
The relationship in Korea between the dynamics of comparative advantage in steel 
production and trade and changes in the economy's supply-side conditions represented 
by rapid economic growth has been examined in Chapter 4. However, the theory of 
dynamic comparative advantage suggests that development of the steel industry and 
shifts in comparative advantage are also associated with growth of domestic demand for 
steel. As shown in Chapter 3, rapid economic growth in Korea brought about not only 
remarkable increases in steel production and exports but also sharp rises in steel 
consumption and imports. In addition, as discussed in the analytical framework in 
Chapter 2, the dynamic comparative advantage theory is elaborated further by 
incorporating Linder's representative demand theory, where it is suggested that, when a 
new industry is growing, the existence of sizeable domestic demand also has an 
important effect on evolution of comparative advantage in the industry. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the demand-side effects on the dynamics 
of comparative advantage in the Korean steel industry and to identify their short-run 
and long-run influences on trade performance in the industry. In an effort to understand 
shifts in Korea's position in world steel consumption, the first section of the chapter 
examines the life-cycle of steel consumption in the world and the size of Korea's total, 
per capita and per GDP steel consumption relative to other major-steel consuming 
countries. The second section uses input-output tables for Korea and outiines changes 
in the sectoral composition of Korea's steel consumption and the influences of growth 
among the steel-consuming sectors on steel production. Some facts about how rapidly 
increasing domestic demand affected decision-making in the Korean steel industry are 
also discussed. The third section identifies the instantaneous (short-run) impact on steel 
trade of an increase in domestic demand for steel in major steel-trading developed and 
developing countries. It is also shown that, in most developing countries where 
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domestic steel demand rose rapidly, such as Korea, there was a negative relationship 
between shifts in domestic demand and net trade in most years, although continuously 
mcreasmg domestic production in those countries had a tendency to improve their net 
trade positions in the longer term. In the fourth section, the relationship between steel 
production, consumption and net trade in relation to income levels in the world is 
examined. It is argued that over the long run a positive relationship exists among these 
variables. The fifth section develops an econometric model to examine the short-run 
and long-run effects of domestic demand on net trade in the Korean steel industry. 
LIFE-CYCLE OF STEEL CONSUMPTION IN THE WORLD 
The theory of dynamic comparative advantage suggests that, in a rapidly developing 
economy, economic growth is also associated with the growth of steel consumption. 
Shifts in steel demand with respect to economic growth stage represent the demand-side 
product cycle of steel. While both total and per capita steel consumption levels and the 
intensities of steel use with respect to unit output or value added measured by GDP in 
most developed countries was falling, some developing countries emerged not only as 
strong producers but also as increasingly important consumers in the world steel market 
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
Until the early 1970s developed countries accounted for more than 60 per cent of 
world steel consumption. However, most of the major steel-making developed 
countries experienced a substantial fall in steel consumption after the mid-1970s. The 
shares of developed countries in world steel consumption then dropped to around 45 
per cent in the late 1980s (Table 5.1).^ Among the major steel-making developed 
countries only Japan and Italy, and, to a lesser extent, Canada, recorded positive annual 
average growth rates of steel consumption in the period 1970-90. 
By contrast, steel consumption in developing countries has almost tripled during 
the last two decades, although average rates of consumption per capita are still at a very 
low level (Table 5.1). The shares of developing countries in world total crude steel 
consumption grew from about 13 per cent in the early 1970s to almost 30 per cent in 
the late 1980s. As a result, there have been gradual shifts, in a global context, in the 
location of rapidly growing areas of steel demand, although the faster growth of 
1. Similar to the trend experienced by world steel production, world total consumption increased 
rapidly and continuously to 701.5 million tonnes until 1974 but dropped sharply in 1975 by almost 
10 per cent. World steel consumption recovered through to 1979, reaching 740 million tonnes, but 
experienced another slump, falUng to around 660 million tonnes in the 1982-83 period. According to 
the IISI, even though world total steel consumption increased gradually after 1983 to reach almost 
800 million tonnes in 1989, it dropped again to 730 million tonnes in 1991 (Source: IISI, Steel 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues). 
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Table 5.1 World crude steel consumption, selected countries and years, 1968-90 
(averages for the specified period: million tonnes)" 
68-72 73-77 78-82 83-87 88-90 AWo" 68-72 73-77 78-82 83-87 88-90 
Australia 6.5 6.6 6.1 5.7 6.1 -0.5 Korea 1.3 4.0 7.3 11.6 18.5 15.4 
Canada 
(518) (476) (410) (360) (361) -2.0 (39) (114) (191) (283) (437) 13.7 
11.3 13.6 13.1 12.8 13.5 0.9 Taiwan 0.9 2.5 5.4 7.1 13.7 15.1 (529) (602) (547) (508) (514) -0.2 (64) (153) (301) (367) (680) 13.1 
Germany 382 35.1 33.3 30.4 35.1 -0.8 China 21.5 28.3 42.0 67.1 70.1 7.0 (630) (568) (541) (496) (566) -0.9 (26) (31) (43) (64) (63) 52 
France 21.8 22.7 19.1 15.0 17.5 -1.6 India 7.0 8.6 12.6 14.6 20.3 5.6 (429) (431) (354) (272) (312) -2.1 (13) (14) (18) (19) (24) 3.3 
UK 23.5 22.2 17.5 14.6 17.2 -2.0 Turkey 1.7 3.4 3.4 5.1 6.4 7.6 (422) (396) (311) (259) (300) -2.1 (46) (86) (76) (101) (117) 5.1 
Italy 19.2 21.3 22.5 21.7 27.6 1.6 Brazil 6.2 112 12.4 122 11.5 4.1 (356) (385) (400) (380) (479) 1.3 (65) (104) (102) (89) (78) 1,8 
Japan 61.6 71.2 72.9 71.8 93.1 1.8 Mexico 4.0 5.8 9.3 6,8 7,5 32 (590) (641) (625) (595) (756) 0.9 (75) (94) (132) (87) (88) 0,7 
US 134.0 134.9 124.1 104.5 107.9 -1.3 Total (B)' = 74.8 1122 155.1 187.3 216,0 5,9 (653) (625) (547) (437) (434) -2.3 ( - ) ( - ) (46)"^  (48) (51) 1,0^  
Total (A)f 352.6 373.6 354.2 315.1 348.9 -0.3 World 582.1 679.3 712.8 716.0 785.4 1.5 
( - ) (465)'' (403) (454) -1.2' ( - ) ( - ) (163)^ (149) (151) 
Notes a Consumption per capita (kilograms) in parentheses. 
The other country not listed here but with crude steel consumption of more than 10,000 tonnes 
in 1990 is Spain (excluding East European countries). Those with annual crude steel 
consumption per capita greater than 400 kg on average in the period 1989-90 include Finland, 
Sweden and Singapore. 
b A%: Annual average growth rates (per cent) between the 1968-72 and die 1986-90 averages. 
c Total (A): Developed countries total. 
Total (B): Developing countries total. 
See notes in Figure 4.2 for classification. Consumpdon per capita in 'Total (B)' excludes 
Cuba and centrally planned economies in Asia other than China. 
d 1980 data. 
e Annual average growth rates in the period 1979-90. 
Sources IIS I, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from Summers and Heston (1991), Penn World Tables-, 
and World Bank, World Tables). 
developing country output has not been sufficient to offset declines in developed 
country consumption or to lift world demand for steel (Findlay, 1990). 
Some developing countries with relatively high economic growth rates and/or 
high per capita income levels exhibited faster increases in steel consumption during the 
last two decades. Table 5.1 suggests that this took place mainly in the East Asian 
developing economies, particularly in Korea and Taiwan, while Brazil and Mexico, the 
two major steel-making countries in Latin America, have in fact exhibited very stagnant 
steel consumption. It is not surprising that Korea and Taiwan, two of the world's most 
rapidly growing economies, recorded also the world's highest growth rates of steel 
consumption during the 1970s and 1980s, averaging more than 15 per cent per annum. 
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Table Intensities of crude steel consumption, selected countries and years, 1968-90 
(averages for the specified period: kilograms per GDP)" 
68-72 73-77 78-82 83-87 88-90" elasticity 
Australia 0.0509 0.0426 0.0350 0.0290 0.0268 (-0.08) Canada 0.0512 0.0495 0.0398 0.0330 0.0308 (0.13) W. Germany 0.0702 0.0567 0.0487 0.0419 0.0421 (-0.16) France 0.0481 0.0419 0.0317 0.0235 0.0242 (-0.29) UK 0.0523 0.0454 0.0324 0.0242 0.0246 (-0.38) Italy 0.0500 0.0468 0.0410 0.0353 0.0387 (0.26) Japan 0.0839 0.0780 0.0649 0.0551 0.0570 (0.25) US 0.0490 0.0441 0.0359 0.0261 0.0235 (-0.23) 
Korea 0.0222 0.0446 0.0593 0.0690 0.0768 (1.40) Taiwan 0.0318 0.0552 0.0803 0.0772 0.1055 (1.34) China 0.0315 0.0310 0.0338 0.0352 0.0267 (0.67) India 0.0869 0.0667 0.0585 0.0521 0.0648 (0.52) Turkey 0.0191 0.0279 0.0248 0.0305 0.0317 (0.98) Brazil 0.0244 0.0268 0.0238 0.0217 0.0268 (0.59) 
Mexico 0.0186 0.0200 0.0230 0.0167 0.0174 (0.47) 
Notes a IntensityT = ( CNx / Y-c), and 
Elasticity (in parentheses) = 
Sources 
Average Growth Rate between CNeg-?: and CNge-go'' 
Average Growth Rate between Y68-72 and Yg6-9o > 
where CNt and Y-c denote average consumpuon and average GDP, respectively, per annum 
during X ( = 68-72,. . . , 83-87, 88-90). 
Yt , t = 1968,.. . , 1988, is from Perm World Tables (Summers and Heston, 1991). Y1989 and 
Y1990 are obtained by muldplying Yiggg by real GDP growth rates in the periods 1988-89 and 
1989-90 calculated from real GDP data (at 1987 US$) in World Bank, World Tables. 
As for Table 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 Economic growlh and the life-cycle of steel consumption 
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The pattern of steel consumption per capita or per unit income shows more 
clearly the life-cycle of steel consumption. A study by the Nomura Research Institute 
(1986) provides a stylised pattern of steel consumption per capita and projections of the 
cycle in several steel-making countries including Korea (Figure 5.1).^ The intensities of 
steel consumption with respect to real GDP in the world, which are shown in many 
studies such as nSI (1983) and Jones (1986), assume a similar pattern to that of per 
capita consumption depicted in Figure 4.5. 
Steel consumption levels per capita or per GDP, or both, in most steel-making 
developed countries recorded negative growth rates in the 1970s and the 1980s (Tables 
5.1 and 5.2).^ This suggests that, in terms of the life-cycle of steel consumption, their 
steel industries passed the growth stage (Stages 1 and 2 in Figure 5.1) but are now in 
the mature or declining stages (either Stage 3, 4 or 5). 
In developing countries total steel consumption increased substantially, but per 
capita consumption in most of the countries was still less than 100 kilograms per annum 
in the period 1988-90 (Table 5.1).^ Only Korea and Taiwan experienced sharp 
increases in both total and per capita steel consumption. Their average growth rates of 
crude steel consumption per capita in the period 1970-90 were more than 13 per cent 
2. According to NRI (1986), steel consumption per capita in a rapidly industrialising country begins to 
grow quickly after exceeding about 100 kilograms (Stage 1 in Figure 5.1). The growth rates fall as 
consumption reaches around 400 or 600 kilograms per head (Stage 2). After peaking at around 700 
kilograms, consumption per capita decreases for about 5 or 10 years (Stages 3 and 4) and then enters 
'Stage 5' where consumption is maintained at around 300 kilograms as steel consuming sectors in 
the economy mature (see also Kim, 1987, p.l 12). The levels of per capita consumption at each stage 
and the speed of shifting from one stage to the next will differ between different countries due to 
many factors such as differences in industrial structure, economic growth rates and/or population 
density. Nevertheless, the patterns of the life-cycle of steel consumption would be similar. 
3. This implies that the peak levels of steel consumption, both total and per capita, in most developed 
countries were reached before 1975, or around 1980 in some countries, as their major steel 
consuming projects were established, the exceptions being Italy and Japan. These countries recorded 
positive average growth rates of per capita steel consumption in the period 1970-90, mainly due to 
sharp increases in steel consumption in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. As shown in Table 5.1, 
most developed countries consumed more steel per head in recent years than in the mid-1980s. This 
may be mainly due to cyclical growth of heavy steel-consuming sectors in the developed countries. 
Nonetheless, all the developed countries in Table 5.2 showed declining consumption intensities 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the elasticities of consumption with respect to GDP in real 
terms were either negative or less than one. Most developed countries passed the period of highest 
steel intensity between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s (in the case of the United States, between 
the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s) when their steel consumption growth rates matched their 
economic growth rates (see Jones, 1986, ch.4, and Bamett and Schorsch, 1983, ch.3). The decline in 
steel intensity in developed countries is due to changes in indusU-ial structure as the economy 
matures, particularly in activities consuming less metal per unit of output and/or due to substitution 
away from steel to other materials such as plastic or aluminium (Findlay, 1990). Findlay (1990) 
argues also that, while substitution away from steel to other materials has occurred, a shift back to 
steel is also possible, depending on technological changes and relative prices, as shown by recent 
examples in the packaging and building industries. 
4. According to the IISI (1992), only 8 of all the developing countries, except Korea and Taiwan, 
showed a per capita consumption of crude steel of more than 150 kilograms as of 1990. They 
include Singapore (1,274 kg). Hong Kong (301 kg), Malaysia (179 kg), Israel (195 kg), Oman (190 
kg), Qatar (169 kg), Saudi Arabia (190 kg) and Trinidad Tobago (210 kg). Malaysia was the only 
one of these which produced more than one million tonnes of crude steel in 1990. 
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per annum. Their steel consumption intensities also increased rapidly and were 
relatively high compared to those in other steel-making developing countries. In the 
period 1970-90 their steel consumption grew faster than GDP in real terms, resulting in 
elasticities of steel consumption greater than one (Table 5.2). 
Korea's per capita consumption of crude steel equivalents in the period 1988-90 
averaged about 440 kilograms per annum, more than double the amount in the eariy 
1980s. Korea then approached 'Stage 2 ' of the steel consumption life-cycle in this 
period, which the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan entered in the eariy 
1960s or eariy 1970s (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). The magnitudes and the changing 
pattern of intensities of steel use in Korea in the 1980s are similar to those exhibited by 
the West European countries and Japan during the 1960s (Jones, 1986). 
The prominent growth of steel consumption in Korea along with Taiwan among 
developing countries suggests that the world's highest economic growth rates in Korea 
during the 1970s and the 1980s were coupled with rapid industrialisation through the 
development of heavy steel-consuming industries. It is perhaps not surprising that 
Korea (and Taiwan) showed the world's highest rates of economic growth and total and 
per capita steel consumption growth at the same time in the period 1970-90. 
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND STEEL INDUSTRY GROWTH IN KOREA 
In the domestic economy, a rise in domestic demand for steel in Korea was associated 
basically with economic growth, followed by expansion of the construction sector and 
the steel-consuming heavy industries (see Chapters 2 and 3). The influence of the 
increases in domestic demand on the industry growth can be examined by looking at the 
linkage effects that the steel-consuming industries had on steel output growth. 
In the process of economic growth, industries are related to each other by 
supplying inputs to other industries or by constituting important sources of domestic 
demand for other industrial products. The industrial linkage relationship can be found 
by analysing the input-output tables for the economy. In input-output analysis, forward 
linkages of industry i are defined as opportunities offered to the industry by growth of 
other industries using industry / 's products as inputs, representing effects of domestic 
demand on growth of industry i.^ 
5. In an input-output table, total demand comprises 'intermediate inputs' used by domestic industries to 
produce other goods and services and Tmal demand' consumed by end-users and for exports. The 
input-output relationship between domestic demand and supply in an economy with n number of 
industries can be expressed in matrix terms: 
2 = + (1) 
where Q (= (Q/), / = J, 2,..., n.) and £?(= [Qj}J = 1,2,..., n.) are (n x 7) vectors of sectoral output 
and domestic final demand (including exports), respectively. A^ is an (« x n) mauix of domestic 
input-output coefficients, and A'^Q can be interpreted as a domestic intermediate demand (input) 
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In Korea, the steel industry has been one of the industries exhibiting the highest 
forward and backward linkages with other industries in the domestic economy. Several 
studies show that, as an industry producing important intermediate inputs for 
mdustrialisation, steel has exerted very high backward linkage effects on development 
of the steel-consuming industries during the rapid industrialisation of the 1970s and 
1980s/ In addition to this, the iron and steel industry showed one of the highest 
forward linkage index values among manufacturing sectors throughout the 1970s and 
1980s (Table 5.3). This implies that Korea 's rapid economic growth and 
industrialisation, leading to the growth of the steel-consuming heavy industries as 
shown in Table 4.3, had significant effects on steel industry development. The forward 
linkage effects of the steel industry were higher than those of other major export 
industries in Korea such as textiles and clothing, electrical goods and automobiles. 
These data seem to relate to the fact that steel as an important supplier of intermediate 
inputs for industrialisation has shown higher shares of domestic uses in production than 
other major export-oriented manufacturing sectors in Korea. In 1985, for example, 
shipments for domestic uses out of total domestic steel output were 68.1 per cent, while 
the shares of domestic uses in total production in the case of textile and clothing, 
electric machinery and transport equipment were 49.6 per cent, 56.2 per cent and 63.4 
per cent, respectively."' As of 1988, the shares were 71.6 per cent in the steel industry, 
matrix. Equation (1) can be rewritten: 
[l-A^]Q = Q ^ (2) 
where I is an x /z) identity matrix. The inverse matrix [I-A'^y^ is known as 'the Leontief inverse 
(net of intermediate imports)' and captures both the direct and indirect effects of any change in the 
exogenous vector Q. By defining the inverse as 
[I-A'^]-i = r = {Yyl, 
the economic significance of the inverse can be illustrated as: 
Yy = OQ, /3Q^) (3) 
where Yy is the/,; th element of the Leontief inverse. According to (3), Yy is the partial derivatives of 
Qi (output in the /tii sector) with respect to Qy (domestic final demand in theyth sector). If, therefore, 
Clj increases by one unit (all other final demands unchanged), its effect on production of the ith sector 
is captured by the expression Yy. The industrial linkage relationship can be expressed in terms ofYy 
as follows: 
i l Y y A l S Y y . J / ^ ' J 
j ^ l y j j ^ l l y , 
' / " ' ; 
: forward linkage (4) 
: backward linkage (5) 
Forward linkages (4) are represented by tiie relative size of the average effects of a unit change in 
total final demand on industry i's production to the average effects on tiie whole industries. 
Backward linkages (5) of industry i, showing tiie extent to which growtii of industry i offers 
opportunities for other industries, are expressed as the relative size of the average effects on the 
production of all industries of a unit increase in final demand for industry i to the average effects of a 
unit change in total final demand. See Leontief (1986) or Bulmer-Thomas (1982) for further 
discussion of the input-output analysis. 
6. See Kim (1976), Research Centre for Social Science (1987) and Hong et al. (1990). 
7. The data are from Economic Planning Board, Annual Report on Current Production Survey, 1988. 
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Table 5 3 Industries showing the highest forward linkage effects with other domestic 
industries in Korea, 1975-88 (value based) 
1975 1980 1985 1988 
Petroleum 4.557 4.320 3.041 2.033 
Chemicals 2.054 2.464 2.345 2.173 Pulp and paper 1.677 1.805 1.886 2.000 
Pig iron and semis 1.478 1.672 1.704 1.743 
Finished steel 1.360 1.462 1.403 1.469 
Note The index of forward linkage effects of industry / is defined as equation (4) in footnote 5 in 
this chapter. The total number of industries are 65. 
Source Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables, various issues. 
compared with 55.6 per cent in the textile and clothing industry, 51.6 per cent in the 
electric machinery industry and 67.5 per cent in the transport equipment industry. 
The demand-side effects of economic growth and industrialisation on the nation's 
steel-making, represented by the forward linkage index numbers of the steel industry, 
can be analysed further by looking at the sectoral composition of Korea's steel 
consumption and the influences on steel production. The changes in Korea's steel 
consumption in the 1970s and the 1980s include not only rapid increases in absolute 
sizes in total, per capita and per GDP but also shifts in product mix and sectoral 
composition of domestic demand. Figure 4.4 in the previous chapter repons the 
growing importance of consumpdon of hot-rolled and cold-rolled flat products relative 
to long products and other flat products such as plates in the Korean economy in the 
1970s and 1980s. These shifts are reflected in Figure 5.2, which shows the changes in 
the composition of the sectoral and industrial demand for finished steel in Korea using 
data extracted from input-output tables for the Korean economy. Figure 5.2 confirms 
that, while the value (in real terms) of total industrial domestic demand for steel 
increased sharply throughout this period, Korea's steel consumption became more 
concentrated in manufacturing activities as the economy underwent industrialisation 
and gradually established its infrastructure. 
The shares of the construction sector in Korea's total industrial demand for steel 
declined continuously from about 60 per cent in 1970 to 35 per cent in 1980 and about 
25 per cent in 1988. With the growing importance of the steel-consuming heavy 
industries - such as manufacturing of fabricated metal products, automobiles, electrical 
goods and machinery - in the Korean economy ,as shown in Table 4.3, their shares in 
steel consumption rose rapidly during this period, from 36.5 per cent in 1970 to about 
72 per cent in 1988. In the case of the fabricated metal industry, the shares doubled 
over the period - from 15 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1988. The machinery 
industry also realised rising shares in steel consumption during this period - from about 
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Figure 5J2 Composition of sectoral domestic demand for fmished steel in Korea, 
selected years, 1970-88 (per cent: value based)" 
(per cent) 
100", 
Index of total demand sizes in terms of real values (1988=100) 
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Notes a The figures here are the composition of total finished steel used as 'intermediate inputs' in all 
domesdc industries odier dian die iron and steel industry itself. Final demand for finished 
steel m Korea accounted for about 20 per cent of total demand. In general, die iron and steel 
mdustiy consumed about 15-25 per cent of die intermediate demand for finished steel. 
b Index of total demand sizes: one of die 1987 issues of Input-Output Tables by die Bank of 
Korea provides die 1975, 1980 and 1985 I-O tables in 1985 constant prices. The 1963, 1970 
and 1988 figures were transformed into real terms, using die wholesale price index of rolled 
products. 
c TR equipment: transpon equipment such as ships and boats, automobiles, trains and bicycles. 
EL goods: electrical and electronic equipment and apparatus. 
Machinery: general industrial machinery and precision apparatus. 
Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables, various issues; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Sources 
7 per cent to 20 per cent. In the period 1970-88 the shares of electric and electronic 
machinery and transport equipment also increased from 3 per cent to 7 per cent and 
from 12 per cent to 16 per cent, respectively (Figure 5.2). 
The growth of these manufacturing sectors, with their intensive use of various 
steel products, has an important implication for steel industry development. Table 5.4 
reports estimates of a rise in steel production induced by a unit increase in final demand 
for the major steel-consuming industries in Korea. These estimates came from the 
elements in the row corresponding to the steel industry (the steel-row elements, 
hereafter) of 'the Leontief inverse (net of intermediate imports)' in the input-output 
analysis. Even though the estimates do not suggest a clear causal relationship between 
steel demand and production or provide a complete picture of the effects of increases in 
domestic steel demand on steel production, they do suggest three important 
implications for the relationship between steel industry development and growth of the 
steel-consuming sectors.^ 
8. In fact, there are several problems in using die elements of the Leonuef inverse in this static input-
output table as complete indicators of die demand-side effects on steel indusuy growdi. First of all, 
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Table 5.4 Induced steel output in Korea by a unit change in final demand for major 
steel-consuming industries, selected years, 1963-88 (value based)" 
1963 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 
Finished steel ^ 1.848 2.162 2.480 2.719 2.695 2.733 
Finished steel (=/) 1.087 1.059 1.127 1.266 1.194 1.197 Fabricated metal 0.074 0.266 0.346 0.339 0.300 0.287 Machinery 0,118 0.217 0.242 0.176 0.201 0.207 EL machinery 0.047 0.034 0.119 0.072 0.078 0.088 Transport equipment 0.082 0.099 0.097 0.145 0.159 0.118 Construction 0.134 0.161 0.177 0.190 0.196 0.199 Water, electricity and gas 0.019 0.021 0.028 0.038 0.044 0.055 Mining 0.036 0.050 0.061 0.080 0.077 0.078 
Pig iron and semis ^ 1.581 1.941 2.695 3.108 3.274 3.242 
Pig iron and semis (=/) '' 1.088 1.167 1.372 1.643 1.570 1.593 Finished steel 0.252 0.334 0.569 0.632 0.770 0,769 
Notes a The figures are row elements of 'the Leontief inverse net of intermediate imports' in the input-
output table for a total of 65x65 sectors. That is, {Yy) = [I-yi^]-iand7,y =(dQ/dQJ). 
See footnote 5. Other industries not presented here have coefficients generally less than 0.01. 
b The row sum of the Leontief inverse, indicating the total effect on the i th productive system 
when each final demand increases by unity. 
c In the Leontief inverse, J a shows the largest value and is greater than 1. The value of (Y,, -1) 
can be interpreted as the indirect effect of a unit change in final demand for i th industry 
products on its own production. 
Source Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables, various issues. 
Table 5.4 shows firstly that the sum of the steel-row elements of the Leontief 
inverse in Korea - the total effects on steel production of a unit increase in final 
demand for all industries - increased over time (see the rows of Xy Yy). This implies 
that, as the Korean economy continued to industrialise throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
the direct and indirect effects on steel industry development of the demand side of the 
Korean economy increased. 
Secondly, the industries consuming steel more intensively had a stronger impact 
on the steel industry's production system when the final demand for these industries 
increased (Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2). Besides the steel industry itself, the steel-
intensive manufacturing industries such as metal products, machinery, transport 
equipment as well as the construction sector exhibited the highest values among the 
steel-row elements in the Leontief inverse. As shown in Table 4.3, these industries 
increased their importance in the Korean economy throughout the 1980s. Growth of 
djTiamic analysis of the input-output models would be more appropriate in rapidly changing 
economies. Moreover, the effects of domestic steel demand as intermediate input cannot be fully 
captured, even if part of these effects are reflected through the effects of final demand for the 
industries using steel as intermediate inputs. In the presence of external scale economies, which may 
be the case for the steel industry in rapidly developing countries, the effects on development of the 
steel industry of increasing domestic demand for steel induced by growth of the economy and of 
steel-consuming industries would be much more complicated, and the static linear input-output 
model may not be able to capture all the effects. Nevertheless, the estimates reported in Table 5.2 
can be used as proxies for the effects. 
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these industries induced substantial rises in steel demand due to their high degrees of 
input requirements for steel, indicating that they made an increasing contribution to 
expansion of steel production. 
Thirdly, the estimates of row elements corresponding to the pig iron and semi-
fmished steel sector in the Leontief inverse suggest that demand-induced effects on 
production increases in pig iron and semi-fmished steel stemmed mostly from growth 
of the sector itself and the downstream rolling sectors (Table 5.4).' In relation to the 
backward integration process of the Korean steel industry discussed in Chapter 3, this 
confirms that development of upstream iron and crude steel processing in the Korean 
steel industry was strongly influenced by growth of the rolling sector, which resulted 
inevitably in rapidly rising domestic demand for steel primary forms and pig iron. 
While Table 5.4 suggests that, in Korea, domestic demand had increasingly 
important effects on steel industry growth throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the channel 
through which it influenced the steel industry may be more complicated. Some 
examples of how domestic demand influenced development of the Korean steel 
industry can be found in the history of POSCO. 
Firstly, one of the influential factors in the Korean government's decision to 
establish POSCO, to expand its capacity rapidly and to establish another integrated mill 
was the rapid growth in domestic steel demand at the time, to the point where it far 
outstripping domestic supply (Kim, 1976; POSCO, 1988; and Innace and Dress, 1992). 
POSCO's construction plan, procurement of equipment and field design also responded 
to characteristics of the current and anticipated domestic demand. In the construction 
process of the Pohang works, for example, POSCO constructed rolling facilities first in 
order to meet the rapidly increasing domestic demand for finished steel (POSCO, 1988; 
and Innace and Dress, 1992).'° POSCO (1988) states that it was to help to ease the 
nation's steel shortage. POSCO was then able to produce hot strip and some finished 
steel products with imported semi-finished steel slabs and other primary forms, while 
the construction of steel-making converters and blast furnaces was still in process. This 
provided the company with an immediate cash flow and the opportunity to achieve 
profitability faster (POSCO, 1988; and Innace and Dress, 1992). 
9. Since semi-finished steel manufacturing uses pig iron as the most important input, the input-output 
relationship within the aggregated pig iron and semi-fmished steel sector is relatively strong and 
hence the estimates of Yi-,-, / = the pig iron and semi-fmished steel sector, shown in Table 5.2 are 
relatively high. 
10. The conventional way of building an integrated steel mill (the forward construction approach) is to 
install an iron-making facility fu^t, then steel-making, and finally the rolling facilities. This is the 
actual flow-line for manufacturing steel products. However, POSCO reversed the traditional 
process and introduced rolling facilities first, followed by steel-making and iron-making blast 
furnaces. This backward approach was not unique to the construction of POSCO but in fact was 
common practice among many other world steel-makers during the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 7 will 
discuss the construction process of POSCO in detail. 
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Since POSCO engaged actively in exports to ease scale constraints on production 
due to the small size of domestic demand, foreign sources of demand and international 
competition also constituted an important driving force for POSCO's growth." 
Nevertheless, POSCO's strong relationship with domestic downstream processing firms 
and steel-using manufactures, and information feedback and pressure on product 
quantity and quality by them, have had important effects on its decision-making and 
growth pattern with respect to investment priorities, quality control and product-mix 
development.'^ This was one way in which domestic demand contributed to the 
growth of POSCO, but was also one reason that POSCO's growth was concentrated 
mainly in ordinary carbon steel. Even though investment in special steel-making 
facilities is becoming more important in the Korean steel industry, Korea's levels of 
production and consumption of special steel were still very low relative to those of 
developed countries.'^ In addition to the unfavourable supply-side conditions such as 
high production costs and low technology levels, the small size of domestic demand 
constituted a main constraint to development of special steel-making in Korea (see 
Yang, 1986). 
DOMESTIC DEMAND PRESSURE AND SHIFTS IN TRADE IN THE SHORT-RUN^' 
Given the assumptions made in the input-output analysis, Table 5.4 suggests that 
increasing domestic demand for steel followed by growth of the steel-consuming 
industries constitutes one of the main sources of expansion of the steel industry in a 
rapidly developing country. In the short-run, however, a sharp rise in domestic demand 
will reduce the volume of net trade, if adjustment to the rise through expanding 
production capacity is less flexible in the short-term than reducing exports and/or 
increasing imports. 
The short-run relationship between domestic demand and net trade can be 
explained by using the identity of total demand and total supply. The identity at given 
11. In the early period of POSCO from 1973 to 1979, around 20 to 38 per cent per annum of total 
shipment was for exports. The export shares of total shipment in the first half of the 1980s (1980-85) 
were between 31 and 46 per cent per annum. The shares dropped to less than 30 per cent afterwards 
(obtained from POSCO data base). 
12. This information was obtained by interviewing personnel in POSCO and other steel-making and 
steel-consuming companies in Korea. 
13. For example, the shares of special steel in total crude steel output in Korea was 2.3 per cent in 1977 
and 2.6 per cent in 1984, while the figures in the United States, Japan and EC were 13.5 to 18.5 per 
cent in 1977 and 13.5 to 22.0 per cent in 1984. See Yang (1986) for discussion of development of 
special steel-making in Korea. 
14. The term 'domestic demand pressure' can be defined in various ways according to the purposes of 
the different studies. In this thesis, it is defined simply as the short-run situation where domestic 
demand increases more rapidly than production. See Zilberfarb (1980) for other definitions. 
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point of time t, DD^ + Xt = Qt + Mt, can be written as: 
DDt = Q t - N T t (5 1) 
where NTt = Xt - Mt and ' N T ' stands for net trade. Taking the first difference, the 
identity (5.1) becomes 
ADDt = AQt - ANTt (5 2) 
where A is the difference operator, and hence A At = At - At.„ At = {Qt, DDt, NTt}. In a 
newly industrialising country, both domestic steel demand and production increase very 
rapidly in general. In this case, 
A D D t > 0 => AQt-ANTt > 0 ; and 
AQt > 0 => AQt > ANTt 
where the sign of ANTt could be either positive or negative depending on the sizes of 
shifts in steel production and consumption between time t-l and t. However, the 
presence of domestic demand pressure, which can be defined as ADDt > AQt > 0, leads 
to reduction of the net trade size (ANTt < 0). Then the short-run relationship at time t 
(IRt) between domestic demand pressure and trade performance can simply be 
expressed as: 
(5.3) 
Domestic demand pressure can exist in a rapidly growing economy, where continuing 
industrialisation brings about a very sharp rise of domestic demand for steel but 
synchronous upward adjustment of the steel production level is limited to the current 
production capacity. In an industry such as steel, increments to the existing capacity or 
construction of new plants requires a huge amount of capital investment and long-term 
planning. The relationship (5.3) may hold even when domestic demand falls. 
Table 5.5 provides the IR^ values in major steel-making countries and suggests 
that, in the 1970s and the 1980s, the relationship (5.3) is more applicable in developing 
countries, where both production and consumption rapidly increased. In most years of 
the 1970s and 1980s, domestic demand for steel in developing countries grew rapidly, 
instantaneously reducing net trade volumes despite continuous increases in production 
(IRf in Table 5.5).'^ Improvement in their trade balances took place through two 
channels. One was when domestic demand fell, though this was only occasionally. In 
this case, the relationship (5.3) still held in these countries due to the steady rise in 
15. For example, when ADDt < 0 but AQt > 0, then ANTt > ^Qt > 0. Even if production also falls, net 
trade may increase and the relationship (5.3) will hold when ADDt < AQt < 0. 
16. For the changing patterns of steel production, consumption and trade in major steel-making 
countries, see Tables 5.1,4.4b and 4.5. 
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Table Ratios between changes in domestic demand and net trade, crude steel 
equivalents in selected countries and years, 1968-90 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
-0.7 -1.3 (-1.5) (1J) (0J) -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 (-0.9) 
(-0.8) U -1.1 (-1.4) @J @J (10) -0.4 -0.6 
(-0.2) -0.2 -0.1 (-0.1) ( ® J ) -0.6 (-0.5) M (-129) 
-0.8 -1.4 10 (-0.9) (-0.4) -0.1 (-0.5) -0.9 (®J) 
(i.7) 12 (-0.8) (O) (17) (-1.3) -3.1 -0.4 
(-2.4) -0.7 7A (-0.3) (0J) 23 (MJ) -0.3 
(-6.4) -0.6 (-2.2) (-0.7) (Hi) | J (§J) -0.3 -1.6 
I J -0.6 (-1.8) -0 .2 -2.0 -0 .2 -2 .3 -0.7 -0.6 
IR^ = (ANTt/ADD,) : 
Australia -0.6 -1.3 -1.1 Japan -6.3 (0J) -0.3 US -0.7 (-0.2) 
1.1 
0.1 Canada -0.2 UK -0.1 10 -0.3 Germany -0.4 -1.6 -0.2 France S.1 0J -0.6 Italy u -0.6 0.0 
Korea -0.7 -0.6 W Taiwan -0.9 (-1.4) 
0J 
(-2.0) China 0J U 
India (-1.1) 
0.§ 
-1.6 -0.6 Turkey -0.7 11 Brazil -0.2 -0.2 ®J Mexico 0J -0.1 0.0 
Categories of IR, 
-0.2 0.1 -0.5 (-1.7) (-3.8) -0.4 0.2 §.0 -0.6 
-0.9 -0.3 0.S -0.8 (-3.0) -1.1 -0.8 0.11 -0.4 
(-0.1) 10 -0.3 (-24) -0.2 -0.6 0.1 (-3.2) -2.6 
-0.5 (-6.3) -0.9 (-0.2) (-3.2) -0.9 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 
-0.8 -0.6 (-1.2) -0.6 l i -0.6 1 ? (-3.3) (-3.6) 
-0.9 (-2.6) 110 -0.1 (-0.8) 0J -0.7 (-1.7) ( iJ) 
-0.5 (-1.1) -0.4 -1.0 (-0.8) -0.4 (-0.9) -0.7 -0.1 
Conditions eg. ^ 
m f : I R , < 0 ADDt>0; ANTj<0 ; A Q , > o r < 0 (ADD^>AQ,)= -0.5 
I R ^ IR^<0 ADDt<0 ; ANTi>0; AQ^>or< 0 (AQt>ADDJ= (-0.5) 
IRt: IRt > 0 ADD^ > 0; ANT^ > 0; AQ^ > 0 (AQ, > ADD, > 0 ) ®.i 
m f : IR, > 0 ADDt < 0; ANT, < 0 ; AQ, < 0 (0 > ADD, > AQ,) (iJ) 
Notes a The production data base on crude steel output and the trade data are from semi-finished and 
finished steel figures converted to crude steel equivalents. 
b Examples of the IRt values in the table. 
c If the sign AQt is negative in the case of 11^, then 0 > AQt > ANTt. In the case IRt, if the 
sign AQt is positive, then ANTt > AQt > 0. 
Sources IIS I, Steel Statistical yearbook, various issues. 
production (IR?). The other was when AQt (> 0) was greater than ADDt (> 0) as in 
the case IRt^. This was intermittent and may have been the result of gradually growing 
comparative advantage in steel-making and a long-run outcome of the industries' or 
f i rms' efforts to adjust production capacity upward in response to continuously 
increasing domestic demand. 
By contrast, developed countries experienced little domestic demand pressure but 
many periods of declining domestic demand and production after the mid-1970s (either 
IR? with AQt < 0 or IR? ; see Table 5.5 and also Tables 5.1, 4.4b and 4.5). Even in 
many of the years when there was domestic demand pressure ( I R f ) , their steel output 
fell, in contrast to developing countries where the situation of IRt^ was generally 
accompanied by rising output levels. 
Table 5.6 shows that, in most years during the last three decades, Korea's trade in 
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Table 5.6 Short-run relationship of domestic demand, production, trade and RCA, 
finished steel products in Korea, 1965-90 (thousand tonnes) 
1965 1966 1%7 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
ADD, 90 143 289 278 379 150 253 423 987 229 -632 1190 1670 
AQ, 35 58 121 243 279 262 181 402 911 447 -392 1069 1155 
ANT, •55 -85 •168 -35 -100 112 -72 -21 -76 218 240 -121 -515 
ART, -0.07 -0.23 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.11 -0.04 -0.23 
ARCAj -0.10 •0.11 -0.09 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.07 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
ADD, 1610 254 -1197 1432 -970 1946 2009 e n 997 2400 719 3360 3443 
AQ, 1395 1133 373 2262 744 1231 1338 P E I 1376 2199 1381 2869 2780 
ANT, -215 879 1571 831 1714 -716 -670 1 2> 379 -201 662 -491 -663 
ART, -0.01 0.34 0.77 0.41 2.21 -1.72 -0.70 0.10 0.16 -0.22 0.29 -0.40 -0.35 
ARCAj 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.04 0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Notes a AG, = 6 , - where t = 1965, 1966 1990 and 6 = {DD, Q, NT, RT, RCA} 
The values of RCAs were negative until 1979. After that, RCA, > 0. 
Bold-faced when the signs of ANTt and ARCA, are different, 
c RTj = ( X , / M O = (X /M) j andARTj = ( X / M X - ( X / M ) , . , . 
Bold-faced when the signs of ADD, and ARTtare the same. 
d A Q t > A D D t > 0 , and ANT, > 0, where shaded. Otherwise, the relationship (5.3) holds. 
e The ratios (ANT, / ADD^), which can be calculated in this table, and the IR, values for Korea in 
Table 5.5 are not necessarily equal, since the figures in this table are based on finished steel 
production and trade data. 
Source Table 3.1. 
finished steel was under pressure from sharp shifts in domestic demand to reduce the 
size of net trade. Korea achieved the highest increase in steel consumption rates in the 
world during this period (Table 5.1). During the period 1965-90, Korea's domestic 
demand for finished steel rose every year, except in 1974-75, 1979-80 and 1981-82. 
From the mid-1970s, the annual increase was more than one million tonnes for most 
years and, in the period 1989-90, the annual increments were more than 3 million 
tonnes. 
Table 5.6 reveals that, except for 1974-75, Korea 's finished steel output also 
grew, with the size of increments rising almost every year in the period 1965-90. 
Nonetheless, the annual increments in domestic demand were greater than in production 
in most years, and these reduced the size of net trade (X-M, except for those years with 
shaded cells in Table 5.6). By contrast, the balance of steel trade improved in the years 
with falling domestic demand (the case ). These data confirm the existence of the 
negative short-run relationship (IRt< 0) between domestic demand pressure and trade 
performance in the Korean steel industry in most years during the period, even though 
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the industry grew rapidly and, in spite of rising domestic demand, an increase in net 
trade followed large increments of output in several years. 
Table 5.6 also provides changes in export-import ratios (ARTO and a revealed 
comparative advantage index (ARCAt), showing shifts in Korea 's steel trade 
performance following the short-run changes in domestic d e m a n d . E v e n if a fall in 
the size of net trade (NT in Table 5.6) does not necessarily mean a drop in either RCA 
or RT measures, or vice versa, Table 5.6 shows that, with a few exceptions in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, falling (rising) net trade was also associated with falling 
(rising) values of RCAs and RTs in the Korean steel industry. This relationship was 
fairly consistent from the mid-1970s. In particular, an almost continuous drop in RCA 
and RT values from 1982 corresponded to a substantial fall in net trade due to rapidly 
rising domestic demand by around 2 or 3 million tonnes per annum in the periods 1982-
83, 1983-84, 1986-87 and 1988-90 (see Table 5.6). This implies that, even though the 
fall in comparative advantage, measured by an RCA index, in Korea's steel trade in this 
period basically resulted from increasing production costs relative to other countries 
(see Chapter 4), it can also be attributed to the impact on net trade of sharply increasing 
domestic demand relative to production expansion. The Korean experience shows that, 
in the short run, the pressure of sharply increasing domestic demand has a negative 
effect on trade performance measured either in terms of the size of net trade or the 
export-import ratio, even when the country currendy has comparative cost advantage in 
production. 
L O N G - R U N RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STEEL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION 
AND T R A D E 
Sharply increasing domestic demand tends to have negative effects on net trade in the 
shon run due generally to sluggish production adjustment. However, the theory of 
dynamic comparative advantage, incorporating the representative demand hypothesis, 
suggests that, in the longer run, rapid economic growth in a developing country may 
generate not only increases in steel production and domestic demand but also 
improvement of the trade balance and comparative advantage in steel. This relationship 
can be analysed by examining the long-run trends and correlation of intensities of steel 
production and consumption and changes in the relative sizes of net trade to GDP in 
real terms (Figure 5.3). 
17. The variable (RTJ is particularly useful in a regression analysis, which will be conducted later in this 
chapter, since, unlike NTt and RCAj, RTj always has a positive sign and a logarithmic form can be 
employed, if necessary. 
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Figure 5-3 Relat ionship between intensities of steel consumpt ion and product ion , 
selected countries , 1967-88 
a. Distribution of (9, ti) and correlation coefficients" 
0.10 -
0.08 -
0.06 -
0.04 -
0.02 -
0 
India (-0.65) 
^^ . ••• ^ ® A A - Korea ^ 
^ © (0.92) 
Net imports <= (jr = 9) => Net 
exports 
n ' 
Australia; USA; Canada; UK; France; Italy => Total 
(0.84) (0.93) (0.98) (0.97) (0.98) (0.99) (0.88) 
China (0.48); Turkey (0.50); Mexico (0.09) => Total (0.66) 
0.02 
b. Growth path of (9,n) 
0.04 
1-
0.06 0.08 0.10 
(7r = 9) 
1 
(6) 
0.04 
0.02 
Notes a n and 9 denote 'consumption intensity' and 'production intensity', respectively. 
Correlation coefficients between n and 9 in parentheses. 
The relationship between two variables, X = (xu xi,..., Xn) and y = (yi, >>2,..., jn), can be 
represented by correlation coefficient {pxr). The equation for the correlation coefficient is: 
n -
1 " 
where -\<p^<\\ c^^ Co\Qi,Y) = (^i" AtXj i ' 
<•=1 
= ^ U - ^ x ) ' ; and ^ ^ t { y i - ^ r f • 
Hxior, /if) and c^ (or, denote 'mean 'and ' s tandard deviations'of X (or 7), respectively. 
b Steel trade surpluses, when (9, n) at time / locates at the right-hand side of the line (n = 9). 
Trade deficits, when (9, tt) is at the left-hand side of the line (j: =9) . 
c OLS regression of ;: 's on 9's for all the listed countries except India and Taiwan provides: 
ir = 0 .013+ 0.6159 with = 0.86. 
The straight line n is the fitted line of the regression. 
Sources Compiled from Figure 4.3 and Table 4.5. 
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Figure 5.3a shows combinations of steel production intensity (tc) and consumption 
intensity (0) in the world's major steel-making developing and developed countries 
over the period 1967-88 plotted on the (0,7u) co-ordinates. The figure confirms that, in 
most of the world's major steel-making countries, intensities of steel production and 
steel consumption over the long run are positively correlated, except for a few countries 
such as India and Brazil. Then, the time series and cross-country data of (0,7t)'s form 
an upward-sloping band on the (0 ,n) co-ordinates. The estimate of the slope of the 
band, which are obtained by a simple regression of Tt's on 0's, is (dS / d0) = 0.615, and 
the fitted line of the regression (11) has a positive intercept term, crossing the line 
(0 = t:) from the left (see note c in Figure 5.3). The positive slope and intercept term of 
n suggests that, in a country where the steel industry grew rapidly, steel production 
intensities rose in general faster than consumption intensities in the long run, and that 
the size of net trade in steel, expressed as a ratio to real GDP, increased over time. 
According to Figure 5.3, surpluses in steel trade were achieved mostly by the 
countries where both production and consumption intensities were relatively high (the 
countries in 'Stage B' and/or 'Stage C , except the United States). If a point (0,7c) for a 
country at time t locates at the right-hand side of the line (7: = 0) in the (0,7t) co-
ordinates, the country has steel trade surpluses and the horizontal difference between 
the line (7r=0) and the point (0,7t) is the size of the surpluses relative to GDP, 
(X-M)/GDP. There are steel trade deficits when (0,7u) is at the left-hand side of the 
line (71 = 0), and the vertical difference between the line (7t = 0) and the point (0,7i) is the 
size of the deficits relative to GDP, (X-M)/GDP. Figure 5.3 shows that the long-run 
growth path of (0,7t) in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s moved from the left-hand bottom 
to the right-hand top crossing the line (7U=0) at levels of production and consumption 
intensities of around 0.06. Even though sharp rises in consumption intensities relative 
to production intensities in some years increased trade deficits or reduced trade 
surpluses, the overall pattern was that, in the long run, production expansion surpassed 
consumption growth and the size of net trade relative to GDP also showed an increasing 
trend. Nevertheless, Figure 5.3 shows that sharp rises in steel consumption intensities 
relative to production intensities after the mid-1980s reduced the horizontal distance 
between the point (0,7c)'s in the period and the line (tu = 0), implying declines of the 
size of net trade in steel relative to income levels. This may be due to either declines in 
comparative advantage or to tiie persistent short-term effects of rapidly rising domestic 
demand pressure, or both. 
Most developing countries in the 1970s and the 1980s (and Korea, Taiwan and 
Brazil in the late 1960s and tiie early 1970s) were at 'Stage A', the early stage of steel 
industr>' development. Both production and consumption intensities were rising but 
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Still below or around 0.03 or 0.04 kilograms per GDP at 1985 US dollars. In most 
developing countries domestic steel demand exceeded production at this stage, resulting 
in net imports of steel products. As these economies grew, however, the relative size of 
the steel trade deficit to GDP reduced gradually.^^ 
Nevertheless, not many developing countries in 'Stage A' experienced significant 
growth of steel production and/or consumption intensities, the levels of both remaining 
below 0.04 throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Only Korea and Taiwan moved out of 
this stage in the early 1970s, achieving rapid growth in production and consumption 
intensities. While in Taiwan consumption intensities were much higher than production 
intensities throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Korea exhibited growing intensities of 
steel production at rates higher than those of steel consumption in the 1970s and 
became a net exporter in the early 1980s.^' Thus, Korea became the only developing 
country to enter 'Stage B' , as depicted in Figure 5.3, with not only relatively high steel 
production and consumption intensities but also with increasingly important steel trade 
surpluses in a rapidly growing national economy. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, Japan and West Germany were the only two developed 
countries at 'Stage B' in the 1970s and the 1980s. West Germany's intensities of both 
steel production and consumption had already been falling from the late 1960s. The 
path of (0,7:)'s in Japan was also on a downward trend after reaching a peak in the early 
1970s. Both countries in the late 1980s entered 'Stage C', where most developed 
countries experienced a declining steel industry relative to a national economy with the 
path of (9,::) 's in general on the downward trend (Figure 5.3).The intensities of steel 
production and consumption in the 'Stage C' countries in the 1970s and the 1980s both 
declined from about 0.06 kilograms to 0.02 or 0.03 kilograms throughout the period. 
As argued by Howell et al. (1988), the fall in demand in developed countries following 
the establishment of steel consuming infrastructure and either sharp declines or cyclical 
fluctuations in the heavy steel-consuming industries were the principal cause of the 
slowdown in the world steel industry after the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, most of these 
countries, with the exception of the United States and to a lesser extent Italy, were still 
18. A few emerging steel-makers in developing countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Turicey became net 
exporters at this stage followed by low levels of consumption but relatively high production levels. 
Among them, Brazil's achievement in steel exports was remarkable (Table 4.6a). 
19. Even though Korea and Taiwan were the only two which moved out the 'Stage A' in Figure 5.3, 
there were structural differences between these countries' growth paths in production and 
consumption intensities. Figure 5.3 shows that Taiwan's consumption intensities were exceptionally 
hieh relative to steel production intensities throughout the 1970s and the 1980s and that its growth 
pa'th of (6,7r) departs significantly from the general trend shown by the other steel-making countries. 
This led to Taiwan becoming a net importer of steel throughout the 1970s and 1980s, despite the fact 
that its production intensities were much higher than those in many net-exporting developed 
countries. Other East Asian NlCs with relatively small sizes of land and population, such as 
Singapore and Hong Kong, also showed high and rapidly rising steel consumption intensities but 
very low production intensities in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
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net exponers of steel. 
Korea entered 'Stage B' following West Germany and Japan, with its steel 
production and consumption intensities continuing to increase in the early 1980s up to 
0.09 and 0.06 kilograms per GDP, respectively. Thereafter, steel production intensity 
fell slightly to above 0.08 kilograms, while consumption intensity rose to more than 
0.07 kilograms. These changes in the path of (0,7r)'s, lowering the ratios of steel trade 
surplus to GDP from the mid-1980s, are consistent with the fall in the net trade ratios to 
total trade (Table 4.6b) and with the declining shares of the steel industry in Korean 
manufacturing output, employment and exports (Table 4.3) in the same period. This 
suggests, on the one hand, that Korea's continuous rapid economic growth relative to 
the rest of the world in and after the mid-1980s led to greater specialisation in industries 
that required more capital and higher technology than steel-making, reducing the 
imponance of the steel industry in the national economy. On the other hand, this data 
also suggests that, even though the absolute size of the Korean steel industry and its 
share in world output and expons were still rising (Tables 4.4a, 4.4b and 4.5), 
comparative advantage in the Korean steel industry was being weakened in and after 
the mid-1980s. 
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF THE SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS 
Korea's steel production, consumption and trade data show that volumes of domestic 
demand and net trade changed in opposite directions over the short-run, except where 
there was a substantial rise in production, but both displayed an increasing trend in the 
long run. However, these shon-run and long-run trends or relationships do not 
necessarily confirm whether shifts in the size of domestic demand for steel influenced 
Korea's steel trade performance or whether the steel output expansion in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, which improved the steel trade balance intermittently even in the presence of 
rapidly increasing domestic demand, represented a long-run response by Korean steel 
producers to persistent domestic demand pressure. This section tests empirically the 
proposition that domestic demand pressure had negative short-run but positive long-run 
effects on trade performance, and evaluates the effects on the Korean steel industr}'. 
Specification of an empirical model 
The effects of domestic demand pressure on trade has long been a controversial issue 
on both a theoretical and an empirical level.^° It is generally argued that domestic 
20. See, for example, Ball et al. (1966), Artus (1970) and Zilberfarb (1980). Other references can be 
found in Zilberfarb (1980). Most studies on this issue concentrated on proving that domestic demand 
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demand affects trade through its effects on price mechanisms. A basic theoretical 
model of this can be derived from the identity (5.1), which can be rewritten as a simple 
system of equations. By suppressing the notation of time t, the identity for a 
commodity ' i ' becomes 
N T i ^ X i - M i = Q i . D D i (5 1) 
where 
Qi = Qi(W, P, P*) (5 4) 
DDi = DDi(Y, P, P*) (5 5) 
Then, (5.1) becomes 
NT, = NTi(Y, W, P, P*) (5 6) 
where, for commodity i, Qi is production; DDj is domestic demand; NTi is net trade as 
the difference between exports (Xi) and imports (Mi); Y is income; W is the domestic 
factor price vector, and P (or P*) is the domestic (or world) commodity price vector. 
All prices and income are in real terms. The equation (5.6) implies that a country's net 
trade in a commodity is affected by any of the variables for the production function 
(5.4) and the domestic demand function (5.5). Domestic demand is then treated as an 
endogenous variable, and its shifts are not supposed to affect trade directly; instead, 
changes in prices and income levels transmit the effects of domestic demand on trade.^ 
However, even if (5.6) indicates that the level of domestic demand is determined 
by prices and income, the price mechanism may not reflect fully shifts in domestic 
demand in the presence of market imperfections and rigidity of prices, at least in the 
shon term. Particularly in the intermediated goods industries such as steel, where 
domestic demand is derived from growth of steel-consuming industries using steel as an 
imponant intermediate input, changes in prices of either steel or other commodities 
may have a weak effect on domestic demand in the shon run when the steel-consuming 
industries are experiencing rapid growth. In this case, the presence of domestic demand 
pressure exens a direct effect on trade, either reducing the shares of exports in total 
pressure had negative short-run effects on exports. 
21. The identity (5.1) is assumed to hold under all conditions. The equation (5.4) shows that, as 
suggested in trade theor>' and theory of the firm, production depends on factor prices such as wage 
rates and capital costs and both domestic and world relative prices. The equation (5.5) suggests that, 
according to consumer theory, domestic demand is a function of income, domestic and world relative 
prices. In these equations, P or P* can be interpreted as the domestic or worid price of steel relative 
to the other commodities. VrTiere there are neither trade barriers nor transport costs, P = P*. 
22. If the domestic demand function is assumed to be homothetic as in the traditional comparative 
advantage model, the size of domestic demand for steel relative to other commodities is not affected 
by income at given relative commodit>' prices. Therefore, at given relative commodity prices and 
technology, a country's comparative advantage and net trade position in steel are affected 
fundamentally by factor prices, although the size of net trade is determined by the differences 
berv^  een production and domestic demand. 
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demand or increasing the shares of imports in total supply, or both. Inversely, prices 
are also affected by demand changes, as suggested by the inverse demand function, 
which can be derived from (5.5). In this case, short-term price rigidity and imperfect 
mformation will again prevent prices from transmitting the full effects of demand 
changes on trade. These imply that both prices and demand are weakly exogenous in 
the system and can be entered under (5.6) as explanatory variables. 
The direct effects of domestic demand on trade in the above case can be defined 
as short run. Domestic demand may also have long-run effects on trade. Where 
continuing shifts in domestic demand provide better market opportunities for domestic 
producers, this will eventually generate adjustment in production capacity, as suggested 
in Linder's representative demand hypothesis. Other things being equal, these longer-
run responses of the production system to domestic demand pressure will improve net 
trade. These effects can be separated from price effects, since the size of domestic 
demand can be treated as a variable generating external scale economies in the 
production function. As shown in (5.4) and (5.5), production is a function of factor 
prices but domestic demand is a function of income, at given relative commodity 
prices, and production and domestic demand levels are determined independentiy of 
each other. However, the production-inducing effects of domestic demand pressure 
allow domestic demand to enter (5.4) and hence (5.6) as another explanatory variable. 
Based on this argument, a general model for empirical investigation of the effects 
of domestic demand pressure on trade performance in the Korean steel industry can be 
constructed as follows: 
Z, = a + + (5.7) 
h 
where, for t = 1, 2,... , T,^ 
Zt = an independent variable representing Korea's trade performance in steel, 
either trade balance (X-M) or export-import ratios (X/M); 
Dt = apparent consumption (Q+M-X) of steel; 
for h = 1,2, 3, 4, is a set of variables, defined as 
v ; = Yt = GDP in real terms; 
Vj H Wt = steel industry wages per employee relative to total manufacturing; 
V3 = pdx _ P? ^ ^ t . 
^ t - ~ px 
px y4 ^ pxm ^ ^t . 
P: 
m 
23. For details of data and variable description, see Appendix Table A.7. 
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P? = the domestic price index of rolled steel products; 
Pt = the export price index of rolled steel products; 
P ? = the import price index of rolled steel products; 
ERt = an exchange rate per US$; and 
Ct = an error term. 
However, (5.7) is a static model and can be used to estimate the long-run coefficients p 
and 5 for h = 1, 2, 3, 4. A dynamic model to obtain both the short-run and the long-run 
multipliers can be specified in the form of the general autoregressive-distributed lag 
equation as follows (see Bewley, 1979; Hendiy et al, 1984; and Wickens and Breusch, 
1988): 
1 m n*-
z , = a + Xi^ j + + vf . j -he^ (5.8) j=l j=0 h j=0 
where 1, m and n^ are the lag length of each of the variables. 
Both the short-run and the long-run multipliers can be obtained by estimating 
directly the equation (5.8) and by calculating 
3Z 
^ = ^ ^ = Po : short-run multiplier (5.9) 
3Z 1 Q = ^ = : long-run multiplier (5.10) 0 ?t jto 
with 
?i = ^ 1 
. j=i 
where Z = Zt_i = Zt_2 = ... = Zt_j, and D = Dt_i = Dt_2 = ... = Dt_j. To validate the 
h>^othesis concerning the negative short-run effects but positive long-run effects on 
trade performance of domestic demand pressure, O should be less than zero and Q 
should have a positive value. 
Estimation procedure and results 
The data set contains 28 observations for each variable in (5.8), covering the sample 
period 1963-90. In estimation of a dynamic model with distributed lags, it is necessary 
to choose the lag length of the variables at the outset, which in general is quite arbitrary. 
In estimation of (5.8), the maximum 5-year lag length was chosen, which reduced the 
sample size to 23. This choice was based on the fact that it takes at least 4 or 5 years to 
construct an integrated steel mill. An awkward problem in the presence of a small 
number of observations is the loss of degrees of freedom for the test statistic, when 
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there are substantial lags in variables. By adding various combinations of lag length to 
variables, nevertheless, tiie following three types of linear models were estimated using 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, or either the exact maximum likelihood 
(EML) or the Cochrane-Orcutt (CO) method when non-stationary autoregressive error 
process was detected: 
(A) A dependent variable, Zt, is NTt H (Xt - M^ = (X - MX . 
All other variables are as defined in (5.7). 
(B) A dependent variable, Z^, is RTt = (Xt / Mt) = (X / M)t. 
All other variables are as defined in (5.7). 
(C) A dependent variable, Zt, is the logarithm of RTt = ^ RTt = ^ ( ^ ) t . 
All other variables are also in logarithmic forms. 
Including all lagged explanatory variables and lagged Zt's in the model generally 
provided insignificant Student's f-statistic for almost all coefficients, due possibly to 
high degrees of multi-collinearity among explanatory variables. In this case, it was not 
possible either to produce test statistics for various diagnostic testings due to the small 
sample size and the many explanatory variables. Since the prime concern of this 
empirical work is to obtain the coefficients p's, estimation was based again on the 
following model: 
Z, = a + Po Dt + i p j Dt.j + Y Wt + (|) P? + (p P;^  + C Yt + Et (5.11) 
j=i 
After estimating (5.11), the results were compared with model (5.11) including various 
combinations of other lagged variables to determine the lag length of other variables 
and to avoid a misspecification problem. 
Estimation for cases (A) and (B) using various combinations of explanatory 
variables and lag lengths failed to produce satisfactory results in terms of the signs and 
the statistical significance of coefficients and various diagnostic tests, and are not worth 
reporting here. The most satisfactory estimation results were obtained from the models 
where all variables are in logarithmic form and the dependent variable is as 
follows: 
( l ) ^ ( ^ ) t = - 11.16- 1.21 ^Dt + 0.05^Dt.i 0.36^ Dt.2 +0.51 ^Dt.3 +0 .42^ Dt-4 
(1.948)# (4.941)* (0.247)t (2.043)# (3.252)* (2.415)t 
+ 0.56 ^Dt.5 -1.78^Wt - 1.46 ^P? -H.04 ^P^ - 0.28 ^ Yt 
(3.032)* (3.405)* (4.253)* (2.197)t (0.329) 
T = 0.976 SE = 0.093 DW = 2.75 1 ML = 32.968 
t -4 
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^ ^ ^ ^ ( m ) ^ = - 12.76- 1.25^Dt + 0 . 0 3 ^ D t . i + 0 . 3 3 ^ D t . 2 + 0 . 4 8 ^ D : . 3 + 0 .40^D 
(5.925)* (6.825)* (0.159) (2.589)* (3.771)* (2.670)* 
+ 0.52 ^Dt.5 -1.78^Wt - 1.48 ^ P ? + 1.04 ^P^ 
(3.680)* (3.731)* (4.761)* (2.452)t 
^ ' = 0 . 9 8 0 SE = 0.085 DW = 2.718 ML = 32.636 
where the numbers in parentheses under each coefficient are the absolute values of the 
Student's r-statistic (* significant at 99 per cent, t significant at 95 per cent, # significant 
at 90 per cent confidence interval ); refers to adjusted for degrees of freedom; 
SE is the standard error of the regression; DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic; and ML 
is the maximised value of the log-likelihood function.^^ Inclusion of other lagged 
variables did not improve these results. Dt.j, for j > 6, also turned out to be insignificant 
when included. Additive and multiplicative dummy variables to check structural 
changes during or after several events such as construction of POSCO, the oil-shocks 
and the period of rapid domestic demand expansion in the 1980s were also used in the 
estimation procedure but none of the coefficients for the dummy variables were 
significandy different from zero. 
Even though the r-statistic in (2), where the variable £Yi was excluded, shows 
higher values than in (2), the estimation results in (1) and (2) are not very different. 
The difference is that the coefficient of ^Yt in (2) turns out to have a wrong sign, 
though this is statistically insignificant in any case. This could be because of the high 
degree of multi-collinearity between domestic demand and income levels. The 
estimation results in (2) are thus used for economic inference. 
Since the equation is in a logarithmic form and the dependent variable is 
expressed in terms of an export-import ratio rather than net trade, the coefficients of the 
explanator)' variables are the elasticities of the export-import ratio with respect to the 
corresponding variables. The coefficient of ^Dt (Pq = -1.25) represents the immediate 
reaction (per cent changes) of ( X / M ) in response to a maintained increase or unit step 
A 
(changes by one per cent) in D and can be interpreted as the short-run elasticity (O) of 
expon-impon ratio with respect to domestic demand pressure. As expected, domestic 
demand shifts affect trade performance instantaneously in the opposite direction and, A moreover, reduce the export-import ratio by a greater percentage (<E> is less than -1). 
^ A 
In the next period, the response of the export-import ratio is given by Pq + P c 
since the size of domestic demand remains at its new level. Equation (2) implies that 
24. The fourth order of autocorrelation of residuals, AR(4), was detected in the OLS estimation for both 
equations, when the Lagrange multiplier tests were applied. The Cochrane-Orcutt iterative method 
was used to correct this problem. 
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demand shifts in the ciment (first) period do not reduce the export-import ratio in the 
next (second) period (p^ « 0). However, shifts in domestic demand begin to have a 
positive effect on^the export-import ratio from the third period, which continues until 
the sixth period ( Pj > 0, for 5 > j > 2). The change in ^ (X/M) after 6 periods is given 
by the sum Q = Pq + Pj P2 + ... + Ps = 0.51, counting the period in which the change 
occurs as period 1. The sum Q represents the long-run elasticity of the export-import 
ratio with respect to domestic demand pressure, which appeared to be greater than 0. 
Equation (2) provided additional information on factors affecting trade 
performance of the Korean steel industry, which mostly can be referred to as the 
supply-side influences. Even though this equation was unable to separate the 
coefficients of the variables other than domestic demand into long-run and short-run 
effects, all the coefficient signs appear to be correct. Shifts in the steel industry's wages 
relative to other manufacturing wages (Wt) reduced its export-import ratios. The effect 
of Wt was greater than that of any other explanatory variables, the elasticity (Y in the 
equation 5.11) being -1.78. An increase in domestic prices relative to export price also 
has a negative effect on the export-import ratio, since it reduces the relative profitabihty 
of 
exports. This is reflected by (J) = -1.48 in (2). By contrast, shifts in export prices 
relative to import prices exhibited positive effects on the export-import ratio (9 = 1.04). 
COXCLLDING REMARKS 
Rapid economic growth through industrialisation in the 1970s and the 1980s enhanced 
growth in Korea's steel-consuming heavy industries, followed by rapid increases not 
only in total but also per capita steel consumption. Both the size and the growth rates 
of steel consumption and its intensity in Korea rank among the highest in developing 
countries. 
The existence of rapidly increasing domestic demand has been shown to have 
important implications for development of the Korean steel industry. Examination of 
the world steel industry suggests that, with a few exceptions, achievement of a strong 
comparative advantage in steel trade is also associated with high levels of steel 
consumption in the domestic economy. Korea showed a similar growth path of 
intensities of steel production and consumption and hence of trade to those experienced 
in most developed countries when their steel industries were growing towards their 
culmination. By contrast, many steel-making developing countries with relatively low 
levels of total and per capita steel consumption levels have not yet achieved strong 
comparative advantage in steel trade. In a similar vein, a slowdown in the steel 
industries in most developed countries can be attributed to the fall in steel demand. 
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Input-output analysis revealed that expansion of steel-consuming heavy industries 
following rapid economic growth through industrialisation had significant effects on 
Korea's steel output growth. It showed further that development of upstream iron and 
steel-making in the Korean steel industry was again strongly influenced by growth of 
the rolling sector, which generated rapidly rising domestic demand for steel primary 
forms and then pig iron. This led to the backward integration process of the Korean 
steel industry as shown in Chapter 3. 
Statistical data and empirical study show that, while rapidly increasing domestic 
demand has had a direct negative effect in the short run on Korea's trade performance 
in steel expressed in terms of changes in export-import ratios and hence reduced 
comparative advantage, it has gradually induced domestic steel production and 
ultimately improved the trade performance of the Korean steel industry over the longer 
term. 
6 Government Intervention 
and Industrial Policies for 
Steel Industry Growth 
While a large part of the Korean steel industry's development and success in 
international competition can be attributed to the vitality of Korea's dynamic national 
economy and corporate endeavours, the fact that the government intervened intensively 
in the nation's steel market as shown in Chapter 3 suggests that the role played by the 
government in establishing POSCO as a national project and its industrial policy were 
also important factors affecting the industry's development. This is because, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, industrial policy can either provide a stimulus in promoting 
industry development and enhancing industrial competence, especially in the early 
stages of growth, or lead to deterioration of industrial growth by not encouraging 
sufficient interest and incentives for investment and growth in the protected industries. 
In some cases, while a protected industry grows and enhances its competitiveness in 
both domestic and foreign markets, promotional policies may incur net costs to the 
entire economy. 
After the successful implementation of a growth strategy through export 
promotion of the light industry sectors in the 1960s, the Korean government tried to 
shape and accelerate the country's economic transformation by moving labour out of 
backward and low productivity light industries into increasingly advanced high 
productivity heavy and chemical industries. The heavy and chemical industry drive 
was officially launched in 1973 and continued throughout the 1970s.^ The government 
sees steel as occupying a central place in the industrial nexus, serving as a crucial input 
component in the industrialisation process, and made the promotion of modem steel-
making a priority in its efforts to transform the industry, pushing it ahead of the official 
heavy and chemical industry drive. 
Steel business at the internationally competitive level requires not only huge 
capital investment but substantially high levels of technology and know-how. It is a 
1. At the same time, the government also sought to strengthen and extend its export drive.. The export 
drive was eventually applied to the import-substituting heavy and chemical industries as well. 
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difficult industry for countries at an early stage of development to establish. However, 
given the strategic importance attached to industrialisation as well as national defence, 
governments in many developing countries have tried to develop the industry earlier 
than implied by the international trade theory. Even in many developed countries, 
govemment intervention in the industry has been the rule rather than the exception.^ 
This chapter attempts to consider the role played by various industrial policies in 
development of the Korean steel industry. Rather than arguing either that govemment 
intervention was absolutely necessary for Korea to develop the steel industry or that 
development of the industry had to be left solely in the hands of market forces, the 
interest here is in evaluating the extent to which the Korean govemment involved itself 
in development of the industry. The discussion will address the questions of whether 
govemment intervention was consistent with the infant industry argument and whether 
its policies were effective in promoting the industry. Related questions are whether 
some forms of market failure existed in Korea that prevented investment in modem 
steel-making.^ 
The first section examines the establishment of POSCO and the role of the 
govemment with respect to the market failure problems that existed at the time. In the 
following section, the impact of financial policy on the process of capital deepening in 
the steel industry is examined. The financial policy adopted at the time, especially in 
the 1970s, was considered to be the most significant measure not only for steel but also 
for the overall heavy and chemical industry drive, since the govemment controlled 
allocation of national resources through such policy. The third section outlines the 
extent to which other forms of promotive policies were implemented to provide 
industrial competence. The fourth section seeks to define some of the policy effects on 
steel industry grow^th. The fifth section discusses the process of liberalisation. 
While some factual information about these policies is available, numerical and 
historical data on these measures are extremely hard to obtain due to either commercial 
secrecy or the complicated nature of the measures. This made it difficult to provide a 
quantitative analysis of the effect of policies on industrial development or of the costs 
and benefits involved in implementation of the policies. Instead, the following 
discussion serves to establish that infant industry promotion through such measures 
may work to foster rapid industry growth, though this is admittedly a weak conclusion. 
2. Howell et al. (1988) provide an extensive discussion of steel policy in the world. In Appendix 4, ihe 
nature of industrial policies for steel in the world is briefly discussed in an effort to shed light on the 
issue of steel policy in the domestic economy and international trade. In the sense that competing 
countries' policies affect a domestic industry's competitiveness, it is important, particularly in 
evaluating domestic policies, to understand the status and direction of world steel policies. 
3. Other issues such as the impacts of policies for the upstream and the downstream industries on 
development or performance of the steel industry and the implications of the steel industry policies 
for national economic welfare are left for further research. 
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MARKET FAILURES AND THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN ESTABLISHING A 
MODERN STEEL-MAKING INDUSTRY 
When the Korean government took the initiative in establishing a modem steel industry 
m the late 1960s, its infant industry promotion policies were directed at building 
Korea's first large-scale integrated mill, POSCO, rather than fostering and/or protecting 
existing small firms.^ 
There were criticisms that the project was driven solely by govemment, that it 
was economically premature, that it would have been more efficient if POSCO had 
been established as a private rather than a public enterprise, and that it could undermine 
national welfare. Nevertheless, the role of the govemment in initiating the project can 
be evaluated as an attempt to transform the industry into a modem steel-maker in terms 
of technology and capacity by overcoming existing market failure problems. Industrial 
promotion policy has important implications for industrial development, since it can be 
justified only if there are domestic market failures which prevent private markets from 
developing the industry. 
Organisational structure of POSCO 
The govemment established POSCO as a state-run enterprise, partly because no private 
firms were willing to take on the risk.^ The govemment also thought that the scale of 
the project and the establishment of the related infrastructure lay beyond any private 
f irm's capacity in terms of the required capital and technology. The project in fact was 
the single largest in Korean history at the time. It appears that fundamentally the 
govemment had no v^ish to see any possible monopoly by a private company, with its 
potential to interfere in both national security and the competitiveness of major 
downstream industries. 
It was decided that POSCO would be built as a wholly incorporated entity, neither 
supplementary nor complementary to any existing plant, since all the existing plants 
were obsolete and too small to be compatible with POSCO's projected scale and 
technology. Govemment policy at the time and the construction of POSCO were 
4. See Appendix 3 for a detailed account of the establishment of POSCO. 
5. This differed gready from most of the countr>''s major industrialisation projects in the 1970s. The 
major projects in heavy industr>' were led by emerging chaebol (private business conglomerates in 
Korea), and those in the chemical industry as an import substitution strategy took the form of joint 
ventures between the govemment and foreign furos. Moreover, none of these ventures were 
involved in leadership of POSCO. Regardless of the pros and cons of public enterprise, steel is the 
one industry' where govemment ownership is dominant (Toda, 1984). Much research, including 
Tarr's (1985) on steel, shows that government involvement in ownership and business planning is 
negatively related to productivity. Nevertheless, many steel projects established in other developing 
countries in the 1970s took the form of state-mn enterprises. Even in many industrial countries, 
except Japan, the United States and, to the lesser extent, West Germany, governments manage their 
major steel producers direcdy or indirectly. 
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unable to contribute directly to restructuring the existing small firms, and POSCO was 
able to take full advantage of new equipment and technology without being burdened 
by any deficiencies of the existing small firms. 
The government and the state-run Korea Development Bank owned a majority of 
the shares. Some private banks which were actually controlled by the government at 
the time and the government-owned Korea Tungsten Company held the remaining 
shares. Even though POSCO was incorporated under the Korean Commercial Code 
and its daily operations, pricing, marketing and management were left solely to the 
company, the government controlled top policy decision-making and management 
appointments. Thus the government was able to guarantee that POSCO provided inputs 
to downstream industries at reasonable prices.® However, the fact that internally it was 
run as a private enterprise seems to have helped POSCO avoid the low performance 
generally inherent in public enterprise. 
Market failures and the government 
Korea's entry into large-scale steel-making was designed and driven totally by the 
government. The government's view on the appropriateness of its timing, scale and 
technology was different from both domestic private opinion and international 
expertise. Despite the obstacles stemming from both domestic and international 
pessimism, the project became possible with the government serving as the primary 
agent. The government's role can be rationalised in terms of the existence of market 
failures. 
The first aspect of market failure in the Korean economy in the 1960s was 
imperfect private information, which led to substantial risk and uncertainty. It was ver>' 
difficult for a potential private entrant into a large-scale steel business to foresee its 
future prospects and to grasp fully the profit opportunities. This problem was 
particularly complicated in industries exhibiting strong links with its upstream and 
downstream industries such as steel. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, the close 
interdependence with other industries reinforces the importance of sizeable domestic 
demand and growth of the related industries with respect to development of the steel 
industry. Private investment in steel-making at the time was very limited and private 
firms were unwilling to enter into large-scale and risky integrated steel-making until it 
became clear that domestic demand could produce consistent and reasonable increases. 
This does not necessarily mean that the government took the initiative for the 
project because it had better information about the prospects of economic growth and 
hence of demand for steel. The government may have had less information and less 
6. POSCO in return may have been able to induce government support relatively easily. 
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understanding of future development than some large international companies or 
institutions such as the World Bank. Instead of taking the initiative, the government 
may have been able to induce private investment by collecting and spreading 
mformation about market prospects or by subsidising research on market prospects as a 
second-best policy. 
In fact, the government took the initiative because it had a different objective 
from that of private entrepreneurs, even though gradually increasing domestic steel 
demand at the time of the mid-1960s also influenced the government's decision-
making. While the main concern of private firms is business profit, the Korean 
government had in mind a broader conception of the nation's rapid industrialisation 
through promotion of the heavy and chemical industries, and it had no doubt that 
development of the steel industry was required first. In the presence of conflicting 
opinions about market prospects, only the government's bold view of the steel industry 
as an essential part of industrialisation rather than a business venture allowed it to 
launch such a large and risky project. The steel project was promoted several years 
before the heavy and chemical industrialisation drive was launched with the 
commencement of the third Five Year Economic Development Plan (1972-76). 
The second but more crucial aspect of market failure in Korea originated from the 
weak and imperfect domestic capital market. Despite the rapid economic growth of the 
1960s, Korea's capital market at the time was not well developed. Scarcity of capital, 
in particular in the amount necessary to finance construction, was a basic and 
fundamental problem for a less developed country like Korea seeking to establish an 
integrated steel works. Capital in the form of finance was certainly obtainable from 
foreign sources, and the technology (except for very high quality specialty steels) was 
available in the international market. However, the pessimistic views of potential 
creditors with respect to the profitability of the project made capital difficult to 
procure.' Nevertheless, because the government was the primary agent, the POSCO 
project was able to overcome the initial problem of capital procurement. 
Imperfect capital market 
Successful competition in steel requires a sustained high level of capital investment not 
only in initial construction but also in capacity expansion and, on a continuing basis, in 
renovation and replacement of equipment. The government assisted the steel-making 
industry at tiie growth stage by ensuring that it had access to enough capital on 
7. The World Bank and the International Economic Consultative Organisation for Korea (lECOK), 
which at first had promised loans for the construction of POSCO, suddenly raised objections to the 
POSCO project, expressing the view that building an integrated steel mill in Korea at the time was 
premature and lacked economic feasibility, and that Korea would find it difficult to repay foreign 
credit due to its rising foreign debt. See Appendix 3 for details. 
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Table 6.1 Sources of investment capital for POSCO's Pohang mills, 1970-83 (per cent) 
First stage Second stage Third stage Fourth stage 
(04/70-07/73) (12^3-05/76) (08/76-12/78) (02/79-05/83) 
Domestic capital" (123) (199) (618) (945)"^  of which (per cent) 
Government investment 81.2 8.9 36.4 15.4 Policy funds'' 1.9 17.9 16.3 42.9 POSCO's internal capital 0.0 73.2 47.4 41.7 
Foreign capital" (178) (348) (766) (839) of which (per cent) 
Reparation funds 43.3 12.1 0.0 0.0 Japan 42.7 32.2 53.0 59.4 Others 14.0 55.7 47.0 40.6 
Notes a Million US dollars in parentheses. 
b 'Policy funds' includes the government's National Investment Fund and the funds raised by the Korea Development Bank. 
c Shares are only for the first phase completed in February 1981, of which total domestic capital 
investment was US$726 million. Domestic capital for the second phase was all suDplied bv 
POSCO itself. 
Sources POSCO's internal information; 
Economic Planning Board (Korea), Korea Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
domestic and international markets by channelling and/or rationing domestically 
available capital to the steel industry and by intervening in international loan 
negotiations and providing actual and de facto guarantees for foreign loans. The 
government consistendy ensured that the industry had access to capital on favourable 
terms not only for capacity expansion but for facilities investment, rationalisation, 
introduction of new technology and development of secure sources of raw materials. 
International development banks, notably the World Bank, financed a substantial 
amount of the developing countries' steel industry development in the 1970s and 1980s. 
As the steel industry in industrial countries entered a recession in the mid-1970s, a 
number of leading steel-makers began to view the export of equipment to developing 
countries as a means of offsetting slackening demand. This brought about intensified 
competition among the industrial countries to sell equipment to developing countries, 
supported by national export-import banks. A highly competitive lending environment 
also developed among the various private commercial banks in industrial countries as a 
substantial portion of the oil exporting countries' huge trade surpluses, following the oil 
price increases in the mid to late 1970s, were deposited in the banks, which then sought 
borrowers for these deposits (Howell et al, 1988). 
Despite the competitive lending environment, winning a particular bid was 
subject to the potential borrowing country's economic status and the economic 
feasibility of the project concerned. In many cases, therefore, insufficient capital was 
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an obstacle to construction of the most up-to-date steel-making processes. Lall (1987) 
argues, for example, that the Indian steel industry suffered from second-rate technology 
at the hands of the only source of finance available to it. In the case of the POSCO 
project, while the Japan group was very enthusiastic about providing technical and 
financial assistance, international lending institutions and some research institutions 
continued to advise against its expansion, even when it came on stream in the early 
1970s. According to POSCO, for example, the World Bank, which denied loans to the 
first stage project of POSCO, was still refusing loans for its expansion project in 1973. 
In this environment, the Korean government gave assurances that it would provide 
guarantees for the foreign investment. Involvement of the government in loan 
negotiations and its guarantees of repayment as well as the successful inception of 
POSCO's first stage gradually attracted many foreign capital lenders. A number of 
foreign export and impon banks agreed to extend favourable equipment financing to 
POSCO's expansion projects. Even the United States Export-Import Bank, which at 
first was against the POSCO project, entered the loan competition, providing US$75 
million in equipment financing in 1975-77 (Howell et al, 1988). 
In the domestic capital market, the government as a major shareholder was one of 
the main sources of finance. As shown in Table 6.1, the government supplied more 
than 80 per cent of domestically raised capital for POSCO's expansion projects. In the 
1970s, the government also contributed to the company's finances by allowing POSCO 
not to pay dividends on its shares (Howell et al, 1988). As POSCO expanded, it 
became able to finance the second phase of the Pohang works' fourth stage and the 
Kwangyang works without government investment but with its own capital and foreign 
loans. 
FINANCIAL POLICY: T H E PRINCIPAL AGENT IN INDUSTRY PROMOTION 
From the early 1970s, the Korean government explored ways to support the nation's 
economic growth through heavy and chemical industrialisation, vigorously pursuing an 
industrial targeting policy. Even though various industry specific promotion laws had 
been promulgated, the most significant and important policy tool exercised by the 
government was its control over financial markets and its power to allocate national 
resources, not only to strategically targeted industries but also to individual investment 
projects, and to subsidise them with controlled interest rates.^ Most of the banking 
institutions served as arms of the government's financial policy. The favoured sectors 
8. See Hong (1979), Kwack and Chung (1986), Hong and Park (1988), Kim (1990) and Nam (1990) for 
studies of Korea's financial policy in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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included the heavy and chemical industries and some export-oriented light industries 
such as textiles and clothing. The steel industry was formally designated a target 
industry by the government in the 1970s. Although the policy was applied to all 
strategic firms and industries, the construction and expansion of POSCO was singled 
out as a priority. 
Credit rationing and interest rate control 
As the Korean economy developed, the magnitude of total domestic loans from 
domestic financial institutions also rapidly increased, rising from equivalent to just 
about 10 per cent of GNP prior to 1960 to about 35 per cent in the 1970s, to more than 
50 per cent in the early and mid-1980s, and to more than 70 per cent by the end of 1990 
(Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues).' The importance of 
borrowings from financial institutions in corporate financing also increased, at least 
until the early 1980s. According to the Bank of Korea (1975-90), funds from financial 
institutions accounted for less than an average of 30 per cent of total corporate funds in 
the 1960s. The average proportion increased to about 34 per cent during 1971 and 1976 
and then, until the early 1980s, to about 40 per cent, with a slight decrease afterwards. 
A shortage of national capital created a bottleneck in corporate financing, not only in 
the 1960s when an export-oriented economic strategy was adopted, but also in the 
1970s when a rapid economic development strategy (through the heavy and chemical 
industry drive) was implemented. The Korean economy, though growing rapidly, 
encountered problems of low domestic savings rates and, at the same time, excess 
demand for loans. These led to a severe shortage of domestic funds and, consequently, 
increasing foreign debt. The Korean government actively intervened in the financial 
9. Financial institutions in Korea can be classified as (numbers in parentheses, as of the end of 1990): 
(1) Monetary institutions: 
• The Bank of Korea 
• Deposit money banks 
Commercial banks: nation-wide commercial banks (11), local banks (10), and 
foreign banks in Korea (69). 
Specialised banks: the Korea Exchange Bank, the Small and Medium Industry 
Bank (also called as the Industrial Bank of Korea), the Citizens 
National Bank, the Korea Housing Bank, and the Citizens 
Agricultural, Fisheries, and Livestock Cooperatives. 
(2) Non-monetary institutions: 
• Development instimtions: the Korea Development Bank, the Korea Export-Import Bank, 
and the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank. 
• Investment institutions: the Korea Securities Finance Corporation, investment and 
finance companies (32), merchant banking corporations (6), 
and investment trust companies (8). 
• Savings institutions: the mutual saving and finance companies, credit unions, mutual 
credit, etc. 
• Insurance institutions: domestic (25) and foreign (4) life insurance companies, 
Korean-foreign joint life insurance companies (5), etc. 
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market and controlled the flow of credit to help key industries overcome the financial 
bottleneck, to speed up construction, and to increase exports. 
The most important channel of credit rationing was government directed 'policy 
funds' mobilised from various sources including deposits from banking institutions and 
foreign borrowings. The loans from the funds, known as 'policy loans', were rationed 
to designated industries/projects.'" They were made through the deposit money banks 
including both commercial and specialised banks and through the government-owned 
development institutions. Until the early 1970s, credit was extended to selected 
industries mainly through specialised banks, since the participation of commercial 
banks in policy loans was limited primarily to export financing with the aid of 
rediscount facilities at the central bank. However, with implementation of the rapid 
economic growth strategy and the heavy and chemical industry drive, the shortage of 
funds became more serious, and commercial banks were also brought into the process 
of mobilising and directing funds to targeted industries. 
The government's control and rationing of credit was applied not only to policy 
loans but to most non-policy loans such as discounted commercial bills and loans based 
on general banking funds.'^ Furthermore, low interest foreign loans were also allocated 
directly to entrepreneurs, amounting to about 6 per cent of GNP each year on average in 
the 1970s (Hong and Park, 1986, p. 168). Such strong government intervention in the 
financial market continued until the mid-1980s. 
With formal implementation of the heavy and chemical industry drive policy, the 
government instituted the National Investment Fund in January 1974. The fund had 
been the most visible and clearly directed policy fund for specific industries and played 
a significant role in financing various large-scale heavy and chemical industry projects. 
The fund was raised mainly through compulsory deposits from banking institutions, 
national savings associations, insurance companies and various public funds managed 
by central and local governments and other public entities.^^ Loans from the fund were 
allocated mainly through the deposit money banks and the Korea Development Bank to 
the electricity sector, the primary sector and the important manufacturing sectors. The 
10. Some other forms of policy loans including short-term credits and earmarked loans for agriculture, 
fisheries and housing were in general free from government control. 
11. Overdrafts, loans based on instalment savings deposits, loans for the populace, remunerations and 
loans by the branches of foreign banks might be regarded as non-policy loans free of government 
control, though they still seem to have been subject to favouritism and political influence (Hong and 
Park, 1986, p. 167). 
12. Banking institutions' compulsory deposits made up the bulk of the fund's resources. They were 
required to deposit 13 per cent of the increase in time and saving deposits in the fund. The 
contribution rate thus varied over time. National savings associations, which channelled mandatory 
savings by public and private employees, also contributed all of their savings to the fund, though this 
accounted for just a minor portion of the fund. Transfers from various government budgetary 
accounts also contributed to the fund. See Kim (1990). 
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Table 62a Allocation of the National Investment Fund by sector in Korea, 
1974-83 (percent)" 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Total sectors * (75.4) (123.7) (178.5) (240.7) (380.2) (439.8) (438.4) (606.7) (730.0) (732.6) 
HC industries"" 58.5 49.6 56.4 61.2 63.0 64.9 60.8 54.9 61.0 65.0 
HC industry promotion 34.6 20.0 25.4 23.5 29.0 332 26.0 13.3 11.6 6.0 Domestic machinery purchase 6.2 5.3 14.9 7.9 8.3 7.9 9.4 10.5 21.5 30.9 Machinery factory construction 132 10.1 6.1 14.0 117 10.0 4.0 3.5 5.4 2.5 
Planned shipbuilding - 4.9 3.3 8.2 6.4 7.4 12.5 15.9 16.8 187 
Defence industries 4.5 9.3 6.8 7.6 7.5 6.5 9.0 11.6 5.6 6.4 
Agriculture 14.0 9.2 10.9 42 3.9 4.5 5.0 6.4 62 6.1 
Power industries 22.5 34.9 22.4 20.8 242 227 27.4 26.4 192 5.5 
Exports on deferred payment basis - 2.4 5.6 12.5 7.8 6.8 6.8 12.4 137 23.9 
Other 5.0 3.9 47 1.5 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note a Because of rounding, figures may not add to 100 per cent. 
b Trillion (million million) won at current prices in parentheses, 
c Heavy and chemical industries. 
Source Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Table 6 J b Shares of loans from the National Investment Fund in major banking 
institutions'total domestic credit, Korea, 1974-83 (percent) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Commercial banks 0.6 1,5 3.1 4.3 4.4 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.9 
Specialised banks 1.3 3.0 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.1 32 3.1 3.5 42 
Envelopment finance institutions 9.5 192 27.6 29.8 35.7 36.8 31.3 30.6 26.1 24.5 
Korea Development Bank 9.6 202 28.0 29.6 372 37.8 33.8 34.3 33.2 29,8 
Korea Export-Import Bank - - 23.1 32.0 22.7 26.5 16.3 15.5 15.3 19.4 
Total banking institutions 2.2 5.0 7.6 92 10.5 10.8 9.7 9.4 8.9 8.7 
Note Domestic credit includes aU loans and discounts to the private sector by deposit money banks 
and the r^-o development institutions (the Korea Development Bank and the Korea Export-
Import Bank but excluding the Korea Long-Term Credit Bank). 
Sources World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, 1987; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
latter included steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, machinery and shipbuilding. More 
than 50 per cent of the fund was allocated to the heavy and chemical industries during 
the period of the heavy and chemical industry drive (Table 6.2a). Although constituting 
a small proportion of total domestic credit, loans from the fund increased until the end 
of the 1970s, reaching almost 11 per cent of total outstanding loans by major financial 
institutions (Table 6.2b). 
Other forms of policy funds were also raised; those relevant to financing steel 
and/or other targeted industries included the Export Industry Equipment Fund, the 
Industry Rationalisation Fund, the Foreign Loan Fund, the Foreign Currency Loan 
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Table 6 J Shares of policy loans in domestic credit in Korea, 1975-85 (per cent) 
Not earmarked " Foreign trade ^ Earmarked Total 
1975 27.67 8.86 18.52 55.04 1976 26.98 9.84 17.78 54.61 1977 29.52 10.20 18.03 57.76 1978 32.14 10.62 19.17 61.93 
1979 33.05 10.49 16.34 59.88 1980 32.76 11.15 15.44 59.35 1981 31.52 12.56 16.24 60.31 
1982 29.65 12.16 14.25 56.05 
1983 27.70 12.56 15.98 56.24 
1984 25.73 12.62 16.94 55.29 
1985 25.03 12.75 16.98 54.76 
Notes a Includes the National Investment Fund loans, foreign currency loans, all loans by the Korea 
Development Bank, and other miscellaneous items. 
b Loans for international trade by deposit money banks and all loans by the Korea Export-
Import Bank. 
c Loans for agricultural industries, small and medium-sized firms, home-building, and so on. 
d Not earmarked + Foreign trade -(- Earmarked. 
Sources Yoo (1989); 
Economic Planning Board, Korean Economic Indicators, 1986; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Fund and the Machine Industry Fund. Loans from these funds aimed to support various 
industrial needs for development and exports, as their titles imply. All policy loans 
other than those for international trade and earmarked projects increased their shares of 
total domestic credit to take more than 30 per cent during the Fourth Economic 
Development Plan period (1977-81), when much of the heavy and chemical industry 
drive was actually implemented (Table 6.3). That is, during this period, the 
government controlled about 60 per cent of total domestic credit under the name of 
policy loans, and one-half of this went towards the industrial promotion policy. 
In addition to control over the flow of funds, the Korean government also 
controlled interest rates on loans by imposing low ceilings, which led to an increasing 
excess demand for loans and rationing of credit. Even though interest rate control was 
relaxed in the early 1980s, it nevertheless continued until 5 December 1988, when most 
of the interest rates were liberalised. In addition to imposing low interest rate ceilings, 
the government maintained high inflation rates through expansionary monetary policy 
and hence extremely low real interest rates (calculated as the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the rate of change in the GNP deflator). As a result there were 
negative real interest rates for extended periods. Moreover, exchange rates were 
maintained at 484 won per US dollar during 1977 and 1979, despite the fact that 
domestic prices were rising at about 19 per cent per annum, while the weighted average 
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Table 6.4 Interest rates on various loans in Korea, 1971-85 (percent) 
Curb Corporate Selected policy loans Inflation market bonds General Export MIPE" NIFD'' (GNP deflator) 
1971 46.41 . 22.0 6.0 13.92 1972 38.97 19.0 6.0 16.11 1973 33.30 15.5 7.0 10.0 0 13.40 1974 40.56 15.5 9.0 12.0 12.0 29.54 1975 41.31 20.1 15.5 9.0 12.0 12.0 25.73 1976 40.47 20.4 17.0 8.0 13.0 14.0 20.73 1977 38.07 20.1 15.0 8.0 13.0 14.0 15.67 1978 41.22 21.1 18.5 9.0 15.0 16.0 21.39 1979 42.39 26.7 18.5 9.0 15.0 16.0 21.20 1980 44.94 30.1 24.5 15.0 20.0 22.0 25.60 1981 35.25 24.4 17.5-18.0 15.0 11.0 16.5-17.5 15.90 1982 32.60-33.12 17.29 10.0-16.0 10.0-12.0 10.0-15.0 10.0-16.5 13.2/7.6 1983 25.77 14.23 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 3.00 1984 24.84 14.12 10.0-11.5 10.0 10.0-11.5 10.0-11.5 3.90 1985 24.00 14.20 10.0-13.0 10.0 10.0-11.5 10.0-11.5 3.50 
Notes a Machinery Industry Promotion Fund. 
b National Investment Fund. 
Sources World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, 1987; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
price level of its major trade partners, the United States and Japan, was rising at about 6 
per cent per annum (Hong and Park, 1986). 
The anomaly of negative real interest rates did not disappear until prices stabilised 
in the 1980s. The significance of credit policy can be better understood by looking at 
the interest rates of policy loans. As shown in Table 6.4, until the early 1980s, the 
ceilings on policy loans were even set below those on commercial loans. 
The Korean steel industry, especially POSCO, received substantial direct and 
indirect public financial support for its investment projects. In the 1970s, the 
government had formally designated the steel industry as one of the priority sectors for 
lending. In particular, the POSCO project was regarded as the core of its steel industry 
promotion policy and the government not only directly invested in the project as a 
major shareholder but also channelled into the project capital from the Korea 
Development Bank and other commercial banks. POSCO benefited in particular from 
policy funds raised by the Korea Development Bank through foreign borrowing, issuing 
bonds and borrowing from the National Investment Fund (Table 6.1). The bank 
became POSCO's largest single domestic creditor by 1978 when construction of the 
third stage was finished (Howell et al, 1988). 
Government intervention in the financial market implies that the steel industry 
and other targeted industries/firms were not only able to procure their investment 
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capital relatively easily but were also indirectly subsidised by the low interest rate 
ceilings on their loans, particularly the policy loans.'' The total benefits realised by the 
favoured sectors and/or firms as a result of credit subsidy would have been larger, since 
interest rates on commercial loans were also restrained by the government. In mid-
1982, the government reduced commercial loan interest rates from 14 to 10 per cent, 
which meant that POSCO and the nation's nine other steel-makers were able to save 
US$146 million in 1982 interest payments (Howell et al, 1988). By contrast, the firms 
not on the priority list for bank lending faced severe fund shortages and, in many cases, 
had to pay very high curb market rates for financing (Table 6.4). 
Subsidised credit rationing and capital deepening 
The government's channelling of subsidised funds to the targeted industries, alongside 
repayment guarantees on foreign loans, helped the nation's steel firms, especially 
POSCO, procure the necessary investment funds not only for initial construction but 
also for capacity expansion. Moreover, the interest subsidies, by reducing the firm's 
financial burden, further stimulated investment in capacity expansion through capital 
deepening. In other words, financial policy through subsidised credit rationing had a 
significant positive impact on expansion of the nation's steel industry. This section 
examines the extent of credit rationing and interest subsidy that was provided to the 
steel industry and looks at the implications for the steel industry's expansion through 
capital deepening in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The figures in Table 6.5 show how, relative to the manufacturing average, 
domestic bank loans and foreign borrowings have been allocated. The amount of loans 
per value added (LV) or the share of loans in total capital (LFQ in an industry relative to 
the manufacturing average was used as an indicator of credit rationing. That is, given 
the shortage of funds and excess demand for loans, the ratios in a sector above the 
manufacturing average imply that the sector was able to receive a relatively large 
amount of credit per value added or per capital stock. 
The iron and steel industry received relatively favourable treatment with respect 
to loan allocations during the heavy and chemical industry drive period (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 shows that both LV and LK in the steel industry were greater than the figures 
for the manufacturing average in most years in the 1970s and 1980s, implying that. 
13. According to internal information from the Economic Planning Board of the Korean government, in 
1978 alone manufacturing sectors were indirectly subsidised to the amount of US$73.2 million due 
to differences in interest rates between commercial loans and policy loans, of which US$9.5 million 
went to the steel industry. Of the estimated indirect subsidisation in 1978, 76.6 per cent was 
allocated to the heavy and chemical industries: 29.0 per cent to machinery, 15.8 per cent to 
shipbuilding, 13.0 per cent to iron and steel, 12.4 per cent to chemical, 4.8 per cent lo electronics and 
1.7 per cent to non-ferrous metals. The main exporting light industries received the rest (23.4 per 
cent), of which the textile industry was the largest beneficiary, receiving 14.4 per cent. 
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Table 6S Sectoral credit allocation in Korea, selected industries, 1972-89 
(ratios to total manufacturing average) 
1972 1974 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 
Total manufacturing (per cent) 
LV 2.05 Z06 1.76 1.17 1.47 1.18 128 1.02 0.89 
(L) 0.65 0.55 0.54 0.3S 0.46 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.38 
(S) 0.63 0.83 0.67 0.52 0.62 0.55 0.63 0.44 0.43 
(F) 0.77 0.68 0.55 0.28 0.39 025 022 0.17 0.07 
LK 45.41 4522 41J32 36.48 38.05 30.74 33.19 28.63 25.99 
Ratios to manufacturing average 
Textiles, etc. (ISIC code 32: textiles, wearing ; apparel and leather products) 
LV 1.01 1.38 1.11 1.15 0.89 1.15 0.88 0.79 0.98 
(L) 0.97 1.32 0.82 0.92 0.74 0.98 0.75 0.70 0.97 
(S) 1.37 1.56 1.56 1.49 1.05 1.47 1.07 1.00 1.10 
(F) 0.74 1.22 0.83 0.82 0.81 071 0.57 0.45 0.33 
LK 1.04 1.21 1.06 1.24 1.03 1.21 1.03 1.05 1.07 
Chemicals, etc. (ISIC code 35: chemicals, petroleum. coal, rubber and plastics) 
LV 0.91 0.75 0.84 0.77 0.96 1.00 0.94 1.02 1.16 
(L) 0.54 0.38 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.64 0.84 1.03 
(S) 0.58 0.50 0.88 0.83 1.08 1.15 1.19 1.33 1.31 
(F) 1.49 1.35 0.95 0.76 1.06 1.01 0.81 0.69 0.94 
LK 0.87 0.78 0.88 0.79 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.97 
Iron and steel (ISIC code 371) 
LV 1.49 0.88 2.35 2.23 1.72 1.58 1.34 1.37 1.00 
(L) 1.98 0.78 1.82 1.51 1.06 1.12 1.20 1.00 0.89 
(S) 1.31 0.47 0.93 1.43 1.15 0.82 0.93 0.52 0.55 
(F) 1.22 1.45 4.59 4.72 3.37 3.93 2.81 4.55 4.28 
LK 1.03 0.93 1.22 1.41 1.33 1.08 1.09 1.21 0.90 
Non-ferrous metals (ISIC code 372) 
LV 1.69 0.98 0.92 0.71 1.07 0.98 1.97 1.00 1.06 
(L) 1.85 1.09 1.54 1.25 1.74 1.67 3.25 0.93 1.04 
(S) 0.23 0.49 0.87 0.41 0.85 0.62 1.59 1.17 0.86 
(F) 2.75 1.48 0.36 0.54 0.63 0.68 0.55 071 2.35 
LK 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.62 0.77 0.81 1.46 1.10 0.98 
Machinery, etc. (ISIC code 38: fabricated metal products and machinery) 
LV 1.04 0.74 0.82 1.08 0.97 0.97 1.13 1.11 0.98 
(L) 1.29 1.19 1.11 1.39 1.29 1.13 1.23 1.32 1.08 
(S) 1.12 0.74 0.77 0.97 0.91 0.88 1.04 1.04 0.97 
(F) 0.76 0.39 0.61 0.89 0.69 0.78 1.19 0.76 0.59 
LK 0.98 0.89 0.94 0.95 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.01 1.04 
Notes LV = total loan+value added 
(L) long-term bank loan+value added 
(S) short-term bank loan + value added 
(F) foreign loan+value added 
LK = total loan + total capital 
Source Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis, various issues. 
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except for 1974 - a year after the completion of POSCO's first investment project -
domestic credit was favourably allocated to the industry/ ' The industry has also 
maintained a very high ratio of foreign loans to value added relative to other 
manufacturing sectors, which means that capital investment in the industry has 
depended more on foreign sources than on domestic credit. Accessibility by an 
industry to foreign loans is, however, not especially relevant to the issue of domestic 
credit rationing. Such high LV ratios of foreign loans in the industry are largely due to 
the industry's, and in particular POSCO's, successful foreign loan negotiations in the 
mid and late-1970s when successful operation of the industry attracted low interest 
foreign investment and when there was strong lending competition among foreign fund 
suppliers. The industry also received priority in relation to general foreign loans 
procured by the govemment from international financial institutions such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank. 
The high ratios of LK or of LV in the iron and steel industry may not by 
themselves imply that the industry has received relatively favourable treatment with 
respect to loan allocations. The very nature of the industry, which is relatively more 
intensive in using physical capital, means it requires a high ratio. However, given the 
subsidised nature of loans due to interest restraint, a ratio in a sector above the 
manufacturing average implies that the sector receives a relatively large subsidy 
allocation per unit of capital or per value added (Hong and Park, 1986, p. 168). It 
should also be noted that, among domestic loans, there were differences in interest rates 
on different types of loans (Table 6.4). It may be the case that, if a sector was 
designated as a high priority, it could be allocated relatively more policy funds through 
interest rates that were lower than other bank loans. In this case, the relative size of the 
interest subsidy received by the industry could be larger than the LKor LV ratios imply. 
In the case of iron and steel, the relative magnitude of the interest subsidy on long-term 
domestic bank loans could be higher than the figures (L), since the industry was known 
to be one of the major recipients of loans from the National Investment Fund and other 
policy funds. Nevertheless, the figures in Table 6.5 alone do not clearly indicate the 
14. The major export-oriented industry, classified as 'textiles, etc." in Table 6.5, shows that, in the 1970s, 
the industr>' was able to access more credit than the manufacturing average, in particular short-term 
bank loans such as short-term expon credit. However, a specific conclusion of credit rationing in 
relation to the heavy and chemical industry drive is hard to draw from the figures of very aggregated 
sector classification at the 2-digit ISIC level. The only two classified at the 3-digit level in the table 
are iron and steel (371) and non-ferrous metals (372). Using a detailed industry classification, Hong 
and Park (1986) show that, among the heavy and chemical sectors, basic metals, industrial 
chemicals, cement, automobiles and parts, large machinery firms and shipbuilding are major sectors 
having clearly higher ratios than the manufacturing average in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Miscellaneous chemicals, electronic and telecommunication equipment, electrical machinery and 
medium and small-size machinery fums shows ratios of less than one during the period. Among the 
light industry sectors, the ratios for textiles, wood products and synthetic fibres were larger than one, 
while those for clothing and footwear were less t h ^ one. 
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relative magnitude of the interest subsidies implied by credit rationing with interest rate 
restraint. 
The interest subsidy rate can theoretically be defined as the difference between an 
undistorted equilibrium interest rate in given credit supply/demand conditions and an 
actual interest rate set below the equilibrium rate. However, since the only data 
available to this study are the controlled actual rates vaiying across different loan types, 
it is impossible to calculate the exact subsidy rates. Instead, this study calculates 
MGi = RKi - IC i , 
where MGi is the margin between RKi and ICi, used as a proxy for the rate of credit 
subsidy received by the industry i; RKi is the estimated rate of return on total capital; 
and ICi is the estimated real rate of average interest costs on total loans. 
This method is basically drawn from Hong (1981, 1990) and Hong and Park 
(1986). The estimated rate of average interest costs is defined as the ratio of total 
outstanding interest payments to total loans from both domestic and foreign sources. 
Hong (1981, 1990) and Hong and Park (1986) used, instead of IC, the weighted 
average real interest rate on domestic loans. Using their terms, the same interest rates 
can be applied to all firms or industries in estimating interest subsidy rates. Using IC, 
different interest rates can be applied to different firms or industries, which seems more 
realistic. With tiie limited data, however, IC cannot exclude interest costs on foreign 
loans, most of which were not affected by the government control over credit allocation 
and interest rate ceilings. Nevertheless, they are affected by various financial policy 
measures such as exchange rate policy or other monetary policies that change the real 
rates. The use of I C then can reflect, given the rate of return on capital, the overall 
effects of financial policies on interest subsidy rates. In the case of the estimated 
average rate of return on capital, this study uses the same definition as in Hong (1981, 
1990) and Hong and Park (1986), namely the ratio of the non-labour share of value 
added to total capital stock consisting of physical assets and net working capital. By 
allowing positive net profits in value added, some positive MG can be expected even if 
there is no interest subsidy. Given the interest rate ceilings in the Korean economy of 
the 1970s and 1980s, a pan, though not all, of the MG can be attributed to interest 
subsidy rates.'^ 
The ratios of sectoral MG to the manufacturing average {mg) rather than the 
absolute values of MG are illustrated in Table 6.6, and can be interpreted as each 
sector's relative interest subsidy rates. An industry's mg of greater than one implies 
15. When positive MG is calculated, this cannot all be attributed to the subsidised credit rationing. For 
example, a part of the estimated rate of return on capital may in fact come from wage resu-aint in the 
Korean economy in the 1970s. On the other hand, at given interest rates and wage rates, a firm or 
industry with better business performance will reveal a higher return on capital. 
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Table 6.6 Relative interest subsidy rates and capital intensity in Korea, selected 
industries, 1971-89 (ratios to total manufacturing average) 
Manufacturing total Textiles, etc. Chemicals, etc. 
ICN IC RK MG K/L ic rk mg k/l ic rk mg k/l 
1971 13.4 -0.6 11.2 11.7 3.77 -1.2 0.9 1.0 0.7 -2.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 
1972 12.0 •A.7 13.7 18.4 3.83 -1.0 1.0 1.4 0.8 -1.7 1.0 1.5 1.4 
1973 8.5 -5.1 16.1 21.1 4.29 0.2 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.5 
1974 10.5 -20.0 13.7 33.7 5.15 -1.5 0.8 2.4 0.7 2.7 1.1 2.4 14 
1975 11.3 -13.9 14.3 28.3 6.07 -1.0 0.8 1.9 0.9 1.8 1.2 2.1 1.3 
1976 11.9 -9.3 15.3 24.6 7.19 0.3 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.1 
1977 13.1 -3.5 14.7 18.3 8.38 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.8 -0.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 
1978 12.4 10.4 15.0 25.4 9.01 3.1 1.0 1.5 0.7 2.9 1.2 1.7 1.3 
1979 14.8 -4.8 15.5 20.3 11.33 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.7 2.5 1.2 1.3 1.4 
1980 18.7 -5.3 12.9 18.2 16.02 0.2 1.0 1.4 0.7 4.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 
1981 184 1.4 13.5 12.1 20.93 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.7 2.5 1.1 0.8 14 
1982 16.0 84 12.9 4.5 24.19 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.6 2.2 1.1 0.3 1.4 
1983 13.6 9.1 13.5 4.4 26.35 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.4 
1984 14.4 10.5 13.4 2.9 28.60 -0.3 0.9 0.1 0.6 3.0 1.2 0.2 
1985 13.4 9.3 13.4 4.1 31.73 0.6 1.0 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.4 
1986 12.5 9.7 14.3 4.6 34.57 0.2 1.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.4 
1987 12.5 9.0 14.8 5.8 39.43 0.1 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.4 1.7 
1988 13.0 7.0 15.4 8.3 45.22 -0.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 -0.5 1.0 0.6 1.7 
1989 13.6 8.4 14.3 5.9 56.21 -0.9 0.9 0.4 0.6 -1.2 1.0 0.5 1.7 
Iron and steel Non-ferrous metals Machinery, etc. 
ic rk mg k/l ic rk mg k/l ic rk mg kJl 
1971 -2.4 0.6 0.8 1.6 3.2 0.9 0.7 0.9 6.9 1.1 0.6 0.8 
1972 -0.2 0.5 0.8 1.7 -4.1 0.5 1.2 1.7 2.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 
1973 -2.6 0.8 1.2 3.1 2.6 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.1 1.0 1.3 0.7 
1974 -2.6 1.1 2.7 3.3 -1.5 0.7 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.0 2.4 0.7 
1975 -3.5 0.7 1.9 3.1 0.5 0.8 1.8 1.5 -0.7 1.0 2.0 0.6 
1976 -4.1 0.6 1.5 3.2 -4.9 0.9 1.9 1.8 -0.3 1.0 1.6 0.7 
1977 -1.4 0.9 1.3 3.6 -0.2 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.8 
1978 -5.8 0.7 1.8 3.8 -1.9 1.7 2.5 1.0 -0.9 0.8 1.5 0.9 
1979 -5.2 0.9 1.5 3.5 -1.1 1.0 1.3 1.1 -1.4 0.7 1.1 0.9 
1980 -7.3 0.9 1.9 3.5 2.2 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.9 
1981 -3.4 1.1 1.2 2.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 1.5 -0.9 0.0 0.8 0.8 
1982 -4.7 1.0 0.7 2.8 -1.8 0.8 0.2 1.6 -0.3 0.9 0.3 0.9 
1983 -3.1 0.9 0.5 3.0 1.8 0.9 0.1 14 -0.6 1.0 0.3 0.9 
1984 -2.0 1.1 0.5 2.6 -2.7 0.8 0.2 1.4 -0.4 0.9 0.1 1.0 
1985 -3.0 1.1 0.6 24 •3.3 0.7 0.3 1.4 -0.2 0.9 0.1 1.0 
1986 -3.8 1.0 0.6 2.4 -2.4 1.0 04 1.3 0.1 0.9 0.2 1.0 
1987 -3.0 1.2 0.8 2.6 0.0 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.2 1.0 
1988 -3.8 1.3 1.0 2.6 0.3 1.3 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.3 1.0 
1989 -3.3 1.3 1.0 2.9 -0.3 0.9 04 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.3 1.0 
Notes ICN rate of interest costs at current prices (per cent) 
IC real rate of interest costs = ICN - inflation rate (per cent) 
RK return on total capital (per cent) 
MG differences between RK and IC 
K/L capital intensity at current prices (million won) 
ic differences between the sector's IC and the manufacturing average 
rk ratios of the sector's RK to the manufacturing average 
mg ratios of the sector's MG to the manufacturing average 
kJl ratios of the sector's K/L to the manufacturing average 
Source Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis, various issues. 
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that the industry was, relative to the manufacturing average, favourably subsidised 
through credit rationing and restraints on interest rates. Although manufacturing's 
average rates of return on capital have been rather stable, the estimated credit subsidy 
rates (MG) in the 1970s and the early 1980s were very high compared to those in the 
rest of the 1980s (Table 6.6). While govemment control over interest rates continued 
until the late 1980s, the higher M G in the 1970s was due particularly to the 
government's expansionary monetary policy in this period, which maintained inflation 
rates high enough to make real interest rates negative. The high inflation rates affected 
not only real interest rates on domestic loans but also those on foreign loans. Thus, an 
industry's accessibility to foreign loans, where in general lower interest rates than those 
on domestic loans were applied, is also related to allocation of interest subsidy, though 
not especially relevant to credit rationing. According to calculations by Hong (1990), 
the weighted average real interest rate on foreign loans was about 2.1 per cent per 
annum during 1967-71 and -7.4 per cent during 1972-76. In the 1977-81 period, the 
London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for the Eurodollar was about 13.2 per cent 
per annum on average. Taking into account depreciation of the domestic currency 
(won) at an average of 7 per cent per annum and an approximately 19.5 per cent 
inflation rate in the period, it is possible that the average real interest rate of foreign 
loans did not exceed 1 per cent per annum. 
Negative real rates of interest costs in this period were realised by most 
manufacturing sectors. Among them, the iron and steel industry in particular has 
enjoyed very low rates of interest costs compared to the manufacturing average (Table 
6.6). Even though significant variations in the rates of interest costs and the rates of 
interest subsidy might be observed when the industry classified at the 2-digit level is 
disaggregated into more specific sectors, there has been no attempt here to examine the 
other specific sectors in the heavy and chemical industry. The rates paid by the 
industry, not only during the heavy and chemical industry drive period but also until 
recent times, averaged 3.5 per cent per annum below the total manufacturing average 
rates. The important sources of such low interest costs were the industry's priority 
access to low interest policy funds and, as implied by the figures in Table 6.5, a 
particularly high ratio of foreign loans to value added compared with other sectors. 
Owing to the very low rates of real interest costs, the iron and steel industry 
during the heavy and chemical industry period was also able to maintain relatively high 
rates of the estimated credit subsidy {mg > 1), regardless of the relatively low rates of 
return on capital below the manufacturing average {rk < 1). This led to enormous 
capital expansion in the industry. The iron and steel industry's capital intensity before 
the formal implementation of the heavy and chemical industry was at a similar level to 
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the chemical industry average, and the relative intensity to the manufacturing average 
i m was slightly above 1.5 (Table 6.6). The it//ratio sharply jumped to 3.1 in 1973, 
which made the industry one of the most capital-intensive sectors in Korea. From that 
time until 1980, the industry maintained kll at a level between 3.1 and 3.8. One 
important implication of the low rk but high mg above the manufacturing average is 
that the substantial expansion of the industry in capital intensity, and hence in output 
and exports in the 1970s and early 1980s, may be due to some extent to the subsidy 
element associated with credit rationing. 
The relatively low rates of return on capital began to exceed the manufacturing 
average and have improved since 1981. In contrast, credit subsidy dropped to a level 
below the manufacturing average in the mid-1980s and, recendy, have been maintained 
at the manufacturing average. The steel industry's k/l ratio also dropped a little and 
then maintained a level of around 2.5. This happened despite the still relatively low 
real rates of interest costs and relatively high ratios of foreign loans to value added 
(Table 6.5). This trend may imply that, beginning in the early 1980s, favourable 
treatment for the iron and steel industry through subsidised credit rationing was 
removed as the industry was seen to have moved out of the infant industry stage and to 
have become more competitive in both domestic and international markets. 
INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRY: LAWS AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE 
While the government intervened in the financial system to control the flow of capital 
towards targeted industries as an overall growtii strategy, it also undenook industry-
specific promotion policies. The Korean government enacted various forms of laws 
and rules in an effort to provide incentives to specific industries classified as 'strategic' 
or ' targeted'. Incentives were concentrated particularly on promoting exports and 
providing fiscal assistance. Even though there has been much criticism of the 
unnecessarily high costs incurred by these promotive policies, the incentives rendered 
to the nation's steel industry contributed directly to strengthening its international 
competitiveness by easing the fiscal bottleneck and boosting production and exports. 
Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law 
Steel was formally designated as one of the priority sectors by the government through 
the 'Iron and Steel Industry Promotion Law' (Steel Promotion Law, for short) which 
was enacted in January 1970, directiy following tiie founding of POSCO. Based on the 
temporary nature of tiie infant industry argument, the law specified its validity for 10 
vears, that is, until the end of 1979. In December 1979, the law was amended to be 
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extended for 20 more years because the government was aiming to build the nation's 
second integrated steel mill. However, the law was abolished at the end of June 1986. 
Under the Steel Promotion Law, the government could provide a variety of 
administrative and fiscal support measures for the nation's steel companies. Most of 
the government assistance through this law was limited to the integrated steel-maker, 
which had to be financed for more than half of its capital by the government or by those 
designated by the government and, at the same time, had to possess an annual 
production capacity of one million tonnes or more in crude steel equivalent. 
Consequently, POSCO was to be main beneficiary, even though the impact was also 
transferred to other firms, many of which engaged in downstream processing of 
products such as pipes, tubes, cold rolled sheets and galvanised sheets from 
intermediate products manufactured by POSCO. 
The Steel Promotion Law allowed POSCO and other steel-makers above a certain 
size to receive fiscal and administrative assistance from the government in the process 
of inducing long-term foreign loans with low interest rates; purchasing of raw materials, 
machinery, equipment and other materials and goods; and constructing infrastructure 
such as ports and bays, roads, railways and facilities. Public charges such as fees for 
electricity, water, railways and ports were also discounted. The law required steel-
makers to have their own R&D and training systems and then allowed the government 
to fund a part or all of the expenses for R&D and/or training. 
Fiscal incentives 
While the Steel Promotion Law was specific only to the iron and steel industry, a wide 
spectrum of regulations and laws existed to induce investment and provide various 
forms of direct or indirect fiscal assistance to the targeted industries or firms, 
particularly through the Tax Reduction and Exemption Law, the Local Tax Law and the 
Customs Duty Law. 
The Tax Reduction and Exemption Law prescribed preferential tax treatment for 
those industries which the government intended to promote. In this respect, the iron 
and steel industry was given a concession on tax exemptions or tax holidays. However, 
since only POSCO had both the iron and steel-making facilities defined in the Tax 
Reduction and Exemption Law as well as in the Steel Promotion Law, other producers 
were excluded from preferential tax treatment. Preferential tax treatment was conferred 
on POSCO from 1970 until 1981. During this period, POSCO was exempted from 
corporate tax by the Tax Reduction and Exemption Law and received a deduction from 
local tax under the Local Tax Law. Even though corporate tax exemption ceased from 
1982, preferential taxation treatment has been accorded to investment in R&D activities 
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in order to accelerate investment. This includes tax-free reserves for expenses in 
technology development, preferential depreciation and tax deduction for investment in 
facilities for rationalisation, energy savings, pollution control, research and 
development and training. Preferential taxation was applied to virtually all industries 
according to the type of business activity they engage in rather than the name of the 
industry or firm. 
The government also gave the key industries concessions on custom duties 
pursuant to the Customs Duty Law, which was designed to promote development of 
specific industries. The law was applied to a variety of iron and steel firms including 
POSCO. If firms or foundries imported plant and equipment which were regarded as 
difficult to fabricate domestically, they received tariff reductions and exemptions. For 
imported items on which less than a 20 per cent legal tariff was imposed, 70 per cent of 
the corresponding tariff was exempted. In the case of tariffs above 20 per cent, 75 per 
cent of the corresponding tariff was exempted. In POSCO's case, such treatment 
continued until 1987. 
Export promotion and import substitution 
A central element in Korea's industrial policy has been the relationship between 
industrial development and international trade. Because of its large population and 
scarcity of arable land and raw materials, industrial growth has been tightly constrained 
throughout Korea's modem history by its abihty to exchange relatively high value 
export goods for primary imports. The iron and steel industry was no exception. Even 
if POSCO was originally established as an import substituting industry, it engaged in 
export market activity as soon as it reached normal operation. The export drive became 
more aggressive from the early 1980s. 
Behind this, there have been various government incentives to boost exports, such 
as the tariff rebate system for imported raw materials and intermediate inputs, which 
was introduced in July 1975.'® Under the tariff rebate system, exporters have to pay 
tariffs when importing raw materials or intermediate inputs to be used for 
manufacturing exports but are entitled to a refund of the duty payments after export 
procedures have been completed.'' The special consumption tax and the value added 
tax for export products were also exempted. An instalment payment customs duty 
system and a temporary elastic tariff system were also adopted to encourage and assist 
16. This system was originally designed to enable domestic exporters to avoid the erosion of export 
competitiveness caused by cost increases stemming from import protection. 
17. A tariff pre-exemption system was in effect before the tariff rebate system. This system stipulates 
that duty payments for exporters be waived from the beginning for imports of raw materials or 
intermediate inputs for manufacturing exports. 
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Table 6.7 Ratios of import licensing liberalisation in Korea, selected industries and 
years, 1983-88 (percent)" 
1983 1987 1988 
Primary and food industry (1386)^ 73.2 80.1 80.5 
Chemical, paper and ceramics (2182) 94.4 99.1 99.6 
Steel and other basic metals (802) 90.9 100.0 100.0 
General machinery (1414) 68.7 93.3 100.0 
Electrical and electronic machinery (495) 53.6 95.5 100.0 
Textile and clothing industry (1089) 80.4 96.9 97.8 
Others (547) 81.2 88.2 88.2 
Total (7915) 80.4 93.6 95.4 
Notes a Proportion of product items to automatic impon approval under the regular trade notice. 
b Number of product items in parentheses, classified according to the eight-digit level of the 
CCCN codes as of 1984. 
Source Data provided by Ministry of Trade and Industry (Korea). 
export activities. Allowance for tax-free reserves for export loss, price fluctuation or 
overseas market development were also made available.'^ Even though export 
incentives involve export subsidies in many cases and frequently cause international 
trade friction, tariff rebates and exemption of special consumption tax and value added 
tax cannot be regarded as genuine subsidies in that they allow exporters to operate 
under free trade conditions. However, allowances for tax-free reserves are inconsistent 
with the GATT Subsidy Code and are gradually being reduced (Young, 1989). 
During the industrialisation drive, import substitution was also maintained. As a 
domestic industry became capable of producing a particular product, import restrictions 
were imposed on it through the import licensing system (see Table 6.7).'^ Steel 
products manufactured by Korean firms were placed on a list of restricted import items 
that could only be imported if approved by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and 
on the recommendation of the Korean Iron and Steel Association, which represented 
domestic steel manufacturers. The proportion of steel items on the restrictions list 
increased from 28 per cent in 1967 to 75 per cent in 1978 as Korean steel-making 
capability increased. In the late 1970s, the government began removing many formal 
barriers to imports of a number of products, including steel. As international 
18. As part of the preferential credit allocation scheme, there was automatic allocation of shon-term 
bank credit for the financing of export production up to a certain proportion of exports, which can 
also be regarded as a means of providing export incentives. The government during the 1980s has 
phased out these incentives of preferential credit. 
19. The import licensing system was the main tool by which import-substitution policies were 
implemented. Import licensing is either automatic or restrictive, depending on the commodity. The 
restrictive import licensing system comprises regular import notice, the import source diversification 
program, the import surveillance program and special laws. The government publishes a list of 
commodities every year that are subject to resuictive import licences with imports of these 
commodities permitted only if no domestic substitutes exist (Young, 1988). 
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Table Median import tariffs on iron and steel products, selected countries 
Year A B C 
United States (1991) 4 5 6 EC (1991) 4 5 10 Japan (1991) 4 5 5 Korea (1991) 5 10 13 Taiwan (1988) 5 13 15 China (1990) 6 15 12 Indonesia (1991) 5 5 20 Malaysia (1990) 3 2 30 Thailand (1991) 10 8 35 
Philippines (1991) 10 10 30 
Notes A: Ingots and other steel primary forms 
B: Rolled products, except those in C, all of iron or non-ally, stainless or other alloy steel 
C: Secondary products such as sheet piling, rails, tubes, pipes and construction material 
Source Klijin and Nguyen (1993) and updates. 
competitiveness strengthened, steel became one of the product groups to have import 
restrictions removed relatively quickly. All steel products were removed from the 
restrictive import licensing list in 1987 (Table 6.7). 
With the impon substitution efforts, high tariffs on most steel products were 
retained in the 1970s. In the case of pig iron, tariffs were 20 per cent during the 1978-
84 period. Tariffs on special and ordinary finished steel products were about 20-40 per 
cent in 1978. In general, higher tariffs were imposed on import-competing and/or 
more-processed products. Even though major tariff reductions not only for steel but 
also for other manufactures were achieved in 1979, progress in tariff reform prior to 
1984 was slow. Since then, tariffs on major industrial products including iron and steel 
items were reduced substantially following the announcement of the tariff reform 
program. Even though the weighted average tariff rates on iron and steel products fell 
from 13.1 per cent in 1988 to 7.7 per cent in 1990, and will drop further to 6.2 per cent 
in 1993, tariff rates on some iron and steel products are still higher than 10 per cent.^ 
In the case of pig iron and related products, tariffs fell remarkably to 2 to 5 per cent as 
of 1988. Nominal tariffs on some ferro-alloy products were still retained at 10 per cent 
as of 1990 but will be reduced to below 10 per cent in 1992. Tariffs on most semi-
finished and finished products fell to 10 per cent as of 1991 and are scheduled to drop 
slighUy to 9 per cent in 1993. Relatively high tariffs (13 per cent) were imposed in 
1991 on further-processed secondary finished steel products such as sheet piling, 
welded shapers and sections, rails, tubes, pipes, containers, structures and wire, but the 
rates are also scheduled to fall gradually to 9 per cent in 1993. Table 6.8 shows that 
20. The data are from Lee and Ahn (1989) and the Ministry of Finance (Korea), Tariff Schedules of 
Korea, 1990. 
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generally higher tariffs are applied to more-processed steel products (group C) in the 
world. Compared with developed countries, Korea's average import tariffs on product 
group B are still 5 per cent higher. Korea's tariffs on group C are also higher than in 
developed countries, but much lower than in the East Asian developing countries, 
where recent tariffs on group C are as high as the levels that prevailed in Korea in the 
late 1970s. 
The protective policies in Korea in the form of tariffs and import restrictions, 
which controlled trade to a considerable degree, do not necessarily imply a bias, 
however, towards import-substitution rather than export promotion.^' In order to pursue 
an export-oriented growth strategy for the steel industry, the Korean government 
introduced various export incentives to offset the import-substitution bias of protection 
(Westphal and Kim, 1977; Westphal, 1981; and Young, 1986)." Exploitation of 
foreign markets helped by provision of export incentives, which resulted in exposure of 
domestic firms to international competition, also contributed to increasing production 
capacity and actual output and, therefore, decreasing cost. 
EFFECTS OF CAPITAL MARKET INTERVENTION AND OTHER ASSISTANCE 
Capital market intervention by the Korean government resulted in a high degree of 
financial repression and overall inefficiency and misallocation of national resources 
(see Kwack, 1984; Park, 1986; Kim, 1990; Nam, 1990; and Yoo, 1990). The 
cumulative effect of the capital market distortions has increased with the transition of 
the economy to a more mature stage of development where allocation criteria are 
relatively more complex and difficult to devise. 
Even at the selected industry level the effect of credit rationing and interest rate 
restraint on capital investment does not seem to have always been desirable. Looking 
at the Korean heavy and chemical industry as a whole, we can observe two major 
problems resulting from discriminatory credit rationing. One is the problem of 
excessive capacity leading to low capacity utilisation and inefficient performance. The 
other is the credit diversion problem (Hong, 1990; and Hong and Park, 1986). 
21. It has an important implication for industrial growth whether the industrial policy is oriented toward 
import substitution or export promotion. It has been argued that provision of unbiased incentives for 
suppl>ing both domestic and international markets implies a greater potential for competition with 
foreign producers and will bring about more efficient resource allocation and greater efforts by firms 
to boost their competitiveness. See Appendix 5 for a brief review of the literature concerning the 
effects of import substimtion and export promotion strategies. 
22. An important point in the Korea's export promotion strategy is that export incentives varied little 
among commodities or industries, so tiiat exports at excessive costs were discouraged and the 
composition of exports were allowed to evolve according to Korea's comparative advantage structure 
OVestphal and Kim, 1977; and Young, 1986). 
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The prevalence of subsidised credit rationing accelerated substantial capital 
deepening in many of Korea's manufacturing sectors.^ As Hong (1981, 1990) points 
out, excessive capital deepening existed in many sectors, beyond the level that can be 
justified by a shift in the basic comparative advantage position or by the dynamic infant 
industry arguments, the chemical industry being a typical example. Large excess 
capacity and poor production and export performance in the industry, in the presence of 
low domestic demand and worldwide excess capacity, greatly burdened the national 
economy in the early 1980s. 
The prevailing judgement was that the investment drive through credit rationing 
and interest restraint was a poor idea, especially in the early 1980s when the second oil 
shock hun the nation's heavy and chemical sectors. As discussed in Dombusch and 
Park (1987), however, the investment drive ultimately contributed to achieving 
international competitiveness in many of the industries by giving them the opportunity 
to expand capacity above the minimum efficient scale, to import advanced foreign 
technology and to gain an export market share. The iron and steel industry along with 
the automobile industry are cases in point. In any event, the investment portfolios in 
those industries seemed sufficiendy well chosen that real wages increased and exports 
expanded enough to pay interest and even principal on the external funds that helped 
finance the investment (Dombusch and Park, 1987). 
There had also been a diversion of a large part of credit to the uses of real 
resources other than those designated by the government. This may be one of the 
factors which limited the effectiveness of government policy or further distorted 
allocation of physical resources. The study by Hong and Park (1986), though tentative, 
suggests a high degree of credit fungibility in Korea's manufacturing during the 1969-
81 period. According to them, the heavy and chemical sectors, where the bortowers 
were usually large industrial groups, are in general characterised by a relatively high 
degree of credit diversion, but the iron and steel industry showed a very low degree of 
credit diversion relative to other sectors and achieved relatively high efficiency and 
export performance during the heavy and chemical industry drive period. Possible 
explanations for that, as Hong and Park suggested, are that the industry was the major 
recipient of Korea Development Bank loans and foreign loans, the usage of which was 
strictiy controlled and supervised by the bank and the government, and that much of the 
investment in this sector was undertaken by POSCO, which won international renown 
not only by vigorous commitment to business success but also by prominent leadership 
and the hard work of its management (Innace and Dress, 1992). 
23. Magee (1976) argues, in his two by two model, that too many subsidies on the use of capital in the 
capital-intensive sector will raise, in addition to wage rates, capital intensities in both the capital-
intensive and the labour-intensive sectors. 
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The government's financial policies, especially in the 1970s, can be considered to 
have created two strong incentives for the development of steel and other strategic 
industries. First, firms were stimulated to invest since low interest rates and access to 
bank loans served to increase the expected rate of return on, and reduce the cost of, 
their investment. Second, the perceived risk of investment was reduced as the 
government assured a stable flow of bank loans to the firms regardless of their short-
term financial performance. In other words, the government, by controlling the 
financial sector, became a risk partner for the firms, encouraging them to undertake 
projects that otherwise might have declined. Other promotional and protective policies 
also provided the Korean steel industry with incentives to invest and export and helped 
it enhance industrial competence. Even though these incentives caused problems of 
excessive investment and credit fungibility in some firms or industries, the steel 
industry was able to avoid these and achieve rapid growth and high efficiency. 
However, these facts alone do not necessarily imply that financial policy for the steel 
industry was effective. In fact, the effects of industrial policies at a selected industry 
level are complicated and difficult to evaluate, since policy measures always involve 
economic costs and benefits.^ Costs and benefits generated by a specific industry are 
even more difficult to measure, because the government's financial policy and some 
other important measures were applied generally to all heavy and chemical industries, 
on the one hand, and the assistance given to the industry would have generated 
complicated externalities, on the other. For example, even though a study by Research 
Centre for Social Science (1987) shows that the establishment of POSCO has 
consequently contributed enormously to the national economy, measurement of the 
effects of policy on POSCO's growth is complicated by the costs incurted by the 
national economy as a whole. 
PRR'ATISATION OF POSCO AND T H E LIBERALISATION PROCESS 
In the early 1980s, as the Korean steel industry grew and enhanced its competitiveness 
both in the domestic and the international markets, internal and external pressure began 
to increase not only for liberalisation but also for privatisation of POSCO. Internal 
24. Since the intent of industrial policies typically extends beyond the aims of the industrial business 
enterprise, the criteria on which industrial policy must be judged are considerably broader than those 
applying to the success of business investment (Adams, 1985). Thus, it is not sufficient to ask 
whether an industry that has been promoted by industrial policy is earning a competitive return on its 
invested capital. The success of an incentive favouring one sectOT over others needs to be evaluated 
on the basis of other criteria with respect to all other industries and the economy as a whole, such as 
impact on emplo>Tnent, trade balance, production costs, technological development, industrial 
structure and externalities. However, not all these considerations are readily measurable. Even if the 
measurement is possible, it is not always clear whether benefits exceed costs, or vice versa. 
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pressure came from the fact that the growing complexity of Korea's economy was 
making management of POSCO more difficult for the government. There was wide 
recognition that far too great a proportion of the nation's resources had been channelled 
into the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s, resulting in major distortions in the 
economy. Beginning around 1980, with the implementation of the Fifth Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan, the government then began a cautious process of 
disengagement from some of its more overt intervention policies. In particular, 
liberalisation efforts in the financial system were manifested in the privatisation of 
some government-owned banks; the progressive consolidation of the various policy 
loan interest rates into a few unitary rates; and a reduction and eventual phasing out of 
the policy of credit rationing to particular sectors including steel.^^ Also in trade, 
formal assistance for exports and restrictions on imports were slowly reduced or 
eliminated.^ 
In the case of the steel industry, as international competitiveness in many 
products grew substantially, the need for government control and assistance lessened 
but the burdens of continuing to assist the steel industry became greater. Increasing 
domestic demand not only in volumes but also in product mix also reinforced abolition 
of import restrictions. As most of the Korean government's policies on the steel 
industry were directed towards assisting POSCO, the most significant liberalisation 
effort was through the elimination of assistance to POSCO. Financial assistance 
through government financing and policy loans was stopped in 1981. Preferential tax 
treatment was also gradually abolished. Concessions on reduction and exemption of 
custom duties for imported equipment were eliminated after 1983 for the Pohang works 
and after 1987 for the Kwangyang works. With the abolition of the Steel Promotion 
Law in 1986, discounting of public charges was likewise abolished.^^ Government 
assistance for construction of infrastructure connected to steel plants continued longer 
than other types of assistance but, by the end of 1991, except for ports and bays in the 
Kwangyang works, most of the assistance was also stopped. 
In addition, as POSCO grew, a strong desire emerged in the mid-1980s to 
privatise the state-run enterprise. The privatisation process, though restrictive, started 
in 1988. As of the end of 1989, POSCO shares were distributed among the government 
(20 per cent), the Korea Development Bank (15 per cent), other private banks (27.7 per 
cent) and the public (37.3 per cent). 
25. For detailed descriptions of the financial liberalisation process in Korea, see Nam (1989, 1990) and 
Lee (1992). 
26. For detailed information on Korea's trade liberalisation process, see Young (1988,1989) and Kim et 
a/. (1991). 
27. The discount periods were 1973-75 for electricity, 1973-79 for water, 1982-86 for railways, and 
1973-86 for harbour and ports. 
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There was also increasing pressure for liberalisation from overseas. As the 
Korean steel producers' aggressive export drive increased market shares in industrial 
countries and hence affected structural adjustment of their steel industries, particularly 
in the United States, there were frequent and increasing numbers of dumping and 
subsidy claims (Howell et al, 1988). These were followed by pressure for import 
liberalisation, accelerating the process of eliminating import restrictions and reducing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers for various iron and steel products in Korea. Moreover, the 
extent of the export success of the Korean steel industry has caused the world to 
scrutinise it closely. International consensus leading to anti-subsidisation and free and 
fair trade has also been an important element in inducing liberalisation in the Korean 
steel industry. 
The extensive government assistance and high entry barriers to the Korean steel 
market, and the need for liberalisation of the industry as it acquired sufficient 
competitiveness, were not necessarily sufficient to encourage the development of the 
Korean steel industry. As discussed in the analytical framework of this thesis (Chapter 
2), the government's pre-commitment to unconditional liberalisation is another 
important policy factor providing incentives in investment and growth. In order to 
boost efficiency and competence in protected domestic corporations and manufacturers, 
the government needs to affirm unconditional elimination of protection and assistance 
after a certain time. Otherwise, the policy of protecting the domestic industry may 
discourage domestic firms from investing, since, when the domestic market is cut off 
from competition from abroad, they generally base their structures and ways of doing 
business on protectionism (Itoh, 1987). 
Trade liberalisation in Korea remained almost at an standstill for about 10 years 
until the late 1970s (Kim et al., 1991). Even though significant efforts were made to 
eliminate government assistance and to lift import barriers in the 1980s, it is claimed 
that the changes towards liberalisation in the 1980s failed to produce an end to Korea's 
industrial policies on steel (Howell et al., 1988). Moreover, it was frequently argued 
that Korea's government policy and liberalisation process continued to be formulated in 
an ad hoc manner, that it was neither planned nor implemented in clearly defined stages 
but was merely a succession of piecemeal changes (Young, 1986; Kim et al., 1991; and 
Bartlett, 1992). Although the government's pre-commitment to unconditional 
liberalisation was not well-formulated or articulated, a salient feature in the 
liberalisation of the steel industry was the government's adoption of an advance notice 
system of import liberalisation in an effort to promote trade liberalisation and 
elimination of assistance as a long-run policy. As the nation's steel industry as a whole 
achieved gradually enhanced industrial competence and international competitiveness. 
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all the country's steel firms became aware that liberalisation was certain regardless of 
the performance of individual firms. External and internal pressures for liberalisation 
also contributed greatly to advancing the view that Korean protection of its steel 
industry would not last. As the 1980s set in, pressure began to mount from the United 
States and other developed countries on Korea to eliminate all its protection measures. 
This became a critical factor not only in promoting the liberalisation process in the 
Korean steel industry but also in boosting the efforts of domestic firms to strengthen 
competitiveness and diversify their export markets. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Korean government intervened in the steel industry in earnest from the late 1960s 
when the industry had an inefficient and non-competitive base. The role of government 
in the establishment of a large-scale integrated steel mill, POSCO, can be understood as 
an attempt to transform the industry into a modem steel-making industry by 
overcoming problems in capital markets, as suggested in the infant industry promotion 
argument. Some government measures were specific to the steel industry, but most of 
the significant policy effects on the steel industry were in fact the result of the overall 
heavy and chemical industry drive and the system of financial controls launched in the 
early 1970s. Most of the incentives were also applied to other designated 
industries/firms including steel. The government's financial policies in the 1970s, in 
particular, were considered to have been a principal agent in industry promotion, 
creating strong incentives to invest for the development of steel and other strategic 
industries. 
Even though the government's interventionist practices provided the steel 
industry, especially POSCO, with various incentives for development, evaluation of the 
policy measures that were implemented is mixed, since policy measures always involve 
economic costs and benefits. The costs and benefits involved in assistance given to the 
steel industry are difficult to evaluate, since most policy measures for steel were in fact 
part of the heavy and chemical industry drive and the financial policy applied to all 
designated industries and fums. It is also difficult to establish whether development of 
the steel industry would have been promoted more efficientiy under a different policy 
regime. The key point is that the establishment of fully integrated steel-making 
capacity in Korea in the 1970s clearly accorded with underlying changes in Korea's 
comparative advantage. 
The change in the position of the Korean steel industry over time reflects the 
pressures for policy change in Korea. These pressures arose from internal and external 
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sources. Internally, they arose from the effects of growth on the competitiveness of the 
steel industry. The steel industry was supported to a significant extent by government 
policy in previous decades. Problems in capital markets in Korea provided the rationale 
for government assistance. Now, however, the importance of that constraint on 
industrial development is much less. Also, the burdens of continuing to support the 
steel industry are much greater, because of the shift in the intemational competitiveness 
of the industry. 
A second set of factors contributing to the liberalisation of steel industry policy 
were pressures from the rest of the world. The extent of the export success of the 
industry has affected the further use of policy instruments to promote its growth. The 
Korean steel industry is now closely scrutinised by the rest of the world. 
These changes have contributed to the re-direction of government policy away 
from active promotion. The focus of policy towards the steel industry in future will be 
the accommodation of the shift to net imports. Policy design in this industry was 
always sensitive to economic costs and benefits involved and that sensitivity is now 
likely to lead to a more neutral set of policies. 
7 Effective Technology Transfer 
and Creating Competitiveness 
through Learning: The Case 
ofPOSCO 
The huge amounts of capital and high levels of technology required for establishing 
fully integrated steel-making facilities constitute one of the main reasons why, 
regardless of the importance of steel in industrialisation and of the potential advantage 
of low labour costs, developing economies have had difficulties establishing modem 
steel-making industries in the early stage of economic development. Steel-making is a 
complex industry involving not only a long production process in a large-scale plant but 
also the production of various types of products with different factor intensities and 
technologies. Technology in the industry is relatively standardised throughout the 
world but of a high level, complex and constantly evolving. It is embodied in the 
physical machinery and facilities and also in labour in the form of human skills. While 
a high level of capital requirement for building a modem steel plant may be a minor 
factor in determining the intemational production location due to a certain degree of 
international mobility of capital in the form of finance, the scale and technology of 
steel-works and human skills are overwhelming factors in relation to its production 
potential and productivity. For a developing country, which generally has to rely 
substantially on foreign capital and imported technology to establish a modem steel 
industry, the most important factor in creating competitiveness is the recipient 
industry's or firms' ability to learn and assimilate the imponed technology quickly and 
efficiently and ultimately to acquire technological capability. 
This chapter examines the process through which modern steel-making 
technology was transferred to Korea and the acquisition by the newly established 
Korean steel industry of technological capability through leaming and accumulation of 
experience. POSCO provides a case study here, since not only does it account for 
about 70 per cent of steel-making in Korea and has thus played a major role in 
development of the industry but it was also the main recipient of modem steel-making 
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technology from steel-makers in developed countries. This chapter analyses in-depth 
POSCO's efforts to install the imported technology and the various learning and 
technology improving processes involved in its growth. The first section outiines the 
process whereby POSCO imported technology and the firm's expansion through capital 
deepening. The second section discusses POSCO's efforts to achieve effective 
technology transfer and build bases for longer run competitiveness. The various forms 
of technology learning and improvement by POSCO, and its competitiveness with 
respect to steel-making technologies, are examined in the third section. Some 
comments on POSCO's R&D investment are made in the fourth section. 
THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY IMPORT AND CAPACITY EXPANSION 
THROUGH CAPITAL DEEPENING 
In 1968, POSCO was founded as Korea's first integrated steel mill; five years later, 
POSCO completed its first stage construction in Pohang and began production with an 
annual capacity of 1.03 million tonnes of crude steel (Table 7.1). Accomplishing a 
further three stages of expansion in just 10 years, the mill reached an annual capacity of 
9.6 million tonnes. The company became the world's eleventh largest producer on a 
crude steel basis (outside of Russia and Eastern Europe) in 1982, rising from 
undeveloped farm land and only moderately skilled workers to a modem industrial 
complex, with highly skilled workers and a world reputation as a low cost producer (see 
also Table 4.8 in Chapter 4). POSCO continued capacity expansion with construction 
of a second integrated mill, the Kwangyang works, until 1992, when the total capacity 
of its two integrated mills reached 21 million tonnes of crude steel per annum. Since 
1989, POSCO has been the world's third largest crude steel producer after Nippon Steel 
in Japan and USINOR in France (excluding Russia). 
POSCO's rapid growth into a world class steel-maker was not a foregone 
conclusion. As discussed in Chapter 6, the establishment of Korea's first modem large-
scale integrated steel-making facility was driven solely by government in the absence of 
the technical skills and economic resources necessary to produce steel efficiendy. As 
argued by Amsden (1989), Korea faced several challenges in entering the large-scale 
steel business.^ A large-scale integrated iron and steel production system is highly 
1. Amsden (1989) describes the founding of POSCO as 'an unpropitious start'. The World Bank was 
pessimistic about the POSCO project, claiming that an integrated steel mill in Korea at the time was 
premature and lacked economic feasibility (POSCO, 1988). Westphal and Kim (1982) also 
concluded in their study of the trade regime in Korea in the late 1960s that most of Korea's steel 
products were 'prominent among the inefficiently produced import competing products'. See Kim 
0976) and Chapter 3 of this thesis for the status of the Korean steel industry in the 1960s. See also 
Appendix 3 for the history of the founding of POSCO, and the difficulties that Korea encountered in 
the initial stage that stemmed basically from pessimistic views on the project internationally. 
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Table 7.1 P O S C O ' s capacity expansion and costs of construction 
Incremental 
annual capacity 
(million tonnes) 
Completion 
date 
(month/year) 
Construction costs (million US$) 
Domestic 
funds" 
Foreign 
capital" 
Total 
costs 
Per tonne 
(US$) 
Pohang (total) 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
stages 
Stage 4: 1st phase 
2nd phase 
Kwangyang (total) 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
s t age s 
Stage 4 
9.60 
1.03 07/1973 123 (41) 178 (59) 301 292 1.57 05/1976 199 (36) 348 (64) 547 348 2.90 12/1978 618 (45) 766 (55) 1,384 477 3.00 02/1981 726 (52) 666 (48) 1,392 0.60 05/1983 219 (56) 173 (44) 392 496 
11.40 
2.70 05/1987 1,394 (74) 479 (26) 1,873 694 2.70 07/1988 893 (79) 236 (21) 1,130 418 2.70 12/1990 2,362 (77) 725 (23) 3,087 1,143 3.30 10/1992 1,888 (83) 374 (17) 2,263 686 
Notes a Per cent of total costs in parentheses. 
b When the fourth stage construction of the Pohang works was completed in 1983, POSCO's 
total annual capacity was 9.1 million tonnes. Later, there was an incremental expansion by 0.5 
million tonnes. 
c Average of the two phases. 
Source Information provided by POSCO. 
capital-intensive, but Korea lacked capital in the late 1960s. Production costs are 
sensitive to plant scale, but Korea's domestic market was small, though rapidly 
growing. Korea had a scarcity of raw materials, especially iron ore, and was located far 
from the main sources of supply. Above all, Korea did not have any experience and 
skill in modern integrated steel-making. Even though the steel-making process is 
embodied in the machinery and equipment and the technology for ordinary steel-
making is well diffused and can be easily imported at arm's length from machinery 
suppliers and technical consultants, the nature of the process necessitates complex 
engineering skills and knowledge. This requires not only a substantial amount of 
investment in labour training but also highly time-consuming efforts to accumulate 
work experience. Despite all these obstacles, the POSCO project was pushed forward. 
Japan provided the main source of foreign capital (Table 6.1) and the engineering 
consultants, designated the 'Japan Group', consisted of Nippon Steel and Nippon 
Kokkan Steel, which were regarded as the world's most efficient large-scale steel 
producers.^ 
2. The effects of the Japanese steel industry on development of the Korean industry were considerable, 
not only as a technology exporter at the early stage of development of the Korean steel industry but 
also as a large nearby export market later and as a major competitor for the Korean steel producers. 
This is a separate research topic, however, and will not be discussed extensively in this thesis. 
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Initial technology transfer and capacity expansion in the Pohang works' 
With neither domestically available capital nor prior knowledge of and experience in 
large-scale integrated steel-making, POSCO had to rely entirely on foreign sources of 
finance and technology to set up the Pohang works on a greenfield site.^ Due to 
POSCO's lack of technological capability to build an integrated steel mill, the initial 
technology transfer was accomplished on a turnkey basis. The technology package in 
the turnkey project included technologies related not only to investment capability, 
covering preinvestment feasibility studies, manpower training, and project execution 
such as project management and engineering and procurement, but also to production 
capability, which in general consists of production management, production 
engineering (including raw material control, production scheduling, quality control, 
trouble shooting, and adaptations of processes and products), and repair and 
maintenance of physical capital (Westphal, Kim and Dahlman, 1985; and Amsden, 
1989). POSCO was only able to contribute at the beginning by writing the project plan 
with experience gleaned from earlier failures in project proposals, and by assuming 
responsibility for the construction work itself. 
The Japan Group provided preliminary and master engineering reports based on 
POSCO's project proposal and expansion plan. All contracts, including 10 plants with 
12 facilities for the full range of integrated steel production activities (even the railway 
system within the plant), were awarded to the Japan Group, except for a plate mill, for 
which Austria's Voest-Alpine was responsible. Plant exporters, most of which were 
Japanese suppliers, provided credit, and were responsible not only for basic design and 
start-up in accordance with the Japan Group's master engineering plan, but also for 
civil engineering and building construction designs. The Japan Group supervised all 
construction and instructed POSCO with respect to process engineering for each plant 
and overall inventory management, production scheduling, and maintenance. POSCO 
involved Australia's Broken Hill Proprietary Corporation (BHP) in the project to 
review and evaluate the Japan Group's engineering reports and to advise POSCO on 
purchasing plant. POSCO also engaged Korean steel specialists living in Japan to 
review the work of both the Japan Group and BHP. 
In the first stage, a blast furnace for iron-making with a capacity of 0.95 million 
tonnes per annum and two steel-making BOFs (basic oxygen fumaces) with a combined 
capacity of 1.03 million tonnes were installed (Table 7.2). A foundry pig iron furnace 
with an inner volume of 330 cubic metres and a production capacity of 150,000 tonnes 
3. This sub-section draws largely on Enos and Park (1988), POSCO (1988) and Amsden (1989). 
4. See Chapter 6 and Appendix 3 for a description of how capital in the form of foreign loans was 
procured for the establishment of POSCO. 
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Table 7.2 Specification of capacity installed in POSCO, from the first Pohang project 
to the second stage of the Kwangyang works (million tonnes per annum)" 
Pohang works Kwangyang works 
EVS'' 1 2 3 4 (Phase 1 / 2 ) 1 2 
Sinter plant 1.32 2.20 4.29 4.29 - 4.43 4.43 
Coke oven 0.58 0.91 1.55 1.55 / 0.73 1.43 1.43 (no. of ovens) (68) (106) (146) (150) / (75) (132) (132) 
Blast furnace'^ 0.75-4.0 0.95 1.42 2.75 2.75 / - 2.84 2.84 (inner volume, m^) (1,660) (2,254) (3,795) (3,795) (3,800) (3,800) 
BOF shop 0.5-10.0 1.03 2.00 3.30 6.50 / - 2.78 5.57 
(no. ofBOFs) (100 t/ht X 2) ( lOOt^ tx 1) (300 t/ht X 2) ( 300 t^ tx1 ) (250 t/ht X 2) (250t/htx1) 
CC shop'' 0.05-3.5 - 1.03 - 3.84 / - 2.70 5.40 
(strand x units) (4x1) (2x2) (2x2) (2x1) 
Hot strip mill 1.0-6.0 0.61 0.78 1.41 3.31 / - 2.66 4.43 
(no. ofRFs) (150 t/h x 1 ) ( 1 5 0 t ^ x 1 ) (150t/hx1) ( 2 5 0 t ^ x 3 ) (300 t/h X 2) (300 t/h x 1 ) 
Cold-rolling mill 0.1-2.5 - 0.69 - 1.00 / - - -
Plate mill 0.5-3.0 0.34 _ 1.23 - / -
(no. ofRFs) (100 t/h x 1 ) (235t/hx1) 
Wire rod mill 0.1-1.0 - _ 0.45 - / 0.35 
(no. OfRFs) ( lOOt /hx l ) (80t/hx1) 
Notes a " - " means not installed. 
BOF: basic oxygen furnace (LD converter); CC: continuous casting; RF: reheating furnaces, 
"t/ht" denotes tonnes per heat; and "t /h" denotes tonnes per hour. 
Capacity after expansion in bold-faced italics. 
b Estimated range of economically viable scale. 
c The capacity here is not necessarily equal to the current capacity. For example, original 
capacity for the first blast furnace (0.95 million tonnes) increased to 1.01 million tonnes 
after re-lining in 1979. 
d Findlay (1990) provides estimates (million tonnes per casting machine) of EVS for various 
continuous casters: slab caster (0.1-3.5); bloom caster (0.1-2.0); billet caster (0.05-0.8); and 
diin slab caster (0.5-0.1). The capacity of a slab caster in POSCO is between 0.5 and 1.84 
million tonnes. The capacity of a bloom caster and a billet caster is 0.5 million tonnes. 
Sources Estimates of EVS are from Findlay (1990); 
Capacity specification is provided by POSCO. 
was also included in the project, as were a sinter plant, a coke oven and a blooming and 
slabbing mill, a billet mill and a hot strip mill. 
As briefly discussed in Chapter 5, POSCO adopted a backward construction 
strategy, giving priority to the completion of rolling mills, to meet rapidly increasing 
domestic demand for finished steel and also to make an operating profit by 
commencing production in some rolling mills as early as possible. By producing 
finished products at one site with imported semi-processed steel while construction was 
proceeding at the other site, POSCO was able to commence operation in some rolling 
mills one year before total completion of the first stage. POSCO's first operational 
plant was a plate mill with an annual capacity of 336,000 tonnes, which was completed 
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in July 1972. During that year, POSCO was able to supply 33,000 tonnes of plates to 
the domestic shipbuilding industry, which was experiencing a boom at the time. A hot 
strip mill with a capacity of 606,500 tonnes was also completed in October 1972, eight 
months before the official completion of the first stage project. 
The first buming-in of a blast furnace for iron-making commenced on 8 June 
1973. Soon after, BOFs also commenced operation, followed by completion of 
blooming and billet mills. The historical dedication ceremony was held on 3 July 1973. 
With commencement of the first expansion project (that is, the second stage of the 
Pohang works) just three month later in December 1973, POSCO's ten-year Pohang 
works expansion project began. 
Capacity expansion in a newly-built steel mill generally involves a process of 
capital deepening - consisting of large and indivisible additions of equipment or 
facilities embodying new technology and a higher capital-labour ratio - while capacity 
expansion in some other industries such as the textile industry can be characterised as 
capital widening, which consists of small and divisible additions embodying the same 
technology. POSCO's expansion projects also involved capital deepening, including 
not only expansion in scale but continuous upgrading in production technology. 
Continuous technology transfer in each stage of ± e expansion projects occurred in one 
form or another. 
The second stage project involved expansion or establishment of a total of 21 
facilities, adding another blast furnace, a BOF, a sinter plant and a coke plant, all of 
which were larger than those installed in the initial stage. The new technology of 
continuous casting, producing slabs and blooms directiy from molten steel, was newly 
introduced in this stage project. The hot strip mill constructed in the first stage was 
expanded and was joined by the addition of a cold-rolling mill with a capacity of 
686,000 tonnes (Table 7.2). 
In general, the second stage project duplicated the initial plant, concentrating 
more on expansion of iron and steel-making capacity and primary rolling rather than 
finished steel rolling capacity. A massive computerised system for factory and office 
automation and business management was also introduced. Even though experience 
and lessons from the first stage of construction were of great help, a new difficulty 
arose in that construction and operation were carried out side by side and foundation 
work had to be connected to the existing facilities. 
The next expansion project was started in August 1976, two months after 
completion of the second stage, and was completed at the end of 1978. The second 
expansion project was carried out on a much greater scale than the previous projects, 
and involved expansion or set up of a total of 20 facilities. Capital deepening again 
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took place with the expansion in capacity, implying that larger facilities encountered 
greater difficulties in process control. The third blast furnace was set up with an inner 
volume of 3,795 cubic metres and a capacity of 2.75 million tonnes, which exceeded 
the combined capacity of the two earlier furnaces (Table 7.2).' Two more BOFs were 
added of a larger scale than the combined steel-making capacity of the first two stages, 
and the capacities to undertake bloom and slab/billet casting (not continuous casting) 
were also increased. Continuous casting capacity was not expanded, though a billet 
mill was established for the first time. Installation of a cold-rolling mill was not 
included in this project, but, as shown in Table 7.2, many rolling facilities such as hot-
rolling capacity and the plate mill were also greatly expanded. A wire rod mill and a 
silicon steel mill were also added. 
Construction of the fourth stage, the last though also the largest of the four stages 
of construction at Pohang, was undertaken in two phases - the first being the main 
expansion and the second involving an incremental expansion project. The fourth 
stage project was officially launched in February 1979, soon after the completion of the 
third stage. In fact, construction of a second hot strip mill, in which about 30 per cent 
of total construction materials and resources used in the first phase project was 
invested, started on April 1978, eight months before the third stage was finished. In the 
first phase, completed in February 1981, seven mills and eleven facilities (including a 
fourth blast furnace and raw material preparation facilities, the second hot-rolling mill 
and the second continuous casting mill) were added, and the existing six mills including 
the second BOF shop and cold-rolling capacity were expanded. In scale, the added or 
expanded iron and steel-making furnaces were equal to those of the third stage (Table 
7.2). As a result, POSCO came to possess an annual crude steel production capacity of 
8.6 million tonnes. 
The second phase of construction was started in January 1982 with new road and 
drainage works and was finished on May 1985, two years after the completion of the 
first phase. The major concern in this phase was stripping and re-lining the thirteen 
major facilities, using Japanese technical assistance. POSCO was then able to add, 
without establishing a new furnace, 0.6 million tonnes more to its existing crude steel-
making capacity, expanding it to 9.1 million tonnes per annum. POSCO also added a 
fifth coke mill and a second wire rod mill (Table 7.2). 
Construction of the Kwangyang works 
With rapid increases in domestic demand for steel products above Korea's total 
5. The first and second blast furnaces had an inner volume of 1,660 cubic metres and a combined 
capacity of 2.25 million tonnes after re-lining. 
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production capacity, the government made plans to build a second integrated steel mill.® 
Unlike when POSCO was founded, competition was severe among POSCO and the top 
business groups, such as Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai, to win end-user rights for the 
second integrated steel mill."' Nevertheless, the govemment ended up choosing POSCO 
on October 1978, since it was considered to have acquired substantial experience and 
an internationally competitive level of technology for modem steel-making. Potential 
complementarity with the Pohang works was also submitted as a reason for choosing 
POSCO. Kwangyang Bay, located on the south coast of Korea, was selected as the 
project site.^ 
After three years of work to prepare the construction site, the first stage project 
was begun in March 1985. The plant was designed to equal or exceed the best Japanese 
facilities in a number of areas (World Steel Dynamics, 1985). Ten major plants and 
fourteen ancillary facilities were constructed, including a large-scale all-coke blast 
furnace with an inner volume of 3,800 cubic metres, a steel-making plant with two 
BOFs, a 100 per cent continuous casting plant, and a hot strip mill (see Table 7.2). 
Construction of harbour and cargo facilities and a raw material treatment plant was also 
included in the project. 
The Kwangyang project introduced newer or more advanced technologies than 
the Pohang works, including a continuous automatic production line capable of turning 
liquid steel from the BOF into hot coil in about 8 and a half hours, compared with a 
production time of 4 to 5 days in the first stage plants of the Pohang works. In addition 
to its advanced and completely computerised and automated systems, which were 
established as an important part of the Kwangyang project, POSCO purchased the 
world's most up-to-date equipment and technology, such as a dynamic control system, 
pulverised coal injection, a pair cross mill and hot charge rolling. Much emphasis was 
6. In fact, the govemment considered establishing the country's second integrated steel mill from the 
beginning of 1972 when POSCO's first stage of construction was at its peak. In October 1973, the 
govemment signed an agreement with US Steel Engineering and Consultants for a feasibiUty study 
and preliminary technical consultation. However, the project was suspended (announced in March 
1975) because of the first oil shock and also because of worldwide stagnation in steel business 
towards the end of 1974. Later, as the oil crisis eased, the concept of the project resurfaced and the 
govemment pushed ahead with site surveys and selection of end-users. 
7. POSCO, the state-mn enterprise, and the Hyundai Group, one of the Chaebol leading Korea's heavy 
industrial sectors representing private capital, engaged in intense competition to the very last. This 
became a prominent issue in the media and was viewed as a competition between state and civilian 
enterprises. 
8. The govemment at first chose Asan Bay located midway down Korea's west coast with a view to 
balanced regional development (note that the Pohang mill is located on the southeast coast). 
However, POSCO opposed the decision, arguing that Asan sits on unstable geographical strata and 
that it would involve the construction of huge scale and tremendously costly sluice gates. One of the 
apparent advantages of Kwangyang was that it was better suited by virtue of natural conditions for 
construction of a large harbour with loading and unloading docks and raw materials handling 
capacity. However, construction required additional work due to soft ground. 
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given to conserving raw materials and energy.' With completion of this project, 
POSCO then entered a new era in steel-making with two integrated, fully operational 
mills/" 
To meet rapidly increasing domestic demand, construction of the second stage of 
the Kwangyang mill started in September 1986, while the first project was still in 
progress. This project virtually duplicated the first stage of the Kwangyang works in 
terms of facilities and production scale. In scale, the iron and steel-making equipment 
was equal to that of the first phase (Table 7.2). Since this project progressed side by 
side with the first stage work, there was a substantial saving in construction costs 
compared with the first project as it was possible to reduce site preparation costs and 
utilise several facilities installed in the first stage project (see Table 7.1). 
In the third stage of the Kwangyang project, which was finished in December 
1990, POSCO installed another blast furnace and two BOFs, two continuous casters 
and a hot strip mill, adding 2.7 million tonnes more of annual crude steel-making 
capacity. The last stage of the Kwangyang expansion project was started in January 
1991 and completed in October 1992, which provided POSCO with 21 million tonnes 
of annual crude steel production capacity from two integrated mills. According to 
POSCO, capacity may be increased at some stage without needing to establish a new 
furnace, though after 1995 no further expansion will take place. 
In terms of technology transfer, from the initial installation through the 
consecutive expansion projects, POSCO has continued to acquire technologies not only 
in investment capability but also in production capability, and this has provided it with 
a sound base for increased international competitiveness. POSCO's capacity expansion 
and acquisition of technological capability can be characterised as comprising, firstly, 
efforts to achieve effective technology transfer and, secondly, a dynamic process of 
learning and accumulating experience. 
EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
POSCO's installation of its imported technology and its creation of a firm base for 
quick technology absorption and long-run competitiveness were achieved through a 
9. The all-coke furnaces in the Kwangyang works were designed to have a fuel ratio lower by 8 kg per 
tonne compared with the major Japanese companies and by 55 kg compared with the major West 
German companies. In the case of energy consumption, the Kwangyang mill was planned to use 
4,906 X ICP kcal per tonne shipped, while the values (ICP kcal per tonne shipped) in major firms of 
developed countries were, for example, 5,174 in Japan, 7,709 in the United States and 5,950 in West 
Germany (World Steel Dynamics, 1985). 
10. The construction of the Kwangyang first stage did not progress smoothly at first, as the Japanese 
steel companies were reluctant to sell the facilities and equipment requested by POSCO. This is 
discussed in the following section. 
173 
reduction in construction times and costs; inducement of effective facility purchase and 
favourable loan conditions; purchase of the most up-to-date technology; maximisation 
of plant scale and facility utilisation; reduction of foreign dependence on funds and 
engineering; and active participation in the projects and intensive labour training. 
Reduction in construction costs and period 
Since establishment of an integrated steel mill involves huge capital costs and long 
construction times, inefficient or slow construction can saddle a firm with excessive 
costs. In current dollars, the construction cost per annual tonne of capacity, or 'the unit 
construction cost', has been steadily increasing from the late 1950s, and has risen from 
around US$200-300 (Etienne, 1992). In the 1970s, the unit construction costs went up 
to US$400-500 (Etienne, 1992). The standard unit construction cost in the world 
economy in the mid-1980s was reported to be US$1,500 {Steel Times International, 
June 1987).'^ Etienne (1992) argues that, as of the late 1980s or early 1990s, the unit 
construction cost was at least US$1,000, which requires very fast design and 
construction, and that minimum capacity has to be around 3 million tonnes, and hence 
an investment of US$3 billion, which is difficult to find. When there are delays in 
construction or when new loans have to be found, unit construction costs can increase 
to US$2,000 or more, as in the case of Acominas in Brazil (Etienne, 1992).^^ Enos and 
Park (1988) have estimated that, taking US$500 million as the total construction cost of 
a mill with a capacity of a million tonnes per annum, an extra year spent on 
construction would incur extra capital costs somewhere in the range of US$10 million 
to US$20 million, and raise production costs per tonne by an extra US$1 or US$2. 
Avoidance of this is a considerable incentive to speedy completion of construction 
projects. 
Table 7.3 shows that POSCO achieved considerably lower construction costs 
relative to other countries. In general, Japan and some newly emerging developing 
countries such as Taiwan exhibited low unit construction costs relative to Europe and 
the United States in the 1970s. The unit construction cost of POSCO's Pohang works, 
established throughout this period, were even lower. The unit construction cost in the 
first stage of the Pohang project was US$290, still lower than international levels, even 
though POSCO had no previous construction experience to undertake such a big 
project. In the case of the second stage project, POSCO's unit construction cost was 
11. Bamett and Crandall (1986) estimate that the unit construction cost in the United States as of 1985 
was US$1,421, while estimates by Worid Steel Dynamic (1985) are much higher, suggesting that the 
world average unit construction cost in 1979 was USS 1,000-1,250 and increased to around 
USSl,700-2,120 in 1985 
12. Employing a discounted cash flow method of appraisal, Cockerill (1974) shows that longer 
construction and commissioning times seriously affect the profitability of the new investmenL 
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Table 7 J Construction period and costs of integrated steel mills, comparison of 
POSCO and selected plants in other countries" 
Plant Capa. Period Costs^ Plant Capa. Period Costs' 
POSCO (PI) 1.03 04/70 - 07/73 (39) 292" Bokaro, India 4.00 - 89 525^ 
POSCO (P2) 1.57 12/73 - 05/76(31) 34? 
POSCO (P3) 2.90 08/76- 12/78 (29) 477' CSC, Taiwan (1) 1.50 09/74 - 06/76 (34) 667' Okishima, Japan (2) 3.00 01/76 - 07/79 (43) 626 
POSCO (P4)^ 3.00 02/79 - 02^1 (25) 464' 
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CSC, Taiwan (2) 1.75 07/78 - 02/82 (44) 857' 
Tubarao, Brazil 3.00 11/79- 11/82 (37) 700' 
Baoshan, China (1) 3.00 12/78 - 09/85 (94) 1081' 
POSCO (Kl) 27 0 03/85 - 05/87 (27) 
POSCO (K2) 270 09/86 - 07/88 (23) 
POSCO (K3) 270 11/88 - 12^0(25) 750' 
POSCO (K4)^ 3.30 01/91- 10/92 (21) 686 
Baoshan, China (1& 2)6.70 - 90 - 1209' 
VSP, India 3.00 -03/92 (11 1500* 
years) 
X Bokaro, India 1.70 - 79 (100)' 
Usiminas, Brazil 1.40 - (74)' 
FOS, France 3.50 - (50)' 
Taronto, Italy 2.60 - (49)' 
Average construction costs in the period corresponding to stages in the Pohang works 
Stages in the Pohang works Japan US EC Developing countries 
First 450 550 500 500 
Second 550 800 600 550-800 
Third 588 820 782 600-850 
Notes a Plant: Names of steel mills. Stages in parentheses. POSCO (Pi) or (Ki), for / = 1, 2, 3,4, 
means the ith stage of the Pohang or the Kwangyang works. 
Capa.: Annual crude steel production capacity (million tonnes). 
Period: Construction period (month/year). Months taken for completion in parentheses. 
The periods of site preparation in a new mill are not included. 
Costs: Construction costs per tonne of crude steel capacity (USS at current prices). 
b Projected costs in the 1970s. c First phase of the fourth stage project 
d Average of the Pohang works. e Average of the first three stages. / Projected. 
Sources Information provided by POSCO; 
Enos and Park (1988); Etienne (1992). 
about US$350. This was much lower than the cost incurred by China Steel Corporation 
(CSC) for construction of its first stage in Taiwan around the same time and which was 
regarded as one of the most efficiently installed mills in the world. POSCO also 
achieved far lower unit production costs for the third and fourth stages of the Pohang 
works compared with the integrated mills in Japan or other developing countries 
constructed around the similar period (see Table 7.3). The unit construction costs that 
POSCO recorded in the construction of the Kwangyang works were even more 
remarkable, averaging US$750 for the first three stages, well below the standard 
international cost. For the fourth stage, costs were even lower, even at the current price 
level. 
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POSCO's lower unit construction costs stemmed mostly from reduction of 
construction times, cheap local construction-labour costs and, as will be discussed later, 
effective purchase of facilities and equipment. From the initial installation of the 
Pohang works, POSCO did its utmost to save capital costs by reducing construction 
times, even though it had no previous experience in building a large-scale integrated 
steel mill and, as shown in POSCO (1988) and Innace and Dress (1992), despite the 
many twists and turns that threatened to delay construction. Construction of the first 
stage Pohang works was completed one month earlier than the schedule set by the 
Japan Group, and set a trend for early completion by POSCO of other projects. 
Due to the utility facilities already set up in the previous stage and also 
accumulation of engineering technology through the experience of actual construction 
and operation as well as increasing skill levels in the Korean construction sector, 
construction times in consecutive expansion projects became shorter despite the fact 
that the scale of work was greater (Table 1 3 ) } ' POSCO completed these projects 
ahead of schedule, even though the schedule for later stages was already shorter in 
terms of construction period per tonne of scale. In the second stage of construction, 
POSCO again completed the work one month early. Construction of the third and 
fourth stages was, respectively, five and four months shorter than scheduled. ^ ^ 
In the Kwangyang projects, POSCO was able to build large integrated works of 
about 3 million tonnes of capacity in just over two years, which was remarkable by any 
international standards (see Table 7.3). This was made possible by the fact that 
construction was completed ahead of schedule on each occasion. For example, 
construction times were reduced by 6 months in the first stage and 3.5 months in the 
second stage. In doing so, POSCO made tremendous capital cost savings. POSCO has 
estimated, for example, that it saved about US$32 million in the third stage of the 
Pohang works and about US$110 million in the whole Pohang projects by reducing 
construction times. 
The cost of construction-labour also influences the capital cost of a plant. Findlay 
(1990) argues that construction-labour costs in Korea were about a quarter of those in 
Japan, the United States or Europe, and a half of those in Australia. This has certainly 
given POSCO an advantage over competing steel-makers in developed countries. 
Compared with other developing countries where construction-labour costs may be at 
13. In the third stage, however, there were difficulties in mobilising skilled construction workers (and a 
shortage of concrete) due to the construction boom in the Middle East (POSCO, 1988). 
14. One of the dangers associated with speeding up construction is poor workmanship. POSCO's quality 
management system made doubly sure that this would not result (POSCO, 1988). During the third 
stage of the Pohang works, for example, POSCO's supervisors found that the concrete pour was 10 
cm lower than indicated in the drawing for the area where machines were to be erected. At the time 
die work was 80 per cent complete. Nevertheless, POSCO dynamited the work and began again 
from scratch. 
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similar or even lower levels than Korea, POSCO's unit construction costs were still 
smaller (Table 7.3). This may imply that the differences between Korea and developed 
countries probably stemmed for the most part from Korea's much lower construction-
labour costs, though one also needs to consider Korea's levels of skill and the 
propensity of Koreans for hard work. In any case, it is clear from Table 7.3 that 
POSCO's ability to reduce construction times gave it a clear advantage over competing 
steel-makers in both developed and developing countries. 
Effective facility purchase and favourable foreign loan conditions 
Effective purchase of facilities, together with introduction of long-term foreign loans 
with competitively low interest rates, was another important factor in reducing 
construction costs. In purchasing facilities, POSCO was able to induce international 
competition among foreign facility suppliers instead of adopting the customary practice 
of employing contractors solely on a turnkey basis, and hence was able not only to 
minimise facility purchasing expenses but also to equip itself with the best technology 
(POSCO, 1988). POSCO had an advantage in that, at the time of construction, very 
littie steel-making capacity was being built elsewhere in the world (Findlay, 1990). 
Facilities suppliers were keen to compete for the job, as leading steel-making developed 
countries tried eagerly to export equipment to developing countries as a means of 
offsetting their slackening demand and falling steel exports. 
As for financial loans, POSCO was able to borrow from overseas US$2,255 
million for the Pohang works at very favourable interest rates of 2.0 to 8.5 per cent and 
US$894 million for the Kwangyang works at 2.0 to 2.7 per cent (as of September 
1989). POSCO's success in raising enough capital to carry out the projects was 
augmented by its ability to procure funds at low interest rates. This was important for 
POSCO, which had to heavily rely on foreign capital to import facilities, since it helped 
POSCO to reduce overall facility purchasing expenses. 
Initially, most of the facilities and equipment and foreign finance for these were 
supplied by Japan (see Table 6.1). By the second stage of the Pohang works, Japanese 
facility prices had increased sharply, and it had became difficult to acquire loans. 
POSCO made serious efforts to diversify its finance sources to five countries including 
Japan (44 per cent of foreign loans, including reparation funds from Japan), the United 
States (18 per cent). West Germany, France and Austria. While the share of loans from 
Japan increased once more, rising to 53 per cent in the third stage of the Pohang works, 
equipment purchase sources became more diversified, to include 11 companies from 7 
countries, as POSCO eagerly searched for newer or better technology (POSCO, 1988). 
In the final stage of the Pohang works, POSCO imported facilities from 12 foreign 
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companies in 5 countries. 
As for loans, many banks and international credit institutions in developed 
countries suggested loan supply given POSCO's now excellent international credit 
rating, which greatly helped it secure necessary funds at fixed, long-term but low 
interest rates. For example, POSCO was able to contract US$100 million loans with 16 
foreign banks on internationally favourable conditions without a government certificate 
of repayment. This was remarkable at the time compared with contracts signed 
elsewhere in the worid (POSCO, 1988). 
The purchase of facilities and procurement of loans did not always progress 
smoothly. In the first stage of the Kwangyang works, for example, POSCO was 
confronted by a reluctance among Japanese steel firms to be involved in the project and 
to sell the latest technology and facilities.^^ Again, by taking advantage of strong 
competition among worldwide steel facility suppliers, POSCO was able selectively to 
purchase on favourable loan conditions the most up-to-date equipment and technology 
from Europe and hence to reduce by 33 per cent the initially scheduled facility prices 
(POSCO, 1988).^' 
It can be argued, as in Findlay (1990), that any other country could have 
bargained for similar arrangements, and that POSCO's achievement of lower costs in 
this way was not unique. Nevertheless, such favourable arrangements for low cost 
facilities and loans also depend on the importer's credit rating and international 
reputation in business performance. This fact actually constituted a big obstacle to 
POSCO's efforts to procure foreign funds for the initial installation. POSCO's 
remarkable achievements in construction and operation, and its emergence as an 
international standard steel-maker, became important in contributing to its ability to 
attract low cost facility purchases and loans. POSCO's intense efforts to diversify 
strategically the sources of facility suppliers and finance was also of substantial help in 
inducing competition among facility and loan suppliers (POSCO, 1988). 
Establishment of maximum capacity and technology 
In 1967 when the Korean government pushed ahead its plan to build the nation's first 
integrated mill, the Korean government and KISA (Korea International Steel 
15. The Japanese worried that Korean steel sales to Japan might have a boomerang effect on its steel-
makers, since Japan was already POSCO's largest steel export market (World Steel Dynamics, 
1985). There was conflict ben\'een Japanese steel firms and equipment manufactures, who were 
keen to sell equipment and facilities to POSCO at a time when the Kwangyang mill was the only 
new integrated mill being built in the world. 
16. Japan later joined in the international competition to supply facilities to POSCO. As a result, Japan 
was only awarded a contract for hot strip mill equipment, while three major contracts for iron-
making, steel-making and continuous casting shops were given to leading equipment suppliers in 
Europe such as West Germany, Austria and England. 
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Association - an international consortium, including the World Bank, to build an 
integrated steel mill in Korea) reached agreement to build a plant with 0.6 million 
tonnes of initial capacity with the potential to expand capacity to 3 million tonnes/'' 
However, this plan was rejected later in 1969, as international finance suppliers claimed 
the project was economically unfeasible. In the first plan for the Pohang project 
submitted by Nippon Steel of the Japan Group, a total 2.6 million tonnes of capacity 
was suggested to be the most feasible (World Steel Dynamics, 1985). However, 
POSCO insisted that a large four-stage plant with a capacity of 9.1 million tonnes was 
required and persuaded the Japan Group of the feasibility of this plan (POSCO, 1988). 
POSCO's efforts to persuade the Japan Group of the importance of the 9.1 million 
tonnes project were rewarded when the increased capacity turned out to be what was 
needed to meet rapidly increasing domestic demand as well as to supply the export 
markets. 
POSCO's concerns about scale extended to each unit. As shown in Table 7.1, the 
first stage of the Pohang works had 1.03 million tonnes of annual crude steel capacity, 
which was more than 70 per cent larger than the scale suggested by KISA. The BOF 
shop, with a capacity of over 100 million tonnes and a rolling mill with 150 million 
tonnes of capacity were the most up-to-date large-scale units at the time. Their size was 
greater than that of many international steel firms in developed countries and was 
considered by the Japan Group as impractical for the Korean economy (POSCO, 1988). 
However, it seems that POSCO did not always install facilities as large in scale as 
those in some firms in developed countries. In fact, many cases of initial technology 
import in the world showed that a scaling down of facilities, particularly of blast 
furnaces, to a size smaller than the maximum size used in the exporting countries was 
required not necessarily because of the narrowness of domestic markets but for 
technical reasons, namely that the larger the furnace size, the more difficult it is to 
operate.^^ It is therefore general practice, as iron-making skills are accumulated, for the 
technology importer to increase blast furnace capacity in the following or later 
expansion projects. The reduction in furnace size serves to lower establishment costs. 
In POSCO's case as well, its first blast furnace had 1,160 cubic metres of inner volume. 
This was relatively small compared with blast furnaces installed between the late 1960s 
and early 1970s by major Japanese firms, which had inner volumes ranging 2,000 to 
4,500 cubic metres. At the time, major steel-makers in the United States and Europe 
were also installing blast fumaces with between 1,700 and 4,(XX) cubic metres of inner 
volumes. In the case of continuous casting, which came into use in steel-making in the 
17. The agreement foresaw one million tonnes of expansion and 3 million tonnes of fmal capacity. See 
Appendix 3. 
18. See Ono (1981) for the cases of Japan and Brazil. 
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early 1960s, POSCO delayed adopting this process until the second stage, given 
technical difficulties in its operation at the start (Table 1.2)}^- This process was 
omitted again in the third stage. After the second stage operation had proved 
successful, however, it was expanded for the fourth stage. Only after gaining 
confidence in operating the process in the Pohang works did POSCO introduce the 100 
per cent continuous casting system. 
Nevertheless, efforts to install facilities at the maximum possible capacity and to 
employ the newest technology continued throughout the expansion projects. With 
successful operation of the first blast furnace (as will be discussed shortly), furnace 
sizes installed in the subsequent projects were increased successively: to 2,254 cubic 
metres in the second stage; to 3,795 cubic metres in the third and fourth Pohang 
projects; and to 3,800 million tonnes in the Kwangyang projects (Table 7.2). The inner 
volume of the third and fourth furnaces in the Pohang works and in all the Kwangyang 
works was greater than the average volume of 2,447 cubic metres in the 5 major 
Japanese integrated firms as of 1985 (World Steel Dynamics, 1985). As of 1990, 10 
steel works in Japan had 16 large blast furnaces in operation (3 at standstill) with an 
inner volume equal to or of more than 3,795 cubic metres, while there were only 5 in 
other countries (Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, 1991).^' 
In the case of the BOF shop, the installed capacity from the third stage Pohang project 
was over 2.5 million tonnes for each shop, ranging between 2.7 and 3.3 million tonnes, 
which was more than double the size of that in the first Pohang project. 
As shown in Table 7.2, the scale of almost all units installed in POSCO is above 
the estimated minimum efficient scale or economically viable scale of a plant. The 
sizes of each of the two integrated mills within POSCO are also above the minimum 
efficient scale for an entire company. It has long been recognised that there are definite 
economies of scale in a large steel mill, with many studies specifying the minimum 
efficient scale of an integrated mill: 4 million tonnes in Cockerill (1974); 6 million 
tonnes in Imai (1980); 3.5 million tonnes in Aylen (1989); and 3.5 million tonnes with 
continuous casting or 6 million tonnes in the case of ingot casting in Findlay (1990). 
Whichever estimates are used, POSCO's two integrated mills are regarded to have 
attained the minimum size for competitiveness. 
19. The continuous casting process was used for non-ferrous metal work such as copper before 
commercial development for steel. Its application to steel closely followed the development of the 
BOF, by which a rapid and regular cycle of steel production was achieved. See Appendix 2. 
20. In 1973, some mini-mills in Korea introduced continuous casting (all billet casting) ahead of POSCO 
for production of bars and structural shapes (Baik, 1986). 
21. Nippon Steel's Oita works has the largest blast furnace at 5,245 cubic metres, which was ignited on 
December 1988. 
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ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY THROUGH LEARNING 
AND IMPROVEMENT IN PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY 
Among the most important factors during and after technology transfer to help POSCO 
create international competitiveness were, on the one hand, the quick and efficient 
establishment of imported technology from the initial stage and, on the other, how to 
embody the imported technology in its engineers and ultimately to lift productivity and 
product mix and quality to internationally competitive levels. Even if the long period 
of construction of projects involves various routes to technology assimilation and 
adoption, the general acquisition by a technology recipient of the necessary 
technological capability, particularly in the form of human skills, can be characterised 
as a process of learning through the accumulation of experience and information. For a 
technology importer, improvement in productivity and in product mix and quality is 
generated most importantly by learning rather than technology innovation. 
As discussed in the analytical framework, learning can take many forms, but 
technology transfer and its accompanying in-house investment in learning is not a one-
shot transaction. Moreover, under conditions of capital deepening throughout the 
expansion projects, POSCO was continuously confronted with process changes. At the 
same time, it broadened its product line including further changes to the processes it 
employed. Under these circumstances, the need to leam from the large-scale integrated 
steel-making it undertook was the most important challenge faced by POSCO in 
entering the international steel business. 
Learning through participation and training 
At the initial stage of technology transfer, the most important tasks for POSCO were 
seen to be the prompt construction of mills and normal operation of facilities. 
However, even though many experienced steel workers from other existing small firms 
were recruited by POSCO, no one in POSCO at the time had any experience in 
constructing and operating an integrated steel works. Before the construction of the 
first stage, for example, only 3 out of 39 POSCO's founding members had even seen a 
blast furnace (POSCO, 1988). Therefore, the training of workers was one of the highest 
priorities throughout the transfer process. 
Active participation in the transfer process and intensive programs to train 
engineers and other personnel afforded a tremendous accumulation of experience and 
know-how. In fact, a distinguishing characteristic of the initial transfer process was that 
POSCO's workers actively participated in that process and were very enthusiastic in 
learning what was being taught to them and also in assimilating what was not being 
taught direcdy (Amsden, 1989). While the training of workers on the construction site 
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was undertaken with great seriousness, POSCO sent a large number of workers to other 
countries that were leaders in steel technology, and this set a precedent for overseas 
training that continues today. About 600 engineers and front-line supervisors were sent 
at the time of the first stage of construction to learn about iron and steel-making 
technologies in particular. For example, many were sent to Japan for field training, 
where they participated actively in the construction and operation of local mills with 
their Japanese counterparts (Enos and Park, 1988). This provided them with 
tremendous experience and know-how in the techniques used in operation and 
production management. During the second stage of construction, more technical 
know-how was acquired by dispatching more than 1,000 employees overseas (World 
Steel Dynamics, 1985). Between 1968 and 1987, a total of about 16 per cent of 
POSCO's employees were sent overseas for training.^^ 
POSCO's overall in-house labour training program was also very intensive. 
During the period 1968-79, 78 per cent of its employees (including both regular and 
contracted workers) received training or education in one form or another (World Steel 
Dynamics, 1985). In 1984 alone, more than 40 per cent of its workers participated in 
various training and education programs. These programs included not only specific 
training in steel-making, computer operation, and sales, for example, but also two or 
three weeks of introductory education for new recruits, language training, quality 
control, occasional programs for new facilities and systems, consigned education out of 
the company, job training and so on. This enabled POSCO to realise considerable 
improvements within a short period of operation and, in the longer term, to enter the 
international arena quickly and efficiendy. 
Acquisition of investment capability 
One form of learning was associated with the acquisition of investment capability, 
which was closely related to what POSCO demonstrated in plant erection with respect 
to capital costs and construction period. On the basis of enthusiastic learning in 
successive construction and plant operations and extensive labour training, POSCO 
eventually acquired the capability to undertake the various engineering construction 
tasks, for which it had relied almost wholly on foreign engineers in the initial stage of 
technology transfer.^^ Table 7.4 shows POSCO's declining dependence on foreign 
22. Most of these were sent to Japan (67 per cent). Others were sent to other 14 countries including 
Austria (9 per cent), West Germany (9 per centX the United States (6 per cent), the United Kingdom 
(4 per cent) and France (2.3 per cent). The training fields included plant operation (38 per cent), 
computers (25 per cent), maintenance (24 per cent) and others (14 per cent) (POSCO, 1988). 
23. The investment c^abilities acquired in the initial stage of technology transfer included preliminary 
engineering planning, preparation of procurement specifications for auxiliary facilities such as power 
transmission and distribution systems, preparation of common specifications for general technology, 
review and evaluation of manufacturer's specifications, preparation of civil engineering and building 
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Table 7.4 POSCO's technological capability in planning, construction and engineering 
tasks, by stages of the Pohang works" 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
Planning and negotiation • • • 
Master engineering plan * * * Process design * * • Equipment design * * • Material balance of facilities * * 
Specification of facilities * * 
Inspection of specifications • • 
Inspection of drawings * • 
Construction • • • 
Start-up and operation • • • • 
Payments for engineering services 
(USS million per tonne capacity) 6.13 3.81 2.42 0.11 
Foreign engineering hours involved 119,070 64,200 491 _ 
Facility localisation ratio (per cent)'' 12.5 15.5 22.6 35.0 
Notes a -
• 
• 
"not available". 
Foreign engineers only. 
Foreign and Korean engineers. 
Sources 
"Ci Korean engineers only. 
b ^-riUf^' „tio - domesUcally-produced equipment 
Total expenditure on facilities 
Information provided by POSCO. 
Enos and Park (1988); and Amsden (1989). 
engineering and the increasing extent to which it participated in project engineering and 
execution in the consecutive expansion stages of the Pohang works. Even though the 
master engineering plan and review of all engineering work still continued to be the 
responsibility of the Japan Group, POSCO undertook all the remaining engineering 
tasks in the third stage project.^ From the fourth stage, POSCO was able to assume all 
the engineering tasks including the most difficult responsibility of formulating the 
general and master engineering plan. The Japan Group's only function was to evaluate 
POSCO's own master engineering plan (Amsden, 1989). Nevertheless, the foreign 
technical assistance required was still massive, as it was in the case of the Kwangyang 
projects also. In the Kwangyang projects, however, while most technology was 
provided by the European plant exporters as Japanese steel-makers became increasingly 
reluctant to transfer know-how to POSCO, POSCO executed all the construction and 
engineering tasks previously undertaken by the Japan Group. 
Along with decreasing dependence on foreign engineering, there was a substantial 
construction design, and preparation of testing and start-up plans (Amsden, 1989). 
24. Additional technology transfer took place in the third stage, with new contracts with foreign 
consultants for special steel and for more advanced labour training. 
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Table I S Comparison of some iron-making technologies in POSCO and the average in 
Japanese firms, 1986-88 
1986 1987 1988 
POSCO Japan POSCO Japan POSCO Japan 
Tapping ratio (tonnes / m V day) 2.03 176 2.06 1.76 2.09 1.89 
Energy consumption (kg per tonne of iron) 490 507 485 509 489 508 
Coke ratio (kg per tonne of iron) 490 482 479 477 470 476 
Sources Information provided by POSCO. 
Hong etal. (1990). 
improvement in equipment and facility localisation. This can be expressed as a ratio of 
the amount spent on domestically-produced equipment to total expendimre on facilities. 
Table 7.4 shows that domestic industries were only able to supply unsophisticated 
equipment at a 12.5 per cent localisation ratio in the initial stage of the Pohang works. 
The ratio went up to 35.0 per cent in the fourth stage, increasing again to 55.4 per cent 
for the second stage of the Kwangyang works and to 63.1 per cent in the fourth stage. 
This improvement in localisation ratios was only partly attributable to acquisition of 
investment capability in POSCO itself, with the large part due to overall development 
of the Korean economy and rapid growth of its heavy industries during the 1970s. 
POSCO consistently made efforts to involve local machinery suppliers in the projects 
as much as possible (POSCO, 1988). As POSCO increased the facility localisation 
ratio in this way, domestic heavy industrial companies were also able to accumulate 
engineering design and management techniques and equipment manufacturing 
technology necessary for plant manufacmring, which was directly related to POSCO's 
efforts to generate indigenous technological capability. From the construction of the 
first stage of the Kwangyang works, even though it continued to rely substantially on 
foreign facility suppliers for sophisticated equipment, POSCO assigned domestic 
suppliers as the leading companies with which foreign companies had to form 
consortiums (POSCO, 1988). 
Learning in blast furnaces, BOFs and steel-working plants^ 
If POSCO can be said to have been successful in carrying out the construction of its 
plant, it can also be said to have been successful in bringing its plant to, and 
maintaining it at, its full potential through learning the imported technology. Figure 7.1 
shows POSCO's learning curves in relation to operation of large-scale blast furnaces 
after the first buming-in, while Table 7.5 compares technology levels in iron-making 
25. The term 'steel-working' is used in Enos and Park (1988) to cover a range of processes from making 
steel primary forms using crude steel to rolling various forms of finished steel. 
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Figure 7.1 P O S C O ' s learning curves for iron-making blast furnaces 
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between POSCO and the average for major Japanese firms, and shows that, in the mid-
to late 1980s, POSCO's iron-making technology exceeded Japan's average in many 
areas. 
POSCO's first blast furnace was designed with a tapping ratio (tonne/day/cubic 
metre of a blast furnace's inner volume) of 1.52.^ After igniting the furnace on 8 June 
1973, the normal rate of output was achieved in less than four months (more 
specifically, 107 days). This was a far shorter period than the Japan Group had 
expected - in view of their own experience in Japan in the 1960s, the Japan Group 
believed that it would take at least a year to achieve normal operation (Enos and Park, 
1988). From the fourth month after the first buming-in, the actual amount tapped 
exceeded the designed tapping ratio. The operating rate of the furnace, defined as 
production divided by rated capacity, for the latter half of 1973 after the buming-in was 
roughly 90 per cent, if prorated over the entire year. In the next year, it reached 114 per 
cent, indicating that rated capacity had been exceeded (see Table 7.6). 
Achievement in the three subsequent fumaces also testified to POSCO's further 
leaming and its ability to bring new blast fumaces quickly on tap and to their rated 
capacity. According to information provided by POSCO, times required to bring the 
blast fumaces to their originally rated capacity became shorter in the subsequent stages 
- 80 days for the second blast fumace; 70 days for the third blast fumace; and just 29 
days for the fourth blast fumace (also cited in Enos and Park, 1988). Given that the 
first blast fumace in Nippon Steel's Oita works (inner volume 4,407 m^) - keeping in 
mind that Nippon Steel had given guidance to POSCO - took 150 days to attain normal 
26. After re-lining in 1979, the tapping ratio in this fumace was increased to 1.67 (Enos and Park, 1988). 
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Table 7.6 Rated capacity and shifts in output of POSCO's Pohang works, selected facilities, 1973-84 (miUion tonnes per annum)" 
Capacity'' 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 
1st BF 1.10(0.95) 0.46' 0.99 0.98 1.07 0.97 0.91 0.83 1.04 1.02 1.33 1.52 1.63 2nd BF 1.70(1.42) 0.74 1.03 1.49 1.50 1.46 1.43 1.43 1.27 1.82 3rd BF 2.92 (2.75) 0.09 2.54 2.86 2.90 2.89 2.61 2,78 4th BF 2.92 (2.75) 2.37 2.90 2.90 2,90 
I s tSM 2.30(1.03) 0.45 1.15 1.23 2.37 2.41 2.27 2.37 2.40 2.23 2.17 1.84 2,22 2nd SM 6.80 (3.30) 0.09 2.91 3.50 5.98 6.62 6.60 6,98 Operating rates'^ 0.44 1.12 1.20 1.00 0.93 0.99 1.01 0.84 0.96 1.03 0.93 1,01 
I s tBS 1.52 0.38 1.08 1.10 1.55 1.59 1.75 1.83 1.76 1.68 1.59 1.30 1,40 2ndBS 3.09 0.02 1.96 2.53 3.12 3.31 2.93 2.81 BC 0.85 (0.50) 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.14 0.54 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.80 1st CC 1.03 027 0,60 0.76 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.93 0.81 0,95 2nd CC 3.84 1.86 2.53 2,90 3,54 
I s tHS 1.71 0.42 0.66 0.73 1.32 1.62 1.86 1.88 1.69 1.49 1.61 1,58 1,71 2nd HS 3.31 0.44 2.98 3.31 3,38 3,43 CR 0.69 0.16 0.42 0.45 0.41 0.51 0.61 0,65 0.71 1st PL 0.34 0.16 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.39 0.30 0.39 0.37 0.36 0,37 0.37 0.39 2nd PL 1.24 0.39 0.90 0.93 1.07 1.11 1.08 1.16 I s t W 0.45 013 0.38 0.46 0,48 0.48 0.49 SS^ 80 1 20 37 34 59 70 
Notes a BF: blast furnace 
BS: blooming and slabbing mill 
CC: continuous casting mill 
Q^: cold-rolling mill 
wire rod mill 
SM: steel-making plant (the BOF shop) 
BC: billet casting miU 
HS: hot strip rolling mill 
PL: plate mill 
SS: silicon steel mill 
Sources 
Figures are not necessarily the initially installed capacity. Initially designed capacity before 
re-lining or expansion for some (not aJl) plants are shown in parentheses. The initial capacity 
of the first BOF shop increased to 2.0 million tonnes with completion of the second stage, and 
later to 2.3 million tonnes. The initial capacity of the second BOF shop was expanded to 6.5 
million tonnes during the first phase of the fourth stage. See also Table 7.3. 
Figures in italics are not the output for a full-year of operation. 
Operating rate = total crude steel capacity -i- total BOF production 
In thousand tonnes. 
Information provided by POSCO; 
World Steel Dynamics (1985). 
operation after the bum-in on August 1979, this was a remarkable achievement 
(POSCO, 1988), especially with respect to the third blast furnace, whose scale was 
double that of the second blast furnace (see Table 7.2). The interval was reduced 
further in the case of the fourth blast furnace, even though it was constructed on the 
same scale as the third one. In the case of the first blast furnace in the Kwangyang mill, 
normal operation was achieved in just 23 days, which was much faster than for the 
previous furnaces. These achievements can be attributed to rapid learning of techniques 
and know-how through training and/or through experience accumulated by the POSCO 
engineers throughout the projects. 
POSCO's learning in steel-making and steel-working can also be illustrated by 
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the trajectory and speed with which it brought into operation facilities such as BOFs 
and the continuous casting plants. In the case of steel-making, the speed of learning 
involved in bringing BOF shops into normal operation is also impressive. The 
operating rate of the first BOF shop in the year of completion was about 90 per cent 
when phased in over a one-year period. Despite the fact that this level itself was normal 
even for experienced producers, POSCO's BOF operating rate in the following year 
reached 114 per cent, exceeding the rated capacity as in the case of the blast furnaces. 
Maintaining operating rates above the rated capacity is neither easy nor necessary for 
optimum production, but POSCO has continued to maintain operation of its plants close 
to full capacity (Table 1.6)}' Even though high operating rates can be generated by 
increased working hours, POSCO's ability to learn quickly large-scale steel-making 
technology is evident from the above. 
In the case of steel-working facilities, it normally takes longer to reach full 
capacity operation than is the case for iron or steel-making facilities, since steel-
working is more complicated and involves both chemical and mechanical processing, 
while iron-making and steel-making employ mainly chemical process (Enos and Park, 
1988). In the first full-year of operation after completion, the first steel-working plants 
exhibited around 50 to 75 per cent operating rates (calculated from Table 7.6). In the 
case of continuous casting, the first plant completed in 1976 showed a 57 per cent 
operating rate in 1977, but the first full-year of operation in the second plant showed a 
higher rate (66 per cent), helped by the experience obtained from the previous 
operation. Similarly, compared to the operating rates for the first hot strip and plate 
mills in the first full-year of operation (which were 70 per cent and 47 per cent, 
respectively, in 1974), the rates for the second mills reached 90 per cent in 1981 and 84 
per cent in 1980, respectively. Table 7.6 shows also that, even though the steel-
working plants had lower starting operating rates and reached rated capacity slower 
than in the case of the blast furnaces or the BOFs, learning in each of the steel-working 
plants had an impact on output, shifting it towards the levels suggested by the rated 
capacity. In general, normal operation rates in the steel-working plants were attained 
within two to three years after initial operation. 
Learning and efforts to improve productivity 
Productivity growth must be among the most important outcomes of technology 
learning. Given excess demand for steel in the domestic market in the 1970s, POSCO's 
27. The ability to bring plants to full-scale operation in such a short period of time and to maintain 
operating rates near 100 per cent was not unique to POSCO. Taiwan's China Steel (CSC) also did 
the same. However, the cases of TOSCO and CSC are exceptional in the world steel industry'. 
Comparison of operating rates in international steel-making companies will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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priority at the time was to increase volume, which was achieved not only by expanding 
capacity but also by increasing productivity and yields. Productivity growth in POSCO 
compared with that in international steel-makers in other countries is shown in Table 
4.9, where productivity is expressed in terms of per worker or per man-hour. Table 
4.9b shows that, when productivity is calculated in terms of per worker, POSCO was 
highly competitive from the commencement of operation and also continued to achieve 
increased levels of output per worker. However, per man-hour productivity in POSCO 
was quite low compared to that in most developed countries in the 1970s, although it 
grew relatively fast and narrowed the gap with developed countries in the 1980s (Table 
4.9a). This implies that POSCO's competitiveness in terms of per worker productivity 
stemmed from high man-hour input at the early stage of development. As POSCO 
accumulated experience and learning, labour-embodied technology expressed as per 
man-hour productivity grew quickly relative to firms in developed countries, 
contributing to POSCO's increased competitiveness in productivity per worker. 
To raise productivity of both labour and capital, POSCO attempted to stabilise 
operations, minimise down-time and improve the performance of each piece of 
equipment. As implied by the theory of leaming-by-doing incorporated in the 
analytical framework employed in this thesis, these efforts contributed to increased 
output, which in turn improved a broad set of skills through learning and accumulation 
of experience, again contributing to productivity growth. 
Stabilised plant operations 
The degree to which POSCO's operations were stabilised can be inferred from data on 
operating rates, since a higher operating rate suggests control over a process and an 
ability to keep plant operating. As shown above, POSCO reached normal operating 
rates for both iron-making and steel-making very quickly. After adding new capacity, 
moreover, operating rates tended to exceed rated capacity, indicating an above-average 
degree of process control (World Steel Dynamics, 1985; also cited in Amsden, 1989). 
This suggests a repetitive cycle of improvement leading to addition of new capacity, 
leading to improvement, and so on (Amsden, 1989). 
There is wide variation in the rates of plant operation among international steel 
mills. Among them, POSCO, along with CSC of Taiwan, has demonstrated its ability 
to maintain plant utilisation near or above rated capacity from the time of first operation 
(Table 7.7). This is a skill that constitutes an important source of long-run 
competitiveness. Table 4.9a in Chapter 4 shows how, other things being equal, higher 
operating rates contribute to productivity. For example, when the standard operating 
rate of 90 per cent was assumed, POSCO's steel output per man-hour in 1984 was 104 
kilograms, still below that of major steel-makers in developed countries (around 145 
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Table 7.7 Average operating rates of international steel firms, selected countries 1973-90 (percent) 
Australia US France UK Mexico India Korea 
Japan Canada Germany EC total Brazil Taiwan 
1973 95.3 91.9 94.5 91.3 77.6 74.7 76.7 78.1 55.8 98.8 66.7 44.5 1974 89.9 85.8 91.6 89.3 74.6 79.5 69.3 79.9 59.6 87.5 76.9 113.4 1975 93.8 72.0 71.8 83.2 5 4 7 61.9 52.7 61.1 58.2 84.4 78.2 123.1 
1976 9 1 7 69.6 78.6 87.3 60.8 60.5 60.3 6 3 7 58.1 76.1 77.5 81.3 1977 7 2 7 62.3 78.4 85.9 55.1 57.1 71.0 60.5 60.5 111.1 80.1 96.1 1978 81.8 66.0 85.8 89.4 62.3 58.5 76.2 64.7 66.4 95.2 75.8 32.4 102.9 1979 79.1 66.5 85.7 94.2 72.9 63.1 59.6 65.0 68.7 58.8 72.4 104.2 100.9 1980 82.2 60.9 71.3 85.2 75.1 69.0 5 1 7 66.2 67.8 60.0 76.9 96.3 107.6 
1981 82.5 60.0 76.1 73.1 747 62.3 6 6 7 667 66.1 60.8 80.3 96.3 96.4 1982 78.8 53.7 46.6 61.3 68.8 55.6 56.1 567 62.6 60.5 81.1 51.2 103.3 1983 73.5 56.0 54.7 64.1 60.7 55.4 64.1 57.8 59.6 75.1 75.3 92.7 93.6 1984 63.7 61.1 62.3 72.0 63.6 68.9 64.1 66.6 57.9 60.9 79.4 108.7 101.0 1985 64.6 58.9 65.0 71.5 66.2 78.0 68.7 70.4 61.1 76.5 73.8 92.8 96.7 
1986 69.7 54.3 62.4 80.4 64.3 78.7 58.9 67.9 46.6 81.8 79.5 99.3 99.3 1987 76.1 62.8 74.7 86.7 77.6 777 75.5 73.4 48.5 88.7 79.8 99.0 99.1 1988 75.3 67.4 81.5 83.2 82.8 87.2 78.9 - 54.0 87.2 77.6 98.8 95.5 1989 81.9 68.9 79.6 88.5 91.3 89.0 73.7 - 46.9 78.5 78.6 108.7 101.9 1990 82.2 7 0 7 77.2 65.8 - - - - - - - 104.3 1057 
Notes Operating rate = crude steel production + annual capacity. 
Averages of major steel firms in a country. One firm only in Korea (POSCO), Taiwan (CSC), 
Brazil (CSN), India (Tata), Australia (BHP), UK (British Steel), and Italy (Italsider). 
In italics: Production in the year of completion of the firm + annual capacity. 
Source World Steel Dynamic, Financial Dynamics of 61 International Steelmakers, various issues. 
kilograms in Japan and West Germany, and 132 in the United States). However, under 
actual operating rates, which in 1984 were 101 per cent in Korea but around 65 to 75 
per cent in the developed countries listed in Table 7.7, POSCO produced 131 kilograms 
per man-hour, which was higher than that in the developed countries (Table 4.9a). 
Learning and improvement in maintenance 
The ability to maintain high operating rates is strongly related to effective plant 
maintenance. Many problems, large or small, and occasional failures in operation are 
part of the life of plants even from the time they first begin operation. For industries 
such as steel with large and long-functioning plants, extensive regular maintenance is 
required not only to prevent depreciation of facilities but also to sustain plant operation 
at an optimal level and to match new technology. According to the ILO (1986), the 
steel industry is becoming increasingly maintenance-intensive, with about a quarter of 
all employees involved in maintenance tasks. Such activities are extremely costly, not 
only because of the nature of the maintenance task itself but because plant operating 
rates may drop substantially during maintenance time. The importance of maintenance 
is highlighted in integrated steel-making where completion of one process depends on 
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Figure 12 Maintenance costs and rates of facility maintenance and operation failures in 
POSCO, 1973-88 (percent) 
(percent) 
13.60 
10 
5 -
0 - 0.15 
1975 1980 1985 1988 
Notes Maintenance rate (per cent) = time spent on maintenance + total operation time. 
Failure rate (per cent) = time for operation stoppage due to a breakdown + total operation time. 
Source Information provided by POSCO. 
materials supplied from the previous process. 
The ILO (1986) argues that successful maintenance requires particular skills 
especially in planning the availability of staff and parts, which is often a major source 
of difficulty in developing countries with no experience and/or weak technological 
capability in the area. Thus, for an inexperienced entrant in a large-scale steel business 
like POSCO in the early 1970s, the acquisition of the technology for effective plant 
maintenance was among the most important tasks to achieve long-run competitiveness, 
in addition to prompt construction of the plants and quick and effective catch-up of 
equipment operating technology. Acquisition of technology to maintain plants 
effectively is also a costly process, requiring capital investment not only on labour 
training and education but also on establishment of maintenance control systems. This 
process includes learning not only from training but also through successive executions 
of plant maintenance, an important source of acquiring maintenance capability. 
Accumulation of skills and experience through learning enables a firm to save on time 
and costs in subsequent maintenance without adversely affecting other activities, and 
hence proceed quickly with normal operation. 
Learning and accumulation of experience in maintenance and improvement in 
maintenance skills can be illustrated by continuously decreasing maintenance rates and 
facility failure rates. Figure 7.2 shows that the share of POSCO's maintenance costs in 
total production costs has been increasing - from around 5 per cent in the early period 
of its operation to 13.6 per cent in 1988. An increase in maintenance costs as a 
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Figure 73 Yields of steel production in Korea and Japan, 1970-88 (per cent) 
96.2 (Kwangyang) Yield (per cent) = total roUed steel produced ^^ total semis used 
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Sources Information provided by POSCO and Korea Iron and Steel Association 
Baik (1986); and KAIST (1988). 
percentage of prcxluction costs is common in almost all steel plants throughout the 
world - especially when the firm is engaged in capital deepening with more 
sophisticated technology - and shows the increasing importance of maintenance.^^ As 
illustrated in Figure 7.2, POSCO has continuously improved its efficiency in plant 
management and maintenance, reducing the ratio of time spent on maintenance to total 
working hours and lowering operation failure rates. POSCO was often able to manage, 
without additional introduction of complicated maintenance control technology, to 
realise substantial achievements in maintenance based solely on improving skills 
through training, improvement in working methods based on experience, and changes 
in its maintenance control system.^ 
Improvement in continuous casting and product yields 
Product yield is defined as the ratio of the amount of final steel output to that of crude 
steel used. Higher product yield is important, since it reduces material costs and hence 
improves cost advantage, ceteris paribus. Figure 7.3 plots shifts in yields in Korea in 
comparison with Japan. It shows that Korea's yields improved rapidly and reduced the 
gap with Japan, the world 's most efficient steel producer. POSCO's yields were in 
between the averages for Japan and Korea. In 1973, the first year of operation, POSCO 
recorded a yield of 79.1 per cent (see Figure 7.3). This rose to 82.5 cent in 1974, and to 
84.2 per cent in 1977 when the first slab and bloom continuous casters were put into 
operation. In 1987, the yield in the Pohang works reached 91.1 per cent, which was 
28. This information was obtained from interviews with steel specialists in POSCO and other companies. 
29. Information provided by POSCO. 
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Table 7.8 Yields in international steel firms, selected countries and years, 1973-90 (per cent) 
Australia 
Japan US Canada 
France UK Mexico Taiwan 
Korea 
1973 74.4 85.9 71.1 77 A 80.5 82.4 78.7 81.1 68.7 78.5 87.2 1975 73.3 84.6 697 73.1 86.4 80.4 75.3 79.7 67.2 77.6 88.8 1977 77.3 87.1 73.3 74.5 92.9 82.3 78.6 82.4 64.2 62.5 917 1980 78.7 93.6 75.5 76.2 91.4 80.5 81.5 83.1 75.4 83.3 85.3 85.4 1983 82.8 93.6 78.3 77.0 97.3 85.4 79.2 86.7 67.6 75.8 89.8 90.4 1985 79.2 94.0 81.1 78,6 94.7 87.1 78.0 88.2 74.7 80.4 95.9 89.6 1987 79.6 94.1 837 86.1 92.2 92.7 84.0 89.8 62.5 82.9 91.0 96.3 1990 89.4 95.3 82.7 97.4 92.0 93.7 89.6 92.8 71.4 94.1 88.6 97.0 
Notes Yield = total finished steel shipment + crude steel production. 
Note the difference in the definition of 'yield' from Figure 7.3. 
See notes in Table 7.7. 
Source World Steel Dynamic, Financial Dynamics of 61 International Steelmakers, various issues. 
Table 7.9 Continuous casting ratios in international steel firms, selected countries and years, 1975-90 (percent) 
Australia US France UK Mexico Taiwan Japan Canada Germany EC total Brazil Korea 
1975 0.6 31.1 9.1 13.3 12.9 24.3 8.5 16.8 13.2 5.7 197 1977 - 40.8 12.5 15.9 23.7 34.0 12.5 25.5 28.8 17.4 24.6 317 1980 10.3 59.5 20.3 25.6 41.3 46.0 27.1 38.9 29.3 33.4 56.5 32.4 1983 24.6 86.3 32.1 37.4 63.8 71.8 46.6 58.8 55.2 44.3 84.7 56.6 1985 27.1 91.1 44.4 43.6 80.6 79.5 54.8 69.7 51.0 43.7 87.2 63,3 1987 44.5 93.3 59.8 49.0 93.1 88.0 64.9 81.4 54.2 45.5 89.6 83.5 
1989 80.0 93.5 64.8 76.1 93.9 89.8 80.2 87.9 58.1 53.9 93.1 94,1 
1990 83.4 93.9 67.4 76.8 94.3 91.3 83.6 89.7 60.9 58.5 96.1 96.1 
Note Continuous casting ratio = output through the CC process + total semis production. 
Sources IIS I, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Still slightly below Japan's average of 92.5 per cent. The first stage of the Kwangyang 
works, which introduced 100 per cent continuous casting system, recorded a yield of 
96.2 per cent, which ranked it among the most efficient in the world (Figure 7.3). 
Table 7.8 provides another set of yield data, obtained by using slightly different 
variables to calculate yields. In this table, the yields may be overestimated if a firm 
also used imported semi-finished steel. While the figures in this table may not be 
suitable for direct comparison among different firms, they do show that POSCO 
managed to attain internationally competitive levels with respect to yield from the 
outset, rising even further in the late 1980s and the early 1990s when the Kwangyang 
works were put into operation. 
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Improvement in yields was attributed not only to learning and accumulation of 
experience in the production process but also to actual production technology, of which, 
from an engineering perspective, continuous casting plays a vital role in increasing total 
yield of steel products.'" By combining Figure 7.3 (or Table 7.8) and Table 7.9, it is 
possible to infer that increasing yields were also associated with a rising continuous 
casting ratio (CC ratio, for short).'^ As already discussed, POSCO introduced the CC 
process in the second stage of the Pohang project and expanded it only in the final 
stage. With the experience and confidence accumulated in the Pohang works, POSCO 
decided to adopt 100 per cent continuous casting in the Kwangyang projects in an effort 
to realise higher yields and efficiency. Korea's CC ratio in 1975, before POSCO 
installed this process, was only about 20 per cent (Table 7.9). In 1977, when POSCO's 
first continuous casting shop had been operating for its first full year, during which it 
produced 0.6 million tonnes of steel primary forms, the CC ratio for Korea as a whole 
rose to about 32 per cent. As shown in Table 7.9, Korea's CC ratios were not low by 
world standards, though they were relatively low compared with Japan and Germany 
until the mid-1980s. Owing to the 100 per cent CC ratio in the Kwangyang works, 
Korea's average CC ratio exceeded the Japanese average in 1989. It was POSCO's 
increasing continuous casting capacity and also its rapid acquisition of know-how in 
continuous casting techniques that had the greatest impact on its increased yields. 
Improvement in technology and product quality 
As POSCO reaped the successes associated with its accumulation of learning and 
experience in its early years of operation, its efforts to acquire technological capability 
were extended beyond relatively simple learning and assimilation of the imported 
technology to technological improvement itself. In addition, while POSCO gave top 
priority to the production of ordinary iron and steel during the first two stages of the 
Pohang works up until the end of 1978, it shifted the emphasis to improving product 
quality and increasing product mix from the third stage of operation. The design of its 
third stage also saw POSCO introduce mills to produce high quality special steels. 
30. Baik (1986) argues that yields in rolling process are improved as continuous casting reduces about 10 
per cent of losses incurred in the ingot casting and slabbin^looming process. Continuous casting 
also offers many other advantages such as more flexibility in adjustment of the unit weight of semi-
finished steel, by which crop loss can be minimised during the hot-rolling process; relatively clean 
surface, which reduces surface conditioning loss; improved potential for hot charging or hot direct 
rolling, which reduces heat consumption and scaling-off loss in reheating furnaces; and better 
flatness and gauge controllability due to improved solidification uniformity. 
31. In general, the relationship between yields and CC ratios is depicted in the form of a Compertz curve, 
which can be expressed as: 
CV = exp {exp ( a + ^ - C C ) ) 
where CV s crude steel conversion coefficient = 1 0 0 / 4 ' (per cent), ^ = yield, CC = continuous 
casting ratio (per cent), and a and ^ (< 0 ) are parameters (KAIST, 1988). 
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Learning and technology improvement 
Technology improvement is not, by definition, innovation or the creation of new 
technology or products, which requires extensive and longer-term R&D investment and 
acquisition of know-why, but the extension of the technology obtained via learning or 
the emergence of indigenous technological capability, drawing on effective technology 
learning and accumulation of experience and investment in these activities. In fact, part 
of the productivity-improving process discussed above can be attributed to technology 
improvement in equipment design and operating procedures. 
Enos and Park (1988) present detailed examples of technology improvement by 
POSCO: the making of gas cutting beds by using its own scrap from slab in the hot-
rolling mill; operating improvements made by the calcination group in the steel-making 
plant; removal of the scrap chute in the shear cutter at the slabbing mill; installation of 
skew volume for tail out in the cold-rolling mill; and remodelling of the mud gun 
nozzle. Other examples include its making the blast furnace an oil-free operation, its 
reduction of the consumption of refractories for steel-making, and its improvement of 
the tundish for continuous casting (Amsden, 1989). Most of these improvements came 
about under its 'zero defect' and 'improvement proposal' schemes, which saw field 
engineers and technicians enlisted to address practical problems taking place in 
production, maintenance and management. According to POSCO, numerous 
technological improvements, both large and small, were made through these schemes.^^ 
The schemes are still in place, and have served to reduce costs, to improve efficiency 
and quality, and to reduce waste and consumption of materials and energy, though they 
were not the main channels for development of new techniques: only 3 out of about 
25,000 cases suggested under these schemes were categorised as new techniques 
between 1974 and 1984 (Enos and Park, 1988). 
Improvement in product quality and non-price competitiveness 
The problem of excess supply in the world steel market, which became more serious 
after tiie second oil crisis, and tighter measures to conserve the use of energy led to far 
stricter steel quality requirements internationally (Amsden, 1989). Price aside, product 
quality became the core of long-run competitiveness. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
product quality and performance is an important non-price factor and affects sales 
conditions and competitiveness. 
In tiie technology transfer contracts that POSCO was a party to, product quality 
guarantees were not included and no explicit instruction was to be provided with 
32. In 1977 alone, for example, 564 cases were investigated under the 'zero defect' scheme, with savings 
estimated to be USS754,(XX). In the same year, 37 cases of improvement were accomplished under 
the 'improvement proposal' scheme, with savings amounting to about USS3 million (data quoted 
from Enos and Park, 1988). 
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Figure 7.4 Rejection rates of selected steel products, POSCO, 1976-85 
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Source Information provided by POSCO. 
respect to improving quality, although the equipment, operating instructions and 
training programs included with the contracts provided basic information on producing 
steel to international standards. Thus, POSCO was obliged to deal with product quality 
and its improvement by itself. 
Even though training and learning contributed substantially to improving quality, 
additional effort and investment were required to meet international standards. POSCO 
therefore placed quality on its own agenda from the outset of operations and set itself 
the target of matching the quality of Japanese products, which in general was 
considered to be among the world's highest. To this end, POSCO established a quality 
control department, and launched its 'zero defect' scheme. Systematic quality control 
was furthered by introduction of process computers from the second stage Pohang 
project, and investments in more sophisticated equipment enabled better testing and 
inspection. 33 
33. POSCO did not introduce computerised control systems until 1975. Despite the fairly widespread 
use of such systems in modem integrated steel mills in other countries, POSCO did not adopt these 
systems in its initial stage, in the belief Uiat, at the initial stage of learning, manual process control 
would help in the accumulation of operating experience and engineering know-how. Only a selected 
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Table 7.10 Comparison of quality and non-price competitiveness 
a. KIET survey (1989) 
Hot 
Plate 
Cold Shapes Special 
coil coil and bars steel Pipe 
Size and shape • • • 
Appearance • • • • 
Ease of process • • • • 
Welding ^ • • • 
Strength and durability • • • 
Product mix • • • • • • 
Variety and size range • • • • • 
Ability to meet small quantity order • • • • 
Delivery • • • • 
Marketing • • • • • • 
After service • • • • • • 
Proportion of poor quality • • • • 
a. MRI survey (1986) 
Concrete Wire Construction Shipbuilding Hot coil Cold coil 
bar rod plate Angle plate for pipe for car 
Delivery • • • 
Dimension • 
Finish • 
Manufacturability • • 
Weldability • A 
Durability • 
Notes ^ as good as Japanese; • a bit inferior to Japanese; * less satisfactory than Japanese. 
Sources The KIET survey is from Hong et al. (1990); 
The MRI survey is from Amsden (1989). 
Even though POSCO was able to sell relatively well-standardised commercial 
grade products to both domestic and overseas markets after commencing operation, 
quality improvements had to be made over a longer period. Figure 7.4 plots data on 
rejection rates of selected POSCO products, showing changes in quality to meet 
customer requirements. In the case of wire rod, POSCO achieved over time rejection 
rates that approximated to zero (0.13 per cent in 1985).^ The rejection rates for hot coil 
and plates rose in the late 1970s due to changes in consumer requirements or the 
introduction of new products. This indicates the persistence of quality problems in 
those products at the time, but from the early 1980s the rejection rates began to decline 
as POSCO accumulated quality control know-how in these products. Figure 7.4 shows 
number of plants adopted process computers in 1975, and it was in the third stage plan that process 
computers were introduced generally. The Kwangyang works are now fully computerised. 
34. POSCO did not systematically collect data on rejection rates until 1976. 
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that, as of the mid-1980s, POSCO still had quality problems with respect to cold-rolled 
coil, which in general requires a higher level of technology than other ordinary products 
and for which quality requirements are more rapidly upgraded. Rejection rates for 
cold-rolled products began to rise from the early 1980s as automobile industry 
customers demanded better surface quality. Since the mid-1980s, substantial quality 
improvement in cold-rolled products has been achieved to meet rising standards of 
customer requirement.^^ 
Table 7.10 contains two sources of information on quality and other non-price 
aspects of Korean products compared with Japanese products: one from user interviews 
by the Korea Institute of Economics and Technology (KET) in 1989 (cited in Hong et 
al, 1990) and the other from user interviews by the Mitsubishi Research Institute 
(MRI) in 1986 (cited in Amsden, 1989). The figures in Table 7.10 along with Figure 
7.4 show a mixed picture: as of the mid or late 1980s, Korea's level of quality was 
equal to Japan's in the case of wire rod but there were quality problems in Korea's case 
for cold-rolled and, to a lesser extent, hot-rolled products, and variations in quality 
along different dimensions for products whose quality was not yet under control. Table 
7.10 shows also that, in terms of other non-price dimensions of competitiveness such as 
marketing, delivery and after-service, Korean products were still less competitive than 
Japanese products. All these suggest that POSCO's efforts to improve product quality 
in the presence of quality competition with nearby Japan resulted in substantial 
achievements but that there is still plenty of room for improvement. 
Learning by using^ 
Improvement in POSCO's products was generated also by information feedback from 
final consumers. Many cases of product inadequacy or faults which POSCO was 
unaware of initially were reported to management, sometimes with suggestions for 
changing or improving the products. These were in turn reflected in changes to 
POSCO's quality control program and resulted in changes to or improvement of 
production processes or in design modifications that enhanced performance, useability 
or reliability. Rapidly expanding domestic steel consuming industries have driven 
POCO to engage increasingly in this kind of learning. One example is the Union Steel 
Company, which specialises in cold-rolling, for which it purchases hot-rolled coil from 
POSCO and transforms it into galvanised sheets. The Samsung Electronic Company 
then uses this product to make refrigerators. Many suggestions and/or requirements 
from the final user for a better product for refrigerator bodies have been fed back to 
POSCO through Union Steel. These in turn have become a subject for research and 
35. Information provided by POSCO. 
36. This can be considered as an important source of demand-side advantage as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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improvement or modification. Figure 7.5 also suggests the impact of user information 
on product quality. Except for wire rod, there have been fluctuations in rejection rates 
for plates, cold-rolled coil and hot-rolled products. At first, the rejection rates for these 
products declined as POSCO accumulated production experience, but they began to rise 
in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. The increasing rejection rates did not necessarily 
mean falls in actual quality but rather demand by downstream processors for higher 
quality as the final goods they produced using steel became more sophisticated. A rise 
in quality requirements constituted a new priority on POSCO's agenda, and 
consequentiy POSCO was able gradually to reduce rejection rates for its products. 
Accumulated technological capability and technology exports 
POSCO's achievement in acquiring technological capability is also evident in the fact 
that, approximately twenty years after its initial massive import of technology, it has 
been able to reverse the flow of modem steel-making technology: initially from Japan, 
Austria and, to a lesser extent, other developed countries, to Korea; and now from 
Korea to other developing countries or even to some developed countries whose steel 
industries are suffering from declining efficiency and competitiveness. 
POSCO's first technology exports took the form of training provided to foreign 
workers. In 1975, POSCO trained nine Taiwanese construction workers from the China 
Steel Corporation (China Steel or CSC, for short), now one of the world's most 
competitive steel-makers, but which at that time was constructing an integrated steel 
mill of 1.5 million tonnes annual capacity (POSCO, 1988). In 1978, POSCO signed 
another contract with China Steel to train 42 workers in Korea in plant operation and 
maintenance and also to assist in the new plant's initial operation (Enos and Park, 
1988). Subsequent exports of technology from POSCO took the form of a 
computerised production control system, as well as the training of computer personnel, 
for the hot-rolling section of the integrated PT Krakatau Steel Company in Indonesia. 
A team of six engineers from POSCO designed the system and assisted at its 
installation and operation (Enos and Park, 1988). 
POSCO's first foreign venture was wixh USX Corporation (formerly US Steel) in 
the United States on 1 April 1986, known as UPI (USS-POSCO Industries), in a 50-50 
joint venture to produce cold-rolled steel. In 1987, the cold-rolling mill workers at UPI 
in the United States received training by POSCO in Korea (POSCO, 1988). On 1 April 
1992, POSCO inaugurated a 10,000 tonnes per year galvanising line in a 50-50 joint 
venture, known as POSVINA, with Viemam's Southern Steel Union, a group of nine 
companies with a total steel output of 40,0(X) tonnes {Steel Times International, July 
1992). 
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R&D INVESTMENT FOR LONG-RUN COMPETITIVENESS 
For a technology importer in a developing country, effective and rapid technology-
learning is overwhelmingly important to create competitiveness and to exploit its low 
wage advantage over established competitors in developed countries. In the analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 2, however, it is argued that R&D competition and 
frontier-moving technology innovation activity become increasingly important not only 
in reducing technology dependence and maintaining or strengthening competitiveness, 
as the company's low unit labour cost advantage relative to developed countries 
diminishes, but also in capturing the technological capabilities involved in innovating 
new technology or products. 
While POSCO had made substantial efforts towards and investments in learning 
and technology improvement in order to acquire competitive technological capability, it 
did not undertake formal R&D until 1977 when it finally established an R&D centre. 
All technical problems were previously solved either by the quality control department, 
by technosections within production departments, or by consulting foreign sources such 
as the Japan Group (Amsden, 1989). In 1987 - ten years after the establishment of an 
R&D centre within the company - POSCO founded the Research Institute of Science 
and Technology, the largest private research institute in Korea, and launched into 
extensive R&D activities. Since then, POSCO's R&D expenditure has increased 
considerably. R&D expenditure in 1985 and 86 was about 0.6 per cent of total sales (or 
slightly less than 1.5 per cent of total facility investment), which increased to above 1.0 
per cent of sales or about 2.2 per cent of total investment (information provided by 
POSCO). This was still far below Japan's R&D ratio (to sales), which was around 2.5 
per cent in 1986-87 (Hong et al., 1990). 
The POSCO R&D department and the Research Institute of Science and 
Technology set their own research agenda but also work on projects proposed by 
production departments. Formal investment to create new technology does not at 
present top the priority agenda; rather, emphasis is given to consolidating and 
systemising technological know-how and to upgrading product quality to the highest 
international levels and also to developing a product mix to meet the increasingly 
diversified product spectrum of demand. According to information provided by 
POSCO, investment in the creation of new technology will reach full force from 1996. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
POSCO's existence is testimony to the fact that technology, even at the most up-to-date 
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level, has become an international commodity. This factor has worked not only in 
POSCO's favour but for the benefit of developing economies throughout the world. 
The creation of competitiveness using imported technology is another question. By 
focusing on POSCO, and its rise to become one of the world's largest steel companies, 
this chapter has attempted to explore the issue of how the Korean steel industry 
acquired the technological capability required to produce steel competitively from an 
inefficient and non-competitive base. POSCO's firm-level technological capability and 
competitiveness was obtained primarily by rapid and successful learning of know-how 
and accumulation of experience, in addition to effective technology transfer practices. 
POSCO's skilful learning of iron and steel-making technology and its proficiency 
in constructing plant, installing equipment, starting up facilities and bringing up 
facilities to above normal operation provide strongevidence of its mastery of investment 
and production capabilities and an ability to reduce capital requirements for each 
successive stage. A further indication of POSCO's acquisition of technological 
capability is provided by the improvements carried out after the initial operation of the 
facilities. Given that POSCO had to create a modem steel-making operation with only 
foreign technology and capital, that this involved extremely rapid capacity and output 
expansion, and that all this took place at a time when the steel industry in the rest of the 
world was in serious depression, POSCO's achievements seem all the more 
remarkable.^^ 
While relatively swift learning took place at the stages of constructing, starting-up 
and operating the new technologies, followed by the carrying out of improvements in 
productivity and quality, it took longer to learn the core technology and apply it to the 
overall design of a facility, and to process and product innovation. It was only in the 
latter stages that POSCO began to increase investment on this activity. POSCO's 
overriding target, however, was mastery of the technology imported from the developed 
countries. Now that mastery of the technology has been achieved, the maintenance and 
strengthening of longer-run competitiveness is POSCO's prime concern. The 
capability to create new technology and to advance to the technological frontier of the 
world steel industry has also become increasingly important. This kind of 
technological capability can only be created by persistent and aggressive R&D 
investment. 
37. Another factor, the general nature or attitude to work of Korean workers, belongs perhaps to a more 
historical or sociological study, though this and other social factors would add to the story of 
POSCO's eventual competitiveness. 
8 Conclusions and 
Implications for the Future 
of the Korean Steel Industry 
The Korean steel industry has developed remarkably since it turned to modem steel-
making with the establishment of the nation's only integrated large-scale steel company, 
POSCO, in the early 1970s. The birth and expansion of the modem steel industry in 
Korea is a classic example of the complex set of factors involved in industrial 
development. This study sought to explore the major factors that contributed to the 
development of, and the evolution of international competitiveness in, the Korean steel 
industry. In other studies, most discussion and analysis of the Korean steel industry has 
either focused on a specific factor such as government assistance and the success of 
POSCO, or limited itself to describing the stmcture of the industry, the supply-demand-
trade pattern and changes in these. The success of the Korean steel industry has also 
occasionally provided an interesting case for discussion of the world steel industry or 
Korean economic growth. This study, however, has sought to provide a comprehensive 
review of the development of the Korean steel industry and a synthesis of the major 
contributing factors from the perspective of the relevant economic theories and theu- core 
elements. A particular effort has been made to draw together a large amount of data on 
the Korean steel industry and to interpret its development and its place within the Korean 
economy and in international steel-making. This chapter attempts to draw together major 
findings, to relate these findings to the conceptual framework, and to draw implications 
for future steel industry development in Korea. 
MAIN FACTORS IN STEEL INDUSTRY GROWTH IN KOREA: A SUMMARY 
An analytical framework was constructed in Chapter 2 for discussion of four important 
issues related to the intemational trade theory and the theory of the firm in order to 
examine the factors that contributed to the development of the Korean steel industry. The 
conceptual approach was based fundamentally on dynamic comparative advantage theory. 
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Table 8.1 Flow chart of the relationship between steel industry growth and major 
influential factors 
f (Market factors) . 
Supply-side conditions Demand-side conditions 
Technological capability 
(Industry / firm-specific factor) 
© 
Industrial policy 
(Non-market factor) 
Note Numbers © to © refer to chapters in which the issues were examined. 
which basically suggests that shifts in supply-side conditions provide the main vehicle for 
changing the structure of a country's comparative advantage. This model was 
subsequently extended to incorporate the influences of domestic demand, government 
intervention and industrial policy, and an industry's or fum ' s technological capability. 
The relationship between steel industry growth and these factors is depicted in Figure 
8.1, which shows clearly how the analytical framework was formulated. The main 
arguments can be summarised as follows. 
The dynamic comparative advantage model suggests that the general but 
fundamental forces behind development of the human capital-intensive steel industry are 
economic growth and accumulation of various forms of capital specific to the industry 
and the tendency of international production location to move from developed to 
developing countries as technology becomes standardised. 
The model of dynamic comparative advantage focuses mainly on the effects of 
changes in the supply side of an economy and hence on the role of factor prices. 
Although domestic demand is included in the model, its role is limited and is supposed 
not to affect production or the nation's comparative advantage in the product. This model 
was then extended to incorporate the representative demand hypothesis, by which 
demand-side effects on industry growth were examined. It was argued that, for some 
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industries, the existence of sizeable and rapidly increasing domestic demand constitutes 
an important stimulus for their development 
The factors highlighted by discussion of the above two issues - the supply and 
demand-side conditions of industry growth - were considered as important market 
factors in industry development. The third issue examined in this study was the impact 
of non-market factors - the role of government and industrial policy when an infant 
industry in a developing country faces problems of market failure. Infant industry 
promotion policy, under several strict conditions, is a possible means of correcting 
market failures and ultimately of promoting an industry in order to realise potential 
comparative advantage. 
The fourth and final issue examined in this thesis was how an industry newly 
introduced into a developing country, possibly with a capital-labour ratio above the level 
suggested by the nation's current factor endowment, acquires technology and know-how 
and produces internationally competitive manufactures. It was then argued that the most 
crucial factor for a new industry in a developing country to achieve success and realise 
potential comparative advantage is the acquisition of industry/fum-specific technological 
capabiUty. Reference to the theory of industrial organisation suggests that learning is an 
overwhelmingly important factor for late-entrants in their attempt to acquire technological 
capability and create competitiveness. 
A major interest in this study was to examine and assemble a large amount of data 
and evidence, including a detailed case study of POSCO, on the effects of factors 
identified as affecting the growth of the Korean steel industry. An extensive review of 
growth of, and structural changes in, the Korean steel industry during the last three 
decades was provided in Chapter 3. 
The supply-side issue with respect to development of the Korean steel industry was 
examined in Chapter 4, using indices of revealed comparative advantage and other 
measures. The dynamics of comparative advantage in Korea's steel-making were 
examined from a number of perspectives: the relative importance of steel in Korea's 
manufacturing output, exports, imports and employment; the importance of Korea in 
world steel production and trade; and the changing structure of comparative advantage 
among different steel product groups. Comparative advantage strengthened from the 
early 1970s until the mid-1980s and began to decline in the late 1980s despite continuing 
output and export growth. The rise of the industry was closely associated with changes 
in supply-side factors deriving from rapid economic growth and industrialisation relative 
to the rest of the world. 
Even though many believed that establishment of a large-scale integrated steel mill 
in Korea in the early 1970s was a poor option in light of static comparative advantage 
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considerations, the growth of the steel industry seems to have accorded well with 
Korea's changing structure of comparative advantage. International comparison of the 
importance of steel production in the national economy also showed that, although it 
belonged to a country group with relatively high ratios of steel production to per capita 
income and relatively fast growth of those ratios (such as Japan and West Germany), 
Korea has also followed the global pattern experienced by most steel-making developed 
countries. But for rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s, which raised the 
nation's capital-labour ratio, the Korean steel industry may have lost its way. The 
analysis in Chapter 4 showed also that steel industry competitiveness in Korea had its 
origins in a comparative production cost advantage, stemming mostly from its relatively 
cheap and abundant supply of skilled labour, which created high labour productivity both 
in per man-hour and per worker terms. All these factors are consistent with the dynamic 
comparative advantage model. 
Chapter 5 explored the influences of domestic demand on steel industry 
development in Korea. Korea's rapid economic growth through industrialisation in the 
1970s and the 1980s enhanced growth in its steel-consuming heavy industries, followed 
by rapid increases not only in total but also per capita steel consumption, and that both the 
scale and the growth rate of steel consumption and the intensity of steel use with respect 
to GDP in Korea were among the highest in the developing countries. Examination of 
the world steel industry also suggested that, with a few exceptions, achievement of a 
strong comparative advantage in steel trade was also associated with high levels of steel 
consumption in the domestic economy. Korea showed a similar growth path with respect 
to intensities of steel production and consumption and hence of trade to those of most 
developed countries when their steel industries were growing towards their peak. By 
contrast, many steel-making developing countries with relatively low levels of total and 
per capita steel consumption have not yet achieved strong comparative advantage in steel 
trade. In a similar vein, slowdown in the steel industries in most developed countries can 
be attributed to the fall in steel demand. Statistical analysis revealed that, while rapidly 
increasing domestic demand had a direct and negative effect in the short run on Korea's 
trade performance in steel expressed in terms of changes in export-import ratios and 
hence reduced comparative advantage, it ultimately improved the trade performance of the 
Korean steel industry over the longer term. 
Chapter 6 examined the significance of industrial policy and the extensive role 
played by the government in establishing and promoting modem steel-making in Korea. 
The Korean government intervened in the steel industry in earnest from the late 1960s 
when the industry had an inefficient and non-competitive base. The role of government 
in the establishment of a large-scale integrated steel mill, POSCO, can be understood as 
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an attempt to transform the industry into a modem steel-making industry by overcoming 
problems in capital markets, as suggested in the infant industry promotion argument. 
Some government measures were specific to the steel industry, but most of the significant 
policy effects on the steel industry were in fact the result of the overall heavy and 
chemical industry drive and the system of financial controls launched in the early 1970s. 
Most other incentives were also applied to other designated industries and firms including 
steel. The government's financial policies in the 1970s, in particular, were considered to 
have been a principal agent in industry promotion, creating two strong incentives for the 
development of steel and other strategic industries. First, firms were stimulated to invest 
since low interest rates (interest subsidy) and access to bank loans (credit rationing) 
served to increase the expected rate of return on, and reduce the cost of, their investment. 
Second, the perceived risk of investment was reduced when the government became a 
risk partner and assured a stable flow of bank loans to the firms regardless of their short-
term financial performance. This encouraged them to undertake projects that they might 
otherwise have declined. 
Even though the government's interventionist practices provided the steel industry, 
especially POSCO, with various incentives for development, evaluation of the policy 
measures that were implemented is mixed, since policy measures always involve 
economic costs and benefits. The costs and benefits involved in assistance given to the 
steel industry are difficult to evaluate, since most policy measures for steel were in fact 
part of the heavy and chemical industry drive and the financial policy applied to all 
designated industries and firms.^ It is difficult to establish whether development of the 
steel industry would have been promoted more efficiendy under a different policy regime. 
Indeed, a key conclusion is that the successful establishment of fully integrated steel-
making capacity in Korea in the 1970s clearly accorded with underlying changes in 
Korea's comparative advantage. 
Chapter 6 showed that the change in the position of the Korean steel industry over 
time reflected pressures for liberalisation. Subsidised credit rationing, through control 
over the financial system, and various incentive systems was removed from the early 
1980s as the steel industry was seen to have moved out of the infant industry stage and to 
have become competitive in both domestic and international markets. These pressures 
arose from internal and external sources. Internally, the burdens of continuing to support 
the steel industry became much greater, because of the shift in the international 
1. Evaluation of the impact of these policies on the entire economy is also mixed. Even if many goals 
are regarded as having been achieved and economic transformation through policy intervention is 
viev^ed as having provided the economy with a springboard for upgrading the industrial structure in 
the 1980s, it is widely accepted that government pohcy was over-ambitious and resulted in a serious 
misallocation of national resources, bringing about reduced domestic economic welfare. There are 
also criticisms that the policy created frequent trade frictions and failed to give proper consideration to 
the impact on the market structure. 
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competitiveness of the industry. Pressures from overseas also affected the further use of 
policy instruments to promote the industry's growth due to the extent of its export 
success. These changes contributed to a re-direction of government policy away from 
active promotion. 
Chapter 7 attempted to explore the issue of how the Korean steel industry acquired 
the technological capability required to produce steel competitively from an inefficient and 
non-competitive base, focusing on the case of POSCO and its rise to become one of the 
world's largest steel companies. Even though POSCO had to rely almost entirely on 
foreign sources of technology and capital to install its integrated production system, long-
run competitiveness was founded on effective technology transfer practices. POSCO 
built plant when new construction work was at low levels worldwide, and so was able to 
purchase relatively new technologies and attract low cost finance. Even more important 
was its low construction costs, due to achievement of short construction times and low 
labour costs, much lower than elsewhere in the world. In addition to this, POSCO was 
also able to acquire technological capability and create competitiveness through rapid and 
successful learning of know-how and accumulation of experience. 
Chapter 7 also provided some evidence about POSCO's skilful learning of iron and 
steel-making technology. Its proficiency in constructing plant, installing equipment, 
starting up facilities, bringing facilities up to above normal operation, and utilising and 
maintaining plants all strongly testify to its mastery of investment and production 
capabilities and an ability to reduce capital requirements for each successive stage. A 
further indication of POSCO's technological capability acquisition is provided by the 
improvements carried out subsequent to the initial operation of the facilities. Given that 
POSCO had to create a modem steel-making operation based solely on foreign 
technology and capital, that this involved extremely rapid capacity and output expansion, 
and that all this took place at a time when the steel industry in the rest of the world was in 
serious depression, its achievements seem all the more remarkable. While Chapter 7 
concluded that the creation and strengthening of POSCO's competitiveness has been 
driven basically by rapid and successful learning of the imported technologies, it also 
suggested that the maintenance of long-run competitiveness depends ultimately on the 
industry's capability to create new technology and to advance to the technological frontier 
of the world steel industry, for which persistent and aggressive R&D investment to create 
innovation-driven competitiveness is most important. 
Despite the fact that Korea is a resource-poor country, its steel industry has grown 
rapidly since the early 1970s. Even though Korea's steel industry competitiveness has its 
origin, in part, in the relatively cheap but skilled labour available to the industry, the 
Korean experience suggests that die development process is the result of a complex set of 
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factors. Thus changing comparative advantage in the Korean steel industry and the 
advantage of relatively low wages was magnified by other factors such as rapidly 
growing domestic demand, which allowed large increments to steel-making capacity, the 
role of government in the establishment of modem steel-making by help to overcome 
market failure problems at the early stage of development, and rapidly accumulating work 
force skills and technological capability. 
PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STEEL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 
The analysis in this study has several implications for future prospects and policy 
directions for the Korean steel industry. 
Firstly, the theory of dynamic comparative advantage and the fact that Korea's 
further economic growth will lead to continuous changes in supply-side conditions imply 
changes in the comparative advantage of the Korean steel industry. Chapter 4 showed 
that, despite persistent increases in steel production and exports in Korea, revealed 
comparative advantage in finished steel dropped from the mid-1980s coupled with a rapid 
rise in domestic demand and hence imports. The fall in comparative advantage measured 
by RCA indices coincided not only with the decUning importance of steel in the nation's 
manufacturing output, employment and exports and hence a drop in steel production 
intensity with respect to GDP, but also with a reduction in cost advantage in this period. 
This is consistent with the expectation that, as the Korean economy grows further, 
increasing comparative advantage in more capital-intensive (technology-intensive) 
sectors, the importance of steel production and trade in the national economy and its 
comparative advantage will eventually fall. Korea's relatively low wages, a main source 
of cost competitiveness, will then be eroded gradually. 
On the demand side, tiie analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that steel consumption in 
Korea will continue to rise but with a slowdown of growth rates expected in the late 
1990s, a pattern experienced by developed countries. Changes in the structure of steel 
consumption are also expected. While having in place its steel-intensive infrastructure, 
Korea will see growth in its capital goods sector, raising the demand for more advanced 
or higher-quality steel products. At the same time, some consumer goods industries may 
lose some momentum, with a gradual decline in their importance in Korea's steel 
consumption. Moreover, development of thinner steels and substitute materials due to 
technological progress in the world may result in reduced steel requirements in many 
steel-consuming activities (OECD, 1985). 
Changes in both supply and demand-side conditions will likely lead to a decline in 
± e steel industry's relative importance in die Korean economy with respect to production 
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and consumption and a slowdown in growth rates of steel production and domestic 
demand.^ These changes are reflected in studies by, for example, KAIST (1988), Hong 
et al. (1990) and POSCO's recent internal research, which project that Korea's steel 
production, consumption and trade growth and net steel trade will decline towards the 
year 2000 (see also NRI, 1986). These projections are consistent with the argument in 
this thesis. 
The completion of the fourth stage of the Kwangyang works in 1992 brought to an 
end POSCO's capacity expansion (see Chapters 4 and 7), and so Korea's steel 
production will continue to increase but at lower rates than in the 1980s. POSCO 
cuirentiy has a total capacity of 21 million tonnes, which accounts for about 68 per cent 
of Korea's total crude steel capacity. The projected expansion plans of other steel mills in 
Korea will see the electric arc furnaces' share of total crude steel production in Korea 
increase from 32 per cent at present to 35 per cent in the year 2000. Total crude steel 
capacity will then be about 32 million tonnes in the year 2000, and, if a 90 per cent 
operating rate is assumed, total crude steel production will be about 29 million tonnes. 
Korea's steel consumption is likely to show similar patterns to those experienced in 
developed countries (see Chapter 5). Most projections suggest that Korea's per capita 
consumption will reach a maximum level of about 650 kilograms in crude steel equivalent 
by around 2005 and will possibly decline gradually after 2010. Total domestic demand 
for steel in the year 2000 is expected to be around 28 million tonnes in crude steel 
equivalent, or 26 million tonnes of finished steel. 
These projections suggest that, although Korea may be a net exporter until the year 
2000, its net export position will decline substantially by that time. It is also possible that 
Korea will turn into a net importer before the year 2000 with steel consumption 
increasing more rapidly than projected and the peak level of per capita consumption 
reaching about or above 700 kilograms. In any case, Korea may maintain a position as a 
net exporter in finished steel in the next decade, implying that imports of pig iron and 
semi-finished steel will increase substantially.^ 
The expected shift to net imports of finished steel as Korea approaches the twenty-
first century, following the shift to net imports of semi-finished steel in 1986, is 
consistent not only with the argument in this thesis but also with the government's 
intentions towards the steel industry. The government is not likely to encourage 
construction of another large-scale integrated steel mill, because wage costs have reduced 
2. See KDI (1987), which provides an intensive study of future prospects for Korea's industrial structure 
towards the year 2010. 
3. Note that, in the case of pig iron trade, Korea has never been a net exporter, except in the 1979-81 
period. The trade deficit in pig iron will widen, since POSCO, the major pig iron producer in Korea, 
has no intention of expanding capacity. In the case of semi-finished steel, Korea has been a net 
importer since 1986. See Table 3.1. 
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competitiveness considerably and infrastructural and environmental factors will also 
affect the industry. The main problem for the steel industry, as the economy matures, is 
strucmral adjustment. This raises another concern, given that capacity far exceeds 
domestic demand, about expanding capacity beyond the projected size of domestic 
demand, even if the Korean steel industry can maintain competitiveness in the 
international market in terms of price and quality for a while. Though continuing growth 
in demand may justify construction of new capacity, this will depend on the choice of 
steel-making methods, namely electric arc fumaces, which require less capital costs for 
construction tiian integrated mills and are more flexible in adjusting to changes in market 
structure and conditions. There are as yet no private investors intending to enter the full-
scale steel business so long as POSCO maintains its position.'' All these considerations 
imply that the focus of policy towards the Korean steel industry in the future will be the 
accommodation of the shift to net imports in the long term rather than expansion of its 
expon capacity. 
It appears inevitable that Korea will tum into a net importer in terms of total iron 
and steel trade, and the fact that Korea's wage rates will rise with continuing economic 
growth and capital accumulation, as a result of which Korea's low labour cost advantage 
will diminish, implies that comparative advantage within the steel industry will shift to 
high quality finished steel products. On the demand side also, consumption will be 
concentrated more on such products. While imports of pig iron, semi-fmished steel and 
some ordinary carbon steel will continue to increase, domestic firms have to focus their 
competitive strategy on product quality and diversity and on further technological 
development, since mastery of ordinary steel-making technology will not be enough to 
compensate for a loss in competitiveness in ordinary steel products due to rising labour 
costs. In fact, not only POSCO but also other medium and small-scale firms are under 
pressure because of the gradual erosion of cost competitiveness in ordinary steel, forcing 
them to redirect investment towards high value-added products and away from ordinary 
steel products. 
The argument here suggests that, under these circumstances, the central economic 
issue for the future of the steel industry in Korea is the capacity of the industry to upgrade 
so that comparative advantage within the steel industry will shift to technology-intensive 
activities. The process of upgrading to achieve and sustain competitiveness against ever-
improving international competitors in developed countries as well as emerging lower 
cost developing countries requires continuous improvement by firms of their capabiUties 
4. While the electric arc sector in Korea will grow to some extent, the existing medium or small-scale 
producers and other potential entrants will direct their attention to operating mini-mills with more 
recent and advanced technolog>', on the one hand, and will try to increase their links with POSCO to 
complement POSCO's product mix or to purchase intermediate materials and scrap, on the other. 
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and technologies. Chapter 7 shows that the Korean steel industry has yet to make the 
transition to a stage where its competitiveness rests on the capacity to innovate and 
advance product and process technology, for which investment in R&D is the most 
crucial factor (the R&D competition stage). Korean steel still competes essentially on 
cost advantage but lags behind the leading countries in terms of product and process 
innovation. The task now is to seek even higher levels of training, skill, and scientific 
activity, as well as rationalisation of facilities, that are increasingly specialised to the steel 
industry in developed countries. The Korean steel industry will not move beyond the 
stage where competitiveness depends primarily on low labour costs until its human and 
technical abilities approach those of Japan and other developed countries. 
There is unrest in the Korean workforce today over wages and other working 
conditions. Rising wage rates and a deteriorating cost advantage, associated with 
continuing economic growth, are putting pressure on Korean steel firms. At the same 
time, these pressures are encouraging domestic firms to invest in innovative activities and 
to reorient their strategies. As rising wages spread prosperity among workers and sustain 
their incentive to improve their skills, this can speed the rate at which companies 
improve. While adjustment of wages and other factor costs should, ideally, be gradual, it 
will certainly serve to promote greater advances in the Korean steel industry. 
Companies need to shift to R&D competition and broaden their strategies away 
from labour cost competition. Cost competition strategies in Korea are now more 
vulnerable to emerging low labour-cost nations that may be willing to subsidise 
construction of large modern plants, as Korea did in the 1970s. Korean firms must 
upgrade their competitive advantage, which will demand true innovation, not imitation of 
Japanese and other competitors' products and processes. Korean steel firms also need to 
avoid severe price competition with each other or between POSCO and smaller-scale 
firms, otherwise the creation of more sustainable competitiveness may be slowed. This 
does not mean that domestic rivalry is to be suppressed. In fact, increased domestic 
competition will be essential to greater international competitiveness, even though the 
steel industry may be limited structurally to oligopolistic competition, as is true in all 
countries. The existing firms, the potential entrants and the government need to promote 
improvement through quality and technology competition, and avoid unnecessary price 
competition in the presence of increasing demand for more sophisticated products 
domestically. 
Rising wages and rising national income levels suggest a shift in domestic 
consumer demand to higher quality and more advanced products. As implied by the 
representative demand h>T)Othesis and analysis in Chapter 5, domestic firms will have 
difficulty achieving innovation without more sophisticated home demand in a wider range 
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of steel-consuming industries.^ Their distance from foreign markets, both geographically 
and with respect to buyer needs, makes it difficult to anticipate new needs or create new 
market segments (Porter, 1990). More sophisticated domestic demand will be promoted 
by a rising level of affluence, on the one hand, and higher levels of consumer 
information, on the other, Korean buyers meed to be exposed to and become more aware 
of better products and services, which implies a need to lift import barriers not only for 
steel but also for other related products. 
Finally, a reorientation in the role of the Korean government is essential to facilitate 
the transition of the nation's steel industry to the stage of R&D competition and 
innovation-driven development. As argued in Chapter 6, direct intervention, rationing 
capital to targeted industries and firms through financial system control, and widespread 
protection and assistance may have been appropriate in earlier stages. However, 
increased sensitivity to the economic costs and benefits involved now recommends a 
more neutral set of policies. The previous interventionist policies need to give way to a 
new set of priorities if the Korean steel industry is to progress further. Moving to the 
next stage requires that economic decision-making be decentralised into the hands of the 
market and individual firms. The job of creating factors for further competitiveness has 
increasingly to fall to the industry itself as well as to universities and research institutes 
with close ties to the industry. Government should shift from direct intervention to 
providing the resource base for upgrading and creating a more challenging environment 
in which domestic firms compete with foreign firms (Porter, 1990). Efforts to stimulate 
investment in R&D will be the government's chief task in moving to the stage of 
innovation-driven competitiveness. 
5. Domestic demand is most likely to become advanced and sophisticated in those industrial goods and 
services where Korean firms are significant international competitors themselves. 
Appendix 1 Comparative advantage and 
intra-industry trade 
It has been widely observed that the pattern of world trade involves not only inter-
industry trade but also intra-industry trade. Since the detailed empirical study by 
Grubel and Lloyd (1975), which demonstrated the importance of intra-industry trade 
among developed countries, a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies have been 
undertaken on this issue. Greenaway and Milner (1986) have widely explored the 
economics of intra-industry trade, including the factors which may be responsible for 
its emergence, its measurement, empirical evidence, and policy issues.^ 
Many theoretical studies suggest that the presence of scale economies and/or 
imperfect competition are the main causes of intra-industry trade either in product 
differentiation in variety or in homogenous products.^ Product differentiation in variety 
(horizontal differentiation) is formally analysed by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), where each consumer has a taste for many different varieties of a product, and 
Lancaster (1979), where products represent bundles of characteristics. These 
Chamberlinian trade models, incorporating both horizontal differentiation and scale 
economies, suggest that intra-industry trade in differentiated products can take place 
between countries with symmetrical production conditions and consumer preferences.^ 
1. See also Gunasekera (1987) for an extensive survey of theoretical and empirical literature on intra-
industry trade. 
2. There are several forms of scale economies. Scale economies internal to firms (internal scale 
economies) are based either on the scale of the plant {e.g., for processing industries such as minerals 
processing) or on the size of the production runs (e.g., for batch or assembly line production such as 
an automobile assembly plant) (Keesing, 1979). In this case, large Turns have an advantage over 
small ones, and the industry will end up being dominated by only one or a few fums, leading to 
imperfect competition. Imperfect competition can also take several forms. The simplest form is pure 
monopoly. Oligopoly, where several firms engage in a mixture of rivalry and cooperation, is one of 
the most complex forms. Chamberlinian monopolistic competition may be an intermediate form in 
its complexity. An industry may be subject to economies of scale external to firms but internal to the 
industry (external scale economies). External scale economies occurs as a result of a division of 
labour in a large market or from the Marshallian externalities. In this case, productivity of a firm 
depends on the size of the industry and the market, and perfect competition can be preserved. Scale 
economies also can take a dynamic form, where the dynamic process by which furns and industries 
improve their technologies through learning and/or R&D is an important source of decreasing 
average costs. Helpman and Krugman (1985) provide an integrated and extensive theoretical 
analysis of the U^de models incorporating scale economies, while Krugman (1987) contains a 
simple but excellent survey of recent studies. 
3. See also Das (1982), Dixit and Norman (1980), Eaton and Kierzkowski (1984), Ethier (1982b), 
Helpman (1981, 1983, 1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985, Pt.IlI), Krugman (1979, 1980, 1981, 
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Intra-industry trade in homogenous products is explained mainly by trade models 
incorporating external scale economies. Ethier (1979, 1982a) makes the most 
significant contribution to the subject, and Helpman (1984b) and Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, ch.3) provide an integrated analysis of this issue."* 
Alternatively, Brander (1981), Brander and Krugman (1983) and Krugman (1984) 
develop Coumot t>T)e oligopoly models of non-cooperative quantity setting firms and 
demonstrate that, if firms behave like naive Coumot duopolists, intra-industry trade in 
identical products can emerge.^ The Coumot approach shows also that intra-industry 
trade in identical products may arise from 'reciprocal dumping' where imperfectly 
competitive firms have an incentive to try to gain incremental sales by dumping in 
others' domestic markets (Brander, 1981; and Brander and Krugman, 1983).® 
In a different approach, Benson and Hartigan (1984) assert that intra-industry 
trade in an homogeneous good can occur, irrespective of market structure, by spatial 
price discrimination, permitting the markup over marginal cost in the export market to 
decline less than in the domestic market. In this case, market structure only affects the 
degree of intra-industry trade; the geographic extent of intra-industry trade is inversely 
related to the degree of competition among domestic and foreign producers, and the 
degree of intra-industry trade; the geographic extent of intra-industry trade is inversely 
related to the degree of competition among domestic and foreign producers, and the 
degree of intra-industry trade is directiy related to tiie extent of spatial discrimination. 
This implies that product differentiation is not necessarily required for intra-industry 
trade to include the range of market outcomes from monopoly to perfect competition. 
These features, which are absent in the traditional trade theory but lead to the 
result of inter-industry trade, can be incorporated into the dynamic comparative 
advantage model developed in Chapter 2 of this thesis in an effort to explain the 
occurrence of intra-industry trade through development of the industry and its 
implications for international competition. 
An ADC's rapid economic growth and industrialisation not only reduces its 
dissimilarity with developed countries in factor proportions but also results in 
overlapping panems of production and consumption with those of developed countries 
1982, 1986), Lancaster (1980, 1984), Lyons (1984) and Venables (1982,1984, 1987). 
4. See also Chacholiades (1978), Eaton and Panagariya (1979), Kemp (1969), Kemp and Negishi 
(1970), Melvin (1969), Negishi (1972), and Panagariya (1981). Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.5) 
and Krugman (1987) provide a summary of this approach. 
5. See also Melvin and Wame (1973) for a pure monopoly case, Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1984) for a 
natural oligopoly case, and Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch.4) for the case of contestable maiicets. 
6. At the initial stages of production, firms in the industry may try to sell some products below 
production cost in the developed (or other developing) countries where the goods are also produced. 
This may happen to optimise resource allocation, since lowering the price at the beginning makes it 
possible to expand prcxluction volumes and thus reduce production costs. 
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in terms of commodity composition. Some of the overlapping industries in the country 
produce commodities differentiated from those in developed or other advanced 
developing countries (see Gunasekera, 1987, pp.16-17). The theoretical arguments 
conceming scale economies and imperfect competition as important sources of product 
differentiation and intra-industry trade are also supported by the fact that many of the 
human capital-intensive manufacturing booms in ADCs involve large-scale economies 
and imperfect competition where monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour is a major 
phenomenon. 
Product differentiation may occur as a result of small changes in the basic 
production process or in the conditions surrounding the scale of the industry. These 
changes lead to a situation where different plants in a given industry produce varieties 
of products, which may be close substitutes for each other in terms of final uses or 
factor input requirements. If a country wishes to benefit from declining average costs 
of output due to scale economies, it may not be possible to produce all the varieties of 
given products, since this would require costly adjustment. A country will then 
produce only a limited subset of products in each differentiated product industry. If 
there exists effective demand for the different characteristics of foreign products, then 
simultaneous imports and exports of the same industrial products may develop. Ethier 
(1979, 1982b), Helpman (1984a) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) have emphasised 
that much intra-industry trade is in reality in intermediate products rather than in final 
goods.' In other words, the taste for variety implicit in the demand for more specialised 
components, machine tools, various metal products and parts represents a more 
powerful source of gains from trade than the desire for variety by ultimate consumers.^ 
In other cases, intra-industry trade could be generated not by scale economies or 
imperfect competition as suggested in the theory but by government intervention in 
trade flows, sharp domestic demand fluctuations, geographical distribution as 
demonstrated by Gnibel and Lloyd (1975), periodic trade and so on. 
Circumstances can also lead to intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated 
products as well. Falvey (1981), Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) and Flam and 
Helpman (1987) show that this type of trade can take place in traditional Heckscher-
Ohlin settings. In the world of product differentiation in quality, consumers can choose 
7. If intermediate goods produced with economies of scale are not tradable, the result will be the 
formation of 'industrial complexes' in an effort to realise linkage effects (Helpman and Krugman, 
1985). Groups of industries are tied together by the need to concentrate all users of a non-tradable 
intermediate input in the same country. Helpman and Krugman (1985) argue that, in this case, the 
pattern of specialisation and trade in the Chamberlinian world will actually come to resemble the 
pattern in the world of Marshallian externalities. 
8. Shaked and Sutton (1984) show that vertical product differentiation occurs also in the industries 
where unit variable costs for quality improvement rise slowly relative to consumers' willingness to 
pay. Such a possibility is likely to associated with the industries where the main burden of quality 
improvement falls on fixed R&D costs, rather than on any increase in labour and raw materials. 
214 
different product t>'pes, not so much because of demand for the different characteristics 
but rather because of different levels of income and/or technology. Vertical product 
differentiation allows the production of various qualities to be allocated among 
countries on the basis of comparative advantage, since different qualities can be 
presumed to differ in their factor input requirement. 
Intra-industr>' trade may also be prevalent in an industry which has many 
component production processes. Some products from a certain process may be used as 
an important input in the next process, or there may be various types of final products 
for different uses. Each of these may require differently specialised crafts, facilities and 
even different factor inputs and technology. It may not be necessary then for a country 
to specialise in the whole production process or in producing all tj^pes of products, even 
if the process can be integrated in one firm. This kind of intra-industry trade may occur 
in conjunction with the trade in differentiated products. 
Wlien intra-industr>' trade has its most important origins in scale economies, firms 
can then exploit a reduction in their own unit production costs by increasing sales 
volume. This implies that a source of specialisation can be found in cost advantages. 
The cost advantage may stem from the countr>''s abilit>' to exploit certain aspects of tiie 
scale economies, which may be different between countries depending on the country-
specific conditions such as market structure, demand pattern, inter-industry or inter-
firm relationships, macroeconomic conditions and government policies, although their 
per capita income levels, technological knowledge and industrial structures are similar.' 
Xevenheless, there is a scope for some obser\'ed intra-industry trade to be 
interpreted as inter-industr)' trade. An example is when vertically differentiated 
products or different products from different operating processes in the same industry 
require different factor intensities and technology. Intra-industry trade in this case can 
be measured as inter-induscr>' trade, if a detailed commodity classification exists that 
captures differences in factor specifications and factor intensities and reflects 
differences in qualit)' and end-use. 
9. Competitiveness and specialisation patterns in an industn' where intra-industr>' trade prevails are also 
affected by production cost and non-price aspects of competitiveness. In addition, the important 
non-pric« imensions of competition underlying pnxiuct differentiation respond to differences in unit 
costs. Firms will also increase their expenditures on non-price dimensions of competition such as 
marketing and advertisings, because the marginal productivity of these expenditures increases as 
margins tetw een price and costs widen. See Owen (1983, Appendix 1) for proof of this proposition. 
Appendix 2 Iron and steel-making processes 
and technology 
The production process of iron and steel can be divided into tliree stages: (1) 
preparation of raw materials and (pig) iron-making process at blast furnaces, (2) steel-
making by using pig iron and scrap steel, and (3) production of finished steel through 
the rolling process. Firms in resource-rich countries such as in Australia and the United 
States usually include raw materials mining activities as a part of the integrated 
production system. 
Iron-making 
The iron oxide present in ferrous ores is reduced to metallic iron (referred to as pig 
iron), usually in a blast furnace.^ Raw materials for the blast furnace are iron ore, coke, 
limestone and oxygen. The amount of energy taken up in this process is in general 
about 70 per cent of the total energy required in a typical modem integrated mill. 
Iron ore supplied from various sources may be blended to give a more uniform 
chemical composition. Rich lump ore is crushed and sized to between about 6 mm and 
30 mm in diameter. It can be charged straight into the blast furnace but most ore has to 
be sintered or agglomerated. Fine ore is pelletised for conversion into blast furnace 
feed, since the presence of powder inhibits the operation of the furnace. Pelletisation is 
also used for chemically upgrading lump ore, which is first crushed. 
Sintering is used not only for recycling dust from blast furnace exhaust gases but 
for dust from steel-making furnaces and flakes of iron oxide from rolling mills. Dust 
and flakes are combined with fme iron ore, coke breeze and crushed limestone (or 
limesand). The mixture is broken into lumps, cooled and screened. 
Coke made by heating washed and crushed coal is used in blast furnaces as a 
source of carbon and as a source of heat. Coal is shipped to coke plants and heated in 
coke ovens at an extremely high temperature to distill any volatile compounds yielding 
1. Iron may also be extracted from its ores by direct reduction (DR). While a blast furnace produces 
molten iron, the DR method produces sponge iron or synthetic scrap. The sponge iron is then 
charged to an electric arc furnace and transformed into steel. One of advantages of this process is 
that a coke plant is not required. Its output is at present very small (2.8 per cent of total world pig 
iron production in 1988) and has been reserved for relatively small-scale operations. 
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rough coke for the blast furnaces, nut coke foi reheating furnace linings and coke 
breeze for use in sinter plants. 
To produce pig iron, the blast furnace is charged with various combinations of 
sinter, pellets, lump ore, coke and limestone from the top, with the air blast blown into 
the bottom. The pig iron is transferred to the steel-making shop, usually in its molten 
form, either to save reheating in open hearth process or because, in the case of basic 
oxygen furnaces (BOF), molten charge is needed. 
Steel-making 
Steel-making can be subdivided into the conversion of pig iron into crude steel and the 
primary rolling process whereby steel primary forms (also referred to as semi-fmished 
steel or, for short, semis) such as slabs, blooms and billets are produced. Crude steel 
production is usually carried out in one of three types of furnaces; the basic oxygen 
furnace (BOF, also referred to as an LD converter), the open hearth furnace (OHF) and 
the electric arc furnace (EAF). Of total world crude steel production of 677 million 
tonnes in 1990, about 57 per cent was produced in BOFs. The electric arc process 
accounted for 27.5 per cent. The open hearth process now accounts for only 15.5 per 
cent, and is used mostly in the former Soviet Union (76 per cent), Eastern Europe (15 
per cent), India (4.5 per cent) and the United States (3 per cent) (IISI, Steel Statistical 
Yearbook, 1991). 
BOFs, which are mostly used in integrated steel works, convert molten iron 
charged with scrap, calcined lime, fluorite, and so on into steel by blowing high 
pressure pure oxygen from the top onto the molten iron to oxidise impurities. The 
amount of carbon and other substances is controlled to meet the targeted requirements. 
Pig iron is then transformed into crude steel. For the production of high grade steel and 
the improvement of steel quality, up-to-date technology such as hot metal pre-
treatments and secondary refming systems may be employed. This typically uses 70 to 
90 per cent hot molten pig iron charges, which limits its use for cold scrap or sponge 
iron. Since scrap charges are around only 10 to 30 per cent by weight and the bulk of 
this may come from offcuts from the rolling mills, this process may not be adapted to 
recycling large volumes of scrap purchased outside the works. The dominant 
advantage of this technology is that the energy input and the time required for each 
heating process is much less. A typical large integrated plant has two or three BOFs. 
The open hearth process was developed in the mid-nineteenth century. Though 
considered as an older technology, it has some desirable features. As its process is 
slower and heat times are longer, it offers the possibility of more exact quality control 
and allows the production of a wider variety of steels. It also offers much higher ratios 
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of cold scrap to molten iron. Cold pig iron can also be used, which is an additional 
advantage in some cases. 
EAFs, which are mainly used in mini-mills or other small plants, use both sponge 
iron and scrap instead of molten pig iron and can take up to 100 per cent of cold metal. 
Electricity is confined to heat generation. While oxygen can be used to reduce 
processing time and to save electrodes and power, a major advantage of this process 
over the BOF and OHF alternatives is that oxygen is not necessary to combustion and 
expensive alloys can be added without significant loss through oxidation. This 
accounts for the use of this process in making special steel such as stainless steel and 
special alloy steels. 
Liquid crude steel is taken to either the ingot casting shop or the continuous 
casting shop. In the former case, the molten steel is tapped into a ladle to be 
transported to the teeming yard where it is poured into ingot moulds (typically 1.8 x 1.0 
X 0.6 m3). After stripped of the moulds, the ingots are reheated in soaking pits at the 
primary rolling mill (blooming and slabbing mill) until they reach uniform rolling 
temperature.^ From the primary mill, steel emerges as either blooms (with square 
transverse sections of 3 to 8 m in length and a diameter of 20 to 40 cm) or slabs (with 
rectangular transverse sections usually 4.5 to 10 m long, 1 to 2 m wide and 20 to 30 cm 
thick). Blooms may be rolled further into billets with smaller square transverse sections 
(typically 6 to 18 m long with a diameter of 0.8 to 15 cm). 
In the continuous casting process, which came into use in the early 1960s,^ the 
molten steel is not allowed to cool and bypasses teeming, stripping and primary rolling. 
It is poured into a mould and cast directly into slabs, blooms or billets. The long 
continuous piece of billets, blooms or slabs is cut to lengths required for processing. 
Depending on the scale of operations, continuous casting offers various advantages. 
Economies in operating (especially energy) costs and capital costs compared to the 
equivalent capacity in the ingot casting system are the obvious ones. Moreover, it is 
accepted by most steel-makers that continuous casting provides superior quality in most 
flat products and higher yield especially in slab casting."*'^ Its share of output has grown 
rapidly from 5.9 per cent of total world crude steel output in 1971 to 14.2 per cent in 
2. The amount of soaking required depends on distance travelled and delays. The layout of the works is 
important for fuel economies. 
3. This process was used for non-ferrous work such as copper before commercial development for steel 
occurred. Its application to steel has closely followed the development of BOFs, by which a rapid 
and regular cycle of steel production was achieved. 
4. The situation with large bloom casting machines is yet to be resolved. These blooms still have to be 
rolled on a continuous billet mill, which heavily increases the capital and operating costs involved. 
5. The higher tonnage of production (about 10 to 15 per cent) in continuous casting compared with the 
ingot casting system shortens the supply of scrap, which affects economies of other steel-making 
processes, especially the electric arc sector, where scrap steel is critical. 
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1975, 30.1 per cent in 1980, 49.7 per cent in 1985 and 64.1 per cent in 1990 (ESI, Steel 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues). 
Rolling process 
The semi-finished products are further rolled to produce finished steel in the form of 
long products and flat products. Long products including sections, bars, reinforcing 
bars, wire rod and rail are manufactured mainly from blooms and billets. Billets rolled 
from square blooms into smaller square transverse sections go to high speed continuous 
mills for reheating and rolling into wire rod, for rolling into reinforcing bars or for 
rolling into small bars and sections. The products are used for concrete reinforcing, 
engineering applications such as springs and bolts and nuts, manufacturing wire rope, 
t>'re cord and so on. The square blooms are also rolled in structural and universal mills 
where structural steel bars of varying cross section such as rails and H beams used in 
construction are produced. 
Flat products are produced from slabs. The slabs come either from continuous 
casting or from ingot casting and primary rolling, and are reheated and further rolled in 
a plate mill to produce plates, which are used in shipbuilding, civil engineering, heavy 
duty equipment, boilers, tanks, steel tube, large pipelines and other kinds of pressure 
vessels.^ For other flat products, the slab is rolled in a hot strip mill, from which it 
comes out as hot rolled sheets in coil. The coils are sent to either shearing and slitting 
lines in the mill or to the cold rolling mill and the silicon steel mill. From shearing 
lines, the hot rolled steel coils emerge as hot rolled sheets cut to length and chequered 
plates. Hot rolled strip is obtained from slitting lines. The hot rolled products are used 
for steel pipes, containers, guard rails and so on. 
Cold rolled products are manufactured in a cold rolling mill in which hot rolled 
coils are cleaned in acid and rerolled at normal temperatures without heating. The 
output consists of cold rolled sheets and strips, black plates, and galvanised sheets. 
Cold rolled sheets and strips are used for vehicle bodies, office and home appliances 
and electric appliances due to their smooth, fine surface and their suitability for paint 
coatings. Black plates, which undergo a tin coating process from which tin plate is 
produced with an anticorrosive character, are mainly used as basic metals for beverage 
containers and sundry pipes. Galvanised products are used for interior and exterior 
panels of vehicles and as construction materials and raw materials for major basic 
industries. 
A portion of hot rolled steel coils are also allotted as raw materials for electrical 
6. Welded pipes produced from plates are sometimes categorised as long products (cf. seamless pipes 
are product from blooms or billets). 
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Steel products in a silicon steel mill. Electrical sheets and strips are essential raw 
materials for a wide range of electrical products from home appliances to large-scale 
industrial equipment. This requires considerable processing and a relatively high level 
of manufacturing technology. 
Mill layouts and times and length of production runs differ according to the 
product being rolled. It should also be noted that technology intensity varies among the 
different processes and that the number of iron-making and steel-making furnaces, the 
choice of various rolling processes, and the choice of technology may depend very 
much on individual plant circumstances. 
Appendix 3 Establishment of POSCO 
With the end of the Korean war (1950-53), which left the country with obsolete and 
damaged facilities that produced a mere 150,000 tonnes of crude steel per annum in the 
early 1960s, the creation of a modem steel industry became a government priority. 
However, Korea had neither the experience in integrated steel-making nor the capital 
necessary to finance its construction at the time. It had to depend wholly on foreign 
sources of capital and technology. The govemment's attempts to finance entry in 1958 
and 1961 and again in 1962 for a group of German steel-makers ended in failure as the 
foreign collaborators were pessimistic about Korea's economic status and the scale of 
plant the Korean government wanted (POSCO, 1988). 
The desire to build an integrated steel mill took shape again when the first Five Year 
Economic Development Plan was launched in 1967, following a direction by President 
Chung-Hee Park. Korea International Steel Associates (KISA), an international 
consortium including the World Bank, was formed in the United States in December 
1966 and a basic agreement was signed in October 1967 between the Korean government 
and KISA for the construction of a plant with a capacity of 0.6 million tonnes a year. 
The agreement foresaw one million tonnes of capacity expansion and 3 million tonnes of 
final capacity, with agreed funding of US$95.7 million in foreign funds and US$35 
million in domestic funds. At the same time (in September 1967), the Korean 
government designated the government-owned Korea Tungsten Company as the main 
organiser for construction of the plant. In November 1967, the government established 
the Integrated Steel Works Construction Committee, which formed POSCO in April 
1968. The president of the Korea Tungsten Company, Tae-Joon Park, who had made 
that company a success and later was elected president of POSCO, was appointed as the 
Construction Committee's chairman.^ The chairman's primary objective was to secure 
funding. 
While construction to prepare the plant site was in progress, the World Bank and 
the International Economic Consultative Organisation for Korea (lECOK), which had 
promised loans to the project, suddenly raised objections. Citing the experience of Indian 
and Turkish steel manufacturing as poor precedents for the viability of an integrated steel 
1. See Innace and Dress (1992) for a detailed account of POSCO's history and its present-day success 
under its chairman Tae-Joon Park. 
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plant in a lower developing country, a World Bank study team expressed the view that 
building an integrated steel mill in Korea was premature and lacked economic feasibility, 
and that Korea would find it difficult to repay foreign credit due to its rising foreign debt. 
Even at home, such negative views prevailed in the National Assembly, the press and 
among academics. Because of the negative views of the World Bank and lECOK, the 
agreement with KISA was finally abandoned in July 1969. 
As the government was about to abandon the integrated steel works project, the 
chairman of the Construction Committee came up with the idea of using reparation funds 
from the Japanese government which had been formerly earmarked for the agricultural 
sector. The chairman successfully procured US$30 million of the available war 
reparations and US$50 million from Japan's Export-Import Bank at low interest rates. 
He also persuaded the Japanese that the capacity of the four-stage plant should be 9.1 
million tonnes, a much larger capacity than the 2.6 million tonnes in the first plan 
produced by Nippon Steel's technical cooperation department (World Steel Dynamics, 
1985). 
At the Korean and Japanese Ministerial Meeting in August 1969, the Japanese 
govemment agreed to support the project, providing loans at relatively low interest rates 
together with the required technology and facilities. The engineering consultants to 
POSCO were designated the 'Japan Group', and came mainly from Nippon Steel 
Corporation and, to a lesser extent, from Nippon Kokan Steel. Construction of the first 
stage began in April 1970, two years after POSCO was founded. The mill was 
completed with a capacity of 1.03 million tonnes in July 1973, two months before the 
first worldwide oil shock. Total cost for the first stage was about US$300 million, about 
60 per cent of which derived from foreign loans, mosdy from Japan. It was fortunate 
that POSCO finished the first stage and started initial operations before the oil shock, 
since it might otherwise have encountered substantial difficulties (POSCO, 1988). In 
fact, POSCO was able to achieve high profitability during the worldwide energy crisis 
and the steel business recession. 
Appendix 4 Nature of industrial policy in 
the world steel market 
Steel-making has a long history in many developed countries. Most steel industries in 
Europe and the United States developed over a long period without government 
intervention. Exceptions were Japan, France and some other developed countries where 
modem large-scale steel industries were established relatively late, due in part to the 
impact of the Second World War, and where government intervention was intensive 
from the outset of industrial development. The question of industrial policy for steel in 
developed countries became serious from the mid-1970s, as the industry matured, but 
later began to decline and focus on structural adjustment of the industry. 
Steel-makers in developed countries enjoyed prosperity until the mid-1970s, 
when the woridwide energy crises shook the global economy. This resulted in an 
abrupt collapse of the steel boom in developed countries followed by serious stagnation 
in steel consumption (see Chapter 5), and left behind problems of exorbitant excess 
capacity and severe price competition among the developed countries, in both domestic 
and international markets. At the same time, the competitiveness of these countries was 
being rapidly eroded by several new and strong competitors from developing countries 
such as Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil, all of whom entered the world export 
market aggressively, armed with low wages and extensive government backup. As a 
result, many of the major steel firms in developed countries came close to total financial 
collapse. This forced their governments to intervene in the market not only to save 
these firms but to halt their declining competitiveness. Thus, various assistance 
measures for industrial restructuring and the protection of domestic markets were 
adopted, although the companies made efforts themselves to reduce their scale of 
business and to rationalise their management. 
In the case of the European Community, there was an imminent collapse of large 
segments of the steel industry after 1974, leaving behind a massive burden of excess 
capacity, and inducing severe sales competition among their steel-making firms. This 
1. See Howell et al. (1988) for extensive and detailed case studies of government intervention in steel-
making in both developed and developing countries. This section largely benefited from their 
findings. See also OECD (1985) for a neat summary of steel policies in the United States and the EC 
and the impact of these policies. 
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prompted intensified market intervention by governments.^ Since then, an immense 
amount of subsidies were given to failing producers in the EC, totalling about US$13 
billion during 1975-80 and about US$34,500 million in the years 1980-85, which is 
incredible even by the standards of this heavily subsidised industry (Howell et al, 
1988). In addition, a comprehensive system of market controls such as production and 
delivery quotas, import restriction, price regulation and so on was imposed.^ All these 
policy measures created major market distortions both within and outside the EC.'' 
These were also the main underlying reasons for the succession of steel disputes and 
trade friction, especially with the United States, in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
The EC steel industry recently began to recover its competitiveness by reducing 
not only production costs but also capacity and employment and by increasing 
productivity and efficiency. The cyclical boom in steel consumption from the late 
1980s also helped the industry achieve better business results. Overall, however, the 
incredible amount of subsidisation to the EC steel industry was geared more towards 
facility investment and continuation of operations rather than reduction or 
rationalisation of excess capacity.^ Moreover, government intervention mainly in the 
form of subsidisation prevented efficient competition among corporations in the EC. 
This resulted in delays in solving the problem of excess capacity and in structural 
adjustment.® The recent steel boom also saw firms less keen to make efforts to enhance 
2. The European Community is the Western world's largest steel-making bloc and its second largest 
steel market after the United States. The steel industry in the EC tried to remove trade barriers 
among the member countries and to realise higher efficiency by taking advantage of a larger 
common market from the early 1950s when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was 
organised. However, steel policy at the integrated EC level was weakened by the different interests 
of the member countries. 
3. Another characteristic of EC steel policy was nationalisation of some major steel firms. In the 
United Kingdom, the British Steel Corporation (BSC), which had been famous for chronic deficit 
operations, was nationalised after the Second World War and subsidised to an enormous extent. 
Since 1985, surprisingly enough, the BSC has become profitable and achieved major gains in 
deficiency and productivity (WSD, 1987). In France, which was relatively late in developing large-
scale steel-making but strove to build new plants in the early 1960s and 1970s, the two major French 
steel firms, Usinor and Sacilor, were progressively nationalised between 1978 and 1981 as a result of 
imminent fmancial collapse and later merged as Usinor-Sacilor. Owing to continuous personnel cuts 
and massive state financial support, Usinor-Sacilor began to show a profit from 1988. The 
remarkable recovery of BSC and Usinor-Sacilor can hardly be regarded as a triumph of market 
principles. It only demonstrates that an industry can be restored even under very adverse 
circumstances if a government is ready to commit enough fmance to the endeavour (Howell et al., 
1988) 
4. The West Germany steel industry, the largest and most competitive in Europe at the time, was 
damaged by heavy subsidies in other EC states rather than by the recession itself. Between 1975 and 
1988, it suffered substantial losses, weakening its control over the market, eroding its traditional 
solidarity in the domestic market, producing a decline in investment and ultimately forcing it to call 
for financial assistance. Some financial assistance was given by the government during that period, 
though much less than in other European countries. Unlike other member countries, West Germany 
persistently advocated the free trade principle and insisted on a reduction of U^de restrictions and 
government assistance in the EC. 
5. Another reason for the difficulty in capacity reduction or the closure of failing firms was its direct 
relationship with regional economy and labour problems. 
6. According to information provided by POSCO, EC overcapacity in crude steel-making as of 1987 
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Structural adjustment by reducing excess capacity, which may arise once more as a 
major issue for the EC steel industry. Nevertheless, as domestic firms recover their 
competitiveness, and as the removal of subsidies gains international consensus, EC 
governments are reducing subsidisation in an effort to improve the constitution of 
domestic firms. 
Among developed countries, Japan provides a typical case of government 
involvement from the outset of development through maturity to restructuring of the 
steel industry. In rebuilding the nation's steel industry after the Second World War, 
Japan evolved sophisticated mechanisms of industrial policy, which provoked 
development of the industry through rapid expansion on a grand scale, especially from 
the 1950s through the early 1970s. During this period, steel was a primary target of 
government and bureaucracy in the formulation and implementation of its so-called 
heavy and chemical industrialisation policy. 
As a result not only of enormous efforts by domestic corporations to improve 
competitiveness but also implementation of extensive promotional and protective 
policies, Japan had grown to possess, by the early 1970s, the world's most prominent 
steel industry in terms of both production capacity and technology and exports. The 
Japanese policy program, orchestrated primarily by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), included systems of market control to protect the industry from 
the most adverse effects of competition among domestic firms as well as foreign 
suppliers, and a variety of assistance schemes to promote international 
competitiveness.'' However, as a result of world steel stagnation, and rapid appreciation 
of the yen in 1985, the Japanese steel industry began to suffer from a dramatic slump in 
demand and marked excess capacity, though the effects of recession in the industry 
were not as severe as in other developed countries.^ The government then applied 
intensive and positive measures to encourage industrial restructuring and 
rationalisation, which suggests that structural adjustment has been progressing well.' 
was 27.7 million tonnes, which means that 16.7 per cent of total capacity was excess capacity. 
Among EC member countries, France and Italy, whose steel industries were relatively 
underdeveloped, possessed 5.5 and 7.7 million tonnes of overcapacity respectively, meaning that 
their overcapacity rate was about 20 per cent. In the United Kingdom, where structural adjustment 
was relatively smooth, and in West Germany, where development of the industry was relatively 
solid, overcapacity was 2.2 and 4.2 million tonnes respectively, with an overcapacity rate of about 9 
per cenL 
7. See Howell et al. (1988) and Yamawaki (1988) for details. 
8. On many occasions, Japan's massive capacity and production expansion until the mid-1970s and 
hence the extensive government policies which encouraged it were criticised as one of the main 
reasons for excess capacity and structural imbalance in the world steel industry. 
9. The measures adopted included not only setting guideposts for reduced production but also fiscal and 
other incentives for R&D, equipment modernisation, upgrading the quality of physical plant, energy 
savings and product diversification towards higher value added products. The government also tried 
to boost steel consumption by launching several large-scale public works and took measures to 
stabilise employment in regions where depressed firms were located. 
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This line of Japanese government policies to promote structural adjustment 
continues to the present with a major focus on R&D assistance in more or less indirect 
forms. The Japanese steel industry is expected to continue to lead the world steel 
industry given its prominent technological advantage, though its excess capacity in 
relation to domestic consumption requirements will be a major concern for both the 
government and individual firms. It should also be noted that, despite having changed 
and evolved over time, the nature of government intervention in the Japanese steel 
industry remain fundamentally not very different from what it was in the 1950s. 
Nevertheless, Japanese govemment policy and close cooperation between government 
and domestic firms were very effective in encouraging investment, improving overall 
efficiency and competitiveness and inducing astounding technological development and 
smooth structural adjustment. This has encouraged governments in other major steel-
making developing countries to adopt various policy measures of a similar vein. 
In the case of the United States, the govemment has traditionally avoided direct 
involvement in industrial development, and industrial policy has taken more general 
forms at the macro level (Adams and Duggal, 1985). The steel industry was no 
exception. The tradition of reliance on the market has continued, despite a dramatic 
erosion of the industry's market position both domestically and internationally in recent 
decades, not only because of declining efficiency among domestic firms but also 
because of extensively subsidised and/or protected foreign competition.^" That is, while 
the US approach has merits in a domestic context, the lack of a coherent policy has 
allowed foreign government actions to influence the shape of the US steel industry 
(Howell etal, 1988). 
Even though strong govemment intervention has been exercised since the late 
1960s, as reduction and decline of the steel industry became more serious in the 
postwar period, it has taken the form of domestic market protection through import 
restriction rather than subsidisation. That is, policy formation has been directed by the 
practices of other nations, in an effort to protect domestic firms from threats by 
subsidised foreign competitors to penetrate the domestic market.'' While the US steel 
industry was the most severely affected by the prevailing policy measures of other 
countries, its domestic market protection in tum exacerbated the steel crisis in other 
countries since the United States is still the largest steel market in the Westem world. 
10. In contrast to the general view that the US steel industry is not especially subsidised, the Canadian 
Steel Producers' Association (1990) recently reported that the United States subsidised directly and 
indirectly about US$27,(X)0 million during the 1980s. 
11. This is evident, for example, from the Voluntary Restraint Arrangements (VRAs: 1969-74 and 1984-
89), the Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM: 1978-82), the US and EC Arrangement (1982 and 1984-
88), the Reagan Steel Program (1985-88) and antidumping and countervailing duty actions against 
the influx from developing countries. See Jones (1986) and Howell et al. (1988) for details. 
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Nevertheless, it induced increases in steel prices in the domestic market, allowing 
domestic producers to recover competitive power to some extent, even if domestic steel 
consumers were unhappy with the price increases. It has also contributed to industrial 
adjustment and productivity improvement. As a result, domestic steel-makers' 
shipments and operating rates have increased, while imports, particularly from VRA 
countries, have been substantially reduced.'^ The efforts by the US government to 
protect domestic producers have led to efforts at 'International Consensus' to abolish 
subsidisation and to remove trade restrictions in all trading countries. 
The competitiveness of many developed countries' steel-makers, which was 
weakened after the worid steel collapse through the 1980s, has recovered remarkably in 
recent years at the same time as world steel consumption has showed an increasing 
trend. A large part of this recovery has to be attributed to government intervention and 
aid towards the industry. As governments in developed countries saw their steel 
industries begin to recover, they have begun to reduce intervention and to refrain from 
direct subsidisation. This trend is expected to increase following the efforts to achieve 
International Consensus led by the United States. 
Compared with developed countries, modern large-scale steel-making in 
developing countries has a relatively short history, beginning in general from the 1970s. 
Nonetheless, some developing countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and Brazil 
have emerged as strong competitors in the world steel market, possessing large-scale 
integrated mills equipped with the latest technology and the newest facilities acquired 
from suppliers in developed countries. In the development of their steel industries, 
developing country governments undertook an important role by adopting a wide 
variety of measures to promote and protect them. In many cases, the measures were 
extended to export markets to ensure the price competitiveness of their products. This 
in fact worsened world steel trade, which had already begun to be distorted by the new 
protectionism in developed countries. It in turn not only affected the exports of 
developing countries but also intensified criticism of government protection in 
developing countries. 
Steel industry policies in developing countries are in general based on the infant 
industry argument. Because governments intervened in industrial development from an 
early stage, the nature of policies in developing countries have been somewhat different 
from those in most European countries and in North America where intervention was 
undertaken mainly for the purpose of structural adjustment of their declining steel 
industries. ^ ^ In general, steel policy measures in developed countries are characterised 
12. This is partly reflected in the improving trend of the US steel industry with respect to production, 
consumption and trade in recent years. 
13. In the sense that governments in developed countries played an important role from the outset of 
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by initiatives undertaken by government, financial arrangements and/or assistance, 
public works for infrastructure needed for the industry, protection from imports and an 
export drive to offset the disadvantage of small domestic demand and/or to earn foreign 
currency. 
The astounding development of the developing countries' steel industry since the 
1970s owes most to government initiatives, since these countries' major steel projects 
were too vast, too costly and far too unlikely to produce a satisfactory return on 
investment to have been attempted by private entrepreneurs. As Howell et al. (1988) 
state, governments provided capital, planning, and infrastructure for the establishment 
of new facilities, and provided the guarantees needed to attract large foreign debt and 
equity investments in the new projects. As the new plants came on stream, 
governments took the measures needed to ensure their continued operation, providing 
protection from imports, subsidies to offset operating losses, successive injections of 
new capital, and incentives to promote export competitiveness. 
Several questions arise concerning the success of the infant industry protection 
policies: namely, whether the policies made operation of the industry profitable enough 
to compensate for resources forcefully allocated to it, whether the protection was 
temporary as implied by the theory of infant industry protection, and whether the 
industry proved sufficiently competitive both in domestic and international markets to 
survive without further government help. 
However, there appears to be few cases where affirmative answers can be given 
to these questions, despite the fact that many developing countries achieved astonishing 
growth in production and exports. For example, despite substantial government 
assistance, and hence increasing exports in some cases, major steel producers in 
Turkey, India and most of the Latin American countries have failed to achieve the 
ultimate goal of infant industry protection, with many of them having suffered from 
poor profitability, low productivity and/or weak competitiveness, due to slack in the 
whole domestic economy or simply due to the entrepreneurs' poor performance.'" It is 
also claimed that without continuous government assistance and protection, they would 
have confronted severe difficulties in competing not only internationally but also 
domestically. Only in a few cases, such as in as the Korea and Taiwan, has the steel 
industry been able to compete without further government assistance.'^ In light of the 
development, their policy intervention was more or less similar to that in Japan and some other 
developed countries that were relative latecomers in the development of a steel industry. 
14. For details of the cases of Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, see Howell et al. 
(1988). The steel industries in those countries in general have suffered from low or negative 
incomes. In the case of the Indian major steel producer Tata Iron and Steel Co., the company has 
shown considerable profitability but poor productivity, probably due to the fact that the Indian steel 
industry has been a typical import-substituting sector with a highly protected domestic market 
15. Given extensive government assistance in all the developing countries mentioned, the divergent 
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fact that countries protect their own steel industries for different reasons and employ 
various measures to do so, there is strong resistance to leaving the industry in the hands 
of already distorted market forces, even if the intention is for the industry to become 
competitive by international standards. This does not justify further protection, of 
course, and results simply from the reluctance of the developing countries to 
completely remove government assistance and protection for an industry that is no 
longer an infant. 
outcomes are of course not solely the result of better performance by firms in Korea and Taiwan but 
are also due to different general economic conditions. That is, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, 
relatively fast and solid industrialisation and capital accumulation in Korea and Taiwan provided 
their steel industries with better domestic conditions by both allowing a smooth transition of dynamic 
comparative advantage towards the industry and increasing steel demand. 
Appendix 5 Import-substitution versus 
export-promotion strategies 
It has important implications for the success of infant industry promotion whether the 
promotive incentives are provided mainly for substitution of imports with domestic 
products (the import-substitution strategy) or for expansion of export markets without 
discriminating against import-substitution (the export promotion strategy).' While the 
import-substitution strategy can be characterised as restricted to substitution of imports 
with domestic products, the export promotion strategy should not be interpreted to 
mean the favouring of exports over import-substitution but, as Balassa (1980, p. 12) 
posits, can be characterised by the provision of similar incentives to production for 
domestic and export markets. Even though there are degrees of variation in incentives 
across industries and firms, a country's development strategy can be stylised according 
to the dominant practices by the govemment in a given period of time. Many studies 
claim that various defects and difficulties are inherent in an inward-oriented import-
substitution strategy, regardless of the theoretical validity of the strategy, and argue 
that, during the last three decades, only a few developing countries have moved 
dramatically upward on the income scale and that these countries have either pursued 
export promotion or moved sharply away from an import-substitution strategy to one of 
export-promotion.^ 
Infant industry protection under the scheme favouring import-substitution may 
reduce not only competitive threats from foreign producers but the domestic firms' 
incentives to market abroad. In this case, the small size of a domestic market may 
mean that if many firms are allowed to avoid a monopolistic or an oligopolistic market 
structure, it is highly likely that each firm will be uneconomically small, or that if a 
small number of firms are permitted to do so, a competitive stimulus to higher 
1. See Balassa (1980) for an excellent review of import-substitution and export-promotion as 
alternative strategies for industrial development. He provides a clear conceptual distinction and 
differences in economic effects between the two strategies. 
2. There is a certain bias towards export-promotion over import-substitution. See Balassa (1978,1980, 
1983), Bhagwati (1978), Donges (1976) and Krueger (1978, 1980, 1981). For empirical analyses 
supporting the effectiveness of export-promotion policy, see Balassa (1971, 1981a), Chen and Tang 
(1987), Donges and Riedel (1977), Drysdale (1988), Jung and Lee (1986), Tyler (1973) and 
Westphal (1978). 
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productivity will be lacking (Knieger, 1980).^ Even if incentives to export are greater 
in some industries, the overall import-substitution regime may force them to use some 
domestic inputs produced at costs higher than foreign products, which will negatively 
affect international competitiveness in the industries. 
Export promotion, however, can permit new firms' (or industries') initial entry at, 
or their rapid expansion to, economically efficient sizes by providing them with support 
to seek export markets but also allow them to compete in the international markets 
(Krueger, 1980). Exposure of the domestic firms to foreign competition will stimulate 
them to improve both price and non-price competitiveness. Moreover, as Balassa 
(1980) notes, overall export expansion can bring about more efficient resource 
allocation according to comparative advantage, higher utilisation of capacity and the 
exploitation of scale economies, lowering the country's overall capital-output ratios.'^ 
Export oriented firms then can be more efficient in production and in technology than 
firms oriented towards import-substitution in the domestic markets, ceteris paribus 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1979; Chen and Tang, 1987). 
Although export-promotion is regarded as superior to import-substitution, the 
latter also has some positive effects on economic growth and export expansion, though 
they may be very limited under a regime restricted to import-substitution (Ffrench-
Davis, 1980). A highly theoretical study by Krugman (1984) also suggests that import 
protection serves to enhance export promotion in some cases, particularly when the 
industry is oligopolistic and subject to some forms of scale economies. The infant 
industries or firms under the export-promotion strategy are also import-substituting in 
the sense of replacing imports in the domestic market. Moreover, when incentives for 
an industry are considerably biased towards exports, domestic consumers and related 
industries may not benefit, or may even lose out. Therefore, what matters most in 
adopting an export-promotion strategy is the appropriate mixture of incentives for 
import-substitution and export expansion or, if necessary, the efficient transition from 
the former to the latter. 
3. In a developing country, the domestic market alone may be too small to support either an efficient 
size of plants (in the case of steel or petrochemicals) or horizontal and vertical specialisation (in 
producer durables like machinery and consumer durables like automobiles). 
4. There can be additional advantages under the export-promotion strategy, including a higher savings 
rate, whereby the savings constraint on economic development can be eased (see Balassa, 1980, p. 17, 
for details); better conditions to ease the foreign currency constraint (Balassa, 1980, 1981a; and 
Krueger, 1980, 1981); greater vulnerability to external shocks due to an increasing ratio of exports to 
national income (Balassa, 1980, 1981b, 1985); smaller price distortions (Balassa, 1980; Agarwala, 
1983; and World Bank, 1983, 1985); and a less distorted market mechanism for efficient resource 
allocation and rapid economic growth (Balassa, 1980). Nevertheless, the outward-oriented export-
promotion strategy may also expose some problems. If export activities are heavily subsidised, there 
may be some static efficiency losses due to a departure from the Pareto efficient pattern of 
specialisauon (Hong, 1981, 1987). 
Appendix Tables 
Table A.l World GDP and GDP per capita in real terms by selected countries, 1960-90 
Korea Australia Austria Belgium Brazil Canada China Germany Spain 
1 9 6 0 13,664 (546) 68,646 (6,681) 47,952 (6,804) 59,158 (6,487) 61,654 (849) 129,306 (7.220) 64,566 (97) 501,300 (9,043) 86,870 (2,852) 
1 9 6 1 14,386 (559) 68,032 (6,490) 50,593 (7,139) 62,042 (6,769) 67,991 (907) 133,262 (7,294) 42,745 (65) 523,716 (9,323) 97,157 (3,160) 
1 9 6 2 14,762 (558) 72,480 (6,747) 51,678 (7,248) 65,532 (7,109) 71,530 (925) 142,703 (7,666) 38,782 (58) 548,485 (9,650) 106,192 (3,418) 
1 9 6 3 16,037 (591) 77,213 (7,051) 53,725 (7,491) 68,137 (7,340) 72,158 (906) 150,110 (7,916) 45,518 (67) 563,225 (9,814) 115,494 (3,679) 
1 9 6 4 17,527 (630) 81,865 (7,331) 57,080 (7,911) 73,058 (7,800) 74,670 (911) 160,116 (8,285) 50,096 (72) 600,890 (10,365) 122,640 (3,866) 
1 9 6 5 18,578 (651) 86,808 (7,623) 58,639 (8,083) 75,679 (8,010) 76,954 (913) 170,681 (8,674) 59,568 (83) 633,221 (10,802) 130,408 (4,068) 
1 9 6 6 20,759 (710) 89,625 (7,692) 61,681 (8,440) 77,950 (8,198) 80,963 (935) 182,268 (9,092) 71,248 (97) 651,688 (11,018) 139,609 (4,310) 
1 9 6 7 22,077 (738) 95,331 (8,080) 63,519 (8,656) 80,950 (8,470) 84,877 (955) 187,610 (9,191) 64,608 (86) 650,255 (10,968) 145,644 (4,449) 
1 9 6 8 24,626 (805) 101,154 (8,423) 66,121 (8,981) 84,327 (8,793) 94,848 (1,040) 197,655 (9,528) 59,538 (77) 687,456 (11.554) 155,508 (4,701) 
1 9 6 9 28,054 (898) 108,401 (8,840) 69,795 (9,452) 89,900 (9,352) 104,224 (1,115) 208,239 (9,903) 74,067 (93) 738,775 (12,299) 169,416 (5,068) 
1 9 7 0 30,614 (959) 114,397 (9,147) 74,897 (10,086) 93,997 (9,753) 110,092 (1.149) 215,315 (10,097) 89,937 (110) 775,481 (9,978) 178,485 (5,284) 
1 9 7 1 33,677 (1.033) 120,111 (9,284) 78,539 (10,528) 97,447 (10,074) 122,550 (1.248) 227,825 (10,551) 96,754 (115) 798,314 (10,187) 186,661 (5,460) 
1 9 7 2 35,642 (1,071) 123,476 (9,371) 83,385 (11,103) 102,591 (10,567) 137,612 (1.368) 240,659 (11,028) 100,114 (116) 831,109 (10,558) 201,654 (5,854) 
1 9 7 3 41,070 (1,210) 131,167 (9,803) 87,572 (11,594) 108,655 (11.158) 157,390 (1,527) 258,830 (11,727) 108,457 (123) 872,492 (11,050) 217,154 (6,238) 
1 9 7 4 44,716 (1.292) 141,205 (10,290) 91,020 (12,033) 113,098 (11.578) 171,621 (1.626) 269,283 (12,041) 109,603 (122) 874,929 (11.078) 228,692 (6.507) 
1 9 7 5 48,141 (1.364) 145,293 (10,458) 90,634 (11,995) 111,416 (11,375) 180,561 (1,671) 275,312 (12,130) 118,666 (129) 862,517 (10,962) 229,918 (6,474) 
1 9 7 6 54,637 (1.524) 149,507 (10,654) 94,773 (12,549) 117,675 (11,994) 198,239 (1.793) 292,534 (12,723) 112,259 (121) 908,247 (11,597) 237,444 (6,607) 
1 9 7 7 60,650 (1.666) 150,868 (10,631) 98,987 (13,095) 118,280 (12,042) 207,370 (1.832) 302,840 (13,012) 121,081 (128) 934,193 (11.951) 244,570 (6,725) 
1 9 7 8 67,282 (1.820) 158,729 (11,055) 99,121 (13,123) 121,528 (12,363) 214,071 (1.848) 316,059 (13,440) 136,001 (142) 962,155 (12,322) 248,113 (6,746) 
1 9 7 9 72,293 (1,926) 161,927 (11.157) 103,812 (13,750) 124,137 (12,619) 228,557 (1.928) 328,023 (13,813) 146,356 (151) 1,001,393 (12,821) 247,766 (6,677) 
1 9 8 0 69,915 (1.834) 166,988 (11,366) 106,827 (14,144) 129,414 (13,143) 249,379 (2,056) 332,521 (13,830) 157,641 (161) 1,012,160 (12,926) 250,833 (6,709) 
1 9 8 1 74,719 (1,930) 171,165 (11.467) 106,428 (14,068) 128,020 (12,994) 238,423 (1,922) 344,992 (14,173) 164,750 (166) 1,013,916 (12,930) 250,212 (6,627) 
1 9 8 2 80,221 (2,040) 167,857 (11,059) 107,659 (14,214) 129,953 (13,185) 239,808 (1,890) 333,491 (13,566) 179,058 (178) 1,005,045 (12,830) 253,256 (6,668) 
1 9 8 3 89,890 (2,252) 178,753 (11,631) 109,686 (14,524) 130,553 (13,246) 231,631 (1,785) 344,202 (13,886) 197,167 (193) 1,020,300 (13,060) 257,828 (6.754) 
1 9 8 4 98,187 (2,430) 187,585 (12,068) 111,179 (14.722) 133,336 (13,532) 244,064 (1,840) 366,153 (14,659) 225,606 (218) 1,048,589 (13,470) 262,468 (6.845) 
1 9 8 5 104,980 (2,573) 195,072 (12,379) 113,917 (15,078) 134,434 (13,637) 263,433 (1,943) 383,483 (15,239) 253,459 (241) 1,068,598 (13,753) 268,542 (6.974) 
1 9 8 6 117,862 (2,862) 200,373 (12,544) 115,264 (15,237) 136,441 (13,835) 284,574 (2,055) 395,971 (15,618) 274,318 (257) 1,092,097 (14,050) 277,161 (7,168) 
1 9 8 7 131,817 (3,171) 208,892 (12,856) 117,175 (15,473) 139,431 (14,127) 294,086 (2,079) 412,354 (16,092) 304,409 (281) 1,107,428 (14,227) 292,716 (7.565) 
1 9 8 8 146,906 (3,500) 217,793 (13,174) 121,855 (16,044) 146,241 (14,769) 293,403 (2,031) 431,787 (16,639) 337,091 (306) 1,148,356 (14,695) 307,860 (7.933) 
1 9 8 9 155,923 (3,679) 224,289 (13,342) 126,398 (16,592) 151,514 (15,246) 303,045 (2,056) 442,255 (16,868) 352,223 (315) 1,185,735 (15,057) 322,521 (8.295) 
1 9 9 0 170,015 (3,973) 221,697 (12,975) 132,629 (17,198) 157,220 (15,792) 290,231 (1,930) 444,019 (16,742) 371,936 (328) 1,241,718 (15,623) 334,168 (8,577) 
Notes GDP in million US$ (at 1987 conststant prices). GDP per capita in US$. Germany refers to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 
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Table A. l ( cont inued) 
France United Kingdom Hong Kong Indonesia India 
1960 337,462 (7,387) 362,426 (6,920) 4,732 
1961 356,044 (7.713) 371,130 (7,028) 5,350 
1962 379,799 (8,081) 375,464 (7,045) 5,896 
1963 400,108 (8,368) 390,236 (7,277) 6,584 
1964 426,211 (8,822) 411,447 (7,621) 7,132 
1965 446,554 (9.159) 421,951 (7.764) 8,435 
1966 469,846 (9.557) 429,349 (7,857) 8,961 
1967 491,882 (9,927) 438,936 (7.987) 9,132 
1968 512,829 (10,274) 456,752 (8,272) 9,424 
1969 548,665 (10,904) 465,877 (8,400) 10,536 
1970 566,941 (11,166) 473,093 (8,504) 11,628 
1971 594,058 (11,591) 482,506 (8,627) 12,489 
1972 620,380 (11,999) 499,317 (8,901) 13,864 
1973 654,128 (12,551) 535,657 (9,527) 15,623 
1974 674,469 (12,857) 526,487 (9,362) 15,950 
1975 672,591 (12,763) 522,462 (9,292) 16,013 
1976 701,134 (13,252) 536,605 (9,545) 18,768 
1977 723,693 (13,617) 548,953 (9,770) 21,022 
1978 747,939 (14,013) 568,989 (10,128) 22,865 
1979 772,182 (14,405) 585,258 (10,406) 25,567 
1980 784,724 (14,564) 572,528 (10,164) 28,219 
1981 793,956 (14,653) 565,005 (10,026) 30,861 
1982 814,167 (14,944) 574,560 (10,204) 31,682 
1983 819,824 (14,980) 595,566 (10,570) 33,683 
1984 830,544 (15.115) 608,441 (10,776) 36,979 
1985 846,423 (15,342) 630,200 (11,131) 37,050 
1986 868,050 (15,670) 654,947 (11,538) 41,159 
1987 887,857 (15,960) 686,330 (12,056) 47,139 
1988 925,367 (16,559) 715,372 (12,536) 51,045 
1989 961,898 (17,128) 731,721 (12,784) 52,493 
1990 989,439 (17,531) 737,738 (12,854) 54,093 
Italy Japan Mexico Malaysia 
(1,544) 
(1,661) 
(1,754) 
(1,889) 
(1,983) 
(2,285) 
(2,376) 
(2,380) 
(2,424) 
(2,686) 
(2,950) 
(3,113) 
(3,390) 
(3,744) 
(3,741) 
(3,673) 
(4,224) 
(4,661) 
(4,974) 
(5,135) 
(5,600) 
(6,028) 
(6,090) 
(6,373) 
(6,886) 
(6,791) 
(7,439) 
(8,398) 
(8,985) 
(9,112) 
(9,325) 
18,324 (195) 
19,350 (202) 
19,755 (202) 
19,340 (193) 
20,069 (196) 
20,234 (193) 
20,846 (195) 
21,022 (192) 
23,401 (209) 
24,844 (216) 
26,671 (227) 
28,532 (237) 
30,328 (246) 
32,955 (261) 
35,485 (274) 
37,267 (281) 
39,841 (293) 
43,416 (312) 
46,771 (329) 
49,651 (342) 
53,591 (361) 
57,569 (380) 
57,368 (372) 
62,421 (397) 
66,661 (416) 
68,426 (420) 
72,395 (436) 
75,932 (449) 
80,340 (467) 
86,238 (493) 
92,403 (518) 
90,783 (209) 
94,072 (212) 
96,720 (213) 
102,386 (220) 
110,029 (231) 
106,959 (219) 
106,937 (214) 
115,422 (226) 
119,235 (228) 
126.981 (237) 
133,972 (245) 
136,154 (243) 
135,325 (236) 
139,907 (239) 
141,636 (236) 
154,653 (252) 
157,336 (251) 
168,676 (263) 
178,395 (272) 
168,993 (251) 
180,238 (262) 
191.982 (273) 
199,297 (277) 
214,020 (292) 
222,095 (296) 
233,965 (306) 
244,530 (313) 
256,527 (321) 
281,559 (345) 
298,986 (359) 
315,481 (371) 
261,332 
282,777 
300,322 
317,170 
326,040 
336,697 
356,847 
382,465 
407,495 
432,344 
463,182 
469,921 
481,791 
516,524 
544,615 
529,686 
563,834 
582,691 
603,821 
640,076 
667,460 
670,511 
671,312 
678,266 
696,815 
715,058 
736,033 
759,066 
789,934 
813,948 
830,153 
(5,206) 
(5,596) 
(5,903) 
(6,188) 
(6,309) 
(6,461) 
(6,795) 
(7,230) 
(7,654) 
(8,075) 
(8,606) 
(8,690) 
(8,860) 
(9,434) 
(9,882) 
(9,554) 
(10,119) 
(10,414) 
(10,753) 
(11,365) 
(11,827) 
(11,866) 
(11,852) 
(11,934) 
(12,224) 
(12,514) 
(12,857) 
(13,237) 
(13,749) 
(14,146) 
(14,397) 
424,304 
476,933 
519,096 
565,520 
633,773 
670,397 
741,633 
824,360 
931,054 
1,050,661 
1,208,081 
1,260,577 
1,365,612 
1,472,150 
1,461,426 
1,502,034 
1,565,311 
1,637,227 
1,716,848 
1,812,461 
1,877,143 
1,944,486 
2,005,949 
2,059,400 
2,147,164 
2,254,381 
2,314,149 
2,408,961 
2,558,794 
2,679,318 
2,819,333 
(4,509) 
(5,023) 
(5,417) 
(5,841) 
(6,479) 
(6,780) 
(7,432) 
(8,184) 
(9,213) 
(10,184) 
(11,578) 
(11,926) 
(12,740) 
(13,621) 
(13,266) 
(13,418) 
(13,880) 
(14,379) 
(14,942) 
(15,642) 
(16,074) 
(16,528) 
(16,935) 
(17,268) 
(17,890) 
(18,669) 
(19,048) 
(19,731) 
(20,869) 
(21,763) 
(22,822) 
34,716 
36,448 
38,143 
41,221 
46,109 
49,122 
52,551 
55,880 
60,388 
64,154 
68,775 
71,629 
77,705 
84,101 
89,192 
94,279 
98,267 
101,452 
109,796 
119,956 
129,998 
141,403 
140,515 
134,618 
139,570 
143,402 
137,856 
140,440 
142,511 
147,088 
152,943 
(913) 
(927) 
(939) 
(983) 
(1,064) 
(1,098) 
(1,137) 
(1,170) 
(1,223) 
(1,257) 
(1,303) 
(1,313) 
(1,378) 
(1,444) 
(1,484) 
(1,523) 
(1,543) 
(1,551) 
(1,637) 
(1,745) 
(1,846) 
(1,962) 
(1,906) 
(1,786) 
(1,814) 
(1,826) 
(1,722) 
(1,721) 
(1,715) 
(1,738) 
(1,775) 
6,123 
6,589 
7,012 
7,526 
7,930 
8,539 
9,206 
9,561 
10,324 
10,829 
11,477 
12,154 
13,292 
14,843 
16,063 
16,193 
18,091 
19,499 
20,818 
22,791 
24,488 
26,166 
27,725 
29,499 
31.826 
31,443 
31,833 
33,560 
36,604 
39.827 
43,808 
(752) 
(783) 
(807) 
(840) 
(859) 
(899) 
(942) 
(952) 
(1,001) 
(1.024) 
(1,058) 
(1.092) 
(1,165) 
(1.270) 
(1,341) 
(1,321) 
(1,442) 
(1,519) 
(1,585) 
(1.695) 
(1,779) 
(1,852) 
(1.911) 
(1,981) 
(2,084) 
(2,005) 
(1.976) 
(2,030) 
(2.161) 
(2,295) 
(2,453) 
Source E D B , RSPacS, ANU (compiled from World Bank, World Tables). 
to L»J 
Table A . l (continued) 
Netherlands New Zealand Philippines Singapore Sweden Thailand Turkey Taiwan United States 
1 9 6 0 89,202 (7,765) 11,143 (404) 2,468 (1,499) 73,148 (9,779) 7,625 (289) 16,170 (588) 8,966 (831) 1,936,591 (10,719) 1 9 6 1 89,704 (7,707) - 11,767 (416) 2,672 (1,570) 77,303 (10,280) 8,029 (296) 16,425 (582) 9,356 (839) 1,987,996 (10,823) 1 9 6 2 96,109 (8,141) - 12,332 (424) 2,857 (1,632) 80,596 (10,658) 8,677 (310) 17,429 (603) 10,307 (895) 2,092,406 (11,217) 1 9 6 3 99,652 (8,328) - 13,191 (440) 3,144 (1,752) 84,890 (11,164) 9,390 (326) 19,078 (644) 11,269 (948) 2,177,338 (11,506) 1 9 6 4 107,543 (8,868) - 13,656 (441) 2,981 (1,619) 90,680 (11,837) 10,025 (337) 19,849 (653) 12,746 (1,040) 2,294,173 (11,956) 1 9 6 5 113,573 (9,237) - 14,366 (449) 3,167 (1,678) 94,145 (12,173) 10,836 (354) 20,353 (653) 14,079 (1,115) 2,427,080 (12,491) 1 9 6 6 117,091 (9,400) - 15,008 (453) 3,504 (1,812) 96,114 (12,310) 12,139 (384) 22,716 (711) 15,264 (1,175) 2,571,358 (13,082) 1 9 6 7 123,546 (9,807) - 15,929 (466) 3,957 (2,001) 99,349 (12,627) 13,112 (402) 23,750 (725) 17,129 (1,288) 2,646,140 (13,316) 1 9 6 8 131,724 (10,348) - 16,810 (476) 4,505 (2,239) 102,963 (13,010) 14,219 (423) 25,297 (753) 18,296 (1,340) 2,756,356 (13,733) 1 9 6 9 138,910 (10,787) - 17,623 (484) 5,084 (2,489) 108,121 (13,569) 15,350 (443) 26,629 (773) 20,078 (1,401) 2,825,555 (13,941) 
1 9 7 0 147,416 (11,306) 24,977 (8,857) 18,582 (495) 5,730 (2,761) 115,509 (14,361) 16,854 (471) 27,954 (791) 22,534 (1,535) 2,768,811 (13,503) 1 9 7 1 153,639 (11,644) 26,271 (9,205) 19,579 (507) 6,422 (3,039) 116,600 (14,399) 17,686 (480) 30,456 (840) 25,529 (1,702) 2,861,232 (13,778) 1 9 7 2 158,725 (11,908) 27,397 (9,441) 20,637 (519) 7,250 (3,369) 119,269 (14,685) 18,426 (485) 32,479 (873) 29,139 (1,906) 3,005,534 (14,319) 1 9 7 3 166,167 (12,365) 29,343 (9,927) 22,450 (549) 8,082 (3,685) 124,002 (15,239) 20,235 (517) 33,852 (886) 32,385 (2,081) 3,146,594 (14,849) 1 9 7 4 172,757 (12,754) 31,090 (10,281) 23,210 (552) 8,628 (3,869) 127,900 (15,672) 21,110 (524) 36,750 (938) 33,160 (2,092) 3,123,247 (14,605) 1 9 7 5 172,599 (12,630) 30,733 (9,956) 24,475 m 8,971 (3,964) 131,068 (15,998) 22,123 (535) 40,017 (998) 34,484 (2,135) 3,091,283 (14,313) 1 9 7 6 181,435 (13,172) 31,482 (10,120) 26,626 (603) 9,612 (4,192) 132,452 (16,109) 24,191 (570) 43,522 (1,063) 39,566 (2,397) 3,241,947 (14,869) 1 9 7 7 185,640 (13,398) 29,948 (9,599) 28,103 (622) 10,358 (4,455) 130,247 (15,784) 26,525 (609) 45,600 (1,091) 43,173 (2,568) 3,386,049 (15,374) 1 9 7 8 190,200 (13,642) 30,025 (9,620) 29,548 (640) 11,248 (4,780) 132,394 (15,997) 29,325 (657) 47,184 (1,108) 48,939 (2,856) 3,559,266 (15,991) 1 9 7 9 194,709 (13,870) 30,711 (9,878) 31,194 (661) 12,290 (5,155) 137,495 (16,578) 30,800 (675) 46,642 (1,073) 53,452 (3,058) 3,629,624 (16,128) 
1 9 8 0 196,388 (13,879) 31,005 (9,960) 32,796 (679) 13,479 (5,584) 139,772 (16,820) 32,236 (690) 46,300 (1,042) 57,247 (3,215) 3,626,751 (15,924) 1 9 8 1 195,006 (13,688) 32,475 (10,326) 33,912 (685) 14,770 (5,953) 139,755 (16,797) 34,256 (718) 48,236 (1,060) 60,822 (3,354) 3,709,018 (16,116) 1 9 8 2 192,259 (13,432) 32,636 (10,253) 35,132 (692) 15,785 (6,200) 141,277 (16,970) 35,636 (731) 50,600 (1,085) 62,425 (3,382) 3,613,311 (15,540) 1 9 8 3 194,959 (13,570) 33,532 (10,391) 35,765 (687) 17,073 (6,541) 143,963 (17,280) 38,186 (768) 52,509 (1,097) 67,363 (3,596) 3,754,064 (15,988) 1 9 8 4 201,118 (13,943) 35,113 (10,771) 33,144 (621) 18,498 (6,926) 149,683 (17,954) 40,929 (807) 55,630 (1,133) 73,791 (3,881) 4,014,032 (16,937) 1 9 8 5 206,419 (14,244) 35,412 (10,764) 30,733 (562) 18,158 (6,649) 152,984 (18,321) 42,303 (819) 58,435 (1,162) 76,485 (3,972) 4,163,071 (17,398) 1 9 8 6 210,618 (14,454) 36,336 (10,994) 31,785 (568) 18,481 (6,626) 156,369 (18,682) 44,442 (844) 63,283 (1,229) 84,020 (4,319) 4,299,982 (17,796) 1 9 8 7 212,356 (14,480) 36,499 (10,941) 33,307 (581) 20,232 (7,112) 160,801 (19,145) 48,719 (909) 68,013 (1,292) 97,284 (4,945) 4,452,877 (18,254) 1 9 8 8 218,043 (14,773) 36,120 (10,972) 35,411 (603) 22,496 (7,757) 164,452 (19,494) 55,258 (1,013) 70,544 (1,312) 103,895 (5,220) 4,654,917 (18,899) 1 9 8 9 226,866 (15,278) 36,654 (11,067) 37,542 (625) 24,571 (8,324) 168,355 (19,811) 62,021 (1,119) 71,691 (1,305) 116,861 (5,812) 4,784,535 (19,233) 1 9 9 0 235,784 (15,779) 36,216 (10,636) 38,450 (625) 26,626 (8,866) 169,407 (19,793) 68,416 (1,226) 77,944 (1,389) 122,182 (6,003) 4,828,763 (19,317) 
Note '-" stands for "not available". to 
Table A.2 Shares of GDP by major sectors in Korea, 1954-90 (percent) 
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P*rimary Manufacturing 
Total Heavy 
Constniction 
Light 
Others 
1954 40.7 11.8 2.5 (21.2) 9.3 (78.8) 3.1 44.4 1955 45.5 11.6 2.3 (19.8) 9.3 (80.2) 3.6 39.3 
1956 48.0 11.6 2.3 (19.8) 9.3 (80.2) 3.3 37.1 1957 46.7 11.2 2.2 (19.6) 9.0 (80.4) 4,2 37.9 1958 42.3 12.8 2.7 (21.1) 10.1 (78.9) 4,1 40.7 1959 35.6 14.1 3.0 (21.3) 11.1 (78.7) 4.3 46.0 1960 38.9 13.8 3.1 (22.5) 10.7 (77.5) 4.1 43.2 
1961 41.0 13.6 3.6 (26.5) 10.0 (73.5) 4.4 41.0 1962 39.0 14.4 4.1 (28.5) 10.3 (71.5) 4.6 42.1 1963 45.0 14.7 4.4 (29.9) 10.3 (70.1) 3.9 36,3 1964 48.6 15.6 4.7 (30.1) 10.9 (69.9) 3.7 32.1 1965 40.0 18.0 5.7 (31.7) 12.3 (68.3) 4,7 37,2 
1966 36.7 18.6 6,3 (33,9) 12.3 (66.1) 5,1 39.6 1967 32.5 19.1 6.6 (34.6) 12.5 (65.4) 5,3 43.0 1968 30.2 20.1 7.6 (37,8) 12.5 (62.2) 6,2 43,5 1969 29.3 20.3 7.6 (37.4) 12.7 (62.6) 7,2 43,2 1970 28.4 20.9 7.9 (37.8) 13.0 (62.2) 7,1 43,6 
1971 28.4 21.3 8.4 (39.4) 12.9 (60.6) 5.9 44.3 1972 27.9 22.4 8.1 (36.2) 14.3 (63.8) 5.7 44,0 1973 26.1 25.1 10.0 (39.8) 15.1 (60.2) 5,8 42,9 1974 25.8 26.1 12.6 (48.3) 13.5 (51.7) 5,5 42,5 1975 26.4 26.1 12.0 (46.0) 14.1 (54.0) 6,0 41,5 
1976 24.7 27.6 13.0 (47.1) 14,6 (52.9) 5,9 41,8 
1977 23.8 27.5 13.5 (49.1) 14.0 (50.9) 7,0 41,6 
1978 21.9 28.1 14.2 (50.5) 13.9 (49.5) 9,0 40,9 
1979 20.3 28.8 15.0 (52.1) 13.8 (47.9) 10,2 40.7 
1980 16,2 29.7 15.2 (51.2) 14.5 (48.8) 10,4 43,7 
1981 17.0 29.9 15.6 (52,2) 14,3 (47.8) 9,4 43,7 
1982 15.9 29.2 15,4 (52.7) 13.8 (47.3) 10,0 45,0 
1983 14.7 29.9 16.5 (55.2) 13.4 (44.8) 10,6 44,8 
1984 13.9 30,8 17,3 (56.2) 13,5 (43,8) 10,7 44,6 
1985 13.8 30.3 17.2 (56.8) 13,1 (43,2) 10,5 45,4 
1986 12.5 31,7 18.1 (57.1) 13,6 (42,9) 10,2 45,6 
1987 11.3 32,2 18.4 (57.1) 13.8 (42.9) 10,4 46,0 
1988 11.2 31,6 18,6 (58,9) 13.0 (41.1) 10,7 46,5 
1989 10.7 31,5 19,3 (61.2) 12.2 (38.8) 12,2 45.6 
1990 9.6 29,2 18.2 (62.4) 11.0 (37.6) 15,0 46,2 
Notes Shares of manufacturing total in parentheses (per cent). 
'Primary' sector includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying. 
'Heavy' and 'light' stand for heavy industries and light industries, respectively. 
'Construction' includes electricity, gas, water and construction activities. 
'Others' comprise all service activities and import duties less imputed bank service charges, 
where government services and private non-profit services to households account in general 
for less than 10 per cent. 
Sources Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Bank of Korea, National Accounts, 1989. 
National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, various issues. 
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Table A.3a Shares of manufacturing value added by major industries in Korea, 1963-90 
(ISIC commodity classification; per cent) 
31 32 33 M 35 36 37 371 38 381 382 383 384 385 
1963 31.6 20.2 4.1 7.8 15.4 6.0 3.4 2.9 10.5 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.3 0.3 
1964 31.7 18.6 3.7 8.7 17.5 7.1 2.9 2.4 9.1 1.7 2.5 2.5 2.2 0.2 
1965 26.5 20.2 3.3 6.4 18.8 6.7 5.0 4.2 11.8 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.7 0.3 
1966 25.3 19.4 4.4 7.6 15.9 6.7 4.5 3.7 14.7 2.5 2.8 3.7 5.4 0 4 
1967 24.6 23.6 3.9 5.7 17.7 6.9 3.8 3.1 12.2 2.8 2.9 2.4 3.8 0 4 
1968 23.1 20.0 4.7 6.0 21.2 6.2 3.8 3.3 13.3 2.7 2.3 3.5 4.4 0.5 
1969 23.3 18.7 3 4 5.4 22.8 6.1 3.8 3.3 14.4 2.4 2.0 3,6 6.0 0.4 
1970 25.8 17.1 3.6 5.1 22.1 6.0 4.0 3.5 13.5 2.4 1.8 4.0 5.1 0 4 
1971 24.7 17.6 4.6 5.7 23.6 6.0 3.6 2.9 11.9 2.2 1.4 4.0 4.1 0.3 
1972 25.0 20.6 4.3 5.0 20.9 5.2 3.9 3.3 12.8 1.9 1.5 5.0 3.8 0.5 
1973 18.2 21.8 4.6 4.4 20.0 5.1 7.6 6 7 16.2 2.3 2.3 6.6 4.4 0.6 
1974 18.9 19.7 3.4 4.3 19.3 5.2 8.7 7.7 18.6 3.0 2.1 8.3 4.7 0.5 
1975 17.8 22.6 2.7 4.0 22.3 5.7 6.5 5.7 16.6 2.4 2.2 7.2 4.0 0,8 
1976 18.6 22.5 2.5 3.6 20.7 4.8 5.4 4.7 19.9 2.2 2.7 8.8 5.2 0.9 
1977 19.1 19.6 2.5 4.2 18.3 5.2 5.8 4.9 23.4 2.7 2.9 8.6 8.2 1.0 
1978 18.0 20.0 2.8 4.0 17.5 5.0 6.6 5.6 24.2 3.6 3.9 8.9 6.8 1.0 
1979 16.3 19.3 2.3 4.3 18.7 5.7 7.8 6.8 23.8 3.7 4.4 8.8 5.9 1.0 
1980 16.6 19.5 1.7 4.4 20.5 5.8 7.8 6 4 21.8 3.3 3.4 8.1 5.9 1.1 
1981 15.8 19.8 1.5 4.2 20.0 5.0 8.4 7.2 23.4 3.6 3 4 8.6 7.0 0.9 
1982 16.6 17.8 1.9 4.4 19.1 4.3 8.6 7.6 25.3 4.1 3.5 8.8 8.1 0.9 
1983 15.8 16.6 1.8 4.9 18.5 4.9 8.1 6.9 27.4 4.1 4.1 10.1 8.4 0.8 
1984 14.4 16.6 1.6 4.6 18.1 4.8 8.1 7.0 29.8 3.9 4.5 11.9 8.5 1.0 
1985 13.8 16.5 1.5 4.6 18.5 4.8 7.7 6.6 30.6 4.0 4 7 11.8 9.1 0.9 
1986 12.7 167 1 4 4.6 17.5 4.7 7.2 6.1 32.8 4.4 5 4 13.5 8.4 1.1 
1987 117 164 1 4 4.6 17.3 4.3 7.1 6.0 34.6 4.5 5 7 147 8.6 1.1 
1988 11.4 15.3 1.5 4.5 17.5 4.3 7.2 5.9 35.9 4.9 6.3 15.2 8,1 1.3 
1989 11.5 144 1.6 4.8 17.3 4.7 7.7 6 4 36.0 5.0 6.8 147 8.3 1.2 
1990 11.3 13.1 1.5 4.8 17.7 4.6 8.0 6.6 37.4 4.9 7.2 14.5 9,4 1.3 
Notes The ISIC commodity codes referred to are: 
31: Food, beverages and tobacco. 
32: Textiles, wearing appreal and leather products. 
33: Wood products and nonmetal furniture. 
34: Paper and products, printing and publishing. 
35: Chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber, plastic etc. 
36: Non-metal mineral products except coal and peroleum. 
37: Basic metal products. 
371: Iron and steel products. 
372: Non-ferrous metal products (= ISIC 37 - ISIC 371). 
38: Fabricated metal products and machinery. 
381: Fabricated metal products except machinery. 
382: Machinery except electrical. 
383: Electrical machinery and apparatus. 
384: Transport equipment. 
385: Professional and scientific equipment. 
39: Other manufactured products (not presented here). 
Source lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UNIDO industrial statistics). 
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Table A.3b Shares of manufacturing employment by major industries in Korea, 
1963-90 aSICclassification; percent) 
31 32 33 24 35 36 37 371 38 381 382 383 384 385 
1963 14.7 32.4 4.2 6.8 15.3 5.7 3.4 2.6 15.3 3.7 3.6 2.6 5.0 0 4 
1964 15.6 30.8 4.5 7.9 14.7 5.9 3.3 2.5 15.4 4.0 4.1 2.8 4.2 04 
1965 15.5 32.3 4.1 6.5 14.2 6.8 3.4 2.6 15.0 3.9 3.3 2.8 4.6 0.3 
1966 14.4 31.3 4.8 6.6 12.8 5.6 3.4 2.6 17.6 4.3 3.9 3.3 5.4 0.6 
1967 13.0 33.6 4.7 5.9 11.5 7.1 4.0 3.1 16.6 4.2 4.0 3.4 4.5 0.6 
1968 12.8 32.8 5.5 6.0 12.4 6.7 3.9 3.3 15.9 4.2 3.2 3.8 4.1 0.5 
1969 12.0 33.5 5.3 5.6 12.0 6.0 3 4 2.8 16.9 4.2 3.0 4.7 4 4 0.6 
1970 134 314 5.2 5.7 12.1 5.8 3.8 3.2 16.9 4.1 31 4.7 4.4 07 
1971 13.2 32.8 4.8 6.1 12.6 5.6 3.1 2.5 16.5 4.5 2.4 5.1 3.8 0.6 
1972 13.8 32.7 4.5 6.0 11.7 4.5 2.9 2.2 17.7 3.8 2.6 6.5 4.0 07 
1973 11.9 34.0 4.4 4.9 12.1 4.3 3.3 2.6 19.8 3 8 3.1 8.4 3 8 0.9 
1974 11.8 33.0 3.8 4.7 12.7 4.6 3.6 2.8 21.7 4.1 2.8 9.5 4.3 0.9 
1975 104 35.7 3.6 4.9 13.0 4.2 3.4 2.6 20.9 3.7 3.3 9.0 3.7 1.2 
1976 8.9 35.6 3.5 4.1 13.1 3 8 3.2 2.7 23.3 3.5 3.6 107 4.1 14 
1977 8.7 344 3.6 4.4 12.5 4.0 3.7 31 24.5 4.2 3 7 9.9 5.0 1.7 
1978 8.2 32.9 3 7 4.1 11.9 4.4 4.0 3.2 27.1 4.5 4.1 11.1 5.5 1.8 
1979 8.6 30.4 3.5 4.3 12.2 4.7 4.3 3.5 28.3 4.6 4.6 11.9 5.7 1.4 
1980 9.0 30.9 3.3 4.5 13.2 4.7 4.5 3 4 26.5 4.4 4.0 10.8 5.7 1.6 
1981 8.3 32.1 3.0 4.4 12.9 4.5 4.3 3.3 26.7 4.5 4.1 10.5 6.2 1.4 
1982 8.2 317 2.9 4.5 13.2 4.5 4.2 3.2 27.0 5.0 4.2 10.0 6 4 1.4 
1983 8 4 30.6 2.9 4.4 12.8 4.5 4.3 3.3 28.4 5.2 4.5 10.8 6.5 1.3 
1984 8.1 28.8 2.8 4.4 12.6 4.6 4.3 3.2 30.4 5.2 4.8 11.9 7.0 1.5 
1985 8.0 28.1 2.7 4.4 13.2 4.5 4.1 3.0 31.1 5.2 5.1 12.1 7.3 1.5 
1986 7.6 27.2 2 4 4.2 13.7 4.2 3.9 2.9 32.5 5.3 5.4 13.5 6.7 1.6 
1987 7.2 26.1 2.3 4.1 13.8 3.9 3.6 2.8 34.6 5.3 5.7 15.1 6.9 1.6 
1988 7.1 24.8 2.6 4.2 13.7 3.8 3.8 2.8 36.2 5.8 6.2 154 7.1 17 
1989 7.2 24.4 2 7 4.4 13.1 3.9 4.0 2.9 36.7 5.9 6.6 154 7.2 1.7 
1990 7.1 23.5 2.6 4.5 13.3 3 9 4.0 2.9 37.8 5.9 6.9 15.3 7.8 1.8 
Notes The ISIC commodity codes referred to are: 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38: 
39: 
Food, beverages and tobacco. 
Textiles, wearing appreal and leather products. 
Wood products and nonmetal furniture. 
Paper and products, printing and publishing. 
Chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber, plastic etc. 
Non-metal mineral products except coal and peroleum. 
Basic metal products. 
371: Iron and steel products. 
372: Non-ferrous metal products (= ISIC 37 - ISIC 371). 
Fabricated metal products and machinery. 
381: Fabricated metal products except machinery. 
382: Machinery except electrical. 
383: Electrical machinery and apparatus. 
384: Transport equipment. 
385: Professional and scientific equipment. 
Other manufactured products (not presented here). 
Source lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UNIDO industrial statistics). 
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Table A.4 Finished steel production, exports and imports in Korea, 1962-90 
(thousand tonnes) 
a. Production 
Long products Plate and pipes HR/CR products 
Shapes Rails Bar products Wire rod 
Pipe, 
tube Plates Sheets Hoop, strip 
Total 
1962 8 0 62 8 10 0 23 0 113 1963 17 0 85 21 14 0 25 0 165 1964 23 0 75 27 15 0 33 0 180 1965 21 0 103 29 19 0 36 2 215 1966 20 0 154 25 29 0 39 1 273 1967 28 0 191 32 37 22 78 0 394 1968 43 0 325 51 65 30 109 1 637 1969 60 0 455 72 96 43 158 13 916 1970 50 0 593 71 136 44 249 25 1178 1971 60 0 635 63 117 69 360 37 1359 1972 85 0 560 88 188 139 603 81 1761 1973 132 0 570 95 310 219 1177 144 2672 1974 199 5 704 176 384 344 1065 207 3119 1975 153 8 821 171 346 333 572 270 2727 
1976 216 6 1011 191 496 447 617 759 3796 1977 237 13 1393 262 631 501 864 937 4951 1978 395 16 1702 301 956 822 1090 910 6346 1979 406 35 1955 414 1096 1433 1090 899 7479 1980 345 27 2278 554 1122 1496 1066 835 7852 
1981 468 53 2185 587 1424 1765 1245 2199 10115 1982 621 49 2817 639 1297 1812 1216 2259 10858 1983 674 75 3301 671 1666 1845 1387 2331 12089 1984 777 111 3677 715 1872 1975 1541 2568 13427 1985 864 97 3893 999 1881 2016 1593 2375 13931 
1986 1091 102 4413 1083 1662 2129 1818 2765 15308 1987 1305 125 4280 1152 1883 2381 2261 3816 17507 1988 1469 93 4598 1161 2112 2311 2162 4660 18887 1989 1593 60 5052 1598 2410 2262 2754 5793 21756 1990 1823 78 5879 1658 2657 2717 3392 5943 24536 
HR/CR products 
Hot rolled Hot rolled Cold roUed Cold rolled Stainless Electrical Coated sheet strip/hoop sheet strip/hoop steel sheet sheet products 
1976 160.3 301.5 347.7 457.3 0.0 0.0 109.3 
1977 213.3 417.1 379.2 519.8 75.6 1.0 195.1 
1978 267.0 217.6 469.7 692.7 92.0 0.2 260.7 
1979 239.2 254.9 492.3 643.9 95.8 0.1 262.8 
1980 266.7 315.4 410.9 519.9 97.8 19.1 272.0 
1981 268.0 1588.1 438.3 610.5 100.3 37.0 400.9 
1982 299.8 1706.4 346.4 552.9 89.0 34.2 446.3 
1983 261.5 1613.6 406.2 717.3 110.1 59.0 550.0 
1984 307.0 1662.7 386.2 905.3 125.2 70.3 652.1 
1985 334.1 1515.2 398.8 859.6 118.3 65.2 676.8 
1986 417.6 1876.4 329.1 888.3 172.7 95.8 802.6 
1987 482.8 2486.2 296.0 1330.2 206.9 113.0 1162.7 
1988 538.4 3085.5 205.2 1574.4 219.6 139.9 1058.8 
1989 454.6 3506.7 344.5 2286.7 210.4 153.5 1591.5 
1990 454.8 3708.6 306.8 2234.2 312.7 193.1 2124.5 
Table A.4 (continued) 
b. Exports 
239 
Long products Plate and pipes HR/CR products 
Shapes Rails Bar products Wire rod Pipe, tube Plates Sheets Hoop, soip 
Total 
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 1963 0 0 1 19 3 1 50 3 77 1964 1 0 7 12 1 0 12 1 34 1965 0 0 6 11 0 0 41 0 59 1966 0 0 0 3 0 0 27 1 32 1967 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 7 19 1968 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 12 23 1969 0 0 2 2 1 0 28 38 72 1970 0 0 13 6 2 4 54 62 141 1971 0 0 19 8 8 8 155 183 382 1972 5 0 110 18 51 40 424 5 663 1973 11 1 43 18 94 111 542 40 880 1974 87 0 25 108 206 241 547 135 1354 1975 36 1 148 57 109 163 182 201 899 1976 30 0 174 41 238 168 487 253 1403 1977 16 0 95 10 254 97 503 326 1301 1978 33 2 76 35 435 157 747 118 1623 1979 92 2 205 120 494 671 593 198 2395 1980 128 4 669 157 757 889 605 288 3548 
1981 155 11 664 90 993 710 617 1074 4371 1982 185 7 743 116 736 1016 780 1630 5263 1983 218 20 968 85 974 904 808 1331 5366 1984 228 64 1145 43 1060 688 1032 1172 5473 1985 215 39 1140 229 935 565 895 1183 5239 
1986 309 51 1465 142 713 873 776 1228 5597 1987 404 63 1036 113 802 692 1047 1542 5743 1988 459 48 748 78 898 687 445 2829 6262 1989 431 33 499 353 812 600 712 2948 6448 1990 292 29 236 252 849 676 1270 3144 6795 
HR/CR products 
Hot rolled 
sheet 
Hot rolled 
strip/hoop 
Cold roUed 
sheet 
Cold roUed 
strip/hoop 
Stainless 
steel sheet 
Electrical 
sheet 
Coated 
products 
1975 12.1 200.8 161.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 1976 2.4 253.1 472.4 0.2 8.1 0.0 3.8 1977 14.1 313.9 445.9 11.8 12.1 0.0 30.5 1978 29.9 114.2 646.7 3.9 0.0 0.0 70.1 
1979 21.8 185.7 510.5 12.3 0.0 0.0 60.4 
1980 51.9 269.7 441.6 18.6 21.7 7.8 82.4 
1981 67.0 1067.7 376.3 6.6 12.5 5.8 154.9 
1982 81.4 1622.9 462.0 6.9 14.0 3.0 219.9 
1983 60.3 1319.8 442.4 11.3 12.5 9.6 283.2 
1984 80.3 1159.8 578.0 11.8 16.7 11.6 345.6 
1985 83.5 1171.6 463.1 11.7 19.1 12.4 316.9 
1986 93.1 1212.1 372.2 15.4 20.0 16.4 274.0 
1987 98.5 1518.0 531.4 23.5 33.9 10.0 373.4 
1988 34.9 2258.5 47.0 570.7 28.7 12.0 322.1 
1989 37.6 2104.0 132.8 844.2 21.6 13.0 506.6 
1990 27.1 2163.1 124.5 980.6 46.1 44.5 1027.2 
Table A.4 (continued) 
c. Imports 
240 
Long products Plate and pipes HR/CR products 
Shapes Rails Bar products Wire rod Pipe, tube Plates Sheets Hoop, suip 
Total 
1962 14 9 3 7 17 44 22 14 123 1963 10 17 7 15 9 35 85 22 203 1964 5 3 3 4 1 25 17 16 76 1965 8 13 2 3 5 35 67 22 156 1966 16 29 11 5 8 47 47 30 214 1967 23 19 27 12 45 100 22 90 368 1968 22 18 28 20 19 40 67 152 407 1969 23 35 29 25 21 60 37 266 557 1970 19 21 9 28 17 24 42 312 513 
1971 27 58 5 26 43 18 51 539 826 1972 74 6 12 36 25 47 44 825 1129 1973 55 38 17 59 16 152 52 999 1422 1974 60 43 44 112 23 238 66 1059 1679 1975 58 11 46 140 32 238 52 405 983 
1976 56 36 45 224 45 209 155 836 1608 1977 146 28 56 174 110 339 247 914 2016 1978 226 27 113 271 73 384 228 1232 2559 1979 152 24 104 266 89 179 256 1374 2452 1980 124 7 35 198 72 166 212 1228 2034 
1981 256 9 69 189 82 245 191 980 2026 1982 217 2 38 159 81 261 153 286 1205 1983 169 4 42 281 85 280 212 941 2023 1984 261 3 51 316 99 409 327 1325 2801 1985 220 4 57 237 92 431 294 1201 2547 
1986 99 2 61 246 94 298 508 1212 2525 1987 114 3 100 313 122 507 775 933 2873 1988 123 2 94 428 140 446 430 1056 2730 1989 147 6 88 207 130 331 541 1949 3407 1990 396 3 773 234 191 317 277 2213 4417 
HR/CR products 
Hot rolled 
sheet 
Hot rolled 
sUip/hoop 
Cold rolled 
sheet 
Cold rolled 
stripAioop 
Stainless 
steel sheet 
Electrical 
sheet 
Coated 
products 
1975 18.5 404.7 20.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 5.1 
1976 46.4 836.5 534 0.0 0.0 2.3 53.3 
1977 132.1 859.7 53.2 53.9 0.0 19.4 42.6 
1978 66.9 1216.5 29.0 15.7 0.0 44.2 87.7 
1979 74.8 1356.7 614 174 4.9 40.5 79.1 
1980 112.6 1218.3 28.2 9.5 4.9 17.2 48.5 
1981 105.2 975.0 28.5 5.1 11.7 9.8 35.5 
1982 64.5 281.0 30.6 5.5 10.2 8.0 40.1 
1983 91.7 935.5 47.6 5.6 24.1 9.2 39.2 
1984 149.4 13054 39.0 19.1 36.3 12.2 89.7 
1985 87.3 1182.7 35.1 184 31.3 17.6 123.1 
1986 116.8 1186.5 108.3 25.6 25.6 27.8 229.1 
1987 154.0 904.9 261.2 28.4 22.3 47.1 290.6 
1988 48.4 757.8 17.8 298.0 24.9 72.1 267.1 
1989 92.1 1679.9 21.8 269.4 24.4 68.6 333.9 
1990 75.3 2019.2 11.9 193.9 19.6 50.4 120.1 
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Table A.4 (continued) 
Notes The difference between 'Total' and the sum of finished steel data is for iron and steel forgings 
and castings. Cast iron products are not included. 
Bar product includes bars and reinforcing bars. 
HR /CR stand for hot rolled/cold rolled. 
1976 HR strip production data include export figure only 
CR sheet export and import data before 1988 include CR sheet and CR strip. 
Export and import data for stainless steel sheet and electrical steel are not specified before 
1980. 
Coated products include tin plate, galvanised sheet and other coated products. 
Source Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
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Table A.5 Factor costs per tonne of gross steel production, selected countries, 1975-90 
(US$; averages over major firms) 
Australia US Canada Japan W. Ger France UK Brazil India Taiwan Korea World" 
Total production costs per tonne of crude steel 
1975 176.1 259.8 205,5 220.4 322.3 296.4 301.9 409,3 207.4 - 162,7 252.7 1976 190.6 260.3 227,8 241.0 278,6 267,0 261,6 465,8 220,2 — 150,7 250,4 1977 206.9 296.4 235,5 285.7 313,9 322,9 361,9 364,1 250,1 _ 194,2 289,0 1978 217.7 312.7 247,1 357.4 364,2 350,4 386,2 423,4 277.4 272,0 243,5 326,7 1979 247.2 367.3 267,0 331.9 426,8 432,7 523,1 468,5 356.3 256,7 212,5 361,0 
1980 292.6 442.1 295,6 415.1 472,5 434,0 657.1 410,6 375.0 248,5 264,0 427,2 1981 389.4 431.3 346,9 425.0 416,4 431,0 428.9 488,2 424.1 277,9 259,6 414,6 1982 435.6 591.4 367,4 407,7 443,1 474,1 454.3 561,6 468.1 268,8 254,7 444,2 1983 504.0 465.9 346,7 397,9 417,8 449,0 350.5 383,4 503.1 266,0 249,2 400,7 1984 420.7 470.8 336,0 369,9 367,4 417,7 340.5 501,8 487,1 236.1 237,6 378,0 
1985 381.8 457.7 323,0 413,3 334,3 433,6 335,7 473,0 504,4 258.4 234,9 384,6 1986 352.6 440.6 337,3 527,8 413,1 504,4 377.5 339,6 523.7 221.4 248,3 430,1 1987 407.5 413.0 366,1 534,3 492,8 537,5 370.7 574,3 552.8 236.3 301.5 444,3 1988 577.3 419.4 428,4 588.2 537,5 533,1 431,2 745.8 579.4 259.6 337.2 490.2 1989 664.3 441.4 430,2 554.8 539,4 530,9 424,4 1133.5 580.4 220.5 406.4 497.3 
1990 684.3 433.7 541,1 575.9 - - - - - 248.7 414.8 505.8 
Employment costs per tonne of crude steel 
1975 68,0 109.5 71,5 28.2 91,3 66,8 101,5 67.3 43.5 11.0 73.9 1976 66.0 105.4 80,3 29.2 86,9 61,7 79,9 91,1 42.6 - 9.6 71.3 1977 72.9 118.1 82.2 39.4 94,8 69,0 101,0 73,6 48.8 - 12.2 82.1 1978 77.6 118.7 81,4 49.1 105,5 67,6 117,0 83,2 58.8 16.2 18.2 88.8 1979 83.1 142.7 87,6 44.4 118,7 86,5 151,8 85,6 74.9 15.8 13.3 99.1 
1980 99.6 169.9 95,4 56.6 125,4 81,4 198,8 83,0 80.3 19.7 11.8 113.0 1981 127.9 161.1 108,2 57.5 116,3 73,9 122,2 101,3 80.5 25.2 12.8 105.6 
1982 165.2 214.1 133.6 57.7 123,7 80,1 114.6 116,9 83.2 25.9 11.7 112.7 
1983 177.1 162.1 121.0 59.1 118,7 75,5 84.1 57,6 93.3 22.2 12.9 98.7 
1984 109.5 145.4 116.0 54.1 95,1 61,4 75.6 59,5 83.6 22.3 13.4 85.9 
1985 126,0 131.4 112.3 66.5 82,6 107,5 80.5 51,1 84.5 28.6 11.9 87.2 
1986 115.8 135.6 112.2 89.6 114,3 139,3 89.1 67,8 87,5 28.0 13.4 100.8 
1987 125,4 118.1 121,7 91.5 141.8 151,5 84.9 79,8 104,5 30.4 16.5 102.3 
1988 167.2 108.7 131,4 94.6 144.2 134,5 95.2 95,3 107,1 38.6 19.5 106.1 
1989 156.3 105,4 136,5 84.3 137.3 110,8 93.3 170,5 104,2 37.8 21.7 100.1 
1990 155.5 106.3 154.6 82.4 - - - - - 50.2 23.4 89.9 
Material costs per tonne of crude steel 
1975 84.4 135,8 116.3 158.5 206.0 197,8 173.1 298,2 144,4 - 123.4 152.9 
1976 96.8 140,2 125.4 173.7 166.0 175,0 157.0 304,7 157,9 - 109.5 151.8 
1977 104.9 160,9 127.9 199.0 193.2 213,1 229.3 223,7 180,8 - 136.7 174.3 
1978 112.8 178.1 143.0 250.2 230.3 248,0 231.5 289,2 196,7 152.0 168.5 202.7 
1979 134.8 206.7 158.3 232.2 276.3 298,4 327,5 342,0 254,1 165.1 131.3 223.8 
1980 161.6 249.9 177.5 289.7 310.1 307,9 401,7 287,2 266,0 158.6 182.1 267.8 
1981 223.7 248.7 210.5 298.2 262.5 310,1 276,3 314,1 312,7 189.9 181.0 262.3 
1982 244.8 338.3 200.9 283.6 278.6 340,2 311,8 345,9 346,3 170.2 172.7 280.0 
1983 288,3 269.1 193.6 272.3 263.0 328,9 249,7 218,7 358,6 167.2 174.5 252.9 
1984 274.6 286.2 191.8 255.1 240.6 321,0 247,7 309,9 344,9 151.2 150.5 244.6 
1985 211.2 291.0 184.7 280.0 227.5 293,3 239,3 318,0 374,0 153.7 154.8 250.9 
1986 191.3 269.0 196.8 349.5 268.7 311,7 270,0 178,2 388,2 146.6 172.8 276.1 
1987 247.5 263.8 215.5 353.7 312.8 328,4 266,2 386,3 393,0 156.0 192.8 286.4 
1988 359.6 283.9 255.4 405.6 353.4 340,5 313,1 565.7 416,8 166,2 185.8 328.0 
1989 435.7 307.9 253.9 396.1 365.9 377,2 308,0 705.4 406,2 132,5 238.3 339.8 
1990 458.1 300.4 329.6 416.5 - - - - - 143,3 249.8 351.1 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Australia US Canada Japan W. Ger France UK Brazil India Taiwan Korea World 
Financial costs per tonne of crude steel 
1975 23.7 14.5 17.7 33.7 24.9 31.7 27.2 43.9 19,4 28.3 25,9 1976 27.7 14.7 22.2 38.2 25.6 30.4 24.6 70.0 19.7 _ 31.6 27.3 1977 29.2 17.5 25.4 47.2 26.0 40.8 31.7 66.9 20.5 _ 45.3 32.6 1978 27.3 16.0 22.7 58.2 28.3 34.8 37.7 50.9 21.9 103.7 56.8 35.3 
1979 29.3 17.8 21.1 55.4 31.8 47.7 43.9 41.0 27.4 75.7 68.0 38.1 
1980 31.3 22.4 22.7 68.7 36.9 44.7 56.6 40.3 28.7 70.2 70.1 46,4 
1981 37.8 21.4 28.1 69.2 37.5 47.0 30.5 72.7 30.8 62.8 65.8 46.7 
1982 25.6 38.8 33.0 66.4 40.9 53.8 27.9 98.7 38.7 72.7 70.2 51.4 
1983 38,6 34.9 32.1 66.5 36,1 44.6 16.7 107.1 51.2 76.6 61.9 49,2 
19&4 36.6 39.3 28.2 60.7 31.7 35.3 17.2 132.3 58.5 62.6 73.8 47,5 
1985 44.6 35.2 26,0 66.8 24.3 32.8 15.9 103.9 45.9 76.2 68.3 46,5 
1986 45,5 36.0 28.2 88.7 30.0 53.5 18.4 93.5 48.1 46.9 62.0 53,3 
1987 34.5 31.1 28,8 89.1 38.2 57.6 19.6 108.2 55.2 49.9 92.2 54,7 
1988 50,5 26.7 38,9 88,0 39.8 58.1 22.9 84.8 55.6 54.8 131.9 56,1 
1989 72,3 28.2 39,8 74,4 36.1 42,9 23.2 257.6 70.0 50.1 146.5 57,4 
1990 70.7 27.1 56,8 77.1 - - - - - 55.3 141.7 65,0 
of which: 
Interest costs per tonne 
1975 3,4 3.8 6,9 17.6 7.5 23,9 13.0 31.9 7.2 _ 9.8 11,4 
1976 5.2 4.3 10,7 20.7 7.3 23,1 14.4 54,4 7.6 _ 11.2 12,9 
1977 5.8 5,4 14.1 25.6 8.1 30,6 20.0 37.0 7.6 _ 14.8 15,7 
1978 6.4 4,9 12.2 29,5 8,9 21.1 23,0 32,4 6.2 65,9 23.7 16,3 
1979 6,5 5.1 9,8 27.0 10,9 23,3 28,2 22.5 8.3 44.1 26,8 16.9 
1980 6,7 6.3 10,0 36.1 14,6 22,8 34,9 25.3 9.7 40.0 33,3 22,2 
1981 6.7 5.7 12,4 32.9 17.0 30,7 13,8 50.1 12.4 31.7 32.2 21,9 
1982 5,9 15,6 14,0 32.0 17.3 36,9 14,9 77.2 23,9 29.6 19,7 24,1 
1983 9,8 14,4 13,9 32.9 12.2 29,4 7,4 80,5 26.2 35.2 16.3 23,0 
1984 8.8 20,4 11.6 28.9 9.3 23,3 6,8 95.1 25.2 19,2 11,2 22,5 
1985 16,4 12,9 10,4 31.5 7.1 14,3 5.2 64.0 23.9 18,8 9,4 19,9 
1986 16,1 12,3 11.5 38,8 8.1 26,8 2,5 74,8 25.2 10.5 9,9 21.2 
1987 13,6 10.0 11.6 34,7 8,4 26.2 1.9 64,8 26.3 8.3 15.0 19.2 
1988 20,0 7.3 14.1 31,8 7,0 26.2 1.3 83.9 23.3 4.6 16.6 17.4 
1989 32,9 7.9 14,7 26,2 6,9 14.8 1.3 256.4 34,8 4,4 18,0 19.1 
1990 33,3 5.9 21,3 27,9 - - - - - 5,6 18.4 19,0 
Depreciation costs per tonne 
1975 20,3 10.7 10,8 16.1 17,4 7.8 14,2 12.0 12.2 _ 18,5 14,5 
1976 22,5 10,4 11.5 17.5 18.3 7.3 10,2 15,6 12.1 - 20,4 14,4 
1977 23,4 12,1 11.3 21.6 17.9 10.2 11,7 29.9 12.9 _ 30,5 16,9 
1978 20,9 11,1 10.5 28,7 19.4 13.7 14.7 18,5 15.7 37,8 33,1 19,0 
1979 22.8 12,7 11.3 28,4 20.9 24.4 15,7 18,5 19.1 31,6 41.2 21.2 
1980 24,6 16,1 12.7 32,6 22.3 21.9 21.7 15.0 19.0 30,2 36.8 24,2 
1981 31.1 15,7 15,7 36,3 20.5 16.3 16,7 22.6 18.4 31,1 33.6 24.8 
1982 19,7 23.2 19,0 34,4 23.6 16.9 13.0 21.5 14.8 43,1 50.5 27,3 
1983 28,8 20,5 18.2 33,6 23.9 15.2 9.3 26.6 25,0 41,4 45,6 26,2 
1984 27,8 18,9 16.6 31,8 22,4 12,0 10,4 37.2 33,3 43.4 62,6 25,0 
1985 28,2 22.3 15.6 35,3 17.2 18,5 10.7 39.9 22.0 57,4 58,9 26,6 
1986 29,4 23,7 16,7 49.9 21.9 26,7 15.9 18.7 22.9 36,4 52,1 32,1 
1987 20,9 21.1 17.2 54,4 29.8 31.4 17.7 43.4 28.9 41.6 77.2 35,5 
1988 30,5 19,4 24,8 56,2 32.8 31.9 21.6 0,9 32.3 50,2 115.3 38,7 
1989 39,4 20,3 25,1 48,2 29.2 28.1 21.9 1.2 35.2 45,7 128,5 38,3 
1990 37,4 21.2 35,5 49.2 - - - - - 49,7 123,3 46,0 
Notes a Averages of world 61 major steel mills. 
1990 data are averages of Australia, the United States, Canada, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. 
Source WSD, Financial Dynamics of 61 International Steelmakers, various issues. 
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Table A.6 
a . R C A b ( X ) 
Balassa ' s revealed comparative advantage index of iron and steel products in 
Korea, 1967-90 (by 3 digit SITC codes; value based)'' 
671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 Total 
Semis 6727 6741/3 6747/8 
1967 0.07 0.23 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.10 0.61 0.13 
1968 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.20 0.06 
1969 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.04 1.30 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.16 
1970 0.41 0.79 0.00 0.16 2.21 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 
1971 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.19 4.50 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.11 0.46 
1972 0.30 0.07 0.12 0.80 9.69 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.63 0.30 1.19 
1973 0.31 0.25 0.83 0.24 9.81 0.06 0.04 0.12 1.04 0.90 2.59 1.18 
1974 0.32 1.10 2.06 0.89 12.64 0.19 0.33 0.05 1.01 1.83 4.69 1.79 
1975 0.19 0.21 2.33 0.94 4.17 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.52 0.77 1.62 0.87 
1976 0.33 0.14 2.28 0.80 5.70 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.53 1.06 1.13 1.06 
1977 0.56 0.19 2.34 0.36 4.34 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.65 1.14 0.95 0.96 
1978 0.27 0.01 0.63 0.38 5.32 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.87 1.39 1.20 1.04 
1979 0.33 5.82 1.00 1.08 7.18 0.19 0.26 0.15 1.49 1.72 1.13 1.70 
1980 0.60 7.41 1.80 2.42 8.15 0.30 0.30 0.23 2.02 2.57 1.01 2.50 
1981 0.24 2.54 6.05 1.92 6.68 0.68 0.66 0.52 1.71 2.27 1.21 2.31 
1982 0.38 3.00 8.61 2.01 7.09 0.87 0.46 0.58 1.67 1.47 0.98 2.35 
1983 0.15 4.30 5.91 1.83 4.83 0.83 0.22 1.94 1.95 2.15 1.28 2,21 
1984 0.10 2.20 4.35 1.85 4.38 0.84 0.30 2.24 1.68 2.24 1.17 1,99 
1985 0.20 1.22 3.81 1.69 3.51 0.64 0.17 1.37 1.60 1.81 1.44 1,64 
1986 0.21 0.55 3.81 1.95 3.46 0.59 0.26 1.83 2.09 1.43 1.47 1.62 
1987 0.01 0.60 3.63 1.59 2.98 0.64 0.28 1.80 2.12 1.59 1.56 1.54 
1988 0.01 0.76 4.54 1.33 2.82 0.41 - 1.40 1.86 1.48 2.50 1.51 
1989 0.04 1.51 3.68 1.34 3.48 0.67 - 1.31 1.99 1.40 2.70 1.63 
1990 0.03 0.71 3.88 1.02 3.79 1.38 - 1.03 2.16 1.44 2.41 1.79 
b . R C A b ( M ) 
671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 Total 
Semis 6727 6741/3 6747/8 
1967 0.57 0.90 1.09 0.96 5.78 0.06 1.47 4.66 0.49 0.80 2.45 1.20 
1968 0.82 0.60 6.62 0.65 2.63 0.07 1.14 3.73 0.34 1.09 0.42 1.03 
1969 0.55 1.27 5.87 0.59 1.88 0.05 1.14 5.51 0.38 0.92 0.24 0.96 
1970 0.14 0.59 5.69 0.41 2.28 0.05 1.05 2.94 0.32 0.80 0.34 0.85 
1971 0.47 1.56 9.17 0.39 1.82 0.03 0.85 6.91 0.21 0.96 0.20 1.09 
1972 0.64 2.78 13.53 0.54 1.84 0.02 1.39 1.95 0.25 0.72 0.18 1.39 
1973 0.64 5.02 13.30 0.62 2.19 0.03 1,54 4.09 0,36 0,31 0.34 1.51 
1974 0.73 1.47 10.46 0.68 2.60 0.02 1.74 3.46 0,30 0,39 0.30 1.22 
1975 0.48 1.96 5.11 0.76 2.99 0.03 1.43 0.58 0,50 0,30 0,19 0.89 
1976 0.15 1.01 8.55 0.77 2.32 0.02 1.95 2.19 1.23 0.37 0.46 1.08 
1977 0.27 2.22 8.76 1.04 2.51 0.08 1.95 2.14 1.33 0.74 0.30 1.38 
1978 0,29 2.74 8.14 1.49 3.40 0.04 1.55 1.73 1.28 0.57 0.42 1.52 
1979 0.45 1.39 8,00 1.10 2.42 0.05 1.38 1.41 1.01 0.62 0.26 1,29 
1980 0.29 0.56 8,77 0.86 2.15 0.05 1.11 0.62 0.63 0.45 0.13 1,15 
1981 0,39 0.54 7.47 1.17 2.53 0.08 0.92 0.73 0.51 0.40 0.09 1.05 
1982 0,51 0.90 3.44 1.02 2.23 0.06 0.69 0.19 0.44 0.40 0.26 0,80 
1983 0,63 0.66 5.99 0.98 2.08 0.06 0.69 0.56 0.86 0.52 0.22 1.03 
1984 0,69 0.48 6.68 1.10 2.75 0.15 0.74 0.27 1.02 0.54 0.26 1.21 
1985 0,57 0.35 5.78 0.82 2.32 0.20 0.61 0.40 0.92 0.55 0.42 1.04 
1986 1.16 1.28 5.89 0.77 2.10 0.41 0.78 0.18 1.20 0.53 0.53 1.22 
1987 1.62 2,51 4.65 0.99 2.86 0.45 0.92 0.31 0.59 0.63 0,74 1.44 
1988 1.52 1,37 3.96 1.03 2.57 0.47 - 0.20 0.59 0.53 0,73 1.27 
1989 2.21 0.88 4,84 0.77 2.55 0.57 - 0.83 0.47 0.57 0,48 1.43 
1990 2.19 2.03 4.31 1.47 1.82 0.30 - 0.32 0.43 0.83 0.48 1.48 
T a b l e A . 6 (continued) 
b . R C A * ( X , M)''^ 
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671 672 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Semis 6727 
673 674 
6741/3 6747/8 
675 676 677 678 679 Total 
(-1.19) 
(-0.56) 
(-1.24) 
J-1.69) 
1.36 (-3.65) (-0.15) 
2.77 (-3.86) 0.58 
0.79 (-0.47) (0.21) 
0.76 (2.78) (0.38) 
1.56 (0.19 )i- 0.36 
0.69 (-0.89) (0.33) 
0.41 (-0.79) 0.45 
(-0.61) 0.68 
(-0.06) 0.41 
(0.81) (0.25) 
(0 .29) (-0.51) 0.29 , 
(-0.43) (-0.27) (-0.77) • 
(-4.44) 
(-2.02) 
-1.14) 
-1.05) 
-0.07) 
2.37) 
2.68) 
2.99) 
-0.27)^  
1 . 1 8 ) 
0.51) 
0 .66) 
1.75) 
2.35) 
0.75) 
0.22) 
0.32) 
0.52) 
0.93) 0.52 
0.02 
-0.05 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.08 
0.04 
0.10 
0.25 
0.36 
0.36 
0.32 
0.21 
0.11 
0.13 
0.00 
0.06 
(-1.07) 
(-0.81) 
(-0.76) 
(-0.66) 
-0.54 
(-0.77) 
(-0.81) 
(-0.86) 
(-0.81) 
(-0.99) 
(-0.94) 
(-0.76) 
(-0.66) 
(-0.47) 
-0.17 
-0.13 
-0.23 
-0.21 
-0.22 
-0.21 
-0.25 
0.36 
(-0.04)r 0.41 
0.90 
0.82 
0.50 0.45 I 
0.65 0.47 0.76 
1.00«, (0.26) 0.82 
0.49^^0.27 0.62 
0.89 (0.48) 0 . 4 9 - ^ 
0.82 0.80 0.57 
0.65 0.74 0.55 
0.24 0.79 , 0.43 
0.34 0.85 « 0.27 
0.745" 
0.72^ (0 .27) 
0.77 (0 .16) 
1.28 ' ( 0 2 3 ) 
1.40 "' (0 .12) 
1.12'^^'(0.10) 
Notes Descriptions of 3 digit SITC codes (revision 1) for iron and steel are: 
671: Pig iron, ferro-alloys, etc. 
673: Bars, rods, wire rod and shapes. 
672: Iron and steel primary forms = Semis -i- SITC 6727 (iron and steel coils for re-rolling). 
674: Universals, plates and sheets = SITC 6741, 6742, 6743 (universals and uncoated plates and 
sheets) -i- 6747,6748 (coated plates and sheets). 
675: Hoop and strip. 
676: Rails and railway track construction materials. 
677: Wire excluding wire rod. 
678: Tubes, pipes and fittings. 
679: Castings and forgings unworked. 
"-" No export or import data were reported. 
/ ^w/ 
RCA (X, M) = _ p (X,7-M,y)/(X,-hM,) 1 ^ r(X,>-M^)/(X.-hM,) 
Source 
Xwj / X w 
See footnote 18 in Chapter 4, for details. 
When shaded, R C A b ( ^ > 1. 
In parentheses, RCAb(A^ > 1. 
Normally, RCA*(x, M) is positive (net exports), when RCA(X) > RCA(M) >1, or 
negative (net imports), when RCA(M) > RCACX) >1. 
" t " indicates exceptions. 
Raw data are provided by EDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UN trade database). 
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Table A.7 Raw data for variables in empirical tests of the relationship between 
domestic demand pressure and trade performance in Korea, 1963-90 
X M Q DD pd px pm WS w t Y ER 
1%3 77 203 165 290 8.2 52.0 20.5 1.2 1.0 13071 130.0 
1964 34 76 180 ??? 10.8 47.9 30.3 1.5 1.1 14339 213.9 
1965 59 156 215 312 13.0 71.1 34.3 1.8 14 15156 266.4 
1966 32 214 273 455 14.7 74.5 32.9 2.3 1.6 17005 271.3 
1967 19 368 394 744 15.2 50.2 35.5 2.2 2.0 18009 270.5 
1968 23 407 637 1021 15.7 21.2 39.1 2.8 2.4 20044 276.7 
1969 72 557 916 1401 164 374 41.8 4.2 3.1 22810 288.2 
1970 141 513 1178 1550 19.1 42.7 48.4 4.9 3.8 24817 310.6 
1971 382 826 1359 1804 19.6 384 48.4 6.9 4.6 27125 347.2 
1972 663 1129 1761 2226 19.5 43.0 48.8 7 4 5.2 28590 392.9 
1973 880 1422 2672 3214 22.2 56.4 68.7 9.3 6 4 32449 398.3 
1974 1354 1679 3119 3443 31.1 85.9 99.0 13.8 8.2 35143 404.5 
1975 899 983 2727 2811 36.7 75.4 84.5 15.4 10.8 37638 484.0 
1976 1403 1608 3796 4001 37.6 79.4 85.7 21.0 13.8 42493 484.0 
1977 1295 2016 4951 5672 38.6 79.0 87.7 26.8 17.8 46785 484.0 
1978 1623 2559 6346 7282 414 96.7 96.5 36.4 24.7 51323 484.0 
1979 2395 2452 7479 7536 52.3 108.2 113.3 44.2 32.4 55223 484.0 
1980 3548 2034 7852 6339 62.2 115.7 120.9 56.4 39.8 54009 607.4 
1981 4371 2026 10115 I HQ 82.0 117.8 114.2 65.9 47.5 57627 681.0 
1982 5263 1205 10858 6800 94.2 108.8 105.1 62.2 53.2 61834 731.1 
1983 5366 2023 12089 8746 97,6 102.5 104.6 75.9 58.3 69130 775,8 
1984 5473 2801 13427 10755 98.7 104.7 104.9 93.2 65.1 75629 806,0 
1985 5239 2547 13931 11239 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 69.9 80847 870,0 
1986 5597 2525 15308 12236 101.3 101.3 1034 107.6 73.9 90868 881.5 
1987 5743 2873 17507 14636 103.8 109.7 117.8 118.3 86.4 101804 822.6 
1988 6262 2730 18887 15355 106.8 140.5 161.3 154.8 102.3 113492 731.5 
1989 6448 3407 21756 18715 109.3 148.8 172.7 195.8 128.5 120477 671.5 
1990 6795 4417 24536 22158 110.3 137.6 155.6 216.1 138.0 131263 707.8 
Notes X Exports of rolled products; 
M Imports; 
Q Production; 
DD Domestic demand; 
P^ Rolled steel domestic price index; 
P'' Bsic metals export price index (used as a proxy for steel export price index); 
P"^ Basic metals import price index (used as a proxy for steel import price index); 
W^ Steel sector average wage (per employee) index; 
W^ Total manufacturing average wage (per employee) index, weighted by 1985 W^; 
Y GDP in real terms, thousand won at 1985 prices; and 
ER Exchange rate per US$. 
Sources Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various issues; 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues; 
Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Korean Economy, 1973-78; 
National Statistical Office, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, various issues; 
Korea Iron and Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook, various issues; 
lEDB, RSPacS, ANU (compiled from UNIDO, Industrial Statistics). 
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